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Abstract
This thesis explores the experience of caring for people with the new diseases of 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) by hospice services. The experiences of the 
hospice staff and carers of five people, who had died, or were dying, as a result of 
variant CJD, at three different hospice sites in the South of England were explored. 
Data from four focus groups and 11 interviews, with hospice staff (included health 
care assistants, nurses, doctors and social workers) and family members, plus hospice 
patient records were analysed. Media material was also examined and used to inform 
the study.
The thesis offers a theoretical explanation of these experiences developed through 
grounded theory methodology using an emergent fit design. It describes the event of 
the admission into the hospice service of a person with a new disease, that of variant 
CJD, and how the dying experience of these people was managed by both in-house 
and community hospice teams. ‘Open systems’ theory is used to assist in analysis and 
interpretation of the participant experiences, and as a means of ‘contextualising’ the 
hospice service. The hospice is presented as a metaphorical container within which 
dying is processed, and where the primary task of the organisation had a different 
emphasis and focus, depending on individual perspectives of participants.
A theory of ‘dealing with the unknown’ was developed to explain the impact of this 
new disease on system equilibrium. The disease was a novelty and influenced 
admissions into the service and responses to the disease by others. It engendered the 
need for staff to use controlling practices to maintain the system balance. There were 
paradoxes between the practices of in-house and community teams, and between in- 
house and family member ‘understanding’ of how care was managed. The experience 
of caring for people with variant CJD was also profoundly humbling for participants. 
Humility was identified as a response to the realisation of limitations in relieving the 
suffering of people with variant CJD and their families. The study demonstrated 
change over time, where hospice staff moved from not knowing to becoming 
knowledgeable about managing the care of the person with variant CJD. The theory 
is complimented by and builds on existing theories of hospice practice.
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Introduction to the Thesis
For many years I have had an interest in, and been clinically involved with, end-of- 
life issues for older people, including people with dementia. This has been both as a 
practitioner and as an educator in the fields of palliative care and care of older people. 
The focus of this research developed from these interests. The emergence of variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) offered the opportunity to explore the experience of 
providing palliative care for a specific group of people who experience a type of 
cognitive impairment that is categorised within the dementia syndromes. This thesis 
documents my journey to explore this experience and develop myself as a researcher.
The literature review comprises Chapter 1 and 2. It begins by providing a background 
to CJD as a dementia syndrome, the emergence of variant CJD and the scientific and 
social responses to this emergence. The second part of the literature review addresses 
literature on hospice practices and theories of hospice care that consider concepts of 
the ‘good death’, dignity, personhood and the focus on the body of the dying person. 
Implications of these concepts that relate to dementia care at the end-of-life are 
considered during this discussion.
Grounded theory, the methodology used to conduct the study, is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. I present a critical discussion of the rationale and Justification for my 
research design and how and why I set out to take a constructivist approach and use 
open systems theory in the analysis and interpretation of my data. Chapter 4 provides 
a step by step description of the methods I used to collect and analyse my research 
data.
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In Chapter 5 the findings are presented at the same time as the discussion, in keeping 
with using grounded theory methodology. A series of figures are presented as each 
category is described, building up to the complete theoretical explanation of the 
experiences of my study participants. In Chapter 6 I present a critique of the study 
and discuss the contribution the thesis makes to an understanding of hospice culture 
and practice and to research knowledge. This is followed by my conclusion.
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Literature Review
Chapter 1 -  Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD)
1.1 Introduction
Chapters 1 and 2 comprise the literature review. Chapter 1 provides a background of 
the emergence of the new disease of variant CJD, beginning with a short discussion 
defining the term dementia. This was necessary as dementia is often viewed as a 
specific disease rather than as symptoms of neurological damage and the cognitive 
impairment that has ensued from the damage. A description of the four main types of 
CJD and the mode of transmission of these is given. Responses to the emergence of 
the new variant of CJD is examined and some discussion on the proof offered by 
scientists that the disease is directly connected to the outbreak of BSE is provided. A 
discussion on the clinical progress of variant CJD is then presented, including the 
diagnosis and care for sufferers, focusing on end-stage issues. The final section of 
this chapter discusses the social component of variant CJD as a potentially ‘dreaded’ 
disease.
1.2 CJD as a dementia syndrome
1.2.1 Neurological diseases and dementia
Brain dysfimction is extremely varied and extensive. It can be caused by brain injury 
and from a variety of neurological disorders, and may be genetic or environmentally 
induced. In the event of a neuropathology that leads to the loss of cognitive function, 
biochemical changes that occur vary, depending on the area of tissue that is affected 
and the cause of that effect. Mechanisms in this process include tissue destruction, 
compression, inflammation, and biochemical imbalances. In other words, the process 
of dementia is one manifestation of some of the many brain disorders (Cheston and
12
Bender 1999; Wilcock et al 1999; CJD Surveillance Unit 2002). Dementia, therefore, 
is not a disease in itself but a neuropsychological deficit that has occurred as a result 
of chronic brain disease or encephalopathy (Neary 1999).
The World Health Organisation (WHO 2003) ICD-10 definition of dementia refers to 
it as a syndrome due to disease of the brain. It is usually of a chronic or progressive 
nature. There is a disturbance of multiple higher cortical function, including memory, 
thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, learning capacity, language, and 
judgement. Consciousness is not clouded. Impairments of cognitive function are 
commonly accompanied, and occasionally preceded, by deterioration in emotional 
control, social behaviour or motivation. This syndrome occurs in Alzheimer’s 
disease, in cerebrovascular disease, and in other conditions primarily or secondarily 
affecting the brain.
Dementia is used as a specific term indicative of a variety of pathological disorders 
i.e. dementia is a term related to symptoms rather than to a specific disease. At each 
stage of history the medical establishment (and the population) accept the textbook 
definition of their time and the diagnosis depends on an arbitrary dividing line drawn 
on some point in a continuum of disability and may be viewed as an evolving concept 
(Berrios and Freeman 1991:1). Berrios and Freeman (1991:1, 2) propose a shift 
towards the ‘creational’ approach to diagnosis, acknowledging that there is ‘no such 
thing as the final description of a disease’. Its clinical boundaries, symptom-content, 
and even anatomical descriptions are no more than temporary scripts, taken from the 
ongoing medical discourse. That is, the creation of disease can also be viewed as 
social phenomenon. Once a name is accepted it quickly comes to dominate the social
13
reality of the disease and the flavour of the name can make a difference to how the 
disease is perceived and acted on (Shenk 2001).
For the purposes of this thesis, the term dementia refers to the cognitive deterioration 
that occurs for neurological disorders classified within the dementia syndromes, 
including CJD. This places my use of the term dementia within a bio-medical frame. 
Whilst the bio-medical frame will be used to discuss the neurological manifestations 
of dementia caused by CJD it will not detract from addressing issues such as 
personhood as this relates to the person with cognitive impairment. That is, 
throughout the thesis I also consider the psychological and social factors of the 
experiences of the person with variant CJD. Literature that discusses theories of the 
social construction of dementia, particularly dementia of the Alzheimer type (see for 
example; Kitwood 1988, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997; Kitwood and Bredin 1992; Adams 
and Bartlett 2003) will not be addressed in any detail.
1.3 Categories of CJD
CJD has historically been classified within the dementia syndromes. Neary (1999) 
suggests that the traditional definition of dementia, as a global deterioration of 
intellectual function, is incorrect. He points out that cerebral diseases do not affect 
the brain uniformly. These diseases preferentially affect certain brain areas. This 
impacts on psychological and physiological processes that depend on the functioning 
of specific brain regions.
CJD belongs to a group of diseases known as transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies (TSE) that are known to occur in both humans and animals. It is a
14
rare, rapidly progressive and fatal disorder. The progress of multifocal 
encephalopathies is aggressive, it ‘seems not to respect anatomical boundaries or 
functional systems so that a wide variety of psychological and neurological deficits 
rapidly emerge’ (Neary 1999:61). Brain damage that occurs is characterised by the 
spongy appearance of brain tissue seen under a microscope (Lacey 1994; Weihl and 
Roos 1999; Roberts 2003). It is also referred to as prion disease. Prion is an acronym 
for a PROteinaceous INfectious agent. The prion theory suggests that the infective 
agent of CJD is only composed of protein and does not contain nucleic acid, which 
would be necessary if the agent was a conventional virus. The transmittable agent is 
either genetic or an abnormal form of prion protein that causes aggregates of cellular 
protein to accumulate in the brain. The exact process that occurs that leads to brain 
damage from original inoculation/contamination is incompletely understood (Will et 
al 1996; Bruce et al 1997; Weihl and Roos 1999; Will et al 2000; Brown et al 2001; 
Roberts 2003).
Historically three types of CJD have been identified; iatrogenic, inherited and 
sporadic. Iatrogenic CJD refers to the cases of CJD that have been caused by medical 
treatment. These comprise a very small number of cases. The causes include: 
injections of infected growth hormone material, tissue grafts, particularly comeal 
transplants and human dura mater grafts; and contamination from neurosurgical 
instruments and depth electrodes (Will 2003). More recently iatrogenic CJD has 
occurred as a result of a CJD contaminated blood transfusion (Llewelyn et al 2004). 
Media and medical focus on the iatrogenic risk of contracting CJD substantially 
increased following the emergence of variant CJD. Inherited CJD occurs where there 
is a mutation in the prion protein gene that makes conversion into the abnormal form
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more likely. Approximately 10% of the cases of CJD are inherited. Sporadic CJD 
(also referred to as classical CJD) refers to cases of CJD that occur at random 
throughout the world. They are categorised as sporadic if they have no genetic 
mutation or any known iatrogenic infection. Sporadic CJD accounts for 85% of all 
cases of CJD (CJD Surveillance Unit 2004). Other more rare types of spongiform 
encephalopathies include ‘kuru’. Kum is a TSE that was confined to the Fore social 
group or tribe, and amongst other groups who intermaiTied with the Fore group, in the 
Eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea. It was transmitted through an 
endocannibalistic ritual associated with mourning. Women and children comprised 
the majority of kuru victims. During the practice of cannibalism the women carried 
out autopsies barehanded and did not wash thereafter. Infants and children (of both 
sexes) appeared to have been contaminated through contact, as children did not ingest 
kuru-infected tissues. Men, unlike women and children, rarely handled or ate the 
brain of dead kuru victims and were therefore rarely contaminated (Verdrager 1997; 
Weihl and Roos 1999; Ironside and Head 2003). Kuru is highlighted here as it 
provides an example of how contamination can occur from the infectious agent via 
both contact and ingestion. It is now very rarely found amongst this group due to the 
cessation of cannibalism in Papua New Guinea (Ironside and Head 2003).
i. 3.1 Emergence o f variant CJD
In 1996, in the United Kingdom (UK), a new variant of CJD (nvCJD) disease was 
officially recognised (Will et al 1996; Will et al 2000). What was unusual about this 
new type of CJD was that those infected were young people and that it closely 
resembled the spongiform encephalopathy of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE), a prion disease of cattle. This new disease was originally referred to as new
16
variant CJD and later shortened to variant CJD. The emergence of variant CJD is 
believed to be linked to the BSE outbreak during the 1980s (Scott et al 1999). It is 
widely accepted that the BSE epidemic that occurred in the mid-1980s originated 
from animals consuming feed that was contaminated with scrapie, a sheep prion 
disease.
The potential for BSE disease in cattle to cross the species barrier was suggested as 
early as 1988 (Lacey 1994) and concern about risk to humans was expressed within 
weeks of the first case of BSE (Britton et al 1995; Bateman et al 1995; Brown et al
2001). However, it was not openly addressed by the UK Government until Will et al 
(1996) published a paper confirming the emergence of variant CJD. Emergence of 
the new form of CJD, and its link to BSE, provoked a world wide interest in all types 
of CJD. Several countries have carried out surveys to establish the status of all CJD 
cases and identify any evidence of the presence of the variant type of CJD. Countries 
that have carried out surveys include the US, France, Italy, Japan and others. These 
surveys confirmed that variant CJD was initially confined to the UK. However, cases 
are now emerging in other countries, some with a known connection of possible 
contamination in the UK, with recently reported cases in Japan in a man who had 
visited the UK in 1990 (Asia news yahoo 2005) and the Netherlands (Yahoo News 
2005a).
To make predictions on the potential variant CJD epidemic it was also important to 
establish that variant CJD was a new disease entity and not simply the result of better 
case ascertainment. Hillier et al (2002) carried out a systematic study of all certified 
deaths in Wales of individuals between the ages of 15 to 45, between 1985 and 1995
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to detect variant CJD deaths that might have been overlooked. No cases were 
detected and the researchers conclude that variant CJD was a new disease entity 
which appeared to predominantly affect younger people (Hillier et al 2002; Will et al 
2002).
1.4 Mode of transmission and predictions
Since 1996, 156 cases of variant CJD, confirmed or probable (some still living) have 
been reported in the UK (National CJD Surveillance Unit 2005). This figure is 
updated monthly. Future predictions have been a matter of debate among scientists 
within the media and scientific and medical literature, and the implications of the 
emergence of this new variant continues to be debated. The consequence of the 
emergence of the variant CJD is as yet unknown. Little notice was taken of Lacey’s 
(1994) work, yet he provides a comprehensive history of BSE in Britain in which he 
highlighted the already known risk of contamination by prions, long before the first 
case of variant CJD was identified. In a summary of what was known by the end of 
1988, he points out that diseases caused by agents with similar properties, i.e. the 
TSEs, later identified as infections caused by the prion protein (prion theory), 
occurred in several mammalian species, including man. Experimentally the majority 
of mammalian species challenged with the infective agent would develop the disease, 
if challenge titres were sufficiently high, i.e. the ‘species barrier’ could be breached. 
Main routes of natural infection were known to be through ingesting infected food and 
it was thought that vertical transmission (from mother to foetus) was possible, 
including contamination of pasture by infected placenta tissue (Lacey 1994; Chesebro 
2003). These modes of transmission had occurred in sheep, goats, mink, mule deer 
and man (kuru) (Lacey 1994; Weihl and Roos 1999; Roberts 2003).
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The hypothetical transmission through ingestion of BSE contaminated food has been 
challenged by a relatively small section of the scientific community. Suggested 
modes of contamination by organophosphates (McConville 2000) or managanese 
toxicity, which is related to the organophosphate toxicity theory (Ahuja 2002), have 
been made. These hypotheses have been refuted by the majority of the scientific 
community (Garofalo et al 2001). A further suggestion that variant CJD is caused by 
a bacteria, namely Mycobacterium bovis (bovine tuberculosis), has been made based 
on the epidemiological maps of the origins and peak incidence of BSE matching 
England’s areas of highest bovine tuberculosis (Broxmeyer 2004).
As a declared means of provoking debate on the subject of the mode of transmission. 
Venters (2001) argued that the evidence for variant CJD being a new disease entity is 
flawed. The argument is made that possibilities other than the BSE connection have 
not been reviewed and legitimately rejected. Venters (2001) maintained that the 
numbers are not consistent with possible exposure and incubation, and that the link 
can only be inferred. These arguments have provoked little debate and Brown 
(200la:841) echoes the certainty of other scientists in the field in declaring that ‘there 
is but one incontestable fact, that BSE is the cause of variant CJD’. However, Will 
(2003) admits that the evidence supporting the BSE contamination hypothesis remains 
weak. Although there is no reasonable alternative to the hypothesis. Will (2003) 
points out that there are major methodological difficulties in establishing risk through 
past composition of commonly consumed food products.
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A cluster of cases in Leicestershire (Allroggen et al 2000) gave some indication of a 
hypothetical mode of transmission based on butcher practices where contamination of 
meat occurred from contact with brain or spinal tissue (Collinge 2001). As a result of 
this link regular media reports on the subject of variant CJD have identified a range of 
sources of the contamination through the food chain. These include medication 
products (BBC 2002a) and baby food (BBC 2002b). A controversial hypothesis that 
BSE may have entered baby food in the 1970s has been suggested based on the long 
incubation period from contamination to showing signs of infection (Meikle 2005). 
Headlines from several newspapers during March 2005 mooted a ‘school dinners link’ 
to CJD deaths based on three deaths where the victims had received school dinners 
using meat that had come from the same local slaughterhouse (Yahoo News 2005; 
Shipton 2005). These concerns have also been highlighted from a sociological 
perspective where food risks and the public conception of these have been discussed 
(Beck 1992, 1995; Shaw 1999; Lupton 1999). Beck (1992:23) particularly highlights 
how the mass media and scientific and legal professions have the power to change, 
magnify, dramatise or minimise the knowledge of risk to the extent that these risks are 
‘particularly open to social definition and construction’.
In 1990 a National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit was established. The 
primary aim of the Unit was to monitor the characteristics of all forms of CJD in the 
UK, to identify trends in incident rates and study risk factors for the development of 
the disease (Will 2002). The role of the Unit also includes co-ordination of 
surveillance programmes for CJD throughout the European Union. Their aim is to 
inform the scientific community, policy makers and the general public of 
developments as they emerge. The work carried out by the Unit includes attempting
20
to visit all suspected cases of CJD to collect data on a range of issues, including past 
diet, occupation, and residence (Will 2002). Since 1996, as a result of the emergence 
of variant CJD, there have been a number of articles published that discuss risk factors 
for transmission of all types of CJD (Collins et al 1999; Hansel 1999; Weihl and Roos 
1999; Zerr et al 2000; Will 2003). Others have discussed methods of preventing 
iatrogenic transmission of CJD within the health environment. These included 
operating theatre practices and the use and sterilisation of surgical instruments and the 
handling of body fluids (Dyke 1997; Finkelstein eta l 1998; Williams 1999; Clarkson 
2000; Belkin 2003; Department of Health 2003) with a call for disposable ear nose 
and throat (ENT) instruments for operating theatres (Bingham 2002). Further 
concerns were raised regarding risk from contaminated dental instruments (Smith et al
2002), contact lenses and ophthalmic devices (Macalister and Buckley 2002) and 
cosmetic injections (Laurance 2005). The media and public focus has been on food 
risk and variant CJD, with more recent concerns expressed regarding possible risks 
from blood products (Ironside and Head 2003; Roberts 2003; Bird 2004).
Originally the risk of transmission of CJD through blood products was hypothetical, 
even though experiments on sheep showed that BSE could be transmitted via blood 
products (Lacey 1994; Collins et al 1999; Brown 2001b). New evidence suggested 
that transmission through this medium was a very real risk (Houston et al 2000; 
Roberts 2003; Bird 2004) and led many countries to establish deferral policies for 
donors who had visited or lived in the UK or continental Europe (Brown 2001b; 
Brown et al 2001; Wilson and Ricketts 2004). In 1998 transfusion transmission of 
TSE was clearly demonstrated in animal models and as a result the UK chose to 
import plasma to manufacture fractionated products. Also, as a result of the
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theoretical risk Canada and the US introduced policies to defer blood donations from 
individuals who had lived in the UK for six months (from 1980 to 1996), a policy that 
expanded rapidly to other countries (Wilson and Ricketts 2004). By 2002 there was 
confirmation of sheep to sheep transfusion transmission (Houston et al 2000) and as a 
result the decision was made in the UK to import fresh frozen plasma for use in 
patients bom after January 1996 (Wilson and Ricketts 2004). The first human case 
report of variant CJD in a recipient of transfusion from a variant CJD donor occurred 
in 2004 and resulted in the decision to defer donations from individuals who had 
received a transfusion since 1980 being made in the UK (Llewelyn et al 2004). A 
second case linked to blood transfusion has led to concerns that the disease may affect 
far more people than had been previously thought (Peden 2004; Turner 2004).
Predictions based on contamination and transmission between humans through tissue 
contamination, as evidenced in iatrogenic CJD and kum, have been attempted (Croes 
et al 2002; Verdrager 1997). The recent discovery of a 38-year incubation period for 
a case of iatrogenic CJD from a low dose of human growth hormone has implications 
for calculating predictions of further cases (Croes et al 2002). Kum is discussed here, 
as some lessons learned from the kum epidemic have served to inform the 
transmission of variant CJD tlirough ingestion of contaminated food products. The 
very small number of kum sufferers that are still to be found suggest incubation 
periods of over 40 years (Ironside and Head 2003). Verdrager (1997) used the 
example of the distribution curve of kum deaths following the cessation of ritual 
cannibalism in the Fore group in Papua New Guinea to predict the proportion of a 
variant CJD epidemic. He suggested that if the cases of variant CJD do reach 
epidemic levels the peak should be in 2009 and extend to at least 2025 or 2030. The
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severity of the predicted epidemic has not been realised based on the calculations 
from Verdrager’s 1997 paper. His suggested doubling effect each year should have 
brought the number of deaths to several thousand to date.
Predictions on the size of the potential epidemic vary. They range from an upper 
limit, based on beef ingestion, of 403 cases (Valleron et al 2001), to 80,000 cases 
(Consens et al 1997), to 150, 000 cases, based on concerns of exposure through 
ingestion of sheep meat (Ferguson et al 2002). Other predictions have been attempted 
but owing to the uncertainty of the inoculation period and sources of contamination it 
has become a matter of attempting to ‘predict the unpredictable’ (Medley 2001). 
Although the number of people infected with variant CJD peaked in 2000, the 
possibility of a second peak at a later date cannot be discounted based on possible 
epidemics in other genetic sub-populations and human-to-human spread (Andrews et 
al 2003; Andrews 2005). Other questions have arisen over the potential for BSE 
contamination to have increased the number of people with sporadic CJD (CJD 
Newsletter 2003). The evidence for this is based on BSE prion propagating as either 
variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion strains in transgenic mice experiments.
Monitoring of the developments of variant CJD is a day-to-day experience in Public 
Health surveillance. Media hype on the subject of variant CJD and public health has 
waxed and waned in the manner suggested by Beck (1995:60) where social 
movements and responses come and go, ‘mostly going’. Beck (1995:60) refers to this 
as industrial fatalism or organised irresponsibility where public opinion and alarm, 
stirred by the ‘media circus’, has a ‘half-life’ that fluctuates from a couple of weeks to 
several months, depending on the type of disaster. This view is demonstrated in the
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medical and media discourse that has ensued as knowledge has emerged and evolved 
on the subject of variant CJD. Since 1996, when the identification of variant CJD was 
at its height, the subject has become integrated into the social fabric of Western life. 
Between 1999 and 2004 the subject received little headline attention within the media 
as a potential disaster of major proportions. With the confirmation of the first case of 
transmission by blood transfusion in 2004 (Llewelyn et al 2004), the subject again 
made headlines.
These media responses are consistent with the hype that occurred during the 1980s in 
relation to AIDS. As pointed out by Entwistle and Sheldon (1999), during the mid- 
1980s statistic about numbers of people dying from AIDS were routinely turned into 
news articles. These were rarely reported during the 1990s as journalists became 
more interested in diseases such as meningitis and variant CJD (Williams 1999; 
Entwistle and Sheldon 1999).
1.5 Clinical progress of CJD
CJD is characterised by a rapidly progressive dementia (of less than two years), 
together with at least two of the following symptoms: myoclonus (spasms and 
involuntary jerky type movements), visual or cerebellar problems, extrapyramidal or 
pyramidal signs, akinetic mutism (Poser et al 1999; van Everbroeck et al 2003). 
Initial signs of illness may be non-specific with complaints of dizziness, headache, 
sleep disturbances, apathy, mood swings and depression. Neurological symptoms for 
sporadic and variant CJD develop and progress extremely quickly. Cognitive 
processes, such as memory, concentration and problem-solving are affected and the 
individual may become disorientated. Movement is affected, particularly balance and
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gait. The individual may become apraxic (unable to perform complex sequential 
tasks) and the presence of a tremor and rigidity. Speech becomes slurred and quiet 
(dysarthria) and the individual will have word finding difficulties as the content of 
language is reduced. Reading and writing deteriorates. Swallowing difficulties occur. 
Visual disturbances occur and at later stages there may be cortical blindness. There 
may be seizures in the final stages. Iatrogenic CJD has a slightly different clinical 
progress where dementia is not a prominent feature (CJD Surveillance Unit 2005).
Variant CJD is distinguished from other types of CJD by the age of onset, symptom 
profile, duration of symptoms, histopathology and mode of occurrence. The median 
duration of illness from onset of first symptoms to death is 13 months (range six to 36 
months) for variant CJD compared to a disease trajectory of four months (range one to 
74 months) for sporadic CJD (Hewitt and Llewelyn 2001). The average age of onset 
of variant CJD is 28 years (compared to 65 years for the median age at death for 
sporadic CJD) with a range of 12 to 74 years reported (Will et al 2000). However, 
based on one case of variant CJD diagnosed in a 74 year old some concerns have been 
expressed that variant CJD may be misdiagnosed as Alzheimer’s disease in the older 
population (Lorains et al 2001; Henry et al 2002). These concerns have not yet been 
explored due to processes of accessing autopsy data that would confirm any such 
misdiagnoses. It has been reported that the number of post-mortems carried out in the 
UK has dropped to an all-time low. That is, less than five percent of deaths in British 
hospitals and 25% of deaths in the wider community have autopsies, and the majority 
are due to coroners’ requirements (Jha 2005). This has led to a call from the Royal 
College of Pathologists to halt the decline in autopsies carried out and deal with the
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need to have accurate knowledge of causes of death and contribute to research on 
diseases (Jha 2005).
A particular manifestation of variant CJD is the early development of psychiatric 
symptoms (Zeidler et al 1997; Douglas et al 1999; Hewitt and Llewelyn 2001; 
Spencer et al 2002). However, Bailey et al (2000) found that sufferers of sporadic 
CJD were also often referred to psychiatric services in the early stages of the illness. 
They report on the distress caused to some family members when the person with 
CJD died while still in a psychiatric unit, as the diagnosis of an organic illness had not 
been made quickly enough to enable them to move to a medical environment. A 
further distinguishing feature of variant CJD is the presence of persistent painful 
sensory symptoms such as paraesthesia (pins and needles) and/or dysaesthesia (pain 
arising or persisting from innocuous touch) (Zeidler et al 1997).
1.5.1 Diagnosis o f CJD
Diagnosis of all forms of CJD is made by clinical and neuropathological examination 
and conclusive diagnosis can only be made by microscopic examination of brain 
tissue (Poser et al 1999; Will et al 2000; Will 2001). Investigations include 
electroencephalogram (EEG), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and lumbar 
puncture, where 14-3-3 brain protein in cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) has been identified 
as a marker for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. This is indicative of the 
more rapidly progressive brain destruction in CJD than that in Azheimer’s disease 
and vascular dementia (Poser et al 1999). A new procedure of tonsil biopsy has been 
developed for diagnosis of variant CJD (Hill et al 1999) and a direct gene test is 
available for diagnosis of persons who may potentially develop CJD (Will et al 2000).
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Not having a clear diagnosis of variant CJD was found to be a major source of distress 
for some families. Douglas et al (1999) found that most of the people with variant 
CJD were given a psychiatric diagnosis initially and many were angry that a 
psychiatric label was given. Families reported that the patients denied feeling 
depressed but were treated for depression. Patients themselves were reluctant to see a 
psychiatrist or be treated in a psychiatric unit because of the stigma of psychiatric 
illness and not feeling that this was perceived as a ‘real’ illness. They also report 
family members’ feelings of guilt at allowing invasive investigations to be carried out. 
Some families felt that patients were used as guinea pigs, and that some of the 
procedures were not for the patients benefit.
In one case of sporadic CJD the wife of the person with sporadic CJD described a 
sense of relief at hearing a final diagnosis (Humphreys 1998). She felt that she was 
then able to move on, to prepare for the death, but remained distressed by the lack of 
information about the disease, its treatment and care. Hope of a cure was not an 
option that was discussed or considered in this case. However, for many families with 
members who have variant CJD the hope for a cure being found remained until the 
illness was very advanced (Douglas et al 1999).
Early diagnosis is an important aspect in relation to the management of the disease. 
This was a factor highlighted by Humphreys (1998) where she describes how she was 
distressed when participating in the bereavement groups. She could not continue to 
attend because other members of the group had been able to discuss their partner’s
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imminent death with them. She felt she had lost her husband many months before he 
died and had no opportunity to say good-bye to him.
1.6 Treatment and care for people with variant CJD
Variant CJD also has the added complication that it has been, to date, a disease of 
younger people. Dementia in younger people has been identified as requiring 
specialist resources, as this group has different needs from the older age group where 
much of the dementia research and literature has been focused (Whalley 1997; Harvey 
1998; Daker-White et al 2002; Parsons 2003). As yet, research on the end-of-life 
experiences and issues for this group has not been explored and focus tends to be on 
care issues. As pointed out by Woods (1999), despite some success in slowing down 
the rate of decline in function for the person with dementia through new 
pharmacological interventions, ‘cures’ are not realistically on the agenda as far as 
dementia is concerned. To date there is no specific cure for CJD. Palliation has been 
considered the only treatment. However, since the emergence of variant CJD research 
has predominantly focused on finding a cure.
The discovery that quinacrine (an anti-malarial agent) inhibited the formation of a 
disease associated form of the prion protein in mouse brain led to the establishment of 
a clinical trial of this drug for people with CJD (Department of Health 2001). This 
trial is ongoing, however Knight (2005) points out that as yet no treatment has been 
shown to conclusively slow or halt the disease process. In one case, that of 19 year 
old Jonathan Simms from Belfast, treatment with an experimental drug, pentosan 
polysulphate (PPS), for which his family had to get High Court approval, has been 
carried out. After eight months of treatment Jonathan has shown some improvement
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in neurological functions, including regaining the ability to swallow. Neurologists 
have expressed cautious optimism about the improvements that have occurred (Mayor
2003). The most efficacious period for treatment with PPS would be during the 
incubation period but without a validated pre-symptomatic test and definitive 
demonstration of safety and efficacy of PPS, treatment at that stage is not an option 
(Knight 2005). These results have, however, influenced responses of other families 
with teenagers who have variant CJD (Dyer 2003). Also following High Court action. 
Holly Mills, an 18 year old girl from Yorkshire began receiving treatment with PPS in 
October 2003. The result has also been to slow the disease process (Yorkshire Post 
2005).
Literature on all types of CJD has flooded medical journals and the popular press 
since 1996. Only a few articles have specifically addressed the nursing management 
of these patients, as the focus has been predominantly on disease reporting and cure. 
There are a small number of published case-studies of the experience of caring for a 
person with CJD by the community team (Meek 1998), by family members 
(Humphreys 1998), and in care settings for older people (Wallace 1999). An 
overview of the role of the CJD Surveillance Unit support for people with CJD in the 
community (Barnett 2002) and care for people with prion disease (Prout 2000) have 
provided information on some of the care issues that are encountered in the 
management of people with CJD. The CJD Surveillance Unit (2005) has also 
produced an extensive document on the care needs of people with CJD. Few studies 
have addressed the care of CJD specifically from a hospice perspective (Bailey et al 
2000; de Vries 2003 a; de Vries et al 2003; de Vries 2004), although Douglas et al
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(1999) addressed some of the issues raised in relation to palliative care experiences 
for people with variant CJD.
Douglas et al (1999) provide the most comprehensive study of variant CJD cases, 
where the needs and perceptions of family members and professionals who had been 
involved in the care of 19 people with variant CJD were identified. The aim of the 
Douglas et al (1999) study was to determine the information and care needs of 
patients with variant CJD, and their relatives. This was in order to inform the 
planning of services for future patients. They used a qualitative methodology 
developing a thematic analysis from data collected during face to face interviews with 
close family members, and semi-structured telephone interviews with a selection of 
health and social care professionals. The professional participants were 
predominantly medical. They consisted of 10 neurologists, eight GPs, six 
psychiatrists, five nurses, two social workers, one physiotherapist and one consultant 
in palliative medicine. Medical records of the patients were also examined. A 
comprehensive and detailed report was constructed from the data. The disease 
trajectory of the 19 cases was mapped, with details that identified and highlighted 
issues that were encountered, predominantly by family members.
Douglas et al (1999) found that most of the families were unhappy about the care they 
received in the acute units. Numerous examples of substandard care are cited. These 
particularly focused on issues related to urinary incontinence, feeding, poor support, 
rigid care practices and inflexible visiting times. There is acknowledgement by the 
families of low staff levels and lack of knowledge about the condition. Nearly all 
families expressed appreciation of the care they received on units that specialised in
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terminal care. However, these were not always accessible, as not all hospices would 
take patients who did not have cancer. One hospice wanted to discharge the person 
with variant CJD because the admission was lasting too long and the patient was 
hallucinating, shouting out and disturbing other patients. Whilst family experiences 
are detailed and insightâil, the experiences of the health care workers, in providing 
care, is not addressed in detail within this report.
In one of the few studies of the experience of providing care for CJD patients in a 
palliative care environment Bailey et al (2000) reviewed the issues raised in caring for 
six people who had died as a result of sporadic CJD in a hospice in Australia over a 
12-month period. Using a focus group of relevant nursing staff, the experience of 
providing care for the patients and their families was discussed. A retrospective chart 
audit of the cases was conducted and an internet chat-group for people with personal 
experience of CJD was accessed. Four key issues in caring for the person with CJD 
were identified. These were physical issues, psychosocial issues, issues in caring for 
the family, and personal issues experienced by the nurses caring for these people and 
their families. Douglas et al (1999) identified similar issues in caring for the variant 
CJD population, plus a number of others. These included: poor communication and 
co-ordination between different services, issues related to body disposal, dealing with 
the media, information giving and breaking bad news.
Most families wanted to be able to care for the person with variant CJD in the home, 
if possible. This was pertinent to making sure a package of care was available 
(Douglas et al 1999) and comprehensive packages of care for people with CJD are 
now recommended, including that all CJD patients should be referred to specialist
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palliative care services (Douglas et al 1999; Barnett 2002). Some of the issues 
identified in the Douglas et al (1999) study have been resolved as a result of 
developments in the support service provided by the CJD Surveillance Unit. Most 
people with CJD are identified by the Unit and a member of the CJD Unit team liaises 
with the family and medical and nursing team, giving advice and providing education 
and support (Barnett 2002). However, as was evident in the Douglas et al (1999) 
report and identified in brief nursing articles (McVey 2002), there remains a lack of 
nursing knowledge and facilities that can adequately deal with this type of illness.
The emergence of variant CJD set in place unprecedented levels of care services for 
carers of people with all types of CJD. Care is now substantially funded and 
supported and many family members are now closely involved with CJD support 
groups. Grants are offered to help with the cost of care (Turner 2004) as the 
following example of a care package demonstrates. The family had nine carers 
providing 21 hours a day, seven days a week care, including two carers during the 
day. They had a wheelchair, hospital bed, fully adjustable armchair, hoist and a 
specially adapted automobile. Also included in the package was counselling for the 
family and friends, complementary therapies, and a team to help clear the downstairs 
room ready for adaptations to be made (CJD Support Network 2004). This level of 
support may be attributed to guilt from the UK Government related to the emergence 
of variant CJD and also, perhaps more significantly, to the age of the sufferers. The 
generosity of the support may also have been influenced by the prediction that there 
would only be a small numbers of cases of variant CJD, as more became known about 
it.
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1.7 Dreaded diseases: The social component of variant CJD*
Epidemics that kill young people have a significant impact on society and as a disease 
emerges and becomes defined as a ‘dreaded disease’ irrational fear drives policy 
(Doka 1997:49). Due to the youth of the people with variant CJD and the distressing 
nature of the clinical progress, variant CJD could become defined as a ‘dreaded 
disease’ in the future (de Vries 2004). The care service provision for this very small 
group is already extraordinarily elaborate (as outlined above). To those who have had 
personal experience of the disease it fits within categories of diseases to be dreaded 
that have been identified by others (Sontag 1978, 1988; Doka 1997). The clinical 
progress of CJD leads to a state of profound dementia and to death, and dementia, as 
does death, are terms that provoke fear and dread in the public. Kitwood (1988, 1989) 
suggests that fear and dread of dementia has a clear basis in reality where ‘going 
senile’ is faced with dread, and is seen as experiencing an inevitable path of degrading 
incapacity to a near-vegetable existence and death. In the event of contracting variant 
CJD the person becomes progressively cognitively impaired, experiencing dementia 
type symptoms, leading to death in a relatively short space of time. Variant CJD may 
come to be regarded as one of the ‘dreaded diseases’ of the 21®^ century, not only in 
relation to the dementia and death component, but also in relation to the youth of 
those infected, mode of transmission and implications of environmental pollution 
through the innocent act of eating food that society has been led to assume is safe.
Diseases in this category have occurred throughout history and include the black 
death or bubonic plague, cholera, typhus, and influenza epidemics (Soçtag 1978; 
Doka 1997; Oldstone 1998) and more recently, since the 1980s, HIV and AIDS
‘Killer in the shadows’ headline referring to new cases of variant CJD. Guardian Unlimited (2004).
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(Sontag 1988; Doka 1997). Added to these diseases are the less acute but possibly 
physically deforming illnesses such as cancer and leprosy (Sontag 1978; Doka 1997). 
In the early days of HIV and AIDS the uncertainty of the mode of transmission 
contributed to the dread. This was also applicable to the transmission of variant CJD, 
demonstrated in the media hype that occurred in relation to eating beef and the fear of 
taking blood from the UK (Brown 2001b; Brown et al 2001). The believed mode of 
transmission of the disease speaks of a pollution of a kind that attacks the young 
through the innocent act of, for example, eating a hamburger. The mode of infection 
for variant CJD and the age of those infected fits with Sontag’s (1988) premise that 
some individuals do not necessarily experience stigma, such as ‘innocent victims of 
HIV’, i.e. haemophiliacs and babies who have acquired HIV through blood produces 
or maternal transmission. The biotechnology that caused the BSE crisis is an example 
of the manufactured risk identified in discussions on the political, technological, 
cultural and economic globalisation (Giddens 1999; Beck 1995, 2000, Rose 2000; van 
Loon 2000).
The disease caused an unprecedented public response and impact on the beef market 
that was from the beginning seen as analogous to the HIV and AIDS outbreak 
(Brookes 1999). The pollution that was equated with HIV and ADDS, of sex, sperm 
and contagion, was embraced by religious zealots as retribution from God (Doka 
1997). Variant CJD pollution has been embraced by environmental zealots (Scott 
2000), and as with the early days of (and to date) HIV and AIDS, criticism has been 
focused on UK and government and policy makers. However, there is some evidence 
of early policy development as a result of lessons learned from the ADDS experience.
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particularly in relation to blood transfusion and tissues donation services (Brown 
2001b).
All diseases have a social component and as such they take on metaphoric meanings 
that are related to the culture of the times and also the particular manifestation of the 
disease symptoms (Sontag 1978, 1988; Doka 1997). Outcast has been equated to the 
leper who is seen as dreaded and loathsome, the pox has been metaphorically referred 
to as a curse, or black death which is dark and evil, and cancer is identified with a 
crawling and invading crab (Sontag 1978; Doka 1997). HIV and AIDS were equated 
with sin, shame and sexual pollution (Sontag 1988; Doka 1997). Metaphors have 
already been created through the media of ‘mad cow disease’ in reference to variant 
CJD. The public often understand variant CJD easier through the BSE, ‘mad cow’, 
language. Reports in the media on the subject of variant CJD inevitably include in the 
headline ‘mad cow disease’*.
Rabies is one disease that comes close to both analogously, ‘mad dog’/’mad cow’, and 
symptomatically to that of the variant CJD. Rabies is a communicable disease that 
causes an encephalomylitis and is almost always fatal. The cause of infection is 
usually as a result of being bitten by an infected mammal but has also been caused by 
inhalation of rabid virus, inoculation by poorly cleaned vaccine or through comeal 
grafts (Kaplan et al 1986). Kaplan et al (1986) suggest that, although rabies has never 
had a major impact on historical events, it has exerted an influence on human 
imagination out of all proportion to its incidence and regularly captures the
*‘The Official Mad Cow Disease Home Page’ www.mad-cow.org contains news and science archives, 
internet links etc and demonstrates how the tenn ‘Mad Cow’ lias become irrevocably linked to variant 
CJD.
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imagination of writers of fiction (see for e.g. ‘Cujo’ by Stephen King 1981). This is 
due to the mode of infection, classically by a ‘mad dog’ and the terrifying and 
agonising suffering that occurs in humans before death (Kaplan et al 1986). There are 
other similarities of rabies to variant CJD where a psychiatric diagnosis may be made 
due to the bizarre behaviour, altered mood and hallucinations that occur (Kaplan et al 
1986; Zeidler et al 1997; Spencer et al 2002).
Variant CJD has become socially equated to dying and young people. The youth of 
the people with variant CJD and the clinical progress of the disease is particularly 
distressing, both to the person experiencing the disease and to those who provide care 
for them (Douglas 1999; de Vries et al 2003, de Vries 2003a). It is these aspects that 
contribute to the image of variant CJD being a disease to be dreaded.
1.8 Summary
Variant CJD is a dementia syndrome and a terminal illness with a particularly 
distressing disease trajectory and may become one of the dreaded diseases of the 2T‘ 
century. The predicted numbers of cases are uncertain and research has primarily 
focused on pathophysiological and epidemiological aspects of the disease and the 
search for a cure. There is a growing literature on the mode of transmission, and the 
global impact this has had, and may have in the future. The National CJD 
Surveillance Unit has taken a lead in developing support and education, particularly 
for the families of patients and those closely involved in their care, including 
palliative care and hospice services. Hospice services have traditionally focused on 
the cancer death and there is no certainty that they are in a position to accommodate 
the needs of this patient group. In Chapter 2 I review the literature on hospice
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services and care, and the implications of managing people with dementia within the 
hospice environment.
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Chapter 2 -  Hospice and end-stage dementia care
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter the literature review is presented in two sections. The first section 
addresses hospice culture and practice. There is a very large literature addressing 
hospice practices, the review therefore has been selective, focusing on those aspects 
that are aligned to the thesis and primarily in the context of UK hospice services. In 
the first section of this chapter on the evolution of hospice, the literature addressed is 
drawn only from UK sources, as this is a UK based study. However, the literature 
that is discussed in following sections of the chapter, on for example more 
philosophical subjects such as dignity and the ideology of the ‘good death’ have been 
drawn from an international literature. I begin with a short discussion on the 
background to the evolution of hospice in the UK that examines definitions of hospice 
and palliative care and the rhetoric for extended hospice services to non-cancer 
patients, including a brief review of the debate on the ‘médicalisation’ of hospice care. 
It has been suggested that what is needed is closer examination of the working of the 
hospice as an organisation before a full understanding of the field can be achieved. 
This leads to a critique of four studies that have closely explored aspects of hospice 
practice using qualitative methodology.
I then consider the subject of dignity within the context of dying and the ethical and 
philosophical debate on concepts of self and personhood in relation to dignity. This 
leads on to a discussion on disintegration as a spectacle and how this relates to 
conceptualising dignity for the person with dementia. These concepts are also 
discussed in relation to the ideology of the ‘good death’, an ideology that is central to 
the hospice movement. Dignity and personhood are closely aligned to the ‘good
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death’ ideology and implications of these concepts that relate to dementia care at the 
end of life are considered during this discussion.
The second section of Chapter 2 more specifically addresses literature on dementia 
and dying. There exists an enormous literature on dementia care in general. As the 
focus of the study was on end-of-life events the dementia literature has been largely 
confined to that which addresses end-of-life issues, very little of which is related to 
the UK context. The hospice model and environment offers an opportunity for 
sharing in the experience of dying with dying people themselves within an open 
awareness context and it has been suggested that this model is not congruent with the 
cognitive state of people with dementia. However, there is a growing body of 
evidence that people with dementia have awareness of loss and abandonment that may 
have implications for managing their care at the end of life. I show that the influence 
of hospice practices is only beginning to infiltrate dementia care practices in the UK, 
despite recommendations from both specialities. Issues related to introducing people 
with dementia into the hospice services are also addressed. These include discussion 
on differences and commonalities in the skills of health care professionals working 
with the dying or working in dementia care. The implications of managing a person 
with variant CJD (dementia), within this specialised environment is addressed and 
concepts related to both hospice and dementia care used to justify my research.
2.2 Hospice culture and practice
2.2.1 Background to hospice in the UK
The beginning of the ‘modern’ hospice movement is attributed to the founding of St 
Christopher’s Hospice in Sydenham, South London, in 1967 by Cicely Saunders and
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developed due to shortcomings in mainstream health services for care of the dying 
(Stoddard 1978; du Boulay 1984; James and Field 1992; Lattanzi-Licht and Connor 
1995; Seale 1998; Clark 2002; Clark et al 2005). The first use of the word ‘hospice’ 
in the UK was by the Irish Sisters of Charity. They opened their founding hospice 
near Dublin in 1879 followed by St Joseph’s Hospice in Hackney, East London, in 
1905 (Saunders 2000). A number of ‘hospices’ already existed in other European 
countries that were based on an older medieval tradition, when hospices were wayside 
places of rest and refuge for pilgrims (Seale 1998:113), i.e. hospice referred to a 
lodging for travellers, especially one run by a religious order (Oxford Dictionary 
1999). As the first modem hospice, St Christopher’s set out to combine three key 
principles: excellent clinical care, education and research in managing care of the 
dying person and their families (Saunders e/ a/ 1981; du Boulay 1984; Saunders 2000; 
Clark et al 2005). For Saunders the notion of ‘total pain’ was at the forefront of the 
drive for conducting research and developing practices in symptom control that 
involved patient assessment being carried out by a multi-professional team with an 
understanding of the holistic nature of suffering (Saunders et al 1981; du Boulay 
1984; Clark 1999; Saunders 2000; Clark et al 2005). The hospice philosophy also 
encompassed the principle of giving pain relief to people with terminal cancer 
regularly and routinely and of developing knowledge and understanding of the range 
of available drugs and levels of pain upon which they were effective (Clark 1999).
During the 1970s many new hospices were established in the UK, following the St 
Christopher’s model, and alongside these developments hospice day care and home 
care team services also began to be established (Clark et al 2005). By the early 1980s 
there were 58 hospice in-patient units and 32 home care teams in the UK (Clark et al
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2005). In 1987 palliative medicine became recognised as a speciality within its own 
right in the UK and a new journal, Palliative Medicine^ was established. Help the 
Hospices, an umbrella organisation for hospices, established in 1984, set out the 
definitions and qualifications of provision of hospice care which have been modified 
and extended over the last 15 years as the services evolved. By 1995 there were 250 
in-patient hospice units, slightly smaller numbers of day care and hospital support 
teams, and almost 400 home care support teams and units in the UK and Ireland 
(Doyle 1997). According to the 2005 Hospice Directory there are now 272 in-patient 
units in the UK, including Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (Help the Hospices 
2005), indicating that the growth of these units has remained relatively unchanged 
since the mid 1990s. Most of the hospices in the UK are independent charities and the 
sense that the hospice is the property of the supporting community is usually well 
embedded in the culture of individual hospices (Johnson 1999). This aspect of 
hospices as organisations has however been little studied. Johnson (1999) shows how 
the ‘vision’ of the founders of UK hospices was based on a response to what they 
perceived as an external demand where founders and trustees gave their lives (or a 
great part of them) with excitement, energy and enthusiasm with the belief in their 
power to make a difference. Many of the founding groups incorporated terms such as 
having a ‘religious and medical foundation’, and ‘showing the love of God’ in their 
vision statements (Johnson 1999).
An underpinning Christian principle, harking from the historical background of 
hospice, has remained in the provision of care within the modem hospice (Stoddard 
1978; Saunders et al 1981; du Boulay 1984; James and Field 1992; Clark et al 2005). 
This is referred to by James and Field (1992) as the spiritual ‘calling’, which inspired
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many to become involved with hospices. The emphasis of the modem hospice 
approach has primarily been one of providing care to dying people and their families 
using a multi-professional team approach, including a Chaplaincy service (Doyle 
1993; Hockley 1997; Clark et al 2005). This was promoted as fimdamentally 
humanitarian, with an educational and research focus (Stoddard 1978; Doyle 1993; 
Lattanzi-Licht and Connor 1995).
In early definitions hospices were seen as providing care over an extended period of 
the dying trajectory and not just for the terminal stage of dying, in some ways akin to 
rehabilitation, employing many if its principles; and emphasis was made of the 
importance of a team approach to care (Doyle 1993). In some documents hospice 
care is referred to as ‘a philosophy of care rather than a specific building or service’ 
(Saunders et al 1981; NCHSPCS 1995:5), creating a tension between the terms 
‘palliative’ and ‘hospice’ care (Skilbeck and Payne 2005), and apparently completely 
missing the point that hospices are organisations within which all of the issues of 
organisational behaviour and activity of those working in the organisation impact on 
how palliative care is conducted.
Doyle (1993) argues that confusion has ensured due to the range of existing and 
suggested definitions of hospice and palliative care. These range from emphasising 
quality of life to a focus on symptoms of the disease rather than the pathology itself, 
leading, in some instances, to palliative care physicians being described a 
‘symptomatologists’, in which case dismissing any association with pathology. Doyle 
(1993) describes this as a totally unacceptable situation and goes on to outline the 
extent of the ‘medical’ activities directly related to pathology that are carried out by
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palliative care physicians. The National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative 
Care Services (NCHSPCS) was established in 1991 as an umbrella organisation for all 
those who are involved in providing, commissioning and using hospice and palliative 
care services in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The brief was to act as a co­
ordinating and representative body for the hospice movement in the UK and to give it 
a single national voice. The Councils remit was to co-ordinate and develop joint 
position papers promoting good practice in palliative care and influence health care 
policy through the Department of Health and Government recommendations and 
policies (Gaffin 1996).
In 1995 a working party for the NCHSPCS outlined their definition for specialist 
palliative care, i.e. specialist hospice activity. The characteristics of these were:
Specialist palliative care services, because of the nature of the needs they 
are designed to meet, are analogous to secondary or tertiary health care 
services. They require a high level of professional skills from trained staff 
and a high staff-patient ratio. They can support the patient wherever the 
patient may be; at home, in residential or nursing home, in hospital, day 
centre or a specialist unit. (NCHSPCS 1995)
They were identified as providing:
• Physical, psychological, social and spiritual support through a multi­
professional, collaborative team approach
• A lead person who is a trained and acknowledged specialist in palliative care
• Support and involvement of patients/families in management plans
• Encouragement of patients to express their preference about care
• Support for carers and families through the illness into bereavement
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• Co-operation and collaboration with primary health care teams, hospitals, and 
home care services
• Volunteers whose contribution is recognised and valued
• An either directly or indirectly recognised academic external education role
• Standards set for the education and training provided
• Quality assurance programmes that are constantly used to review practice
• Clinical audit and research programmes to evaluate treatment and outcomes
• Staff support arrangements
The NCHSPCS formally changed its title in 2004, to The National Council for 
Palliative Care (NCPC 2005a), at the same time as making changes to their 
Constitution. These changes were made to encompass the needs of all dying people 
regardless of their diagnosis (NCPC 2005a; NCPC 2005b) and to meet the objectives 
of the Department of Health (DH) End of Life Care initiatives (DH 2003) and the 
drive to develop palliative care services for people with non-malignant disease is now 
a Government priority (DH 2005). However, the rhetoric for integrating people with 
non-malignant diseases into hospice services has been in the literature since 1992 
(Addington-Hall et al 1998) and yet there remains limited action in implementing 
measures to accomplish this.
Whilst, from the outset of the establishment of St Christopher’s Hospice the focus of 
hospice care has been on the cancer patient, what is often not made explicit within 
these definitions is acknowledgement of this exclusiveness. Only a small number of 
people die in hospice in-patient units, approximately 4% of all deaths in the UK 
whereas approximately 17% of cancer patients in the UK die in a hospice or a
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specialist palliative care unit (Tebbit 2004). This has led to criticism that hospices 
provide ‘de luxe’ dying (Douglas 1992), ‘five star’ dying (Field 1994), care for a 
‘privileged minority’ of people with cancer (Doyle 1993), or ‘a bit of heaven for the 
few’ (Clark et al 2005). To further compound the elite status of cancer care provision 
the thrust of the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2004) guidance on 
improving supportive palliative care is for people with cancer.
Although, from relatively early days of hospice care, people with other diseases were 
admitted to hospice seiwices, notably people with Motor Neurone disease and 
Multiple Sclerosis, and in the 1980s people with AIDS (Saunders 2000). The access 
and equity of the HIV/AIDS population to palliative care has been questioned, 
however, and evidence suggests that integration has reduced due to antiretroviral 
therapy and focus has remained only on the terminal stage of the disease (Harding et 
a / 2005).
It wasn’t until 1998 that the NCHSPCS outlined the need to extend palliative and 
hospice care services to people with non-malignant disease (Addington-Hall 1998). 
Using data from a retrospective, national, population-based, interview survey of 
relatives or officials of 3,696 people who had died in the last quarter of 1990 from 20 
English Health Districts (Addington-Hall and McCarthy 1995b, 1995b) a secondary 
analysis was carried out to investigate experiences of dying from causes other than 
cancer (Addington-Hall et al 1998a). The purpose was to investigate what proportion 
of people who die from non-malignant disease might benefit fiom input from 
specialist palliative care services (Addington-Hall et al 1998). The results suggest 
that 16.8% of people with non-malignant disease and their families were as much in
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need of specialist palliative care services, specifically in symptom management, open 
communication about death and dying and in encouraging autonomy (Addington-Hall 
et al 1998). These patients also may have suffered the symptoms for longer periods 
than the cancer group (Addington-Hall. and McCarthy 1995a; Skilbeck and Payne 
2005).
The case for extending specialist palliative care services to chronic conditions other 
than cancer has been made based on equity and need, equity implying the right of 
choice and control over the dying experience for all people (Field and Addington-Hall
1999). The pledge to offer more choice in all areas of medical care for patients has 
been a government focus since their 2001 Manifesto (DH 2003). Following a national 
consultation to find out how choices could be extended in ways that would create 
more personalised care and promote equity, the document ‘Building on the Best’ was 
published (DH 2003). Building palliative care services to offer greater choice over 
care at the end of life was one of the focuses within the document as some of the most 
powerful consultation responses were as a result of distressing experiences of relatives 
of people who were dying (DH 2003). The Department of Health proposal is to 
extend end-of-life services already existing for people with cancer (and HIV/AIDS) 
and offer these to all, regardless of diagnosis, through formal training programmes 
across a wide range of health care settings, working in partnership with existing 
palliative care services. A l of this is to be in place by 2007 (DH 2003).
Need however, presents different issues in care provision for people who maybe 
(slowly) dying from chronic illnesses such as chronic heart failure, end-stage renal 
disease and rheumatoid arthritis (this literature is not reviewed in the thesis). It has
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been proposed that the present palliative care services could meet the needs of the 
non-cancer group of patients, using support from specialist teams to accomplish this. 
However, it has also been argued that this would be problematic as specialist fields 
(such as cardiac, renal, respiratory care) require different specialist knowledge that 
does not necessarily transfer from cancer care (Field and Addington-Hall 1999). (also 
see literature reviewed in Addington-Hall and Higginson 2001; Skilbeck and Payne 
2005).
Another consideration is just how far the services should be extended, i.e. is the remit 
for palliative care broad and therefore required to meet the symptom control, 
psychological and spiritual needs of patients at any stage of their disease, as suggested 
by Harding et al (2005) in relation to HIV/AIDS; or should the focus of this speciality 
be on the terminal stage of the illness only? (Field and Addington-Hall 1999). This 
question is as yet unresolved and there are numerous discussions within the literature 
of how far the remit of specialist palliative care services should be extended. 
However, the definition of palliative care offered by the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) makes the assumption that the services is extended to early stages 
of terminal illnesses.
Palliative care is the active, holistic care of patients with advanced, 
progressive illness. Management of pain and other symptoms and 
provision psychological, social and spiritual support is paramount. The 
goal of palliative care is achievement of the best quality of life for patients 
and their families. Many aspects are also applicable earlier in the course of 
the illness in conjunction with other treatments (National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) 2004).
Extending the services of hospice to the non-cancer patient group, including early 
stages of the illness, presents a number of difficulties and despite the rhetoric very
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little integration of people with non-malignant disease into hospice services has 
occurred. A number of barriers to extending specialist palliative care services to this 
group have been identified. Of crucial importance are resource implications for 
specialist palliative care services (Addington-Hall 1998; Skilbeck and Payne 2005), 
particularly hospices. The resources of existing hospices are already stretched to cope 
with terminally ill patients with cancer and the small number of neurological patients 
that are admitted to the service (Field and Addington-Hall 1999). This barrier is 
closely linked to the method of funding for hospices of which over 50% is through 
voluntary contributions and there is no certainty that voluntary contributions would be 
forthcoming to fund the expansion of hospice services to the non-cancer patient group 
(Field and Addington-Hall 1999). Other barriers to extending palliative care services 
to non-cancer patients include a potential lack of skills amongst specialist palliative 
care experts in the care of non-cancer patients, difficulties in identifying suitable non­
cancer patients for the palliative care, lack of information on acceptability of these 
services for non-cancer patients; and vested interest in present aiTangements (Field 
and Addington-Hall 1999; Skilbeck and Payne 2005). An interest in the end-of-life 
needs of people with dementia also gained momentum in the UK during the 1990s, 
this work is discussed in more detail in section 2.3 Dementia care at the end-of-life.
2.2.1.1 Médicalisation and hospice
Following palliative medicine becoming a recognised ‘medical’ speciality in 1987 it is 
suggested that the ‘medical model’ has become dominant in provision of specialist 
palliative care (James and Field 1992; Clark 1993; Field 1994; Walter 1994; Clark 
2002), a position somewhat confirmed by Doyle’s (1993) indignation at palliative 
care physicians being referred to as ‘symptomatologists’. The concept of
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médicalisation refers to the way in which medical jurisdiction has expanded in recent 
years and the medical model is generally regarded to mean a focus on biomedical 
research, physical testing and high-technology interventions, with a focus on disease 
rather than on the person who is ill (Biswas 1993), and control and médicalisation are 
frequently referred to synonymously (Walter 1994; Sontag 1978). In discussing the 
definition of this new ‘medical’ speciality, Field (1994) comments that it is noticeable 
that no reference to the fact of death is made. This comment comes with an emerging 
criticism of the new hospice ‘medical’ model. According to Clark and Seymour 
(1999) hospice has developed a form of ‘therapeutic’ culture in which the universal 
experience of suffering is characterised as a ‘problem’ with a medical solution. This 
is highlighted in the increasing routinisation and médicalisation of hospice and 
palliative care that Kastenbaum and Wilson (1997:271) have described as 
‘bureaucratic creep’.
The issue, from a sociological perspective, of the ‘prolonged’ dying trajectory (in 
some illnesses) that has been created by modern Western medicine has been raised by 
a number of writers on the subject of hospice (Seale 1998; Walter 1994; Copp 1996, 
1999; Lawton 1998a, 1998b, 2000). They argue that priority is now being given to 
patients exhibiting particularly distressing symptoms, especially during the terminal 
phase of their dying trajectory. This has become the priority of specialist hospice 
units where definitions of specialist palliative care generally refer to the acuteness of 
distressing symptoms as in a definition offered by Doyle (1997) where specialist 
palliative care is deemed an ‘acute’ service.
Specialist palliative care are for specialist needs which can not be met in 
smaller, non-specialist units and for round-the-clock advice. The 
specialist units admit and discharge many patients after short lengths of
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Stay and perform investigations and interventions traditionally associated 
with acute hospitals (NCHSPCS Discussion Paper, Doyle 1997:17 -  
emphasis added).
This definition moved the focus away from that of earlier definitions where providing 
care over extended periods and making links with principles of rehabilitation was 
highlighted by Doyle in 1993, just four years earlier. However, in defence of some of 
the criticism of the medical dominance in hospice care it has been pointed out that 
medical practices have combined with this some of the most significant developments 
in symptom management that require the use of technological aids (Ahmedzai 1993,
1994).
Others, such as Bradshaw (1996), have argued for a return to the spiritual dimension 
of hospice. Using the médicalisation issues identified above as the basis for her 
concerns about the secularisation of the hospice ideal Bradshaw (1996) argues that the 
move away from the original charisma of the Christian spiritual elements of hospice 
care means that these have lost their reality and influence. She suggests that as the 
original spiritual values diminish so the values become those of the ‘expert’. Skills 
and techniques offer efficacy in treatment and suppression of conflict, death then is no 
longer a truth to be confronted, but a process to be managed (Bradshaw 1996). This 
view is not universally held of contemporary hospice and in a study examining the 
‘stories’ of 25 hospice patients and a period of participant observation, Stanworth 
(2004) constructed an interactive hermeneutic of nine revealed and constructed 
metaphors that expressed patients’ sources of meaning and sense of self in a non­
religious language of spirit. Stanworth (2004) showed that this ‘spiritual’ ‘story 
making’ exists within contemporary hospice care and may be accessed through the 
attention of the silent listener.
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Seale (1998:117) however, cautions for sociologists not to take sides on the issues of 
what is essentially ‘an interplay of discourse’. He proposes that:
A more analytic approach lies in seeing how these discourses, or grand 
meta-stories, are appropriated by people as they seek to understand their 
experience in care settings. That is to say, we need to see how people who 
work in these settings think about their work, what they do on an everyday 
basis, and how they, as ‘system representatives’ seek to mould the 
subjectivities of the people for whom they care (Seale 1998:117).
Since the early 1990s academics have been asking the question, what do hospices do?, 
frequently asking this question with particular reference to the cost of the service 
(Johnson et al 1990, Seale 1991). There are numerous surveys that have collected 
data on the use of various hospice services. For example, day care (Higginson et at
2000), making comparisons between hospice and hospital or community care 
(research reviewed in Wilkinson et al 1999), level of need for palliative care (research 
reviewed in Salisbury et al 1999), and governance, leadership and management of 
hospice projects (Johnson 1999). There is also a burgeoning literature on aspects of 
hospice and palliative care, particularly the nursing component, that together construct 
a ‘mosaic’ of the hospice service and contribute to a picture of the practices that take 
place within hospice environments. These studies indicate that definitions of a service 
do not necessary equate with what actually takes place within a given organisation 
and offer some of the perspective of ‘system representatives’, called for by Seale 
(1998). For the purposes of this discussion I draw on a number of qualitative studies 
that have been conducted on practices that occur within hospice environments. In 
relation to my study I draw particularly on theories that consider the hospice service 
as a type of system, and where organisational behaviour and activity are important
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components within the models. These theories are elaborated and drawn on 
throughout the thesis.
2.2.1.2 Hospice care as a ‘rite o f passage '
In a robust and insightful thesis Froggatt (1995) offers a model of ‘rite of passage’, 
based on the concept of liminality, to explain hospice culture. Using an ethnographic 
approach Froggatt (1995) explored how the life-death transition was managed in 
hospice with a focus on the personal bereavement experiences of the nurses. Four 
types of data collection were carried out in parallel. These were interviews with 32 
nurses and six nurse managers from four English hospices, a short period of non­
participant observation in one hospice and analysis of the hospice literature that is 
given to patients and relatives from 113 hospices, plus analysis of contemporary 
literature on bereavement from Woman’s Own magazine over a period of six months. 
The data were analysed using the comparative content approach and examination of 
metaphor use in the language of the participants and written material, van Gennep’s 
(1960) anthropological ‘rite of passage’ framework was used to provide a theoretical 
base with which to consider the multiple bereavements experienced by nurses when 
carrying out hospice work, i.e. the nature of hospice work where staff face repeated 
losses. The model was applied to the hospice as an institution providing a conceptual 
framework in which to position the hospice culture’s management of death (Froggatt 
1995). An emotional labour framework, a framework closely connected to work on 
understanding organisational behaviour (Hochschild 2003), was also applied in 
exploring what kind of emotional labour is undertaken by nurses with patients and 
family members in dealing with their peers and in relation to their own personal 
experiences of bereavement.
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Froggatt (1995, 1997) presents hospice as a liminal space; a waiting room for the 
dying. Liminality has two dictionary definitions. One relates it to a transition or 
initial stage of an event. The second refers to liminal as a boundaiy or tlireshold and 
Froggatt (1995, 1997) uses this threshold metaphor drawing on the work of van 
Gennep (1960). Froggatt (1997:128) suggests, as does Stanworth (2004), that hospice 
provides ‘a liminal space which is metaphorically structured to manage the process of 
dying’. According to van Gennep (1960) the transition phase of the ‘rite of passage’, 
that is also known as the limen, is a ‘space’ within which people are cut off from the 
wider society in a temporary position. The illustrative literature that is provided for 
patients who are admitted to hospice demonstrated how liminality may be central to 
hospice culture. Froggatt (1995, 1997) shows how some hospice logos, such as a 
doorway, symbolically illustrate the liminality of hospice space. The attributes of 
liminality include: transition, travelling, lodging, equality, absence of status or rank, 
simplicity, non-violence, totality, sacred institution and reference to mystical powers. 
These are posited as being features of hospice ideology. Some of the hospice 
ideological principles that have attributes of liminality are: dying as a journey, 
bereavement and follow-up care, entry requirements, hospice as family, flattened 
hierarchy, multidisciplinary team, team nursing, holism and spirituality and physical 
and social symbolism (Froggatt 1995, 1997).
Within this liminal space nurses become ‘ritual specialists’ who control the passage of 
dying in various ways. Rituals are conducted within the context of ‘family’ and 
‘holistic’ ideals, and work is controlled and managed with respect to emotional 
expression. Froggatt (1995, 1998) identifies two factors that facilitate the daily work
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of hospice ideology by the ‘ritual specialist’. These are knowledge and time, i.e. 
‘possessing knowledge’ (specialist hospice knowledge of pain and symptom control) 
and ‘having time’ (to get to know the patient) and are necessary for the establishment 
of relationships between nurses, patients and their kin (Foggatt 1995:126). She refers 
to these as stmctures or ‘bridges’ over which a relationship between a nurse and 
patient was established.
Within this model the service is symbolically a ‘family system’, albeit idealised 
family, where staff represent the parent/adult, and the patient and family members the 
children. This practice of holistic, family focused care also encompasses the process 
of staff personally identifying with the patient and relating this to their own family 
members. It is through providing the means of a ‘rite of passage’, in the organisation 
of hospice care, that the service can manage the life-death boundary. In doing so it 
can provide ‘a space to manage the seemingly disordered process of dying which may 
threaten order in society’ (Froggatt 1997:134).
This model has much in common with the work of Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000), 
although Froggatt (1995, 1997) offers a more idealistic model of hospice culture than 
does Lawton. She shows how hospices may be construed as communities which 
patients enter into as family members, and where the hospice is symbolically shown 
to be a protected environment where the specialist knowledge on caring for dying is 
used to their benefit. What is also a feature in Froggatt’s (1995) thesis is that there is 
a need for reciprocity that is allowed due to (the often) long the length of the 
admission and to the availability of time for patients and families. Whilst it needs to 
be remembered that Froggatt collected data for this study in the early 1990s, when the
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norm was for patients to remain in hospice for some time with less pressure for 
discharge, the rite of passage model is a framework that can explain how order is 
maintained in the face of potential disorder arising fiom an individual’s death, 
recognising that death is more than a medical event, but that it is a process (Froggatt
1995). Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000) also presents hospice as a space in which dying 
is processed but paints a less idealised picture of hospice activity, whilst also drawing 
on anthropological frameworks.
2.2. L 3 The sequestration o f ‘dirty dying ’
Lawton’s (1998a, 1998b, 2000) carried out a ten-month, participatory, observational 
anthropological study within a 19-bedded hospice in South-England, also using 
detailed case studies of the dying experiences of hospice patients to illustrate her 
arguments. She identified four major themes that show how dying is controlled and 
processed within the hospice. These are: day care as a safe retreat; ‘body-subject’ to 
‘body-object’ during transmission from day care to in-patient admission; the 
sequestration of the unbounded body and ‘dirty dying’, during the dying process; and 
invisible suffering, as the social death.
Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000) maintains that the bodily deformation and decay that 
may occur during the process of dying, is why some patients are now sequestered 
within hospices whereas others are not. Sequestration is a state of isolation enforced 
by a social rejection of the unsightly ‘unbounded body’ as proposed by Lawton 
(1998a, 1998b, 2000) in relation to the in-patient unit at her study site. Particularly 
powerful images of the ‘unbounded body’ are conjured to demonstrate the level of 
disintegration;
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...incontinence of urine and faeces, uncontrolled vomiting (including 
faecal vomit), fungating tumours (the rotting away of a tumour site on the 
surface of the skin) and weeping limbs which resulted from the 
development of gross oedema in the patient’s legs and/or arms (Lawton 
1998a;6).
Lawton (1998a, 2000) also goes on to give graphic descriptions of outpourings of 
blood and sputum and of tumours that grotesquely distorted the faces and bodies of 
patients, a feature also highlighted by Copp (1996). These descriptions of ‘abject 
embodiment’ for cancer patient were also identified by Waskul and van der Riet 
(2002) in a study using data from participant observation and 72 interviews with 18 
cancer patients from a palliative care unit in New South Wales, Australia. All 
interviews were conducted during a massage sessions and were focussed on feelings 
about the body of the patient. The authors show how:
Those who experience abject embodiment also know that neither they nor 
anyone else can easily ignore the appearance and sheer existence of their 
grotesque and diseased bodies (Waskul and van der Riet (2002:509).
Furthermore, as also described by Lawton 1998a, 1998b, 2000), for these patients ‘the 
“natural” relationships among the self, body, and society have ceased’ (Waskul and 
van der Riet (2002:510).
However, dictionary definitions and the origin of the word sequester, from old French 
sequestrer, or late Latin sequestrare ‘commit for safe keeping’, where the Latin 
meaning o îsequester is ‘trustee’, has more in common with the original philosophy of 
hospice as a place of safety and hospitality. Lawton sets the scene of pre-entry to the 
hospice in day care and posits day care as a safe retreat where patients, primarily with
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cancer, could meet others in similar situations. In this sense Lawton’s work can be 
associated with a more idealised ‘rites of passage’ model. For some, day care served 
as a type of ‘surrogate family’, particularly for those who were socially isolated. The 
metaphorical ‘family’ was also identified by Froggatt (1995, 1997) as one of the 
components of liminality. Lawton, as does Froggatt, addresses the complexity of 
using the ‘family’ metaphor. For example, on how parent/child dependency roles 
developed within the relationships between staff and patients in day care.
Within the day hospice space Lawton (1998a, 2000) maintains that deterioration and 
dependency were masked and that discussion about the future was taboo. Essentially 
death was denied, a ‘conspiracy’ encouraged by day hospice staff (Lawton 2000:47). 
The depiction of day care as an environment in which death is a taboo subject is 
contrary to the findings of an ethnographic study by Langley-Evans and Payne (1996). 
The researchers explored communication processes amongst patients with terminal 
illnesses in a day care unit over a seven week period of participant observation. They 
found that patients readily talked about cancer, illness and death, often in a ‘light­
hearted’ manner. Lawton (1998a, 2000) however, did find during interviews with 
some of the patients, that this death denial was not extended to their homes, and 
patients spoke of reading obituaries and discussing death at home. This does indicate 
that the patients in day care were able to discuss death and raises the question of why 
or how Lawton came to suggest that a ‘conspiracy’ of silence about death existed. 
Lawton’s interpretations of the day care activities were, however, focused on the idea 
of ‘space’, not as in the Langley-Evans and Payne (1996) study, exploring 
communication, and this may account for the emphasis she puts on the interactional 
model of day care as a space for masking deterioration and dependency. That is, day
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care was a space or place that could not be understood by others who were not dying, 
causing the patients to experience a sense of isolation with their diseases.
Lawton (1998a, 2000) then addresses the impact of the move from day care to the in­
patient unit. Of particular interest is Lawton’s (1998a, 2000) personal response to 
what she saw in this unit. She expresses the shock and horror of seeing the bodily and 
psychological deterioration of the people she had met previously in day care. 
Although she does not address the impact of this in her data interpretation, this 
appeared to be an emotionally disturbing event for her. This type of response was 
also a feature of an observational study of hospice care by. Ramsay (2000), who 
reported that she was haunted by the images of a patient’s emaciated face. These 
responses may occur for any person first encountering extreme bodily deterioration 
and disintegration. Lawton found that on entering the in-patient unit of the hospice 
the importance of focusing upon the body of the patient and the disease process taking 
place within it and upon its surfaces became paramount.
The process Lawton (1998a, 2000) describes is one of patients moving from ‘body- 
subject’, as in day care, to ‘body-object’. Setting the disintegrating body apart from 
mainstream society, as hospices appear to do, enables certain ideas about ‘living’, 
personhood and the hygienic, sanitised, bounded body to be symbolically enforced 
and maintained (Lawton 1998a, 1998b, 2000). She suggests that conceptualising a 
hospice as ‘no place’, that is, a space within which taboo processes of bodily 
deformation and decay are sequestered allows it to be understood as a central part of 
contemporary Western culture. In respect to the idea of sequestration, the hiding of 
‘dirty dying’, Lawton (2000) proposes that the hospice could be understood not
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simply as a liminal space. It could be understood as ‘no place’, likening it to that of 
the ‘modern’ abattoir (Lawton 2000:144). This proposal is based on the idea of 
hiding processes and suffering that the general public does not want to see or even 
know about. Furthermore, she considers the problem of ‘living too long’ and ‘dying 
too soon’ as signifying how social and interpersonal relationships are lost for people 
who are dying. She refers to this social death as invisible suffering.
Lawton (2000) also draws on van Gennep (1960) in referring to the hospice liminality 
as a ‘fringe/liminal’ space where ‘non-persons’ waver between two worlds, the worlds 
of the living and the dying. She uses the idea of liminality to emphasise the non­
person status of the dying person. Froggatt (1997) also speaks of the threat to the 
order of society that a disordered process of dying may have, and how the dying are 
bounded within the space. This liminality is contributed to by the withdrawal of the 
dying person from social encounters which Lawton (1998a, 2000) suggests starts 
during the day hospice admission. That is, they experience a social death due to the 
withdrawal of friends and family. This withdrawal progresses further due to their 
bodily disintegration. Lawton (2000) argues that the academic rhetoric on hospice is 
not about fear of death. Neither is it about obsession with death, as suggested by 
Walter (1994). It is primarily about the question of personhood. Lawton (2000:172) 
questions; ‘When, during the dying trajectory, does one cease to be a person per se, 
and when does death become a better option to living and suffering?’ The work of 
Copp (1996, 1999) and Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000) share some common features 
where they identify how in hospice care the personhood status of the dying person is 
in question, particularly as death approaches.
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2.2.1.4 Readiness to die -  the person-hody split during the dying process 
Copp (1996, 1999) used prospective case study methodology, combining participant 
observation, interview data and medical and nursing documentation to explore 
experiences of patients who were facing impending death in one hospice setting. 
Comprehensive case reports are presented of 12 individual patients detailing the 
experiences of both patients in confronting death and nurses experiences of caring for 
these patients. The study specifically set out to use a symbolic interactionist 
perspective and the ‘open-awareness’ context (Glaser and Strauss 1965) where it was 
understood that the patients were living in the knowledge of ‘certain death but at an 
unknown time’ (Copp 1996:85). I address Glaser and Strauss (1965) awareness- 
context theory in detail later in this chapter.
Copp constructed a model to describe how both the patients and nurses understood 
‘readiness to die’ for this patient group. Three phases of the process were identified, 
these were: ‘protecting and controlling’, ‘watching and waiting’, and ‘holding on and 
letting go’. Protecting and controlling was the dominant theme of the model. This 
involved protecting kin, patient and nurse protecting each other, and protecting self 
through a number of controlling processes. These themes were both individually 
distinct but also intertwined. Protecting was about the ‘public’ and ‘private’ fronts, 
for which Copp (1996) draws on Goffman (1959) to explicate. Everyone protected 
each other, particularly as physical deterioration accelerated and in the event of the 
emban assment of loss of control of continence, memory problems and slurred speech 
of people with neurological degeneration. These were ‘covered up’ to preserve the 
dignity of the dying person. As found in Lawton’s work both patients and nurses 
focused on the bodily deterioration of the process of cancer and this was crucial in
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determining quality of life and dignity of patients. Copp’s (1996) participants speak 
of the body leaking in the same manner as described by Lawton (1998a, 2000) and 
Waskul and van der Riet (2002).
Copp (1996, 1999), as does Lawton (1998a, 2000), also draws on the work of Lawler 
(1991). Lawler (1991) developed some of the earlier sociological discussions on 
nursing and embodiment. She refers to ‘the problem of the body’ as a configuration 
of embodiment that has arisen out of the fragmentation of study of the body. Lawler
(1991) was concerned that the emphasis had been on abstract and reductively derived 
knowledge, and claimed that practical knowledge about the body has not been 
systematically studied. She saw ‘the problem of the body’ as people not wanting to 
know about nurses ‘practical’ knowledge of the body. Consequently there was a 
social pressure to hide the body, some of its functions, and the private nature of work 
that nurses do in caring for the bodies of patients, i.e. work that is carried out behind 
closed doors.
Copp (1996, 1999) shows how both patients and nurses consistently separated body 
from personal self, however, for patients this was related to body distancing in 
discussions about funeral arrangements. For nurses the split was linked to the process 
of gauging whether the person’s physical and personal self were in synchrony. The 
nurses felt ‘rejected’ if the patient chose not to discuss impending death. It appeared 
to be important that the nurses had formed a relationship with the patient that openly 
acknowledged the impending death and when this occurred the person-body split was 
synchronised. An absence of the synchronicity/separation constituted the total 
annihilation of the person, body and self. Copp (1996, 1999) found that the
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establishment of personhood status required a relationship that had developed over 
time between the nurses and the dying patient and this in turn led to a strong sense of 
coherence.
This finding correlates with a theoretical framework of hospice work developed by 
Andershed and Temestedt (2001). The authors draw together four studies about 
relatives’ involvement in the care of the dying to provide a useful metaphorical model 
of hospice work in Sweden. The ‘involvement in the light’ represents meaningful 
involvement in the dying process for people who have a sufficiently long illness 
trajectory. This requires time within which relationships can be made between the 
staff and patient and is depicted as developing a strong sense of coherence. 
‘Involvement in the dark’ conceptualised non-meaningful involvement due to a rapid 
illness trajectory where there was no time to form this relationship. Consequently 
there ensues a weak sense of coherence.
Of further interest, and in relation to the issue of the capacity of hospices to extend 
services to a wider group of chronic illnesses, Copp (1996) found that three of her 
cases did not die during the study, which took place over a number of years. There 
was lack of conformity to the expected dying trajectory and these patients went 
through a transition from a dying to a not-dying role. This created tension and 
conflict for the hospice under study regarding the use of expensive services and the 
appropriateness of the place of care for the patients with this new role.
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2.2. L 5 'Symbiotic niceness '
Li (2002) draws on the work of Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Copp (1996, 1999), 
although her focus, when drawing on these works, is on the psychosocial discussions 
within the theses rather than on bodily care. She specifically set out to investigate 
how palliative care nurses enact psychosocial care in their natural surroundings, with 
particular reference to their talk and to emotional labour theory. Using an 
ethnographical approach and conversation analysis of the nurses’ ‘talk’ from two 
hospices and a general hospital in the South of England, Li (2002) proposed a theory 
of ‘symbiotic niceness’. The work is underpinned by emotional labour theory, as is 
Froggatt’s thesis. Li’s (2002) model proposes that through the negotiation and 
enacting of psychosocial care, both nurses and patients use a number of constructs of 
‘niceness’, each one dependent on how patients were categorised by the nurses. The 
premise is that ‘symbiotic niceness’ is a core component of professional and patient 
identity which works to maintain social orderliness. It is also posited that this process 
advances personal, professional and organisational aspirations. She summaries her 
argument with the equation: nurses' assets + patient assets = team assets = 
organisational assets = marketable assets = 'nice ' organisation (Li 2002:270). This 
argument, for maintaining orderliness within organisations, will be returned to in the 
discussion on dementia care within organisations.
The idea of ‘doing niceness’ in hospice is not new. Speck (1994) coined the term 
‘chronic niceness’ in describing how staff work at creating an environment in which a 
‘good’ or ‘nice’ death can be achieved. ‘There is a collective fantasy that the staff are 
nice people, who are caring for nice dying people, who are going to have a nice death 
in a nice place’ (Speck 1994:97). In using this term Speck (1994) refers to a process
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where the individual and organisation collude to split off and deny aspects of the 
stress of caring for dying people, a component of doing niceness also acknowledged 
by Li (2002) and demonstrated by Froggatt (1995), where the body of the nurse was 
posited as a metaphorical container for holding emotions which could be released 
only at appropriate times. Speck (1994) suggests that organisational and work 
pressure increase ‘not-so-nice’ feelings that are then projected onto management. In 
this ‘niceness’ relationship it is only the patient who really appreciates what they 
(staff) are doing in their everyday care practices (Speck 1994). Li (2002) does not 
examine the impact of ‘symbiotic niceness’ on the wider organisation in any detail. 
However, Li’s conceptualisation of doing niceness to maintain social order has 
implications for the maintenance of continuing niceness outside of the nurse/patient 
interaction relationship, if as Speck (1994) suggests niceness is used as a defence 
against the fear of death. In which case categorising patients enacting different 
‘types’ of niceness supports the proposal that this is a strategy for managing conscious 
and unconscious defences against the emotional impact of working with dying people, 
as suggested by Speck (1994).
Although it does sei*ve as a means of managing relations between palliative care 
nurses and dying patients, ‘symbiotic niceness’ is not easily applicable in the case of 
people who are demented. At least Li (2002) does not address how ‘symbiotic 
niceness’ may be enacted with the person who is cognitively impaired. The 
implication is that the model could not be used as it generally requires the 
demonstration of ‘niceness’ to be initiated by the patient rather than the nurse.
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It is however, a model that may be applied to the relationship between family 
members (of people with dementia) and hospice nurses. In this case it acts rather as a 
deceptive mechanism where the underlying feelings and beliefs about how patients 
should be managed (controlled) may be hidden from family members. Li’s (2002) 
work is useful in portraying staff acting out organisational roles, displaying the culture 
and philosophy through actions and words that may not always match practice. The 
idea o f ‘symbiotic niceness’ suggests a somewhat cynical approach to the interactions 
between nurses and their patients within hospice care. However, Li (2002) is careful 
to point out that it was not her intention to create such an image of the model. Rather 
her thesis sets out to show how the symbiotic nature of interactions between patients 
and nurses is a component of the emotional labour of carrying out psychosocial care.
Within these discussions personhood is implicitly related to concepts of personal 
dignity and the ideology of the ‘good death’. Lawton and Copp propose theories of 
hospice care that address the concept of personhood in similar ways. For Lawton 
(1998a, 2000) personhood was used to consider aspects of self and the place of self 
during a dying process where self is disintegrating. Lawton is particularly critical of 
the concept of the ‘good death’ and Copp (1996) is careful not to use the term ‘good 
death’ but speaks of the ‘model death’. The ‘model death’ is related to a death 
observed by one patient as to how they would like to die. Copp (1996) later refers to 
the ‘peaceful death’ as the death whereby the dying person has resolved any issues, 
where the body-person is synchronised and they have reached a stage of open 
awareness, i.e. according to the nurses they die ‘at peace’.
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In the above four models organisational activity is either implicit or explicit, Froggatt 
(1995, 1997) presents an idealised concept of hospice work that has commonalities 
with some of the founding principles of hospice where nurses are depicted as ‘ritual 
specialists’ controlling the dying process within a possibly ‘sacred space’. Li (2002) 
presents hospice as a creating an impression of a ‘nice’, ‘marketable’ organisation 
with less of an idealised focus than does Froggatt (1995, 1997), but demonstrates how 
symbiotic niceness works to maintain social orderliness within the organisation. 
Controlling is explicit within all of the models albeit with different emphasis. Lawton 
(1998a, 2000) shows how the dying process is controlled through a state of isolation 
enforced by a social rejection of the unsightly ‘unbounded body’, i.e. sequestration. 
Both Froggatt (1995) and Copp (1996) identify the tension between controlling and 
protecting, and also identify hospice as place within which dying may be hidden. For 
Froggatt (1995) this tension between controlling and managing care is related to 
knowledge and time, i.e. ‘possessing knowledge’ (specialist hospice knowledge of 
pain and symptom control) and ‘having time’ (to get to know the patient). Froggatt 
(1995, 1998) identifies two factors that facilitate the daily work of hospice ideology 
by the ‘ritual specialist’ that are necessary for the establishment of relationships 
between nurses, patients and their kin. This is depicted as a bridge over which a 
relationship between a nurse and patient is established, whereas for Copp (1996), this 
tension relates to protecting self and others through a number of controlling processes. 
Both Li (2002) and Copp (1996) use the work of Goffman to consider concepts of 
self, where for Li the self was an ‘acted’ self, and for Copp (1996), during the dying 
process, protecting the ‘public’ and ‘private’ fronts for patients was of crucial 
importance. Emotional labour theory, which is closely linked to understanding
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organisational behaviour is used to underpin the work of both Froggatt (1995) and Li 
(2002).
2.2.2 Dignity and dying
The ideology of the ‘good death’ is central to the hospice movement (Hart et al 1998) 
and is a subject that has attracted a number of research projects and philosophical 
dialogue. See for example (Kellehear 1990; McNamara et al 1994, 1995; Low and 
Payne 1996; Payne eta l 1996a, 1996b; Mui Hing Mak and Clinton 1999; Leichtentritt 
and Rettig 2000; Steinhauser et al 2000; Kristjanson et al 2001; Masson 2002; 
Seymour et al 2002; Vig et al 2002; Dekkers et al 2002; DelVecchio Tong et al 2003; 
Walter 2003; Good et al 2004; Walters 2004). However, Lawton (2000) believes that 
there is an urgent need for more rigorous analysis of such taken-for-granted principles 
as ‘good death’ and ‘death with dignity’. Within this debate Lawton (2000) points out 
how the concept of ‘dignified death’, that is also central to the hospice movement, is 
articulated principally in terms of a discourse centring on pain, a suggestion that 
encompasses the debate outlined above on the médicalisation of hospice care. Lawton 
(1998a, 2000) concludes her thesis with a call for further debate on how and why 
hospice is promoted as the antithesis of euthanasia when patients admitted to hospice 
often request assisted death.
Lawton’s work is based on an anthropological model and Clark et al (2002:59) points 
out that it is not the palliative care clinicians who are writing about the ‘good death’ 
now, ‘but sociologists, anthropologists, historians and ethicists’, and these debates are 
increasingly focusing on the subject of assisted death or euthanasia. This criticism, of 
distancing the dialogue about the ‘good death’ between clinicians and scholars.
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supports one of the positive elements of the so called médicalisation of death. That is, 
clinicians may be more likely to take a pragmatic approach to dying and focus on 
what patients’ really want, in that patients may not fear death but may fear rather the 
process of dying (Clark et al 2002).
‘Good death’, ‘dignity’ and ‘quality of life’ are often evoked and used synonymously 
in end-of-life discussions and debate, and ‘dignity has been subsumed into quality-of- 
life domains, rather than explored for its complex and hidden meanings’ (Street and 
Kissane 2001:95). The concept of dignity is often raised in relation to ideas about the 
‘good death’, by both patients and staff (Payne et al 1996a, 1996b), in relation to 
‘death with dignity’ (Allmark 2002), in debates on euthanasia (Pullman 2004), and in 
planning or making decisions about treatments at the end of life (Chochinov 2002; 
Chochinov et al 2002; Downie 2004; McClement et al 2004). Indeed when Oregon 
legalised physician-assisted suicide in 1997 the title of the document was the ‘Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act’. A precise conceptualisation of dignity is thought by some 
scholars to be enigmatic and elusive (Turner et al 1996; Pullman 2004). Dignity has 
been referred to as an ‘ambiguous euphemism’ (Lynch 1982 cited Pullman 2004). 
Recently it has been referred to as a ‘useless concept’ (Macklin 2003), a claim that 
engendered some debate on the British Medical Journal rapid response website 
(2004). Using measures that were considered relevant to dignity in dying Turner et al 
(1996) reported differences in perception between different observers in what makes a 
dignified death, even with staff using similar parameters in making the judgement.
Radley (2004) presents dignity as both a spectacle and an achievement, a status which 
is accorded by its appearance. Dignity, as a ‘spectacle’, refers to suffering (indignity)
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that is witnessed. Dignity as ‘achievement’ is seen as the result of an individual’s 
way of acting. That is, how they may show how they can suffer and yet be dignified 
(Radley 2004). In this context individual autonomy and personal choice are often 
seen as synonymous in providing a notion of ‘personal dignity’ (Pullman 2004). In 
developing an argument on dying, human dignity, and moral meaning Pullman 
concludes that:
Death with dignity then means dying in a manner that comports with how 
the dying person understands his or her own personal dignity, rather than 
according to some one else’s conception of personal dignity, or some 
externally imposed universal standard of basic dignity (Pullman 
2004:174).
Defining dignity as an individual and personal concept brings into question 
judgements that may be made about care interventions at the end-of-life that use 
concepts such as dignity that are based on dignity as a ‘spectacle’. Dignity of the 
patient is always under threat from the way others are involved in constructing a new 
identity for them (Lupton 1997), particularly when the appearance of the body of the 
person is rendered grotesque by the disease processes (Waskul and van der Riet
2002). To conceptualise dignity as a ‘spectacle’ requires the spectator to also have a 
personal concept of dignity. As pointed out by Frank (2004a), dignity may be 
conceptualised as an ‘event’ happening between persons, rather than a fixed quality. 
In this case ‘anyone’s loss of dignity threatens everyone; as that other person is 
treated, so I myself might be treated’ (Frank 2004a:207).
The purpose of developing this argument is to apply concepts of dignity and end-of- 
life care to people with dementia and perhaps counter the suggestion by Walter (2003) 
that the ‘bad death’ may be attributed to the death of the person with no autonomy.
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That is, according to Walter (2003), the patient with stroke or Alzheimer’s disease, 
who cannot communicate his or her wishes or whose brain has so deteriorated that 
there are no wishes left. Models that have been developed that aim at dignity- 
conserving care approaches (Chochinov 2002; Chochinov et al 2002; McClement et 
al 2004) require some degree of patient autonomy in their application and are not 
easily applied to people who are cognitively impaired, except by proxy (spectators). 
This is due to the fact that it is assumed that little is known about what is taking place 
within the mind of the person who is severely cognitively impaired and unable to 
articulate their needs and wishes.
However, there is a growing body of evidence that must lead practitioners to question 
assumptions about the functioning of the brains (or minds) of people who have severe 
brain damage. Of note is Bauby’s (1997) personal experience of ‘lock-in syndrome’ 
following a massive stroke. This enlightening piece of work is witness to the 
continuing intelligent, humorous and lucid working of the mind in an almost totally 
paralysed body. The testimony of Bauby (1997) was composed using a specially 
constructed communicator which he used through the blinking of his left eye. His 
experience of being ‘locked-in’, and his response to his carers and their individual 
care practices, demonstrates how important it is not to assume loss of awareness of 
people with neurological damage, or in their personal experiences of dignity or 
indignity. Whilst the case of Bauby (1997) is not necessarily comparable to the 
dementia experience, recent work that draws analogies between coma and dementia 
(Lidzey 2004; Clarke 2004) allows consideration of the dementia state as one that 
may resemble the ‘locked-in’ experience.
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Studies that have attempted to conceptualise dignity within hospice care have 
predominately focused on the perceptions of patients (Turner et al 1996; Chochinov 
2002; Chochinov et al 2002; McClement et al 2004), where the patient is clearly able 
to articulate their own experiences of the impact of care and what this means in 
relation to their personal dignity. One of the characteristics of dignity identified by 
Chochinov et al (2002) was that dignity was seen by the patients as preservation of 
cognitive abilities and physical independence. Any major loss of such characteristics 
was perceived by the patients to be associated with loss of dignity. I return to the 
discussion by Frank (2004a) and Pullman (2004), where it is posited that concepts of 
dignity are socially constructed. A socially constructed view allows that assumptions 
may be made, by others, ‘spectators’, that people with cognitive impairment and loss 
of physical independence could be seen to be without dignity. I make this argument 
using Radley’s (2004) position on dignity as a spectacle, where the judgement is 
based on the ‘observers’ concept of dignity.
There is little empirical research specifically on the concept of the ‘good death’ and 
its association with ‘dignity’ within the dementia literature. A study using structured 
telephone interviews with 57 family member care-givers of persons with Alzheimer’s 
disease who had died whilst a resident in a nursing home in the USA, (Bosek et al
2003) attempted to elicit participants’ understanding of the phenomenon of the ‘good 
death’ for this group. The researchers found that 89.5% of the participants believed 
their family member had died with dignity. A significant number (28%), of the 
caregivers did not believe they had experienced a ‘good death’. Based on the 
participants’ responses the ‘good death’ was one where the death conformed to the 
dying person’s preference (as believed by the family member) regarding when and
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where to die. It also required that the death occurred without discomfort for the dying 
person (as observed by caregivers). Bosek et al (2003) conclude that a good death, as 
proposed in the literature, could not occur when the person is dying from Alzheimer’s 
disease. Having Alzheimer’s disease limits the person’s capacity to participate in 
most of the components of a good death (Bosek et al 2003). This supports Walter’s 
(2003) view that such a death may be constructed as a ‘bad death’. However, these 
views are based on constructs about the ‘good death’ that cognitively impaired people 
cannot contribute to.
Whilst discussions on the ‘good death’ are limited within the dementia literature, the 
term dignity is used frequently, and often as freely and ‘loosely’ as it is in much of the 
palliative care literature. Any judgement on the dignity of a person with advanced 
dementia fits Radley’s (2004) concept of dignity as a spectacle, where the dignity 
status would be determined by the ‘spectator(s)’. In this case it is important to 
develop some shared meaning for dignity within any team providing care for this 
patient group. In a phenomenological study of nurses’ and patients’ perceptions of 
dignity Walsh and Kowanko (2002) found that much of the discussion on dignity 
revolved around the exposure of the body and the gaze of others, confirming how 
dignity may be conceptualised as a spectacle.
Enes (2000, 2003) provides a useful conceptualisation of the meaning of dignity in a 
phenomenological study of eight patients, six relatives, and seven (multidisciplinary) 
members of a hospice team in a London hospice. What is particularly useful within 
this study is that the themes are developed from all three groups to form a 
multidisciplinary conceptualisation of dignity within hospice care. Dignity was found
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to be composed of the dimensions, ‘being human’, ‘having control’, ‘relationship and 
belonging’, and ‘maintaining the individual self (Enes 2000, 2003). These themes 
confirm the findings of others on conceptualising dignity. Enes (2000, 2003) work 
also echoes an aspect of Lawton’s (1998, 2000) theory on the sequestration of ‘dirty 
dying’ in one respect. She identifies that, for all groups, to maintain dignity, certain 
things should be ‘hidden’. That is, there was a sense that certain aspects of the ‘self 
should not be exposed if dignity is to be possessed confirming the findings of Walsh 
and Kowanko (2002). This raises an argument against Lawton’s (1998a, 1998b, 
2000) premise that it is society that has predominantly focused on hiding the ‘dirty 
dying’ process. Enes (2000, 2003) correlates with the view held by Storr (1988) that 
sequestration can also be a chosen by the withdrawing person for a complex range of 
reasons. Lawton (2000:148) does concede however, that the dying person becomes 
isolated because, as a response to dying, they were experiencing the world in a way in 
which family and friends could not and were therefore unable to share in the 
experience.
2.2.3 Personhood, dying and dementia
Within discussions on dignity also lies the enormous ethical and philosophical debate 
on concepts of self and personhood. Personhood is a concept that is frequently 
evoked in both the palliative care and dementia care literature and is often linked to 
discussions on dignity. There is a large literature on the subject of personhood and 
dementia which will not be addressed here. I have focused the discussion on 
discussions on personhood in general and personhood in relation to dying, suffice to 
say that there is an emerging criticism of the use of the term person-centred care
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within the dementia literature (see for example Adams 1999; Nolan et al 2003; 
McCormack 2004; Adams and Gardiner 2005).
Both Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Copp (1996, 1999) have discussed the concept of 
personhood in relation to death and dying. For Lawton the inference is that the 
carers’ perception of the dying patient, as they approach death, was that the ‘person’ 
had already gone. Descriptions such as: ‘slips into a coma’, ‘switches off mentally’ 
and ‘become unaware of their environment’ (Lawton 2000:113), were used to denote 
that the person had gone. A view shared by both staff and family members.
Fu-Chang Tsai (2001) states that deep controversies have developed in Western 
philosophy in general, and bioethics in particular, on conceptions of personhood. A 
massive literature exists where debates abound on personhood status of, to list a few: 
embryos, stillbirths, abortion, childhood, severe disability (including birth defects and 
accidental damage), mental illness, autism, homelessness, persistent vegetative state, 
people with profound dementia, and a state of unconsciousness at the end of life. 
Within these ethical debates argument continues on whether ‘persons’ are also 
‘human beings’ (Fu-Chang Tsai 2001). It is generally stressed, within this argument, 
that rationality, self-consciousness, and autonomous moral agency are the key features 
of being human (Fu-Chang Tsai 2001). Engelhardt (1986) proposes that human 
beings, such as infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, people in a permanent 
vegetative state, and individuals with advanced dementia are merely persons in a 
social sense. However, to be a person in a social sense must, by definition, require 
some sort of person-to-person interaction. Fu-Chang Tsai (2001) uses this argument 
to present a Confucian definition of personhood. Within the Confucian model the
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boundaries between the self and others is not clear. Personhood is a relational-based 
state, where becoming fully human is a process that occurs through continuous 
interaction with other human beings. Much in the manner described by Frank 
(2004a), where dignity is an ‘event’ happening between persons, the Confucian model 
proposes that one’s dignity as a person depends as much on communal participation 
as on one’s own sense of self-respect (Fu-Chang Tsai 2001).
Biomedical ethics do not specifically address the subject of personhood or non- 
personhood but appear to prefer to use terms such as competency and non competency 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Implicit within this however, is that competency 
equals personhood and non competency equals non-personhood. In the event of a 
severely cognitively impaired patient’s need for treatment, as is the case for many 
hospice patients as they near death, the strategy is one of making reasonable medical 
judgements (médicalisation) (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). These appear to be 
equated with quality of life judgements (palliative care philosophy) when applied by 
hospice clinicians. Consent for treatment appears to be grounded in discussions on 
competence and non competence within hospice settings. Many treatments and 
interventions are instigated without consent, or with assumed consent, for example the 
use of sedation. However, little study has been conducted that examines the consent 
and non consent to the administration of sedation in hospice.
The study by Bosek et al (2003) on the ‘good death’ for people with dementia does 
highlight that family members have concerns about administration of sedating 
medication and the possibility of family members raising the issue of assisted suicide 
or euthanasia and facilitating the death of a person with Alzheimer’s disease was
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addressed. Bosek et al (2003) make recommendations that professionals became 
knowledgeable about the professional standards for assisted suicide or euthanasia in 
their state or country. This concern was also a factor raised by Seymour et al (2002) 
in a preliminary exploration of older people’s assessment of morphine and terminal 
sedation. Seymour et al (2002) highlight the need to find some common ground 
between patients, family members and healthcare professionals in grasping the 
implications of sedation at the end of life. Doubts and fears were expressed regarding 
risk of exclusion from comfort by not adequately representing dying relatives needs. 
Concerns were also raised about hastening death by use of medications. The 
possibility of families swaying decision making in a manner that hastened the death 
are areas in need of further research (Seymour et al 2002). These issues also raise 
some questions in relation to medications now used in hospice such as, for example, 
midazalom and ketamine, which have historically been used in anaesthetics, a field of 
medicine that has a strong focus on consent.
2.2.4 Disintegration as a spectacle
Fear, horror and aversion to the disintegrating body is not new (de Beauvoir 1970; 
Synnott 1993; Lupton 1994; Williams and Bendelow 1998; Shilling 2003). Nor is it 
new for an individual to wish to withdraw from the social world for reasons of 
disintegrating illness (Storr 1980; Mellor 1993; Lupton 1994; Lawton 1998a, 1998b, 
2000). However, there have also been periods of history where spectacles of 
disintegration were on public view as a source of entertainment. There are examples 
of human dissections of criminals, as a form of punishment, being carried out for 
public entertainment (Richardson 1988).
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Even in the present Western culture the curiosity of the public about death, 
disintegration, and deformity is identified by the interest that is shown in these 
subjects. For example the unprecedented interest in the von Hagens ‘Body Worlds’ 
exhibition (2002) which included carrying out a public autopsy. The inclusion of a 
multitude of public and the media responses in the form of displays of newspaper 
clippings, also presented at the exhibition, served to further emphasise fascination 
towards spectacles of disintegration. As pointed out by a contributor to the von 
Hagen website, ‘going to see a plastinate man carrying his own skin draped like a coat 
over his arm is no different from going to see a travelling freak show in mid twentieth 
century America’ (A804322 2003). The internet displays of beheadings in Iraq and 
the mixed horror and fascination with these, provide another example of responses to 
human disintegration, and journalists constantly debate the context, dignity, distance 
and the nature of the audience in portraying graphic and powerful images of human 
destruction (Marks 2003). There is a paradox in present Western culture, where there 
is ambivalence and hypocrisy towards public displays of disintegration with 
expressions of shock and horror, and also fascination of such displays. This paradox 
extends to fascination (the need to gaze at) and rejection and disgust (the need to hide 
or sequestrate) both disintegrating minds and bodies.
2.2.4. J Sequestration o f disintegration
Sequestration of people with dementia is also central to contemporary Western 
culture. Historically, at least from the Classical Age to the twentieth century, the aged 
and the insane have been dehumanised and frequently confined to institutions 
(Goffman 1961; de Beauvoir 1970; Szasz 1975). The disintegrating dying and the 
demented share a common ground in Western culture in that the bodies and ‘minds’
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of dementia sufferers have been hidden from society in the same manner as Mellor 
(1993) and Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000) describe the sequestration of the 
disintegrating dying. Lawton (2000) briefly addresses these commonalities. This 
sequestration and social rejection has also been identified in institutions for people 
with severe physical disabilities in long-term care (Miller and Gwynne 1972; 
Dartington et al 1981; Roberts 1994a). Roberts (1994a:79) describes the crossing of 
the boundary into such institutions as ‘joining the category of non-contributing, non- 
participants in society’, where they were treated as if they were already socially dead. 
People with dementia are often referred to within the same context as those who are 
dying, without acknowledgement of the terminal state of the disease, and in some 
cases referred to as ‘already dead’ (Gubrium 1986; Orona 1990; Herskovits 1995) 
while they are quite obviously physically alive.
Much of this debate is echoed in the literature on personhood as discussed earlier. 
Suggestions have also been made that the person in the advanced stage of Alzheimer’s 
disease may be classified as already ‘dead’, based on new definitions of death (Blank 
2002). Post (1990) draws attention to the ethical debate on the direct killing of 
newborn (infanticide) and severely demented older people (geronticide) and the 
implications of this. Because they lack empowering capacities, people with advanced 
dementia are defined as ‘nonpersons’ by what Post (2000:247) refers to as 
‘hypercognitive values of some of the philosophical bioethicists’. Post (2000) 
proposes that the ultimate hypercognitive assault on Alzheimer disease related 
forgetfulness is physician-assisted suicide. The justification for physician-assisted 
death is believed to have arisen from the issue of longer and more agonising dying 
trajectories (Wolfson 1998). However, in challenging the grounds for euthanasia
78
Wolfson (1998) goes on to cite an example of a case in the USA of a 54 year old 
woman with Alzheimer’s disease who was given a ‘physician-assisted suicide’ death, 
according to Wolfson (1998), instigated by her husband. She was not terminally ill 
and had only been diagnosed one year before the assisted death.
I do not intend to develop an ethical debate on dementia and ‘physician-assisted 
suicide’ but merely to bring to attention the position of people with dementia and their 
value (and the value they may place on themselves should they become demented) 
within society. What repeatedly comes to the focus within the above debates is how 
socially and psychologically important it is to create a sense of ‘order’ within 
environments of care for these people.
2.2,5 Ordering the disorderly: congruency in dementia and hospice care practices 
Dementia renders people vulnerable and dependent upon others for the provision of 
their care needs and leads to suggestions that they are no longer persons. Mitteness 
and Barker (1995) and Oliver (1999) suggest that the symptoms that occur in the 
person with dementia, such as incontinence, unstable mobility and babbling speech 
symbolise a loss of control that is culturally ‘incompatible with adulthood’ (Mitteness 
and Barker 1995:191). Of particular interest is a study conducted by Oliver (1999), 
who analysed attempts by an institution to impose structure and control on the daily 
lives of residents with Alzheimer’s disease, in a residential setting. Whilst this is a 
study of old age and dementia it has some congruency with the concept of hospice 
developed by Lawton (1998a, 2000) in relation to the marginalisation by society of 
the people who have lost control of bodily functions. Oliver (1999) developed a 
concept of ‘ordering the disorderly’ and concluded that the need to conceal, contain
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and control the disorder of these people is a means of avoiding the risk of exposure of 
the shortcomings of: . modernity’s biggest failure; the inability of science to cure
the uncontrollable aspects of ageing or to conquer death’ (1999:182). Oliver’s (1999) 
study revealed five ‘imposition of structural controls’ over the lives of the residents. 
These were: temporally, physically, materially, organisational, and behaviourally and 
linguistically. Some of these have congruency with hospice practices.
Temporally refers to a strict regime of time structure which tended to create a sense of 
depersonalisation of residents. This related to the daily activities of people with 
dementia and there is congruency with hospice care. Whilst the hospice philosophy 
and practice promotes an environment of granting a high degree of autonomy to 
patients, Walter (1994), Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Ramsay (2000) make observations 
about the control of patients that takes place within hospices, albeit subtle control. In 
an observation study by Ramsay (2000) a state of ‘enforced’ privacy of patients was a 
focus of the hospice in which the observations took place. This was despite the 
‘created’ atmosphere of homeliness (including a cat). Another form of temporal 
control that is imposed within hospice is that of admission criteria (Hockley 1997). 
Rigid time limits on the length of stay are imposed in most hospices, with a strict 
criteria for admission primarily needed to cope with limited bed numbers (Hockley 
1997; Eve and Smith 1996; Eagle 2002; Gannon 2002). Douglas et al (1999) report 
one case where the person with variant CJD was discharged from the hospice because 
the dying process was taking too long, a situation that caused great distress to the 
family.
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Oliver (1999) found that control and concealment was also physically imposed. This 
was the manner in which the unit was placed, i.e. beside a medical centre, ‘medical 
gaze’ and surrounded by residential areas, ‘normality’. An illusion of order is 
presented behind which were ‘decorated’ locked doors. There is congruency with this 
category as identified by Walter (1994) and Lawton (1998a, 2000), in the concept of 
sequestration, which again is (questionably) more subtle. The hospice environment, 
the created atmosphere of peacefulness, calm and homeliness (Walter 1994; Lawton 
1998a, 2000), serves to provide a front for the process of disintegration and dying 
(Lawton 1998a, 2000). However, this aspect of the hospice has not been researched 
in any substantial way. Physical control is imposed through the use of sedation, rather 
than the locked doors and gates found in the dementia care environment. However, 
the regimented methods described by Oliver also included sedation.
Materially, the setting and décor of the units are designed to promote an ‘image of 
tranquillity’, much in the manner of hospice décor. Oliver (1999) suggests that these 
serve to conceal the disorder, the bodily degeneration and decay contained within the 
units. This is a feature of hospices highlighted by both Lawton (1998a, 2000) and 
Walter (1994) where the peacefulness of the environment is of paramount importance. 
Organisational and bureaucratic measures were used to take away any time that could 
be spent with the residents on a personal level (Oliver 1999). Once again a more 
subtle level of this is present within the hospice and is focused around medication, 
particularly sedation of people who are agitated and distressed.
Behaviourally and linguistically residents were categorised and stereotyped according 
to their behaviours and the denial of personhood was perpetuated through
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infantilisation and humiliation (Oliver 1999). There is no evidence within the 
palliative care/hospice literature that indicates congruency of this category within 
present hospice care. However, in relation to future admission of patients with 
dementia to hospices, it may be found to be relevant as it is in many other settings 
where people with dementia are cared for.
2.2,6 Awareness context
The hospice model and environment offers an opportunity for sharing in the 
experience of dying with dying people themselves within an open awareness context. 
This sharing of experience within a humanistic or spiritual framework has been the 
hallmark of the hospice model throughout the history of the hospice movement, from 
its traditional basis of a place of hospitality, to the present model (Zerwekh 1993; 
Nebauer et al 1996; Rasmussen et al 1995, 1997; Seale 1998). There is an 
assumption that nurses who chose to work in this area feel comfortable with the open 
acknowledgement of death and dying (Payne et al 1998), a factor confirmed in a case 
study on how role-models influence palliative care nurses in their choice of career (de 
Vries 2000a, 2000b). The importance of this shared experience is identified by 
Addington-Hall (2000) as one of the barriers to the integration of people with 
dementia into the hospice environment.
Awareness-context, in relation to death and loss, is a concept developed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1965) from their study of dying people in three hospital sites in the USA. 
Glaser and Strauss proposed four contexts of death awareness between staff and 
patients. ‘Closed awareness’ is where staff knew the prognosis was poor but did not 
share this information with the patient. ‘Suspicious awareness’ occurred when the
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patient suspected that their condition was serious and attempted to confirm this. In 
‘mutual pretence awareness’ both staff and patient knew the patient was dying but 
chose to pretend that it wasn’t so. ‘Open awareness’ was where all concerned, 
patient, staff and relatives, knew and acknowledged impending death, and were 
therefore able to talk about dying. The awareness-context model has been critiqued at 
length within the palliative care literature (Timmerman 1994; Field 1996; Seale 
1999a; Field and Copp 1999) and some further development and extensions of the 
model have been offered. For example, Timmermans (1994) splits the open 
awareness context into three different contexts. ‘Suspended open awareness’ refers to 
a situation where the patient or relative may obstmct staffs efforts to be open. 
‘Uncertain open awareness’ is viewed as a flexible period where death matters can be 
discussed if they leave a margin of hope. ‘Active open awareness’ suggests the 
idealised context where patient and family members understand the full implications 
of impending death and try to come to terms with it. Timmerman (1994) uses his 
personal experience of the death of his mother in extending the concept of open 
awareness, pointing out that the importance of the emotional experiences of the 
patients and relatives is lacking in the Glaser and Strauss (1965) model.
Open awareness context is the model that is fundamental to late modem hospice care 
and requires human agency, i.e. illness-insight, where patients have the ability to 
make decisions and discuss the dying process (Seale 1998). Seale (1998) suggests 
that human agency has a significant place in allowing the patient to enter into the 
dying role with open awareness. He says that this entrance is culturally shaped and 
scripted and cannot be applied to the dementia sufferer. A group that could be 
compared (to some extent) to the dementia sufferer is that of people with brain
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tumours, such as malignant glioma. A further challenge to the Glaser and Strauss 
(1965) awareness categories is made by Salander and Spetz (2002) following a 
prospective study of 25 patients, with a diagnosis of malignant glioma, on how they 
talked about death and dying. Patients were not able to share due to cognitive 
deficiencies, personality characteristics, personality change, deep despair, and the 
characteristics of their relationships which placed them in the closed awareness 
context. Salander and Spetz (2002) identified that the couples in their study found 
ways of making life as meaningful as possible, i.e. through ‘mutual 
acknowledgement’ context, part of the awareness context theory that the authors 
believe Glaser and Strauss (1965) did not give due importance to. The idea of a 
‘mutual acknowledgement’ context is much more usefiil in applying awareness 
context for people with dementia and is in keeping with recent discussions on the 
importance of capturing the interdependencies and reciprocities that underpin caring 
relationships within the field of dementia care (Nolan et al 2002; Nolan et al 2003). 
A relational approach to palliative care has also been taken up by ethicists using 
Levinas ethics of the call of the Other’s suffering, a call that ‘commands’ a relational 
response (Schotsmans 2002).
2.2.6.1 Awareness context and people with dementia
At the heart of dementia is loss (Chesten and Bender 1999) and since the late 1980s 
there has been a new emerging view in dementia care, where the individual 
perspective of the dementia sufferer is being stressed. Within this new perspective 
has come a more developed understanding of both the experiences and emotional 
needs of the dementia sufferer (Miesen 1993, 1997, 1999; Kitwood 1990, 1993; 
Kitwood and Bredin 1992; Normann et al 1998, 2002; Oliver 1999). Miesen (1997,
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1999) suggests, and offers some proof of, an awareness context for dementia sufferers 
that exists and could be accessed and scripted in circumstances related to care 
practices and a concept of loss. Miesen (1997) argues that his clinical observations 
and research (Miesen 1993), plus the reseai ch of others has proven that patients with 
dementia of the Alzheimer type still respond to their illness, even after their ‘illness- 
insight’ has disappeared. He refers to this, using the Glaser and Strauss (1965) 
awareness-context theory. Miesen (1997, 1999) maintains that the awareness-context 
causes the dementia sufferer to experience a chronic trauma related to separation, loss, 
powerlessness, displacement and homelessness. Although Miesen does not suggest 
that this awareness encompasses death-awareness there is no evidence contrary to the 
possibility. Miesen (1999) is adamant that for the person with dementia, emotional 
responses to their experiences remain throughout the dementia process. This is 
verified in the early research on the variant CJD experience. There is evidence that 
despite all the apparent symptoms of dementia, many of the people with CJD retained 
a degree of awareness up to very near the time of death. Family members were 
distressed by health care professionals’ disbelief or disregard of the awareness state of 
the person with CJD (Douglas et al 1999; Bailey et al 2000; de Vries et al 2003).
This ability of dementia sufferers to respond meaningfully to others in some situations 
has been identified by researchers in the field (Kitwood and Bredin 1992; Sab at and 
Haixé 1992; Normann et al 1998, 2002). Not only through the use of dynamic 
psychotherapy that has been used in research on this aspect (Hausman 1992) but also 
through the ‘kind care’ that may be part of the normal practice of formal care-givers 
in nursing and residential homes. ‘Kind-care’ can have an impact on a dementia 
sufferer in that some lucidity is briefly restored when the person is treated with a high
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level of kindness and gentleness (Normann et al 1998, 2002). Kitwood and Bredin
(1992) anecdotally report that people may show ‘rementia’ when a conscious 
connection is established with a carer. Kitwood (1993) describes these events in 
relation to care that is centred on the individual.
There are many anecdotal reports of carers relating episodes of the patient 
unexpectedly speaking or acting in a way that surprises the carer and indicates that the 
patient may be more aware of his environment and situation than assumed. Such 
episodes have been referred to as ‘episodes of lucidity’ (Norberg et al 1986; 
Aakerlund and Norberg 1986; Normann et al 1998, 2002). Data from five interviews 
(over a period of two weeks) with a woman with dementia showed how lucidity is 
promoted by supporting the person with dementia using concepts of confirmation and 
communion. Support was given by sharing the person’s view, repeating and 
reformulating the person’s utterance and not emphasising errors (Normann et al 
2002). Normann et al (2002) also showed how when the researcher made demands on 
the person with dementia the response was to go from lucidity to nonlucidity. Using 
this approach communication can be understood as more than just transmission of 
information but rather as a certain way of relating to the other (Normann et al 2002).
Bleathman and Morton (1992) reported experiences similar to those described above 
when using validation therapy with patients. Examples of the use of reminiscence, 
where patients have unexpectedly told carers something about their past that was 
confirmed by their relatives have been described (Bright 1992; Sabat and Harré 1992). 
Jansson et al (1993) and Kihlgren et al (1996) report that dementia sufferers revealed 
more of themselves to carers who spoke the patient’s native language and provided
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patients with calm, loving care. Many of these studies are small but accumulatively 
they provide evidence that people with dementia retain emotional responses to events 
that occur in their lives. There is also anecdotal evidence of episodes of complete 
lucidity immediately prior to death, in the case of profound dementia of long standing. 
The suggestion that awareness of death is culturally shaped or a sociologically 
scripted process proposes a narrow focus of human capacity, ignoring much of the 
biological and functionalist views of human emotion and action.
2.3 Dementia care at the end-of-life
In a review of literature on dementia care, practice and research Nolan et al (2002) 
raise the question of why and when interventions into dementia care relationships 
should take place. What is not explicitly acknowledged within this review is that 
dementia syndromes are, in the majority of cases, caused by terminal illnesses. In 
which case plans for interventions must begin by addressing the potential disease 
trajectory with assessment processes that allow preparation for end-of-life care. 
Dementia as a terminal illness was not generally acknowledged within the palliative 
care literature until the 1980s in the USA. Since then a large literature has emerged, 
predominantly from the USA (Volicer 1986, 1997; Brechling and Kuhn 1989; 
Luchins and Hanrahan 1993; Hanrahan and Luchins 1995a, 1995b; Luchins et al 
1997; Hanrahan et al 1999; Hurley et al 2000; Volicer et al 2001; 2003). A national 
survey of 400 nursing homes in the USA revealed that carers believed that people 
dying with dementia had special needs that were primarily reflective of the limitations 
in communication (Moss et al 2002). Of note was the prominence of discussion on 
advanced directives, which are a common feature in US healthcare end-of-life 
planning. These gave staff a clear direction in managing the care and allowed for
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substantial agreement between the wishes of the person with dementia, family 
members and staff, particularly in relation to issues around hydration and tube 
feeding. Pain control was considered a significant issue by more than half of the 
nursing homes surveyed (55%), although in practice most of the nursing homes (73%) 
reported that pain in dementia residents was treated as aggressively as pain in other 
residents (Moss et al 2002).
There remains a paucity of studies on quality of end-of-life experiences of people with 
dementia and their carers in care home environments within the UK and it is only in 
the last decade that palliative care literature in the UK has acknowledged terminal 
illness status of dementia (Lloyd-Williams 1996; McCarthy et al 1997; Addington- 
Hall 2000; Lloyd-Williams and Payne 2002). From a secondary analysis of a 
retrospective, national, population-based, interview survey of relatives or officials of 
3,696 people who had died in the last quarter of 1990 from 20 English Health 
Districts (Addington-Hall et al 1998) 170 people with dementia were identified. 
These were compared with 1,513 people with cancer (McCarthy et al 1997). The 
authors concluded that people dying with dementia have symptoms and healthcare 
needs comparable with those with cancer. This led to recommendations from the 
National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services (NCHSPCS) for 
specialist palliative care for non-malignant diseases (Addington-Hall 1998) and has 
extended to psychiatric services, where particular reference is made to end-of-life 
dementia care, including CJD (Addington-Hall 2000).
An audit of palliative care services in the UK indicated that the majority of palliative 
care teams do not include people with end-stage dementia in their remit (Lloyd-
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Williams 1996). In one small study palliative guidelines were implemented on a 
number of long-stay psychiatric units and a retrospective evaluation study of all 
deaths was carried out over 12 months. The study showed that through collaboration 
and multidisciplinaiy work between palliative care and psychiatry for older people 
teams there was a positive impact on the end-of-life care for people with dementia 
particularly in the management of pain (Lloyd-Williams and Payne 2002).
The effectiveness of a comprehensive home-care package for people with dementia 
was also demonstrated in a USA study by Volicer et al (2003). The researchers found 
that care recipients who received psychiatric care, were involved in hospice 
programmes, and had effective pain relief for chronic conditions that caused chronic 
pain, particularly arthritis, were more likely to die at home, or stay at home 
significantly longer than those who did not receive this input. It was recognised that 
chronic pain worsened behavioural symptoms of the dementia and made it more 
difficult to keep the person at home. However, this work is significantly 
underdeveloped in the UK and palliative care services continue to be largely focused 
on the cancer death.
McCarthy et al (1997) found that the most frequent symptoms reported for dementia 
patients were mental confusion, urinary incontinence, pain, low mood, constipation 
and loss of appetite. These were of similar frequency as those reported for cancer 
patients but people with dementia experienced them for longer. This factor of 
‘protracted’ death was also the conclusion of Black and Jolley (1990) in a review of 
the characteristics of 97 patients dying during one year while under the care of 
psychiatry for old age services. Few studies have evaluated prognosis of patients with
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advanced dementia or looked at the natural course of end-stage illness of dementia in 
old age using palliative care principles (Schonwetter et al 2003). This has impacted 
on the level of service input that is accorded this group at the end of life.
In an earlier interview survey on a random national sample of deaths of people aged 
15 and over who died in 10 areas of England Seale (1990) found that those who were 
the most poorly serviced and supported at the end-of-life were the older cognitively 
impaired. Most of the group providing care for the dying person with a diagnosis 
other than cancer and in old age lived alone, or in small family units and resources 
were general poor. The services for those people dying at home with a non-malignant 
disease were overall, less than those with a cancer diagnosis, and the burden of care 
often fell directly onto a frail, elderly spouse (Seale 1990). Whilst these surveys are 
retrospective carer views, they do provide insight into the problems experienced by 
this group. They confirm that the progressive neurological and functional decline of 
the person with dementia may cause a great deal of stress on families and caregivers 
(Mace et al 1999). This often leads to the need for hospital or nursing home 
admission, which further impacts on the bereavement experiences of both the person 
with dementia and their carers, often in a detrimental way (Forbes et al 2000; Nolan 
and Dellasega 2000; Lundh et al 2000; Gessert et al 2001).
2.3.1 Place of death and dementia care
The issue of where people die, where people should die and where people want to die 
is an ongoing debate. Also studies of preferences have been in selected populations or 
in groups receiving a specific service (Higginson et al 1998). Home is often cited as 
the place that most people would prefer to die (Townsend et al 1990; Thorpe 1993;
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Seale and Cartwright 1994; Hinton 1994; Addington-Hall and McCarthy 1995a, 
1995b; Karlsen and Addington-Hall 1998; Higginson and Sen-Gupta 2000; Tang
2003), although this preference may change when underlying situations change for the 
patient (Hinton 1994; Fried et al 1999; Grande et al 2003). Bereaved family members 
of decedents who receive care at home with hospice services are more likely to report 
a favourable dying experience (Karlsen and Addington-Hall 1998; Teno et al 2004). 
However, for various reasons many dying people spend the last days of their life in a 
hospital, hospice or other care environments such as a nursing home, rather than 
remaining at home (Hunt 1997; Hinton 1994; Grande et al 1998; Fried et al 1999; 
Grande et al 2003; Higginson 2003). Reasons for this include family members or 
significant others not able to maintain care as the illness advances and the person 
becomes more and more incapacitated (Hinton 1994; Grande et al 2003). Or, that the 
dying person may not wish to die at home, or may not have been consulted on 
preferred place of death (Pemberton et al 2003; Storey et al 2003). A further reason 
for preference for dying in hospital for cancer patients within the USA was that the 
patients had received their cancer-related treatment in the hospital and had built 
trusting relationships with hospital staff (Tang 2003). The literature on preferred 
place of death has also been predominantly focused on the cancer death, and there has 
been little research on end-of-life wishes of people with dementia.
Specialist palliative care is deemed an ‘acute’ service within the category and 
definition of the service. Admission into the service of a person with dementia, who 
may have a ‘long’ and unpredictable prognosis, becomes a matter of concern, where 
‘long term’ has a negative connotation for acute areas of healthcare. The less 
rewarding aspect of dementia care, as opposed to the professional satisfaction from
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emotional relationships, that is a feature of hospice care, is considered a barrier to the 
introduction of dementia care to palliative care environments (Seale 1998; von Gunten 
and Twaddle 1996; Addington-Hall 2000). Making a prognosis for the progress of 
dementia to end-stage is problematic due to the variability of the disease trajectory for 
the different types of dementia and accurate predictions remain one of the difficulties 
in determining an admission to palliative care services for people with dementia 
(Luchins et al 1997; Hanrahan et al 1999; Addington-Hall 2000). This is particularly 
pertinent to the specialist units that base admissions criteria on acuteness or urgency 
of the needs of the dying person (Gannon 2002; Eagle 2002).
A hospital admission can cause unnecessary discomfort and confusion for the older 
person with dementia and it is advocated that a conservative or palliative approach 
should be the mainstay of care. Such an approach weighs the discomfort of the 
experience of being taken from familiar surroundings to receive what may be invasive 
technical medical interventions against any likely benefits (Hermans et al 1989; 
Lyketsos et al 2000). The need for people with dementia to be cared for and 
supported in a familiar environment has been identified in a number of studies (Forbes 
et al 2000; Gessert et al 2001; Pickard and Glendinning 2001). In relation to the 
specific needs of this group the NCHSPCS has recommended that protocols are 
developed to ensure that individuals admitted to acute units with advanced dementia 
do not receive aggressive, life-sustaining treatments inappropriately (Addington-Hall
2000). The less rewarding aspect of dementia care, as opposed to the professional 
satisfaction from emotional relationships that is a feature of hospice care, is also 
considered a barrier to the introduction of dementia care to palliative care 
environments (von Gunten and Twaddle 1996; Seale 1998; Addington-Hall 2000). A
92
further barrier identified by Addington-Hall (2000:26), is that older people with 
dementia may be seen as patients of ‘low status’.
Little research has been conducted that directly addresses the wishes of the person 
with dementia, in relation to approaching death, at a period of the illness trajectory 
when decision making about end-of-life preferences are able to be articulated. As 
pointed out by Bow (2002:193), and confirmed in a massive literature on caring for 
people with dementia, ‘ironically, more appears to be known about how to be a 
caregiver than how to be an Alzheimer’s patient’. Surveys on the practice of telling a 
patient that they have a diagnosis of dementia show a wide variation in practice (Rice 
and Warner 1994; Maguire et al 1996). Carers are invariably told the diagnosis while 
there is considerable variation in the practice of informing the person of their 
diagnosis. At a stage where the dementia is mild or even moderate, the person with 
dementia is often told the diagnosis, but rarely the prognosis (Rice and Warner 1994), 
therefore disenabling any opportunity to discuss death and dying. Potential for the 
person with dementia to make a will, make an advance directive, arrange Power of 
Attorney, settle business affairs, and make plans regarding living arrangements may 
be missed (Pitt 1997) if these discussions do not take place at an early stage of the 
illness.
This approach is advocated by Bryden (2005) based on her personal experience as a 
person with dementia. Bryden (2005) maintains that opportunities need to be taken to 
not only plan for immediate and later care but to also explore more existential issues 
about life and death, with others, whilst they are still able. Echoing the words and 
experiences of Bryden, Morris (2003) outlines a vision for dementia survival which he
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likens to interventions that would be applied to head injury rehabilitation and use the 
experience for gaining insight into society and the human condition. He proposes that 
the person with dementia might actually, for a period of years, become more 
intelligent in verbal and nonverbal problem-solving by being forced to slow down and 
simplify and thereby develop new creative and intuitive strengths.
In ‘The Forgetting’, Shenk (2001) reminds us that, in the case of dementia of the 
Alzheimer type, it is not that the person with dementia forgets what they have learned 
or experienced, but that they do not form a memory of the event. Consequently the 
person lives only in the relative now. Bryden (2005) confirms this experience when 
she moves from her anxious stance, early in her dementia experience, of asking; ‘Who 
will I be when I die? To, ‘I know who I’ll be when I die’. She bases this on her 
Christian faith and also the discovery of the Buddhist principle of being in the ‘Now’, 
a concept that became the most important (and often only) time that could be 
considered. ‘My spiritual self exists in the ‘now’, with no past or future’ (Bryden 
2005:160). This understanding of a fundamental Buddhist concept allowed her to 
begin to live in a manner that she had never before considered. Her life became more 
focused on the meaningfulness and sensitivity of relationships moving from the fear 
and anxiety of loss of control. Shenk (2001) also addresses this manifestation of the 
dementia process using examples provided by dementia suffers.
With less of a grip on what happened two hours or ten minutes ago, 
Morris reported feeling dramatically more involved in the present. “I find 
myself more visually sensitive,” he said. “Everything seems richer: lines, 
planes, contrast. It is a wonderful compensation.... We [who have 
Alzheimer’s disease] can appreciate clouds, leaves, flowers as we never 
did before. .. As the poet Theodre Roethke put it, ‘In a dark time the eye 
begins to see.’ (Shenk 2001:193)
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The experiences of people with dementia discussed above supports the Confucian 
model of dignity where any real meaning or value to being human occurs through 
continuous interaction with other human beings (Fu-Chang Tsai 2001) or where 
dignity is an ‘event’ happening between persons (Frank 2004a). It also has 
congruency with the recent call for relationship-based dementia care (Nolan et al 
2002; Nolan ei al 2003) and a relational approach to palliative care (Schotsmans 
2002).
Shenk (2001) shows that no matter how long the end has been anticipated by the 
friends and families of the person with dementia, no one knows quite what to expect. 
Decisions about end-of-life care being made by family members/carers in late-stage 
dementia and the need for support in this decision making has been highlighted 
(Forbes et al 2000; Kramer 2000; Gessert et al 2001). Families were tom between the 
‘two faces of death’, where death was viewed as having opposing faces: tragedy 
versus blessing, acceptance versus forbidden and acknowledged versus 
unacknowledged (Forbes et al 2000). The death of a person with dementia may be 
viewed with relief by the relatives whilst for some it was both a relief and a tragedy. 
The family may believe that the patient does not have a quality of life and that their 
misery is prolonged as long as they remain alive (Forbes et al 2000; Gessert et al
2001). Gessert et al (2001) found that many of the participants in their study were 
ambivalent about the anticipated death of their relatives, and while they believed that 
death would be a blessing they did not want to appear overly receptive to death or be 
seen to be unseemly advocating death. Challenges such as these that are faced by 
families of people with late-stage dementia are complex. They may experience guilt 
associated with the institutionalisation of the family member, unfamiliarity with death
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in general and death due to advancing dementia, and have limited understanding of 
the natural cause of late-stage dementia. In these cases they need support in coming 
to terms with some of the events that occur during dying and after death such as 
admission to an acute unit or a nursing home or the introduction of artificial feeding 
and other end-of-life interventions (Forbes et al 2000; Gessert et al 2001). These 
studies emphasis planning and preparing for end-of-life care with families and friends 
of people with dementia and in doing so attempts to put more emphasis on the wishes 
of the dementia sufferer. However, it cannot be assumed that those who are 
considered the ‘experts’ in providing end-of-life care have the appropriate skills for 
the dementia group.
2.5.2 Dementia care skills in hospice
The hospice movement has had a substantial impact on the standard of care provided 
for dying people across the health care spectrum and most palliative care is no longer 
confined to the hospice environment. As early as 1990, Black and Jolley suggested 
that the management of dying of psychogeriatric patients could be improved if lessons 
learned from hospice practices were adopted. This call has also emerged as a result of 
European studies on the existential issues of death in end-stage dementia (Albinsson 
and Strang 2002). The NCHSPCS makes several recommendations for initiatives 
aimed at developing partnerships with palliative care seiwices and nursing homes and 
psychogeriatric specialists, particularly in relation to education. They recommend 
that local care of elderly and palliative care services develop joint training 
programmes and promote close collaboration between psychogeriatricians and 
palliative care specialists (Addington-Hall 2000). However, changes have been slow 
to evolve and these two very different specialities have yet to develop comprehensive
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alliances in the educational needs of care staff for people who are dying and have 
dementia.
There is an assumption that palliative caie nurse skills are synonymous with mental 
health nurse skills (Cutcliffe et al 2001a, 2001b; Black et al 2001). However, there is 
no evidence to back these assumptions and discussion papers on this subject have not 
included patients with dementia. Black et al (2001) acknowledge that the common 
ground between the two specialities is particularly in relation to the psychosocial care 
approaches that are integral to the palliative care philosophy, rather than to the 
practice of specialist palliative care, which is the focus of hospice care. The 
discussions only briefly address the major differences between mental health nursing 
and general nursing and the physical needs of dying people.
Albinsson and Strang (2003) found major differences between dementia and palliative 
care staff in providing support, at the time of death, and after. They compared 
perceptions of good support, between 316 staff working closely with people caring for 
a person with dementia to 121 staff working with carers of people in palliative cancer 
care. Dementia care staff placed providing support at time of death of lowest 
importance on a 10-point item list of categories identified by the researchers, this, 
despite late-stage dementia clearly meeting WHO criteria for palliative care. There 
are equally important issues in the ability of palliative care staff to communicate with, 
and understand the specific needs of people with dementia (de Vries et al 2003). 
Albinsson and Strang (2003) found that trying to relieve the family’s feelings of guilt 
was an important factor for dementia care staff but not for palliative care staff. 
Palliative care staff put more emphasis on availability and bereavement support
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(Albinsson and Strang 2003) and propose that one of the reasons for the lack of this 
from dementia care staff was that they do not feel comfortable discussing existential 
issues and death (Albinsson and Strang 2002).
The literature on end-of-life dementia care is clearly focused on old-age dementia and 
the variant CJD population represents a very different dementia group. They are, to 
date, a younger age group, and the death of a younger person has a different impact on 
society and on people who are caring for them, as discussed in Chapter one. 
However, many of the issues discussed above may be applicable to this group.
2.4 Summary
The wider literature of end-of-life care for people with dementia in old-age was 
explored as a means of considering what capacity hospice environments may have for 
delivering a service for the variant CJD group. There is a growing literature on end- 
of-life care for people with dementia that is predominantly from the USA. Whilst 
hospice services could provide appropriate and sophisticated terminal care for people 
with variant CJD, there are still areas within the service that are not well developed. 
These are, particularly, knowledge and understanding of the dementia experience. If 
hospice services are to embrace the care provision for the variant CJD patient group, 
and if the predictions of, possibly, many thousands of people becoming infected in the 
future is realised, there is a need to explore the impact this will have on the services. 
Research on variant CJD, to date, has had a scientific and medical focus, particularly 
on issues such as diagnosis, prognosis and cure for the patient group. What is 
required is the development of some insight into what caring for people with variant 
CJD will mean to the services and the healthcare professionals who will be supporting
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and managing the care at the end-of-life. In Chapter 3 I critically discuss the 
methodological approach of grounded theoi*y in carrying out this study and how an 
open systems theory framework was selected to interpret and analyse data.
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Chapter 3 -  Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is presented in two sections. In the first section I begin by setting out my 
research aims. The study design is discussed in detail and a background to the chosen 
methodological approach of grounded theory is provided and a critical discussion of 
debates on the use of this methodology is offered. I provide a rationale and 
justification for the changes that took place to the design as the study developed. This 
includes discussion on issues and difficulties encountered in developing a 
constructivist study and how these led to an ‘emergent fit’ design using existing 
theories of hospice care and open systems theory and the implications of this on 
development of formal theory. This section also includes a discussion on the 
implications of considering symbolic interactionism when using grounded theory and 
how the use of metaphor influenced my analysis. This is followed by a discussion on 
how the researcher perspective has implications for maintaining rigour and 
trustworthiness in qualitative research. A brief discussion on the methods of data 
collection within a grounded theory study is provided. Discussion on these methods 
is developed in more detail within the Methods Chapter. Analysis processes when 
using grounded theory are addressed, including theoretical sampling processes that 
were used. These processes are also discussed in more detail within the Methods 
Chapter.
In the second section of this chapter I further develop the discussion on open systems 
theory as it was a significant theory within the emergent fit design. In this section I 
discuss the hospice as an organisation with a specific culture and ‘space’, as was 
introduced and implied by Froggatt (1995, 1997), Lawton (1998a, 2000), Copp (1996,
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1999) and Li (2002). For the purposes of my analysis and interpretation the open 
systems model developed by Katz and Khan (1966) was used, in conjunction with 
concepts of the unconscious at work developed by the Tavistock Institute.
3.LI Research aims
1. To explore the issues that arose in caring for people with variant CJD within 
hospice services.
2. To describe the experience of providing care for people with variant CJD by the 
hospice team and family members.
3. To identify strategies used by the hospice team and family members in providing 
care for people with variant CJD.
4. To provide a theoretical explanation of their experiences.
3.2 Study design
Patton (2002) points out that qualitative inquiry designs cannot usually be completely 
specified in advance of fieldwork. The design for this study was qualitative and was 
determined by the purpose of the research, which was exploratory, and required the 
development of research aims in negotiating ethical approval. However, the design 
also emerged as fieldwork unfolded (Patton 2002). ‘Cases’ of variant CJD where 
end-of-life care had been carried out using hospice services were sought. The ‘case’ 
construction was based on conducting focus group and individual interviews with 
hospice staff and family members and examining hospice records relating to care 
carried out by the service. A case study methodology approach to the research was 
rejected as this methodology would have required revealing details of the participant 
experiences in comprehensive case reports and would have compromised
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confidentiality and anonymity of the families of people with variant CJD, due to the 
small numbers of people.
Grounded theory was the methodology of choice as it allows the use of multiple data 
sources and flexibility in recruitment processes that may evolve as the study 
progresses. This is recognised as emergent design flexibility within qualitative design 
strategies where openness to adapting the inquiry occurs as understanding deepens 
and/or situations change (Patton 2002; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 2005; 
Wuest 2000).
3.2,1 Grounded theory
Grounded theory is a methodology (sometimes referred to as a method) of qualitative 
research that was developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It is considered to be a 
method of theory generation where the theory, or conceptual framework, develops 
from, and is firmly ‘grounded’ in empirical data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 
1978, 2005; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The major difference between grounded 
theory and other qualitative methodologies rests in the emphasis on theory 
development, which is the primary aim of the researcher. Theory can assume the 
form of a narrative statement (Strauss and Corbin 1998), a visual picture (Morrow and 
Smith 1995) or a series of hypotheses or propositions (Creswell 1998). Also, built 
into the methodology is a style of extensive interrelated data collection and theoretical 
analysis that is carried out throughout the course of the research project (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2003a; Glaser 1978, 2005). The 
emphasis within the grounded theory approach to research is that the theory is 
generated from data through a systematic process that is worked out in relation to that
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data and not only from flashes of insight obtained from sources outside of the data 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2003a; Glaser 1978, 2005).
The publication of the text on grounded theory procedures and techniques by Strauss 
and Corbin in 1990 led Glaser (1992) to a vitriolic attack on the way in which they 
presented the use of this methodology. Glaser’s (1992) ‘impassioned’ rebuttal called 
for the withdrawal or a rewrite of the book, which was refused by Strauss. Glaser 
(1992) claimed that his intellectual rights to the methodology of grounded theory had 
been breached and that the text by Strauss and Corbin (1990) provided a method of 
producing ‘full conceptual description’, but ‘not grounded theory’. According to 
Glaser (1992:122) full conceptual description represents ‘forcing’ the data, and 
grounded theory is a process of ‘emergence, discovery and inductive theory 
generation’. In his text ‘Emergence versus Forcing’ Glaser (1992) dissociated himself 
from the Strauss and Corbin (1990) ‘Basics of Qualitative Research’ text and sought 
to ‘correct’ the ‘misconceptions’, that the use of the Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
approach to the methodology would give readers. A further publication by Glaser 
(2005), dedicated to Strauss, re-emphasises his stance on the issue of emergence 
versus forcing data with particular focus on theoretical coding and risks of forcing 
data when the researcher does not stay open to the process of emergence.
The consequences of the parting of ways of Strauss and Glaser has raised a debate on 
what are now believed to be two different ‘methods’ of grounded theory (Heath and 
Cowley 2004). Others have argued that there are more than one (or two) versions of 
how grounded theory procedures may be implemented (Dey 1999; Chiovitti and Piran 
2003; Charmaz 2000, 2003a, 2003b). Charmaz (2003a, 2003b) argues that grounded
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theory strategies need not be rigid or prescriptive, as do Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Glaser (1992; 2005) himself. Charmaz (2003a:256) 
extends this argument to asking the question: ‘who’s got the real grounded theory?’. 
Charmaz’s (2000, 2003b) ‘take’ is that researchers using grounded theory ‘tend’ to 
take either a constructivist or objectivist approach.
However, Heath and Cowley (2004) emphasis that there are ‘only’ two ways of using 
grounded theory and that these cannot, and should not, be ‘mixed’. That is, the 
original Glaser and Strauss (1967) (purportedly more creative) approach, versus the 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) (purportedly more reality-oriented), approach (Patton
2002). This inflexible stance on the use of grounded theory methodology is not 
helpful. It is highly prescriptive to a paradigm of knowledge construction (qualitative 
research) that changes daily, and, as pointed out by Patton (2002), emphasises being 
systematic and creative simultaneously. This debate, I believe, has led many 
researchers to declare their use of grounded theory with caution, and has led to the 
frequent use of the term ‘grounded theory approach’. The term ‘grounded theory 
approach’, means little more than grounding the theory in data, an approach that 
underpins all inductive, qualitative analysis (see Seale 1999b; Silverman 2000; Patton 
2002).
My dilemma was, how do I show that I have used grounded theory, as some scholars 
say it must be used, or should I declare that I have used a ‘grounded theory 
approach’? My stance was to claim to be carrying out grounded theory, as my 
strategies met the criteria for a grounded theory study. That is, I carried out 
simultaneous data collection and analysis; pursed emergent themes through early data
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analysis; searched for basic social processes within the data and carried out inductive 
construction of abstract categories that explained and synthesised social processes 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 2005; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Wuest 2000; 
Charmaz 2003b). Furthermore I carried out sampling to refine the theoretical 
categories through comparative processes and integrated categories into a theoretical 
framework through the process of emergent fit (Wuest 2000; Glaser 2005), examining 
theories from a range of fields of study. Glaser (2005) particularly emphasises 
exploring theoretical concepts from a wide range of philosophical fields of knowledge 
in a process he describes as ‘staying open’.
First of all the researcher should study theoretical codes beyond the 
boundaries of his current discipline and keep studying them. (Glaser 
2005:7)
In not confining myself to literature and theory within a specific discipline I was able 
to provide a broader picture and a new perspective on the subject under study (Glaser 
2005).
In keeping with evolving social and academic developments in research, it has been 
suggested that there have been four periods of grounded theoiy development (Benoliel 
1996). Each period is categorised in relation to knowledge generated within a defined 
decade. The period from 1960 to 1970 was that of discovery and the move from 
emphasis on hypothesis testing in qualitative research. Development occurred 
between from 1970 to 1980 where the language of grounded theory was formalised by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) and it is this more formal language of Strauss and 
Corbin (1998) that I use in describing the step-by-step process of coding data in the 
Methods Chapter. From 1980 to 1990 Benoliel (1996) describes a process of
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diffusion taking place where collaborative, multi-disciplinary and organisational 
research evolved. The period from 1990 to the present time is described as a time of 
diversification where tenns such as feminist, constructivist and contemporary have 
been used to describe methods of conducting grounded theory research. As further 
pointed out by Dey (1999), the introduction of computer software to assist in 
manipulation and display analysis processes of qualitative data have added impetus to 
the debate on the diversification of grounded theory methodology.
I believe my study fits within Benoliel’s (1996) diversification category of grounded 
theory use, but still meets the requirements of a grounded theory study rather than a 
grounded theory ‘approach’, as discussed above. Glaser (1992, 2005) has consistently 
demanded that the researcher remains pure to the process of emergence in conducting 
a grounded theory study and I believe that I have met this requirement. Another 
important issue that may lead to the accusation of not staying true to the method is the 
introduction of the use of computer assisted software in manipulating qualitative data. 
On this subject Glaser (2005) is adamant that the use of computer software to manage 
data in a grounded theory is totally inappropriate. Glaser (2005:35) states that ‘hand 
sorting’, ‘achieves the most flexibility and releases the most creativity’. I discuss my 
‘similar’ responses to this in the Methods Chapter {4,3.4 Use o f the NUD*IST 
programme).
The study was originally designed to use a constructivist approach to data collection 
and analysis based influenced primarily by Charmaz (1991, 2000, 2003a, 2003b,
2004) and on the understanding that realities are captured in the form of socially and 
experientially based constructions that are local and specific in nature and are arrived
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at by consensus between the group under study and the researcher (Guba and Lincoln 
1994; Charmaz 2003a). That is, my design intention was to co-construct a theory of 
the experience of caring for the person with variant CJD at the end-of-life with the 
study participants.
3,2.2 Constructivist paradigm
Constructivism is a research paradigm that considers reality knowable through 
people’s mental interpretations or constructions. A constructivist approach is based 
on a holistic ontology, or world view, where it is postulated that there is no single 
reality. Any concept of reality is based on perception, is different for all people and 
changes over time, so that what we know has meaning only within a given situation or 
context. This approach is based on a world view that knowledge is a perspective that 
we have created, to make sense of our experiences and the experiences of those 
participating in the research (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Bums and Grove 2001; Patton 
2002; Charmaz 2003a).
It is proposed that the primary assumptions of constructivism are based on several 
premises. ‘Truth’, is a matter of consensus among the informed and constructors, not 
of correspondence with objective reality. ‘Facts’, have no meaning except within 
some value framework, hence there cannot be an ‘objective’ assessment of any 
proposition. ‘Causes’ and effects do not exist except by imputation, and phenomena 
can only be understood within the context in which they are studied. Findings from 
one context cannot be generalised to another; neither problems nor solutions can be 
generalised from one setting to another. Data derived from constructivist inquiry have
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neither special status nor legitimation; they represent simply another construction to 
be taken into account in the move towards consensus (Patton 2002; Charmaz 2003a).
The difficulties of ensuring consensus was influenced by sampling and access 
problems in organising focus group interviews at different sites where staff changes 
had taken place, plus concerns I felt about repeating interviews with family members 
who were bereaved and had been traumatised by some of their experiences. It became 
apparent that it would have been ethically inappropriate to repeatedly interview the 
family members who had already been interviewed by others about their experiences, 
more than once on some occasions (see Chapter 4, 4.4 Ethical considerations). 
Consequently, consensus was only achieved following the pilot case analysis, where 
the preliminary theoretical framework was taken back to some of the participants for 
discussion and verification.
3.2.3 Emergent f it
In keeping with an emergent qualitative design, what actually occurred as the study 
progressed was ‘emergent fit’. Emergent fit is the process whereby theoretical 
models, identified within the literature, are constantly compared to the incoming data, 
i.e. the constant comparative method of analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 
1978, 2005). Existing theory and new data is used to elaborate, extend or develop 
theoretical construction and this may be used either to develop concepts from theory 
or theory may be modified to take account of new data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; 
Glaser 1978, 2005; Wuest 2000; Hellstrom et al 2005).
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Examples of emergent fit can be found in other grounded theory studies. For 
example, Hutchinson et al (1997) explored the value of awareness context theory in 
the complexities of social interactions in early Alzheimer’s disease. The researchers 
show how during data analysis of clients’ experiences of early probable Alzheimer’s 
disease problems surrounding awareness, or lack thereof, Alzheimer’s disease 
emerged as an issue that was central to social interaction. The researchers then 
revisited the Glaser and Strauss (1967) awareness context theory for its potential as a 
framework for analysing these interactions through the process of emergent fit.
Hellstrôm et al (2005) extend the work of Hutchinson et al (1997) further in 
constructing an understanding of the dementia experience through awareness context 
theory plus the theory of the dynamics of dementia, also using an emergent fit design. 
They discovered, as did Hutchinson et al (1997), that as they systematically carried 
out the process of constant comparison they found distinct similarities to theories 
within existing literature with that of the experiences of their study participants. The 
researchers also do not confine themselves to the original construct of awareness 
context theory developed by Glaser and Strauss (1965). Emergent fit of constructs 
developed by other researchers who have extended and elaborated on awareness 
context theory (for example the work of Timmerman (1994) and Salander and Spetz 
(2002) -  see literature section) were considered. Awareness context theory had 
previously been confined to the area of dying patients’ knowledge/awareness about 
their experiences with healthcare professionals and others. The researchers further 
develop the application of awareness context processes to people with early 
Alzheimer’s disease and their awareness of disease processes and the implications of 
these on their relationships, with others.
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Wuest (2000) describes how she came to the realisation and understanding of the 
emergent fit process when conducting a second feminist grounded theory study of 
women’s caring. She particularly emphasises how she came to realise how only the 
components of pre-existing theory that fit the data could survive. That is,
One does not then code the new data according to the concepts and 
interrelationships of an existing theory; rather, one compares the 
conceptual indicators in the new data with similar concepts in the existing 
theory for fit (Wuest 2000:55).
The theoretical code must ‘earn relevance’ to the emerging fit (Glaser 2005:4), 
consequently emergent fit is a constant process of moving between a deductive 
approach of examining theory that seems to explain what is being revealed within 
data, and an inductive process of interpreting data, checking for fit and modifying 
accordingly (Glaser 1978, 2005; Wuest 2000). Conceptual indicators from the 
existing theories developed by Froggatt (1995), Lawton (1998a, 2000), Copp (1996, 
1999) and Li (2002) contributed to the emergent fit with data analysis as my study 
progressed.
The need to control the hospice environment, staff and patients was either explicit or 
implicit within all theories. This fitted with other discussions on organisational 
control within health care environments where control and médicalisation are 
frequently referred to synonymously (Walter 1994; Sontag 1978), and where the 
conflict between care and control is considered to be endemic to organisational life 
(Clulow 1994; Hinshelwood and Skogstad 2000). For Li (2002:270) the argument 
was for maintaining orderliness within the hospice organisation that advances
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personal, professional and organisational aspirations using the equation: nurses’ 
assets + patient assets = team assets = organisational assets = marketable assets = 
'nice’ organisation. The tension between protecting and controlling was the 
dominant theme of Copp’s (1996) model, which I identify as a paradox within my 
thesis. Protecting was about covering up to preserve the dignity of the dying person, 
although in none of the four theories is there a developed discussion about the use of 
medications to facilitate this process of protecting.
Hospice as a ‘liminal space’ within which people are cut off from the wider society in 
a temporary position whilst waiting to die, and where dying is processed, was shown 
to be central to the hospice culture for Froggatt (1995) and Lawton (1998a, 2000). 
They show how hospice provides a space in which the seemingly disordered process 
of dying may threaten order in society. The attributes of liminality were posited as 
being features of hospice ideology; particularly relevant to my thesis was 
predetermined entry requirements, hospice as family, and physical and social 
symbolism (Froggatt 1995, 1997). The nurses, as ‘ritual specialists’ controlled the 
passage of dying in various ways with particular reference to ‘family’ and ‘holistic’ 
ideals with respect to emotional expression by their possessing specialist hospice 
knowledge of pain and symptom control, and having time to establish relationships 
with patients and their kin (Foggatt 1995). The hospice service is depicted 
symbolically a ‘family system’ by Froggatt (1995), Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Copp 
(1996), and as a community by Li (2002). Hospice was construed as community 
which patients (and in my thesis family members as hospice ‘patients’) enter into as 
family members, and where the hospice is symbolically shown to be a protected 
environment where the specialist knowledge on caring for dying is used to their
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benefit. What is also a feature in Froggatt’s (1995) thesis is that there is a need for 
reciprocity that is allowed due to (the often) long the length of the admission and to 
the availability of time for patients and families. For both Froggatt (1995) and Copp 
(1996) it was important that the nurses had formed a relationship with the patient that 
openly acknowledged the impending death and for Copp (1996, 1999) when this did 
not occur the existence of personhood for the dying person was in doubt. As the 
person became closer to death the body as object and the problem of ‘living too long’ 
were features within the theses of Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Copp (1996, 1999). 
Nurses focused on the bodily deterioration in determining quality of life and dignity 
of patients and sequestration due to the social rejection of the unsightly body was 
central to Lawton’s (1998a, 2000) thesis and implicit within Copp’s (1996, 1999).
3.2.3.1 Theojy construction, emergent f i t  and the place of grand theory 
It had been my intention to develop grounded theory within a constructivist paradigm, 
in which case substantive theory rather than formal theory would be the outcome of 
the study. Substantive theory is grounded in research on one particular area, specific 
to a particular group or situation (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 2005; Strauss 
and Corbin 1998; Patton 2002). However, Glaser and Strauss (1967) propose that 
substantive theory is a strategic link to the formulation and generation of formal 
theory and the substantive theory may have been developed previously by the author, 
as demonstrated by Wuest (2000), or another writer (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 
1978, 2005). Glaser and Strauss (1967) maintain that connections between the 
constant comparative method of analysis and theory generation with regard to both 
substantive and formal theory need to be made explicit.
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Comparative analysis can be used to generate two basic kinds of theory: 
substantive and formal. By substantive theory, we mean that development 
for a substantive, or empirical, area of sociological inquiry, such as patient 
care, race relations, professional education, delinquency, or research 
organisations. By formal theory, we mean that developed for a formal, or 
conceptual, area of sociological inquiry, such as stigma, deviant 
behaviour, formal organization, socialization, status congruency, authority 
and power, reward systems, or social mobility. Both types of theory may 
be considered as “middle-range”. That is, they fall between the “minor 
working hypothesis” of everyday life and the “all-inclusive” grand 
theories (Glaser and Strauss 1997:32, 33)
What was emerging as I carried out constant comparison were data that revealed 
organisational behaviour that fitted with the theories on hospice activity and where 
participants were trying to fit a new event into an organisation that had firmly 
established boundaries of practice and activities. These interactions, practices and 
behaviours fitted with theories from the literature on organisational activity, i.e. from 
grand theory.
My decision to use open systems and organisational theory as part of the emergent fit 
design, was an evolving process. As discussed above, emergent fit can be used to 
develop concepts using formal theory as well as modifying substantive theory to take 
account of new data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 2005; Wuest 2000; 
Hellstrom et al 2005). Open systems theory is, however, grand theory, and how grand 
theory is used in the process of emergent fit is not well elaborated within the grounded 
theory literature. The grand theory (or basic social process) of symbolic 
interactionism is frequently associated with using grounded theory methodology, 
however, Glaser (2005) is adamant that grounded theory does not have an 
epistemology with an attached theoretical perspective that provides one set of 
theoretical codes to the exclusion of others. In challenging the place of symbolic
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interactionism as the foundation theoretical perspective of grounded theory and theory 
construction Glaser (2005) affirms that:
Sure, GT (grounded theory) can use SI (symbolic interact) type data and 
its perspectives, but as a general method it can use any other type data, 
even other types of qualitative data, as well as quantitative, visual, 
document, journalistic and in any combination, and any other theoretical 
perspective, such as systems theory, social structural theory, structural 
functional theory, social organization theory, cultural theory etc. (Glaser 
2005:141).
The main benefit yielded by grand theories is their use of abstract models and the 
integration of formal theory often requires more guidance from explicit models (grand 
theories) because of a greater level of abstraction (Glaser and Strauss 1967). It was 
with this understanding that I approached the use of open systems theory in my theory 
development. My decision was influenced by the conceptual categories that emerged 
from my data, the similar concepts that related to organisational activity found within 
existing theories of hospice care that ‘fitted’ the data, my reflexive processes in 
conducting the research, discussions with academics on the subject of organisational 
behaviour, and reading other literature that examined organisational activity. It is the 
abstract language of open systems theory that I have used to frame my theory and it 
was this component of the emergent fit process that led me to tentatively claim to 
have developed the beginnings of formal theory that explains organisational activity 
in the event of managing a new situation that may have broader application than to the 
hospice semce.
According to Haslam (2004) understanding the psychology undei*pinning the 
behaviour of people within organisations belongs in two subdisciplines. These are 
organisational psychology and social psychology. The imperative to consider using a
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systems perspective is captured by Patton (2002) in discussing a renewed interest in 
systems theory as applied in social science research, where previously it was a 
theoretical model associated with quantitative research. It was particularly relevant to 
developing a better understanding of organisational behaviour within the hospice 
service as a result of the admission of people with variant CJD, a new disease entity.
(1) A systems perspective is becoming increasingly important in dealing 
with and understanding real-world complexities, viewing things as whole 
entities embedded in context and still larger wholes; (2) some approaches 
to systems research lead directly to and depend heavily on qualitative 
inquiry; (3) a systems orientation can be very helpful in framing questions 
and, later, making sense out of qualitative data. (Patton 2002:120)
The seed was planted in influencing my move toward using systems theoiy following 
a presentation of the findings of my pilot study at a conference on prion disease (de 
Vries 2003b). During the conference I was approached by an academic from the 
audience. He suggested that the material lent itself to using the work of Bion and the 
approaches used by the Tavistock Institute in interpreting the responses of my study 
participants. I then embarked on an exploration of the fascinating literature on this 
subject of which previously I had only a superficial knowledge.
My firm decision to use open systems theory stemmed from my assumptions and 
experiences of hospice practices which were echoed in the models describing hospice 
care developed by Froggatt (1995, 1997, 1998), Lawton (1998a, 2000), Copp (1996, 
1999) and Li (2002). These models demonstrated how ideologies are very much 
inscribed in the materiality of social and institutional practices (Kincheloe and 
McLaren 1994). I was also ‘inspired’ by a meeting with an acquaintance who I had 
not seen for some years, who greeted me with; “Are you still working in that death
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factory?” This comment served me with the idea of the hospice as a metaphorical 
factory for processing dying. It fitted the conceptualisation of the hospice as a 
‘container’ for people who are dying and as a place where very specialised and 
specific care practices are performed and where death is ‘processed’ (Lawton 2000). 
This fit emerged as the study progressed in the manner stated by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967:41) where a formal-theory model should never be applied to the emerging 
theory ‘until one is sure it will fit, and will not force the data’. What is strategically 
important in developing grounded formal theory is that both laymen and academics 
‘can readily see how its predictions and explanations fit the realities of the situation’ 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967:98).
A detailed discussed on how the abstract language of systems and organisational 
theory helped to fi*ame my theoretical construct is given in section 3.3, Open systems 
and organisation theory
Symbolic interactionism is understood to be closely associated with grounded theory 
methodology, a suggestion challenged by Glaser (2005) who maintains that it is just 
one of any theory that can be used to underpin grounded theory research studies. 
However, interactions are an important consideration particularly when examining 
organisational behaviour and activity.
3.2.3.2 Symbolic interactionism
Symbolic interactionism was brought to the Glaser and Strauss partnership by Strauss 
firom the Chicago school, where the perspective was developed. Although symbolic 
interactionism had undergone considerable ‘fragmentation’ and expansion since its
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heyday at the University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s (Ritzer and Goodman 
2003:371), it remains a perspective of social psychology that puts particular emphasis 
on social interaction (Rock 1979; Charon 2001; Atkinson and Housley 2003; Ritzer 
and Goodman 2003). Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969) are considered to be the 
leaders in the development of symbolic interactionist theoiy as applied by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). Blumer (1969) maintained that symbolic interactionism rests on three 
premises. The first premise is that human beings act towards things on the basis of 
symbolic meanings that the things have for them, i.e. they identify commons sets of 
symbols that they use to describe that meaning. This includes everything that the 
human being may note in his or her world; i.e. physical objects, other human beings, 
categories of human beings, institutions, activities of others. Second, the meaning of 
such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with 
other humans. Third these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an 
interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he or she 
encounters. In this process of interactive socialisation a sense of the ‘generalised 
other’ is developed that is closely aligned to the social location in which the group is 
placed (Atkinson and Housley 2003).
Symbolic interactionism assumes that these shared meanings become ‘reality’, 
however. Rock (1979) points out that symbolic interactionism pretends neither to 
absolute truth, nor to an exhaustive interpretation of society. Within the paradigm 
there is acceptance of uncertainty and modest scope. It is a paradigm within which 
my personal way of thinking and seeing the world has congruency, as Rock (1979) 
also claims that it requires an innocence of mind that has often been schooled out of 
the sociologist. It was important for me to consider what type of data may be used in
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analysis that could be interpreted tlirough symbolic interactionist concepts. The 
question I asked myself repeatedly was how do I demonstrate and justify the use of 
symbolic interactionism in the interpretation of my data. Particularly when 
historically this approach has been closely allied to ethnographic studies, where 
observation of ‘naturally occurring’ interactions were the focus of analysis. It was the 
importance of the use of forms of language that is the foundation of symbolic 
interactionist thinking, where interaction within society uses symbolisation and 
metaphors to frame their activity (Rock 1979). I discuss how metaphors are used in 
my analysis in more detail in Chapter 4, 4.3.3.1 Metaphors. Rock (1979) claims that 
symbolic interactionism portrays knowledge as a jointly active process rather than a 
state. These are: that multiple realities exist, data reflect the researcher’s and 
participants’ mutual constructions, and that the researcher enters and is affected by 
participants’ worlds (Charmaz 2003a). In other words, the focus of research that uses 
a symbolic interactionist approach is on how people define their world and how that 
definition shapes their actions (Charon 2001).
3.2.4 Researcher perspective
In using grounded theory care needed to be taken that I did not lose sight of the need 
to maintain the systematic rigour that is the hallmark of the approach (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). Indeed, all research should be systematically and rigorously conducted 
(Mason 2002). Of importance in the use of grounded theory is the emphasis that 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) put on practical action, as a basis for achieving ‘credible’ 
interpretations of social interaction. This practical action is related to the process or 
state of ‘being inside’ and understanding the social world in which the research is 
taking place. It requires a reflexive approach to the research and refers to the
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researcher perspective and how this must be acknowledged as an integral part of the 
research. Personal critical self-scrutiny as well as critical scrutiny of data is required, 
a process Mason (2002:7) refers to as ‘active reflexivity’.
Within the grounded theory approach the researcher perspective (personal experience) 
is recognised and represents part of ‘theoretical sensitivity’. This is regarded as one 
of the major challenges for the researcher using grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 
1998; Creswell 1998; Charmaz 2003a, 2003b). Theoretical sensitivity refers to the 
personal quality of the researcher who, as an insider, would have an awareness of the 
subtleties of meaning of the social interactions identified within the data (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2003a, 2003b). This 
sensitivity also comes from reading the literature and documents which provide a 
background of information that ‘sensitises’ the researcher to the topic under study. It 
comes from personal and professional exposure as well as from the analytic process 
experienced during the research.
It is unquestionable that experienced researchers are sensitised by the very process of 
involvement in multiple and varied research projects (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Theoretical sensitivity was already present based on my hospice practice and 
education background. This was further developed during the literature review stage. 
This sensitivity is acknowledged throughout the study as having a substantial impact 
on my interpretations of data. Bums and Grove (2001) caution that as the qualitative 
researcher tends to work alone, personal influences on the subject may go undetected 
and researchers need to be alert and take action to expose subjectivity. As a means of 
monitoring my effect upon the research I kept detailed research journals where I
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reflected on and recorded my responses to the data and the literature in the context of 
my interpretations and clinical experience.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that the researcher may become insensitive or 
defensive to questions that cast doubt on any preconceived theory that they have 
become attached to. This is particularly important in the early stages of a study as the 
researcher can unconsciously fall into accepting what is written due to unrecognised 
assumptions. However, as the study proceeds, and theory begins to develop, the 
danger of latching onto an idea, concept, or theory may be decreased (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Chenitz and Swanson 1986; Strauss and Corbin 1998). A crucial aspect 
of qualitative research is that it must not be assumed that the final representation of 
the research is totally objective and value-fi*ee. In recognising this I needed to take 
care that the participants in the study were represented. That is, that the end result 
provided an adequate depiction of their experiences, and the environment within 
which the study was conducted, and that the claims depicted provide responsible and 
not misleading knowledge (Sandelowski 1995; Denzin 1998).
3.2,5 Interviews
In the original grounded theory research the ethnographic approach using 
observational data as a primary source was the method used by Glaser and Strauss 
(1965), as did other early users of this methodology. However, interviews have 
become a common form of data source for researchers using grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2003 a, 2003b). In understanding semi-structured interviews several factors 
are identified by Fontana and Frey (1994) as important in relation to obtaining a rich 
data from participants. These are, accessing the setting, understanding the language
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and culture, deciding how to present oneself, locating informants and establishing 
rapport. I did not have to ‘get in’ (Fontana and Frey 1994:366) as an insider 
researcher with a background in hospice care philosophy and practice an 
understanding of the culture and language of the participants already existed. The use 
of language and specific terms is important for creating ‘shared meaning’ in which 
both interviewer and participant understand the contextual nature of the interview 
(Fontana and Frey 1994; Charmaz 2003 a, 2003b 2004). Charmaz (2004) emphasises 
that to gain a deep understanding of the studied life means entering it. ‘Entering the 
phenomenon means being fully present during the interview and deep inside the 
content afterward’ (Charmaz 2004:981).
3.2.6 Focus groups
Focus group interviews generate a type of evidence that is not found in the single 
interviews. Data from focus groups is complex. Analysis, not only at the individual 
level, but also of the group interaction, group dynamics and the context within which 
statements are made, are critical aspects of the process (Morgan 1998). They help to 
tap into the many different forms of communication that people use in everyday 
interaction, including jokes, anecdotes, teasing, arguing which may reveal much more 
about what people know or experience. Focus groups can provide a type of 
‘naturally’ occurring data, particularly when a free-flowing conversation is 
established. They can also facilitate the discussion of taboo subjects that may not be 
so readily discussed using the single interview process (Krueger1994; Kitzinger 1994, 
1996; Morgan 1998; Burns and Grove 2001).
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One of the advantages of the focus group interview method is that the group can 
generate their own questions and pursue their own priorities that lead to a more 
diverse and comprehensive understanding of the culture from which they have come 
(Kitzinger 1994, 1996). The interactions were particularly important in the context of 
this study, as I wanted to understand how the team worked together in providing care 
for the person with variant CJD, and to set this within the context of the hospice 
culture. Webb and Kevern (2001) identified that few research articles, within the 
nursing research literature, reported specifically on the interactions when using a 
focus group as a data collection method. This, despite interaction identified as a key 
component in analysing focus group data (Krueger 1994; Kitzinger 1994, 1996; 
Morgan 1998). My analysis of interactions particularly followed the symbolic 
interactionist approach where meanings were interpreted through symbolic and 
metaphorical use of language (Rock 1979).
3.2,7 Hospice patient records
The hospice patient records were used to crosscheck oral accounts and to provide a 
descriptive and historical context (Atkinson and Coffey 1997). Data from this source 
provided a version of reality as they represent ‘official’ records and were used as 
‘proof of events. This does not mean that documents are firm evidence of what they 
report. However, documents need to be examined in relation to their place within the 
organisational setting, the cultural values attached to them and the form that they take 
(Atkinson and Coffey 1997). They also require an understanding of the language and 
other sign systems from the field (Silverman 2000). This is particularly pertinent to 
healthcare research where patient documentation is used in various forms as
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‘evidence’, both at a judiciary level and at a practice level, such as through audit 
reviews (Prior 1997).
3.2.8 Analysis processes
The coding system devised by Strauss and Corbin (1998) provided the focus of using 
grounded theory for the study. However, the earlier work of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) is also referred to in relation to using this methodology. It has been argued by 
Charmaz (2003a, 2003b) and Heath and Cowley (2004) that the methods used to 
conduct grounded theory proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), as opposed to 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), are based on a somewhat rigid and objectivist approach. 
However, Strauss and Corbin (1998) themselves emphasise that the step by step 
description of grounded theory analysis should not be regarded as a rigid tool for the 
research process, but rather used flexibly and creatively. Whilst keeping this premise 
in mind I felt it was important to maintain a structured approach to the coding process. 
The step by step process of data collection and analysis is discussed in detail in the 
methods chapter, as is the specific terminology for grounded theory analysis 
processes.
Computer assistance in qualitative research has become an accepted strategy for the 
management of qualitative data, particularly the ‘code-based theory builders’ for 
researchers working towards theory building (Seale 2000). More and more frequently 
qualitative researchers are encouraged and expected to use computer generated 
software in the manipulation of the large volumes of data that is collected when using 
qualitative research methods (Fielding and Lee 1991, 1998; Creswell 1998: Seale
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2000). I did not access computer software for qualitative data analysis in the early 
stages of the study and the pilot (first data set) was manually coded.
3.2.9 Theoretical sampling — search for deviant cases
Theoretical sampling is a flexible and dialectic process of determining data collection 
in the light of the developing theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978, 2005; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998; Creswell 1998; Dey 1999; Charmaz 2003a, 2003b). 
Concept development is the basis of theoretical sampling and gave direction for focus 
of each new data set collection. Throughout the process of collecting and analysing 
data in grounded theory is the process of ‘constant comparison’ (Glaser 1978, 2005; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2003a). This involved comparing incident with 
incident and category with category. It also involved comparing data with incidents 
from my experience, from my media data and from the literature. Theoretical 
comparison was used extensively in categorising data, where existing theories of 
hospice practice informed my interpretations through the process of emergent fit. 
Constant comparison, in various forms, took place throughout the research process.
The study was designed to collect data from a number of hospices until data saturation 
was achieved. It is thiough this process that an attempt to saturate the categories is 
made. Saturation refers to a process of collecting data or information that continues to 
add to the categories until repetition from multiple sources is obtained (Morse 1994). 
This requires researchers repeatedly returning to the field to seek new cases to 
develop theoretical categories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998; 
Creswell 1998; Charmaz 2003a, 2003b). Strauss and Corbin (1998:136) refer to 
saturation as, not only saturation of sources, but also saturation during coding. That
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is, ‘when no new properties, dimensions, conditions, actions/interactions, or 
consequences are seen in the data’. According to Patton (2002), the question of 
saturation leaves the question of sample size open. Patton points out that there are a 
number of practical problems related to budget and resources, time and specific 
design of the research, a stance that is supported by Strauss and Corbin (1998).
Searching for extreme cases or ‘deviant’ cases is a method advocated by many 
qualitative researchers as a means of establishing trustworthiness. It is also a means 
of overcoming a tendency to select cases which are likely to support the arguments 
(Silverman 2000). The ‘deviant’ case may be able to be integrated into the theory 
construction, or a reconceptualised focus will be required (Perakyla 1997). Streubert 
and Carpenter (1999) refer to the search for deviant cases as selective sampling. 
Selective sampling is appropriate as new factors emerge and there is a need to either, 
increase the sample, focus on a small part of the sample, or seek out deviant cases 
(Silverman 2000).
3,2,10 Maintaining trustworthiness
Patton (2002) maintains that to demonstrate credibility in qualitative research depends 
on three distinct but related inquiry elements. These are, rigorous techniques and 
methods for gathering high-quality data, researcher training, experience, track record, 
status, presentation of self, and philosophical belief in the paradigm underpinning the 
methodology being used. Guba and Lincoln (1994) have identified several terms that 
have been used to describe the processes that contribute to rigour in carrying out 
qualitative research. These are credibility, dependability, confirmability, and 
transferability.
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Dependability is similar to validity as identified in quantitative research (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994). It relates to the extent to which an account accurately represents the 
social phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley 1990; Guba and Lincoln 1994; 
Burns and Grove 2001). Confirmability, or auditability, refers to the use of the audit 
trail, or a decision rule, where the reasoning for making any decision is documented 
and the reader is able to clearly follow the logic that is used throughout the progress 
and development of the study (Burns and Grove 2001). It represents the detailed 
reflections and notes which I kept during the research process that were used to 
illustrate, as far as possible, the evidence and thought processes that led to the 
conclusions and in presenting the findings (Streubert and Carpenter 1999). 
Transferability, within qualitative research, lies with those who read the results and 
determine whether the results accurately describe experiences from similar 
populations (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Stake 1995).
A further strategy believed to strengthen a study is that of participant 
confirmation/validation (Silverman 2000). This is where findings are taken back to 
the participants being studied, and are agreed. This process is also referred to as 
‘member checking’ (Sandelowski 1993; Stake 1995). Participant confirmation is a 
recognised approach when using a focus group method of data collection, where 
ownership of data by participants is acknowledged (Kitzinger 1996). However, this 
approach needs to be used with caution. The risks inherent in using this process are 
that the participant may correct (perceived) errors in the transcription, depending on 
their recollection. They may also attempt to clarify, justify or even revoke or alter 
aspects of what they said during the interview (Hoffart 1991). Sandelowski (1993:7)
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also criticises this approach suggesting that participants may agree to do so only to 
meet the expectations of the researcher, i.e. ‘to be good subjects’, they may want to 
minimise conflict and be reluctant to disagree with the researcher’s interpretation, and 
different participants may have different views of the interpretation. Further, the 
considerations about using this approach are that the participants may choose to 
withdraw, causing data to be lost to the research, or that the responses of a participant, 
in reading a transcription or case vignette in which they are portrayed, could be 
construed as a new experience, and need to be analysed as new data (Silverman 
2000). Seale (1999b) suggests that this approach has more strength when the full 
report of the study is reported back to participants and their responses are monitored.
Successful examples of using participant validation have been demonstrated where 
the focus group members became co-researchers (Morrow and Smith 1995; Charmaz 
2003b). This is when a number of the focus group participants assist in the analysis of 
videotapes of the groups in which they participated, suggesting categories and 
revising the developing theory and model. Construction of knowledge, on an issue of 
concern, should be a joint act of inquiry and closely involve both the researcher and 
the researched (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). It is an approach that may dispel some 
concerns raised in ethical arguments. It is of particular relevance to the issue of 
participants not knowing what theoretical assumptions the researcher will use when 
analysing and presenting the research (de Raeve 1994). However, the ability of the 
participant to offer insightful input into the interpretations of data is an unknown risk.
Inter-rater reliability is a process that is generally associated with quantitative research 
where data is independently coded and the codings are compared for agreement
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(Armstrong et al 1997; Burns and Grove 2001). There is some evidence that it can be 
used as a strategy for maintaining rigour and trustworthiness of qualitative studies 
although this has been challenged (Armstrong et al 1997). As a means of testing the 
viability if using an inter-rater reliability process for qualitative data, Armstrong et al 
(1997) used six researchers to analyse the same data set. These analysts were very 
experienced researchers from different countries and different disciplines. Armstrong 
et al (1997) concluded that there was a degree of consensus in the identification of 
themes between the different analysts but that the ‘packaging’ of these themes showed 
a number of different configurations. The analysts chose to embed the themes they 
identified in a wider context of other themes. These were influenced by the 
discipline, geography and personal experiences and views of the analyst, an 
unsurprising outcome as ‘when confronted with the same qualitative task, no two 
researchers will produce the same result; there will inevitably be differences in their 
philosophical and theoretical commitments and styles’ (Sandelowski 1993:3). 
Armstrong et al (1997) concede that the number was too small to draw definite 
conclusions but they did not find completely divergent interpretations but agreement 
at a level of situating themes within a wider framework.
A further strategy for establishing trustworthiness proposed by Silverman (2000) is 
that of comprehensive data treatment, where every single item of data is analysed. 
This is an important aspect of qualitative research analysis and a strategy for 
defending the study against ‘anecdotalism’ (Silverman 2000; Bums and Grove 2001). 
According to Seale (personal correspondence -  cited Silverman 2000:147) a good 
coding scheme should reflect a search for uncategorised activities, using all data. In 
the coding of my data I endeavoured to take this approach. There are sections
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(categories) within the data that were ‘available’ but not used in the final analysis or 
writing up. One example of these categories is the detailed data on specific medical 
and nursing interventions and medications used in managing the care of the person 
with variant CJD in the hospice. These have been used for teaching purposes and in 
an earlier publication (de Vries 2003a) that specifically addresses treatments for 
variant CJD.
The following section provides a detailed discussion on how open systems and
organisation theory was be applied to other theories of hospice activity in the
emergent fit design.
3.3. Open systems and organisation theory
Open systems theory has been used extensively in the analysis of organisations and 
activities that take place within these, usually with a focus on organisational change 
and management. Systems theory is based on the sociological premise that human 
society is a series of systems and originated in conjunction with the founding of 
sociology. Human biology, and methods and models from the natural sciences, 
formed the basis of systems theory, where analogical similarities between society and 
living organisms were made (Hassard 1993). Early systems theories were based on a 
‘closed system’ concept. This model was believed to fit with the biological model 
where a closed system is deemed to be unaffected by factors external to the
organisation. The ‘open systems’ approach is an approach to organisational theory
and practice that builds on human relations theory by suggesting that work behaviour 
is shaped by the flexible system of relations between social groups that exist within 
and outside an organisation (Haslam 2004).
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Systems theory is orientated in a functionalist paradigm and Parsons’ (1951) work is 
considered central to the development of systems in sociological theory (Silverman 
1970; Burrell and Morgan 1979; Hassard 1993). Parsons (1951) posits systems as 
goal setting and that organisations are both systems in their own right and constitute 
parts of larger systems. In the case of hospice, hospice is a system within the wider 
healthcare system. Miller and Rice (1967) take a similar view but refer to goals as 
‘primary tasks’. The work of Miller and Rice is firmly associated with the 
establishment of the Tavistock Institute and the terminology I have adopted in using 
these models is that of systems carrying out the processes of input, throughput and 
output (Katz and Khan 1966), and defining activities in terms of tasks (Miller and 
Rice 1967).
Katz and Khan (1966:16) point out that organisations have classically been defined 
as: ‘social device(s) for efficiently accomplishing through group means some stated 
purpose’. This definition has been extensively challenged within organisation 
literature and many complex discussions and debates have ensued on what constitutes 
an organisation, the processes that take place within, and how these may be analysed 
or how they may be referred to as systems (for extensive critiques of organisations as 
systems see Silverman 1970; BuiTell and Morgan 1979; Hassard 1993; Morgan 1997). 
This debate varies depending on the particular approach the writer is taking on the 
subject of organisational behaviour/activity and the way in which they are using a 
systems or organisational theory.
130
What is generally agreed is that organisations are a relatively recent phenomenon, and 
are a product of modernity (Gabriel 1999). Within this is the recognition that Western 
society is an organisational society. Most of the daily activity of people takes place 
within organisations, such as companies, schools, hospitals, universities and so on 
(Gabriel 1999). One of the common ways of defining an organisation has been based 
on the specific goal of the organisation. Silverman (1970) points out that defining an 
organisation by its ‘goal’ is problematic in that we can ask an individual about his or 
her goal and purpose but it is difficult to approach an organisation in the same way. 
Regardless of this difficulty in co-ordinating individual goals with organisational 
goals it is fundamental to all definitions that organisations have a system of roles, 
norms and values that exist for some purpose (Haslam 2004).
Equally important in establishing a definition of organisational functioning is 
consideration of internal differentiation. That is, there exist different groups within 
organisations, who will have their own shared roles, norms, values, priorities, 
preoccupations and culture, plus different power and status (Stokes 1994a; Haslam 
2004). These team members are also often accountable to different superiors (Stokes 
1994a). I refer here to the multi-professional/multidisciplinary composition of 
hospice teams. Most hospices have complex teams of nurses, healthcare assistants, 
doctors, social workers, Chaplains, complementary therapists and volunteers. Team 
authority can also be complex, however, as in most healthcare settings authority often 
rests with the doctors. Medical authority appears to be predominant within hospices, 
especially those that consider themselves specialist units (James and Field 1992; Field 
1994) and admission into the service have been shown to be predominantly medically 
determined (Eagle 2002; Eagle and de Vries 2005). Eagle’s (2002) ethnographic
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Study of the decision making processes of hospice teams from three hospice sites in 
the South of England did demonstrate that a large component of achieving a hospice 
admission required negotiation between nurses and doctors. Seale (1998) has argued 
that before accepting the médicalisation of hospice argument a more analytic 
approach is needed where the way in which the people who work in the hospice 
settings and how they think about their work and how, ‘they as ‘system 
representatives’ seek to mould the subjectivities of the people for whom they care’ 
(1998:117).
3.3.1 Katz and Khan open systems theory
The seminal work of Katz and Khan (1966), on open systems theory, has been one of 
the most influential within the field of systems theory research (Silverman 1970; 
Burrell and Morgan 1979; Kolb 1984; Hassard 1993; Haslam 2004), and continues to 
influence research and discussion on organisations. In using an open systems 
approach to critically interpret my data I have proposed that the organisation (hospice) 
is a social system that coordinates the behaviour of the members by means of roles, 
norms and values that are embedded in hospice culture. Culture includes all the 
material and spiritual heritage of the organisation, its myths and stories, artistic and 
craft artefacts, buildings, tools, laws, rituals and customs (Gabriel 1999). Hofstede 
(1991) offers a metaphor of culture as ‘the software of the mind’, indicating that it is 
not only the physical substance of cultural materials but the meanings attached to 
them and how these give meaning to peoples’ lives. The model of the hospice as a 
‘rite of passage’ (Froggatt 1995, 1997) provides one example of how the attributes of 
hospice may be culturally defined. One of the functions of culture is that of social 
control that ensures that people behave in accordance with specific social norms and
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values. Roles relate to the particular place and functions of the individual within the 
system and are defined within the system. These roles are internally differentiated in 
ways relevant to the system’s operation (Katz and Khan 1966). A schematic 
representation of an open system is shown in Figure 2.
Inputs
CZ Throughput and [  
conversion process
Boundary
Feedback loop
Outputs
Figure 2. Schematic representation of an organisation as an open system. 
(Adapted from Katz and Khan 1966; Miller and Rice 1967; Kolb et al 1984)
Systems are considered to be dynamic in nature and with cycles of events occurring 
over time (Katz and Kahn 1966; Miller and Rice 1967; Kolb et al 1984). Events tend 
to occur in natural repetitive cycles of input, throughput and output, with events in 
sequence occurring over and over again. The feedback loop is a part of the evaluation 
process of system fiinction. It involves taking feedback from the environment. This 
feedback is reflected on, and judgements are made about future choices and 
adaptation to the environment. This feedback loop requires a willingness and ability 
to make changes within the system (Katz and Kahn 1966; Miller and Rice 1967;
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Leiper 1994; Morgan 1997). In the case of the hospice service (Figure 3) I propose 
that the input is the admission of a person with a terminal illness (generally cancer) 
and their family members.
Inputs: 
People with a 
terminal illness 
(Cancer focus) Throughput: Care for dying 
people, symptom 
control and 
bereavement support
Boundary
Feedback loop: 
Responses to the service from users 
(i.e. relatives of patients), from 
evaluation of practice (e.g. audit) and 
from research
Outputs: 
Discharged, dea< 
and bereaved 
people
Figure 3. A schematic depiction of the hospice service as an open system.
The throughput and conversion process is all that is involved in the complexities of 
caring for a person with a terminal illness, such as symptom management, and 
bereavement work with both patients and families. Output is the death or discharge of 
the dying person and includes both in-house and community deaths and discharges, 
bearing in mind that ‘discharge’ from hospice is generally a ‘temporary’ event and 
that the most common output is that of the death of the patient. This also includes 
discharge of bereaved family members and significant others, also bearing in mind 
that bereavement support provided by hospice may extend to a year, sometimes
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longer. This is similar to models that have been used to schematically present 
institutions such as hospitals as ‘containers of social anxieties’, particularly in relation 
to fear of death. Obholzer (1994:171) proposes that health care services are ‘keep- 
death-at-bay’ services. This idea of keeping death at bay is the opposite end of the 
spectrum to hospices, where, as proposed by Lawton (1998a, 2000), death is 
‘processed’.
Feedback through evaluation from service users can constitute a challenge and create 
a sense of threat to organisations, and it is never easy to get the balance right between 
attaining a degree of objectivity and taking actions to make changes (Leiper 1994; 
Morgan 1997). Evaluation studies of health care have traditionally used experimental 
and quasi-experimental methodologies that include randomized controlled trials, as 
these are believed to provide the gold-standards for treatments and provision of 
‘evidence’ for practice. The difficulty with hospice care evaluation lies in the 
complexity of the dying process. Palliative care evaluation of, for example, patient 
satisfaction (an important element in the feedback loop) has evolved through a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative studies. Hospice evaluations that have 
been carried out in specific settings have demonstrated that hospice patients and their 
families have better symptom control and are more satisfied with the service than with 
non-specialist palliative care (Seale 1990; Goddard 1993; Hinton 1994; Addington- 
Hall and McCarthy 1995 a; Higginson 1993; Johnston and Abraham 1995; Robbins 
1996, 1997; Grande et al 1996; Fakhoury et al 1997; Seymour et al 2003). However, 
Seymour et al (2003) point out that that there are problems in enabling a synthesis of 
service outcomes due to the diversity of research methodologies that are used.
135
Much of the hospice practice is based on ‘best practice’ that has evolved through 
‘case study’ of individual patients. This is a process referred to as ‘therapeutic 
research’ (Illhardt and ten Have 2002), where the goal is to treat the ill person and 
whilst doing so gather information about the efficacy of the ti'eatment. This ‘best 
practice’ is often influenced by the varied and individual interests of the palliative 
care consultants, medical directors and specialist nurses who manage the care of dying 
people within the hospice services. Warnings against complacency and assumptions 
that hospices provide a system of care that is beyond criticism have been expressed, 
with calls for more developed evaluation of hospice practices and the implications of 
these to the wider social environment (Clark 1993; Walter 1994; Jennings 1997; 
Lawton 2000).
3,3.2 Tavistock Institute and open systems
The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations was founded in London in 1946. It was 
set up for the specific purpose of actively relating the psychological and social 
sciences to the needs and concerns of society (Trist 1990). Thiough research and 
consultancy activities the Institute has built an international reputation and publication 
collection that is both innovative and challenging. Systems theory was one of the first 
inputs ft'om the social sciences that underpinned socio-psychological thinking and the 
psychoanalytical approach to understanding organisations, used by the Tavistock 
Institute, draws heavily on systems theory (Mosse 1994). Research developed by the 
Tavistock Institute drew on psychoanalytical theory of Freud and Klein. These 
theories were used to interpret how individuals in large bureaucratic organisations, 
faced with uncertainty and anxiety, set up psychological boundaries which seriously
136
distorted organisational rationality and task, and where the system is then identified as 
suffering (Trist and Murray 1990).
The Tavistock approach involves using ideas developed in the context of individual 
therapy and applying these to institutions in terms of unconscious emotional processes 
(Halton 1994). Within this is the view that ideas which have a valid meaning at a 
conscious level, may, at the same time carry an unconscious hidden meaning, that 
may be interpreted through symbolic expressions from the unconscious (Halton 
1994).
Various strategies were identified that are used by individuals to manage both 
themselves and the organisation, for example through organisational ritual (Menzies 
Lyth 1988, 1990). These rituals are proposed as depersonalized routines which create 
distance between individuals and their roles, screening out threatening emotional 
involvements and replacing them with a set of mechanical actions (Menzies Lyth 
1988, 1990). Menzies Lyth (1988, 1990) found that, within the hospital in which she 
conducted her research, nursing patients with incurable diseases was one of the 
nurse’s most distressing tasks. However, this study was confined to hospital nurses’ 
experiences. Contrary to this, studies with hospice nurses have suggested that hospice 
nursing provides the opportunity to share in the dying experience in an intimate and 
meaningful way and can be far from distressing (Zerwekh 1993; Rasmussen et al 
1995, 1997; Nebauer et al 1996; de Vries 2000a, 2000b). Payne (2001) showed that 
despite the difficult nature of hospice work, levels of burnout among hospice nursing 
staff are low. She attributes this to the supportive interdisciplinary team and a 
positive environment that is considered the cornerstone of hospice, although she does
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not address this from an organisational perspective. However, Vachon (1995, 1997) 
has shown that hospice nursing provides both a high level of job satisfaction and can 
also be stressful.
Using emotional labour theory, Froggatt (1995, 1998) and Li (2002) argue that 
hospice nurses experience anxiety when nursing dying patients and use a number of 
strategies to deal with this anxiety that are not merely demonstrated through 
mechanical task actions. Froggatt (1995, 1998) provides an insightful model of how 
nurses’ bodies are metaphorical containers of emotion. These emotions are contained 
and expressed only at ‘appropriate’ times, and in ways that do not disturb 
nurse/patient relationships. Both the work of Froggatt (1995), and Li’s (2002) 
‘symbiotic niceness’ model, have congruency with the concepts used by Menzies 
Lyth (1988, 1990) in demonstrating processes that are used as a defence against 
anxiety by hospice nurses. Menzies Lyth (1990:443) points out that a social defence 
system develops over time through collusive interaction and agreement between 
members of the organization as to what form it shall take. This is often unconscious 
as verified by Froggatt (1995). The socially structured defence mechanisms then tend 
to become an aspect of external reality with which old and new members of the 
institution must come to terms (Menzies Lyth 1988, 1990).
Based on the psychoanalytical model it is posited that institutions (organisations) 
pursue unconscious tasks alongside their conscious ones, and these affect both the 
efficiency and the degree of stress experienced by staff (Mosse 1994). These are 
closely linked to the primary task of the organisation (Roberts 1994b). The 
identification of the primary task of the organisation is a complex process. A useful
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way of viewing these was developed by Lawrence (1977- cited Roberts 1994b) where 
the tasks are considered at three different levels of consciousness. The ‘normative 
primary task’ is the formal or official task (Roberts 1994b). These are the operational 
broad aims of the organisation. In the case of hospice this is the care and management 
of the dying person and their families, using the philosophical values and principles of 
palliative care. This task is expressed by Stokes (1994b: 121) as ‘what they say they 
are doing’.
The existential primary task’ is the task people within the organisation believe they 
are carrying out, which includes the meaning or interpretation they put on their roles 
and activities (Roberts 1994b). Or what they really believe they are doing (Stokes 
1994b). In the case of hospice care I propose that the staff believe that they are 
providing the ‘good death’. The ‘phenomenal primary task’ is the task that can be 
inferred from people’s behaviour, and of which they may not be consciously aware 
(Roberts 1994b:30), i.e. ‘what is actually going on’ (Stokes 1994b). Roberts 
(1994b:31) cites Turquet (1974) who warned that when a group does not seek to know 
the definition or feasibility of its primary task, there is likely to emerge either 
dismemberment of the group, or the emergence of some other primary task. The other 
primary task may be unrelated to the one for which the organisation was originally 
called into being.
The above discussion is significant in relation to the evolution of the hospice service 
from the original foundations of monastic influence to the suggested ‘medical’ model. 
Whilst no comprehensive studies of hospice as a sociological system have been 
conducted, there are a number of studies that have conceptualised the behaviours that
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take place within the hospice. These offer some insight into the organisational 
framework of the hospice service and were discussed earlier in the literature chapter. 
I refer to the mosaic of studies that between them have built up a picture of the 
hospice as an organisational system.
Criticism of the hospice, as addressed within the literature chapter, has suggested that 
the original foundation of hospice care has been lost in the process of médicalisation. 
This does not negate the validity of the emergence of another primary task as an 
organisation evolves. That is, there is capacity for integration of the old with the new 
and the ‘rite of passage’ model (Froggatt 1995, 1997) suggests that some of the 
founding values and culture of hospice still remain. Also, within the discussions on 
the médicalisation of hospice, there has arisen criticism of the loss of focus on 
psychosocial needs of dying people which has been superseded by concentration on 
symptom control. This has resulted in the emergence of another primary task, i.e. a 
focusing on the body of the dying person (Lawton 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Copp 1996, 
1999). However, the suggestion that hospice care has become body focused is not 
totally proven and represents one way of viewing the practices within the system, and 
may vary considerably between individual hospice environments.
3,3.3 System boundaries
Many of the difficulties faced by organisations can be traced to defining the primary 
task and to managing the system boundaries (Mosse 1994). System boundaries are 
complex and yet have a fundamental psychological reality (Gabriel 1999). For the 
purposes of my study I use a simple definition of boundaries. I propose system 
boundaries are the demarcation lines for the definition of appropriate system activity.
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This relates to the admission into and out of the system of both members and other 
inputs that are necessary for organisational functioning (Katz and Khan 1966). I 
propose admission of people who are terminally ill as inputs (see Figure 3) necessary 
for the organisational functioning of the hospice, in fact for the very existence of the 
hospice. Froggatt (1995, 1997) describes crossing the boundary into the liminal space 
of hospice marks the move from secular to the sacred space. This, she says, is 
crossing the threshold from getting better to not getting better.
Boundaries may have both psychological and physical symbolic characteristics, such 
as uniforms, dress or other insignia, or more subtle characteristic may determine the 
boundary, such as speech patterns and specialised knowledge (Katz and Khan 1966). 
In the concept of open systems offered by Katz and Khan (1966), all members of an 
organization are considered to be affected by the fact that they occupy a common 
organizational space, in contrast to those who are not members. Once within the 
boundaries and becoming a functioning member of the organization, the person takes 
on some of the coding system of the organization. This requires accepting some of its 
norms and values, absorbing some of its subculture, and developing shared 
expectations and values with other members. This boundary condition is responsible 
for the dilemma that the person within the system cannot perceive things and 
communicate about them in the same way that an outsider would (Katz and Kahn 
1966).
This boundary condition implies potential for individuals within a system to become 
insular and cocooned within their organisation and in doing so may they be at risk of 
losing the ability to stand back from their activities (practices) and take a strategic
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view of these. It has been suggested that this may be the case of hospice organisations 
where the emotiveness of the ‘haloed’ practice of caring for dying people causes 
practitioners to believe that they are beyond criticism (Clark 1993; Walter 1994).
I conceptualise the goals and aims of the hospice system as a philosophical consensus 
of the members (of the system) and a ‘defined’ way of working that is rich with rituals 
and routines, in the practice of caring for dying people. Provision of care within 
hospice is based on philosophical principles of palliative care that are held within a 
specialist literature. They are reproduced by the primary influential members of the 
organisation and imposed on other less influential members of the organisation. This 
is notwithstanding the complexity of the various goals of individuals and sub-groups 
that comprise the individual hospices that were involved in the study.
Little study has been conducted on how hospices manage their boundaries, i.e. 
judgements made on admission criteria and power within the teams on making these 
judgements. Hospices are able to maintain relatively strict boundary controls as 
opposed to hospitals. For example, hospitals, by their very nature have difficulty in 
maintaining strict boundary controls as they cannot easily control emergency 
admissions (Miller and Rice 1990). It has been suggested that hospice boundaries 
within UK hospices are predominantly managed by medical team members and that 
terminal ill acuteness is a primary criteria for admission to specialist hospice units 
(Gannon 2002; Eagle 2002). Eagle (2002) identified that if the patient was known 
personally to any of the clinicians present during referral discussions the patient had 
more chance of being admitted, as an emotive argument would be made for the 
admission.
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The cultural and philosophical values and principles that underpin hospice care have 
evolved since the 1960s, and residual traditional influences and variation exist 
between hospices. Some hospices have retained large components of the traditional 
values and philosophies of hospice care whilst others have moved towards the 
medicalised model and claim to be providers of ‘specialist’ palliative care. They all 
have the common purpose of providing end-of-life care for dying people, 
predominantly people with cancer. This restrictive entry criteria ensures homogeneity 
of care needs and should reduce the potential for differences and tension within the 
liminal space (Froggatt 1995, 1997). This potential for minimal tension represents 
equilibrium within the system.
3.3.4 Equilibrium in systems
Systems tend to move toward the state where components are in equilibrium, i.e. 
where a steady state exists and when changes in the system result in imbalance, 
system components move to restore balance (Katz and Khan 1966; Kolb et al 1984). 
The confined criteria for input (people with cancer), the limited capacity of hospices 
(bed numbers ranging from eight to 48) plus a clearly defined philosophy of care, 
allows hospice to maintain a state of relative equilibrium. The philosophy of 
palliative care defines the central values of hospice and the central values define the 
goal of an organisation, as well as the basis for forms of legitimate authority exercised 
within (Hassard 1993). Any change in the system stems from two sets of processes. 
These are from the demands of the environment and from within the system itself. 
Demands of the environment influences movement in central values. This process
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represents the dynamic nature of systems activity with cycles of events occurring over 
time (Katz and Kahn 1966; Kolb et al 1984).
The idea of an institute maintaining shape is developed by Mary Douglas (1986) when 
considering ‘how institutions think’. She proposes that for an institution to become 
stable means settling into some recognisable shape. Institutions fall into stable types 
that can be recognised in different times and different circumstances. In this instance 
I refer to the hospice services in general. The different shape of the hospice service as 
it has moved through evolutionary processes has been mapped by others (see for 
example Clark 2002; Clark et al 2005). This evolution was influenced by pioneers in 
the field of death and dying such as Kübler-Ross (1969), Glaser and Strauss (1965, 
1968) and Saunders (Saunders et al 1981). According to Douglas (1986:112), any 
institution that is going to keep its shape ‘needs to gain legitimacy by distinctive 
grounding in nature and in reason’. Douglas (1986) further proposes that the 
institution then affords its members a set of analogies with which to explore the 
world. These analogies are then used to justify the naturalness and reasonableness of 
the instituted rules. It fiirther allows the institution to keep its identifiable continuing 
form
The legitimacy of the hospices was grounded in a distinctive and newly recognised 
need to care for dying people that gained popularity at a phenomenal speed, based on 
the literature on death and dying that grew from the 1960s. It was a reasonable 
evolution and matched the scientific and medical development of palliative care 
(primarily a nursing occupation), to palliative medicine (medically led palliative care) 
in keeping with the premise that as systems get larger they also get more complex
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(Katz and Khan 1966; Kolb et al 1984). The question that is now being asked by 
some, for example Lawton (2000), is where now?
There has been increasing differentiation occurring within the hospice service 
(system), particularly in the development of specialist units and increased 
médicalisation. This has been contained within a cancer service framework, and as 
such, equilibrium is maintained by confining expertise to this specific patient group. 
Although lip-service is paid to the integration of non-malignant terminal illnesses into 
the hospice sei*vices, the reality of this is undeveloped. Consequently the service is 
able to maintain relative equilibrium. Issues related to funding, charity status and 
other potential for disequilibrium of hospice services are not addressed in this thesis 
but are acknowledged as areas that are important in a view of the service within a 
systems framework.
3.4 Summary
The nature of this study required an inductive approach using qualitative research 
methodology as the purpose of the study was exploratory and was designed to enable 
theory construction. Grounded theory offered a research approach that required 
rigorous strategies in the data collection and analysis.
Open systems theory applied to the hospice service enables a view of the functioning 
of the organisation as a system in which the care of dying people is managed through 
processes of input, throughput and output. It also offers the opportunity to frame 
hospice activities (practices) at a macro level where the hospice can be placed within 
the wider society as a system within systems of health care. I have suggested that
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individuals may have become cocooned and complacent within the system, due to the 
speciality of hospice practices. In Chapter 4 I outline the methods I used to conduct 
the study.
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Chapter 4 -  Methods of data collection and analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I provide a step by step description of the methods I used to collect and 
analyse my research data, starting with the pilot study. I discuss in detail my 
strategies for gaining access and my sampling processes and reflect on the problems 
encountered in recruiting participants and how these were overcome. The chapter 
outlines my reflexive processes showing how my thinking sharpened and focused 
through reading, intuiting, analysing and synthesising data. Carrying out research 
requires personal and professional responsibility that ensures the design of the study is 
morally and ethically sound. I critically discuss issues about the ethical implications 
for the sample group that was under study. I also reflect on what I considered an 
important issue in this study, that of maintaining confidentiality and anonymity for the 
participants. The methods used to analyse and code data are outlined and discussed in 
detail. The research aims were repeatedly returned to throughout the study as a means 
of maintaining focus.
4.1.1 Study sample
Three hospices were accessed by completion of the study due to issues of sampling 
and access which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 4.3.1.1 Overcoming sampling 
problems. All three hospices met the criteria for providing specialist palliative care, 
as defined in the literature section. That is, they had a specialist palliative care 
physician, specialist social work and bereavement services, in-patient, day hospice, 
and respite and community palliative cai*e facilities. Bed numbers were 15, 18 and 26.
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The pilot data set consisted of: a focus group interview with two senior Clinical Nurse 
Specialists (CNS), two Junior Hospice Nurses (JN) and two Health Care Assistants 
(HCA): an interview with a hospice Specialist Registrar (DR): interview with, and 
examination of detailed hospice notes of a hospice Social Worker (SW): individual 
interviews with two family members (FM): and examination of the hospice records of 
the person with variant CJD. The number of participants for the complete study and 
their codes are listed in Table 1. Type of data collected for the complete study is 
listed in Table 2.
Table 1
CODES
Codes for participants
PARTICIPANT TITLE NUMBER PARTICIPANTS
CNS Clinical Nurse Specialist (experienced 
hospice nurse)
8
(2 interviewed twice/focus 
group)
(1 interviewed three 
times/focus group)
JN Junior Hospice Nurse (new to hospice 
care)
3
HCA Health Care Assistant 
(all were experienced hospice care 
practitioners)
6
(2 interviewed twice/focus 
group)
(1 interviewed three 
time/focus group)
DR Doctor (all were Specialist Practice 
Registrars)
3
SW Social Worker 2
FM Family Member (this does not include 
family members from television 
documentaries)
5
Table 2 Type of data collected
Focus group interviews conducted 4
Single interviews conducted 7
Two person interviews conducted 2
Sets of hospice records examined 4
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Television documentaries transcribed and analysed 2
Newspaper interview analysed 1
Figure 1 provides a flowchart of the data collection process showing; what type of 
data was collected from each of the hospice sites, how many participants were 
interviewed and specifies who these participants were.
Figure 1 Flowchart of data collection sites and processes
In-patient admission
Focus group interview, comprised of: two CNS, two JN, two HCA 
Individual (single) interviews with two FM
Individual interview with one SW plus examination of detailed written notes 
Individual interview with one DR 
Examination of patient hospice records
Repeat focus group interview -  two CNS and two HCA (from above group)
Community admission
• Two person (joint) interview with one SW and one DR
• Did not gain access to hospice records at this site
*
Community and day hospice/respite admission
Focus group interview, comprised of: two CNS, one JN(day hospice), two 
HCA(day hospice and community)
Examination of patient hospice records____________________________I
Community and day hospice/respite admission
Individual interview with one CNS (community)
Individual interview with one CNS (day hospice)
Individual interview with one FM
Examination of patient hospice records_________________I
In-Patient admission
• Focus group interview, comprised of: two CNS and two HCA
• Two person (joint) interview with two FM
• Individual interview with one DR
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• Examination of patient hospice records
NOTE: One CNS and one HCA were interviewed for this admission and were 
members of both focus groups for first in-patient admission above
4.2. Pilot study
4.2.1 Sample and gaining access
In grounded theory the initial sample is determined to examine the phenomena where 
it is found to exist, i.e. purposive sampling is carried out. Initially I carried out a pilot 
study, the data from which has been integrated into the findings. Ethical approval was 
obtained from the Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC) for this (Appendix 1) 
and from the hospice site. Prior to the interviews meetings were held with potential 
participants and the Information sheet provided (Appendix 2). Consent was obtained 
at the time of interview (Appendix 3).
Requirement for inclusion in the study was that participants had been involved in 
providing care for a person with variant CJD at the end of the illness trajectory. No 
Chaplains were interviewed, as, to my knowledge none were involved with my study 
participants. In keeping with the philosophy of hospice care, family members or 
‘significant others’, of the people with variant CJD, were considered to also be 
members of the hospice teams. All significant others were family members, so 
throughout the study they were always referred to as family members.
4.2.2 Data collection
4.2.2.1 Focus gt'oup interviews
The approach I used in conducting the focus group interviews was to create a non­
threatening environment (Morgan 1998). I kept a low profile, allowing a free 
discussion of the care of the person with variant CJD to develop. My input was
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limited to ensuring all of the questions I had on my interview guide (Appendix 4 and 
5) were covered at some stage of the inteiwiew and to summarise at various points.
4.2.2.2 Single and two person interviews
Close intimate discussion occurred during the interviews with family members, and a 
friendly relationship was established, by dint of my personal approach. In the context 
of being a practitioner in the palliative care field, this was natural behaviour and could 
not be ‘put aside’. I felt confident that this was mutually agreed in all cases. 
However, the data collected was of a sensitive nature and during the interview process 
issues of an emotive nature were raised, both in the single and focus group interviews. 
Even some time following the interview emotive affect may occur as interviews are 
also interventions. They affect people, and thoughts, feelings, knowledge, and 
experience are revealed to both the interviewer and the interviewee. As pointed out 
by Patton (2002), being taken through a directed and reflective process about one’s 
life during an interview can be change-inducing. Interviews may leave people 
knowing things about themselves that they didn’t know, or may not have been aware 
of prior to the interview (Patton 2002).
This was a crucial consideration during the research process and in preparation for 
this, a system was established to provide support for myself, and any participant who 
may require this. The person who negotiated my contact with family members agreed 
to take on this role for family members. In two cases this was a Specialist Palliative 
Care nurse and in another case it was a social worker. As a means of providing her 
own support one family member brought her friend with her to the interview (pilot).
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As support for myself I approached a social worker who agreed to act as my support 
system should I need to discuss any issues that arose for myself
I did have some concerns as, at some stage, in all cases, one of the family members 
was in tears during the interview. Distress was verbalised in several ways, with 
family members reporting that '... we don't go to same church now' and that, 'God 
had let us down’. Some of the distress expressed had implications for making 
decisions about continuing or terminating the interview. Seymour and Ingleton 
(1999) recommend that in carrying out research with participants in palliative care the 
principle of process consent should be used. This is a process whereby consent is 
frequently checked throughout the dialogue. Some of the concerns raised in using this 
approach is that it may constrain the research design, possibly reduce the sample size, 
and data may be missed as a result of a half-finished interview (Beaver et al 1999). I 
felt that the practice of process consent occurs within an interview relationship 
intuitively, based on responses of the participant during the interview. My experience 
was that repeatedly saying, ‘Do you want to continue?’ was an impediment to the 
flow of the interview. The approach I used was to make an intuitive judgement on 
how often I used the phrase, ‘do you want to continue?’ This phrase could potentially 
increase distress whereas I found that an empathie silence allowed the person to 
express the emotion and make their own choice when to move on with the interview.
4.2.3 Data analysis
For the pilot study I transcribed all data verbatim as soon as possible following each 
interview. I then listened to the tapes repeatedly, until familiarity with the data was 
established. Analytical memos were made of transcribed data, i.e. notes taken when
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listening to the audio-tapes and whilst consulting field notes. From this I created an 
interpretative commentary while the information and innuendoes remained fresh. [All 
other data for this study were transcribed by an experienced transcriber after which I 
listened repeatedly to the audio-tapes. This enabled me to recall unclear pieces of 
recorded speech and intonation and emphasis of participants and transcriptions were 
modified until I was certain of the innuendoes, meaning and interaction contained in 
the interviews.]
4.2.3.1 Manual analysis o f interview data
The method which I used to conduct the focus groups meant they provided a form of 
‘natural’ conversation and the tapes were transcribed with particular attention paid to 
the interactions within the group. For the manual coding of the focus group data, one 
copy of the transcription was used to analyse the group interaction, using the notes 
taken during the focus group interview to guide this. Other copies were made for 
line-by-line coding and tabulation. I address the subject of tabulation later in this 
chapter. Large margins were retained on the both sides of the transcription sheets of 
focus group and single interviews to enable writing of notes when analysing the data. 
Each line of every page was numbered so location of details was made easier. Several 
copies of the transcriptions were made. Each copy was used in a different way and a 
system of colour codes was developed in the coding of the focus group and single 
inteiwiew transcripts. From these sets of transcriptions I developed several ‘mind 
maps’. I used a visual depiction in accordance with my way of visualising the world 
which is largely pictorial. This visual model was an invaluable tool during the 
research process. As I worked through my analysis and interpretation of data it was 
reformed repeatedly.
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‘Mind mapping’ has been described as a visual format that represents information 
systematically so that the user can draw valid conclusions and take action as necessary 
(Miles and Huberman 1994; Buzan and Buzan 2003; Buzan 2004). It involves a 
process of what Buzan and Buzan (2003) refers to as ‘radiant thinking’. Radiant 
thinking is a combination of brainstorming and relational associations that proceed 
from or connect to a central point. These were all hand written. An example of how 
these ‘mind maps’ were used was converted to a Power Point display and can be seen 
in Appendix 6 where I coded the types of interactions that occurred during the focus 
group interview as conflict, agreement, hierarchy and in-articulation. Appendix 7 
provides a ‘mind map’ of the categories that were developed as a preliminary 
theoretical framework from the pilot.
4.2.4 Tabulation
On the first reading of the transcripts for the pilot I was immediately struck by the 
number of time participants referred to ‘not knowing’ (Appendix 8) and how much 
focus there was on the subject of ‘sedation’ (Appendix 9). This had not been as 
obvious to me on listening to the tapes or even during the interviews. ‘Not knowing’ 
was identified as a very important issue for the participants and clearly had potential 
to become a core category. I decided to use a process of tabulation, reported to be a 
strategy to establish trustworthiness (Silverman 2000; Seale 2000), and count how 
frequently a reference to ‘not knowing’ and ‘sedation’ was made. Transcription 
sheets (for both focus group and single interviews) were used to carry out 
‘appropriate’ tabulation, where the number of ‘instances’ of certain phrases was 
counted (Silverman 2000).
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This is not a matter of counting for the sake of counting, and is a strategy that may be 
utilised in different ways. For example the number of times a certain phrase is used 
may be tabulated as a means of establishing the presence or absence of key 
interactions within a given context. ‘Counting instances’ of, for example repeated 
words or phrases (Silverman 2000; Seale 2000), or ‘manifest coding’ (Sullivan 2001), 
particularly when using a coding scheme, is considered to be a means of increasing 
rigour within a study. I considered this an important contribution to identifying and 
maintaining the core category. Secondly (based on analysis of a later data set) it was 
used to make a comparison between the number of expressions of ‘not knowing’ by 
hospice teams who were caring for a person with variant CJD for the first time and a 
hospice team who had previous experience of caring for variant and other types of 
CJD cases. This led to the development of the category that explains change over 
time from ‘not knowing’ to ‘becoming knowledgeable’.
Care needs to be taken when using tabulation processes as evidence as it is a process 
largely associated with quantitative research methods. Denscombe (1998:169) 
suggests that this type of content analysis refers to the treatment of data rather than 
research methods and warns that ‘the more the text relies on subtle and intricate 
meanings conveyed by the writer or inferred by the reader, the less valuable content 
analysis becomes in revealing the meaning of the text’. For example, within data a 
number of instances of repeated phrases can be attributed to one or two participants 
whose habit, during the interviews, was to repeat themselves constantly. These 
instances were also found to be due to my repeating a question to either clarify or 
summarise an event or situation during the interview. I found that it was essential that
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I took this into consideration when using NUD*IST to tabulate. I needed to ensure 
that I was not merely providing a number of instances of a word or phrase occurring 
without considering the context in which it was used.
One example was that of the repeated use of the word ‘ignorance’, occurring five 
times within a very short section of conversation between two health care assistants. 
This section demonstrated a symbolic interactionist explanation of the process of 
designating, interpreting and transforming the ways in which the participants were 
fitting together their lines of action or conceptualisations thiough symbolic use of 
language (Blumer 1969). In this case ignorance was contextualised as a negative 
expression related to ‘gossiping’. It was also ‘counted’ as an expression of ‘not 
knowing’, and strengthened the core category. The point I am making is that 
‘counting’ must be seen as a more complex method within qualitative data than 
merely providing a table of ‘instances’. These ‘instances’ may be out of context with 
the event/situation being analysed, particularly in relation to interview data. It is a 
very useftil method within qualitative research but should not be seen as providing 
‘objective’ description, and should only be used as long as it can be justified and 
contextualised by the researcher.
Analysis of the pilot indicated that the sources of data used provided a rich account of 
the experience of caring for a person with variant CJD. Design principles for the 
main study were based on those of the pilot. The findings from the pilot are 
integrated into the main findings.
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4.3 Main study
4.3.1 Sampling and recruitment
Five hospice sites initially agreed to participate in the study. Only three of these were 
accessed, for reasons I discuss later. They were given a copy of the Information sheet 
for participants (Appendix 2) at the time of inviting their participation (Appendix 10). 
A reply letter of agreement to participate (Appendix 11) and letters of 
acknowledgement were sent to those sites that agreed to participate in the study 
(Appendix 12). The information sheet (Appendix 2) and a letter of confirmation to 
participate in the study (Appendix 13) was given to identified, potential participants 
from within the hospice teams and a date to carry out the data collection negotiated. 
All family member participants were approached by a hospice staff member who I 
had previously interviewed, either in a focus group or single interview. It was 
important that this member was known to them and that it was a person with whom 
they had a relationship such that I could feel confident that their decision to 
participate in the study was wholly voluntary and that they had been clearly informed 
about the study aims.
4.3. L 1 Overcoming sampling problems
As the study progressed recruitment became problematic for several reasons. The 
first problem occurred when I collected the second data set. What was to be a focus 
group of four, became two members of staff, and some time into the interview it was 
revealed that the patient had actually died in 1997. This was despite my clear 
stipulation that I wanted to collect data on cases that had been at the hospice in the last 
12 months, (see Appendix 10, letter to hospices). There was no potential access to 
family members from this case by the time I carried out this interview.
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Analysis of the interview data for the second case of variant CJD maintained the core 
category and strengthened some categories and weakened others already established 
from the first data set (pilot). Appropriate admission into the hospice service was a 
major focus at the time of the death of the person with variant CJD (1997) and 
strengthened this category and gave me the ‘beginnings’ of conceptualising the data 
as ‘time contextual’. As a result of the unexpected 1997 case, I checked other 
agreeing hospices to find that in one case the person had died more than two years 
previous, consequently I did not pursue data collection from this site. I found that a 
further hospice that had agreed to participate in the research had not had a case of 
variant CJD. The agreement was made based on potential admission.
The site where I collected my third data set also became problematic. As a condition 
of my ethical approval, it required that any approach made to family members must be 
made by a hospice staff member who knew them. Despite several attempts to arrange 
contact with family members through the staff member, I was not successful. The 
reasons for this were never revealed. A further person with variant CJD, identified for 
me by the Prion Centre, was lost due to the interpretation of gaining ethical approval 
by the hospice Medical Director. She considered that I could not have access to staff 
or records unless the family agreed to this. The Medical Director approached the 
family on my behalf and reported that the family were reluctant but said they would 
consider it. Following several attempts to expedite this, I was not successful.
At the outset of the study, the predictions were that large numbers of people would 
become ‘infected’ with variant CJD, and therefore possibly require hospice care. This
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meant that the potential for recruiting participants for the study was high. Variant 
CJD cases ‘appeared’ to peak in 2000 and by 2002 there was a clear lessening of 
numbers (see literature section). Also, by 2002, funding by Government for people 
with all types of CJD was such that for many the care-at-home package was so 
comprehensive that there was little requirement for hospice input. Most did not fit 
within my MREC ethical approval criteria, which was to approach cases through 
hospices.
Sampling became even more problematic by the end of 2002. Another case, 
identified through my networking was met with a refusal to access by the hospice 
Medical Director. Other cases I identified through networking had no specific 
hospice care input due to comprehensive funding support that families were, by then, 
receiving. Hence, by the beginning of 2003, I had a dwindling potential for 
participants for the study.
An important aspect of the data that I already had, from three sites, was that it covered 
a five-year span. That is, three people who had died of variant CJD, one each in 1997, 
2000 and 2001. It was at this stage that I made several decisions about the direction 
of the research. I decided to place the study within a time context, i.e. changes over 
time of the variant CJD experience and relate this to the hospice as an organisation. I 
also decided to examine material on the subject of variant CJD within the media. I 
transcribed two television documentaries of the experiences of two young people, 
Kate and Jonathan and included them in my NUD*IST data base. On CJD internet 
sites I found a number of detailed interviews with family members of young people 
who had died of variant CJD. To one of these, the story of Claire (Pearson 2000), I
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applied the coding scheme (manually). These cases did not fit into the category of 
having been cared for by hospice teams, but were useful in examining family 
experiences, as my field data had only been able to get family experiences from one 
site at the time. The media cases are presented in the findings chapter as footnotes, 
where the experiences were relevant and supported my interpretations. I decided that 
it was not appropriate to include this data within my own field data as the material had 
been journalistically manipulated. Evidence of this is demonstrated by how the 
documentary about Kate focuses on the horrific nature of the disease, risk and food. 
The focus of the documentary about Jonathan was on cure.
At this stage I also decided that, due to reducing numbers of people being identified as 
having variant CJD, I would broaden my focus and look for deviant cases. In 
considering what would constitute a deviant case, I decided that a case of CJD of a 
different type would be appropriate and as, by that stage, almost all cases of CJD were 
being managed at home, this would have to be a hospice community team case.
Through networking processes I found a person with a diagnosis of CJD, the type of 
which was uncertain. There was a possibility that it was variant CJD, but due to a 
number of other factors this had not been confirmed or excluded. Then, 
unexpectedly, I found a case of variant CJD, who became an in-patient admission to a 
hospice that had previously provided care for people with other types of CJD, 
including variant CJD. This offered the opportunity to look for differences between 
the experiences of a hospice team who were more experienced and knowledgeable 
about the disease. This was the team from which I had obtained my pilot data (first 
data set). Not all of the original team members remained at the hospice but two CNSs
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and two HCAs were able to be interviewed again and other members of the team had 
previous experience of caring for a person with variant CJD.
4.3.2 Data analysis
The provisional theoretical framework that resulted from the analysis of the pilot 
provided a coding scheme for analysis of further data sets when using non-numerical 
unstructured data indexing, searching, and theorising (NUD*IST) programme 
software. Appendix 14 provides a chart of the stages of the research process, 
demonstrating the flow of the grounded theory development from the gathering of the 
data, coding, category development and formation to the stage of theory development. 
In practice, when using grounded theory, this process does not occur in the linear 
form depicted in Appendix 14. It is a systematic and inductive process of entering the 
field and collecting data. From there an analytic interpretation of the data is 
developed which focuses further data collection. This is followed by returning to the 
literature and then re-entering the field. It is an evolving and constantly developing 
process of reflexivity and theory building (Charmaz 2003a, 2003b).
4.3.3 Categorising the data
Grounded theory begins with ‘basic description’, moves onto ‘conceptual ordering’, 
and then to ‘theorising’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Patton 2002). In coding my data I 
followed this three-step process, however, based on Charmaz’s (2003a:258) premise 
that ‘coding starts the chain of theory development’, theorising took place throughout 
the process.
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The first step is where basic description of the raw data is produced through the 
process of open coding. This is a process of line-by-line coding of raw data. It also 
involves examining larger sections of conversation/discourse for interactions 
occurring between participants (see Appendix 15 for an example of [manual] open 
coding carried out on a section of my data). The process of open coding produced a 
large number of concepts or codes. Concepts are defined by Straus and Corbin 
(2004:303) as ‘conceptual labels placed on discrete happenings, event, and other 
instances of phenomena’. This involved a combination of ‘literal’ and ‘interpretive’ 
coding of the data. Literally, I was interested in the words, language used, sequences 
of interactions and the form and structure of the dialogue (Mason 2002). My 
interpretive coding was based on my inference of what participants interpretations, 
understandings, versions and accounts of the events were, i.e. I was ‘reading through 
or beyond the data’ (Mason 2002:149). This included noting metaphors.
At step two these concepts were put into some order. The most frequently appearing 
initial concepts were used to sort, synthesise, and conceptualise the large amounts of 
data (Charmaz 2003b). From this process the concepts were then grouped or 
classified and the number of units reduced. These units then formed a category.
A category is a classification of these concepts. ‘This classification is discovered 
when concepts are compared one against another and appear to pertain to a similar 
phenomenon’. (Strauss and Corbin 2004:303) That is, a categoiy represents a unit of 
information composed of events, happenings and instances (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
These categories were given abstract titles based on the relationships within the 
groups of coded concepts. The name chosen for a category was one that seemed the
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most logical descriptor for what was going on. The classification of these categories 
often ends in an ‘-ing’, to convey action (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2003b). 
A source of categories can also be from the literature. However, Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) caution that care needs to be taken when ‘borrowing’ concepts or names for 
phenomena as they often bring with them commonly held meanings and associations. 
In the early stages of analysis (pilot) one category was borrowed from the literature as 
it so succinctly represented the experience of the participants. This was contagion 
which was ‘borrowed’ from Doka (1997) in relation to the early days of HIV and 
AIDS. It served as an appropriate ‘early’ category for the concerns about 
contamination and risk, but was collapsed into other categories as data collection and 
analysis proceeded.
The third step was that of focusing on a core category or selective coding. This was 
the integrative process of selecting the core category and systematically relating it to 
other categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998). It is also the stage of theorising (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998). Charmaz (2003a) however, sees theorising as starting at the early 
stage of coding. Strauss and Corbin (1998) put emphasis on showing that the 
generation of theory occurs around a core category, whereas Charmaz does not make 
reference to the concept of ‘core category’. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
categories that are not related to the core category can be excluded from the theory 
and other categories that are related to the core category can be examined in more 
depth. I found, as Charmaz (2003a) suggests that theorising began early in the 
research process and was constantly refined as data collection and analysis proceeded.
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) caution that the researcher is inclined to begin to construct 
theory at a very early stage of the data collection. As analysis is part of the process all 
the way through the study, in grounded theory, this is an accepted process. However, 
it needs to be approached carefully to avoid some of the pitfalls that can lead to 
accusations of bias and lack of trustworthiness. Silverman (2000:179) advises that in 
practice the researcher should begin analysis on a relatively small part of the data. 
Then having generated a set of categories, test out the emerging theory by steadily 
expanding the data corpus. This was the process that I followed, where the 
preliminary framework developed from the pilot assisted in developing a coding 
scheme that was used both to guide further interviews and provide a preliminary 
theoretical framework (Silverman 2000).
A coding scheme is an operational definition of the content of data material and is 
also an integral part of conceptual development and theory building. There are no 
clear guidelines on how to establish a coding scheme for qualitative researchers. 
Sullivan (2001) suggests that they are typically derived from some pre-existing 
theoretical stance and then an effort is made to see if the data ‘fit’ the coding scheme. 
The scheme can be created before commencing fieldwork (Miles and Huberman 
1994), or it can be developed following analysis of a small section of data (Silverman 
2000; Sullivan 2001), which is how I used this.
I became totally absorbed by the data, writing detailed memos and notes on my 
thoughts and impressions. This was based on the mandate to write what emerges 
from the data where memos were used to aid the development and formulation of 
grounded theory. The term memo, in grounded theory, refers to very specialised
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types of written records that contain the products of analysis or directions for the 
analyst. These are ‘analytical and conceptual rather than descriptive’ (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998:217). These were used to ‘free associate’ and write whatever thoughts 
came to me at any time, often written on scraps of paper and later transferred to my 
research journals. These memos became the beginnings of conceptualising the raw 
data. At the same time I was also reading literature on subjects that were identified in 
the transcripts. Detailed reflections and notes were kept that have been used to 
illustrate, as far as possible, the evidence and thought processes that led to my 
conclusions. Data interpretation was influenced by my intellectual ability and my life 
experiences, particularly my clinical experience within the field of palliative care, and 
consequently is never wholly objective and dispassionate. This is in keeping with a 
constructivist paradigm where the attention to participants and the sense of self 
ultimately leads the researcher to offer a personal view (Stake 1995; Patton 2002; 
Charmaz 2003a; Mantzoukas 2004).
One of the means I used to show how participants defined their world was by 
exploring the use of metaphor in the language that was used. Conceptual systems are 
largely metaphorical (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and I have used metaphors to aid my 
interpretation of the data. These were used both at the conceptual level of the hospice 
service as a ‘container’, and in presenting my interpretation of some of the 
experiences of participants. This reflects one of my analysis strategies of working 
with words through metaphors and analogies (Miles and Huberman 1994). These 
strategies were based on symbolic interactionist concepts where it is understood that 
forms of language mediate the workings of consciousness, the self and social 
interchange. Society is held to emerge from discourse and symbolisation and the
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metaphors which phiase that vision borrow heavily from an imagery of everyday 
speech (Rock 1979).
4.3.3.1 Metaphors
It is important at this stage that the term metaphor, as used in the interpretation of 
data, is defined. However, attempting to provide a concise definition of metaphor 
would require an entire chapter on the subject. An issue of debate is the validity of 
interpretations made of expressed meanings, including metaphors (Czechmeister 
1994). Czechmeister (1994) makes the point that the use of metaphor in life, health 
and nursing is both a rich resource and potential burden. She claims that metaphors 
used by others must be considered within the context of the researcher’s personal 
frame of reference, and be validated by the ‘actors’. The risk in taking this approach 
is that the context of the researcher’s personal frame may be contrary to that of the 
‘actor’s’ world view or interpretation of language. This risk may be less when the 
researcher and participants share a common cultural understanding of the subject 
under study, as was the case for myself and hospice staff. However, there may not be 
this commonality between family members and hospice staff. The metaphors I used 
were not validated by the ‘actors’ (participants), for reasons discussed in relation to 
participant confirmation.
I agree with Czechmeister (1994) who maintains that metaphor will always be an 
imperfect representation. This view is widely held on the use of metaphors and Leary 
(1990) points out that although all knowledge is ultimately rooted in metaphorical 
modes of perception and thought, there are considerable difficulties in precisely 
defining this term.
1
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Metaphor has been likened to a filter, a fusion, a lens, a pretence, a screen, 
a tension, a displacement, a stereoscopic image, a form of linguistic play, 
a false identity, a semantic fiction, a contextual shift, a translation of 
meaning, a twinned vision, and an incongruous perspective, to mention 
only a few of its common metaphors (Leary 1990:4).
Dictionary definitions are similar to some of the ‘working definitions’ Leary (1990) 
offers. Metaphor is a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to 
something to which it is not literally applicable, a thing regarded as symbolic or 
something else. Leary (1990) also proposes that similarity (or analogy) is the bond 
between the two things compared in a metaphor. For the purposes of this study I have 
adopted Leary’s (1990) working definition of a metaphor:
Metaphor consists in giving to one thing a name or description that 
belongs by convention to something else, on the grounds of some 
similarity between the two (Leary 1990:4).
4.3.3.2 Analysis o f hospice records
The hospice records were primarily used to cross-check data from the other sources. 
The issue of accuracy proved interesting in that in one case, the focus group 
participants reported that the person had been on the ward for a month to six weeks, 
when in fact, as was clearly documented in the records, the person had only been a 
patient for 18 days. This gave some indication of the impact of the event on their 
memories. Other inaccuracies were found, but these were more related to types of 
medications that were given and times these were commenced. The records also 
provided useful data on the ‘different’ ways that ‘not knowing’ could be recorded and 
built on the categories that had been developed from the interviews.
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4.3.4 Use of the NUD *ISTprogramme
As data collection progressed all data were inserted into the NUD*IST programme. 
The choice of computer assisted software was made without exploring as thoroughly, 
as I now believe was required, all possible programmes. NUD*IST was the package 
that was made available, through my workplace, to assist in the storage and 
manipulation of data whilst carrying out the analysis. Prior to choosing to use 
computer software I had not considered my personal style of ‘seeing’ or visualising 
data, or the world in general, and how this would influence my relationship with data. 
The programme was purchased and study programmes attended without any 
investigation of the limitations of NUD*IST or of the potential of other computer 
software.
Becoming competent at using the package was considerably time consuming and I 
spent a large part of my research time just learning to use NUD*IST. It soon became 
clear to me that the data display option within NUD*IST did not allow the complex 
visualisation of the data that I had when using the manual display system during 
analysis of the first data set. Engaging with data is a cmcial aspect of the research 
analysis process. It became clear to me that the limitations of NUD*IST did not allow 
me to ‘see’ the work in its entirety, in a manner that suited my ‘way of looking’ at the 
world. When using grounded theory each set of data is ‘new’. That is, as part of the 
process of constant comparison different questions are asked of the participants and 
specific focuses are developed and new data sources are sought as the theory 
develops. Following input of a third data set into the programme I became 
increasingly frustrated by the inability to ‘see’ my analysis development in its 
entirety. As a widely spatial thinker and an experienced painter I needed to be able to
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‘see’ the data in its ‘wholeness’, as one looks at a picture. My research journals bear 
witness to this, and I covered many pages with diagrams, matrixes and configurations 
of how the emerging framework could be presented.
While manipulating the data it could only be viewed in segments reading left to right. 
I began to feel as though I was pursuing in the use of this software, because it was the 
‘way to do this’ and was required of me at this level of study. I could not ‘see’ the 
developing construction of my theoretical framework whilst working at the computer 
and had to constantly stop and draw diagrams of my insights and how these fitted 
within the framework.
I had identified immediately with a short discussion by Charmaz (2003a) 
demonstrating her reseiwations on the use of computer assisted software in carrying 
out grounded theory research. Charmaz (2003a:268) quotes Lincoln in a personal 
communication (1998). Lincoln asks her students, “Why would you want to engage 
in work that connects you to the deepest part of human existence and then turn it over 
to a machine to ‘mediate’?” Charmaz (2003a) suggests that the software packages are 
more suited to objectivist grounded theory rather than constructivist approaches, 
where objectivist approaches echo positivism. My original analysis of the data for the 
first data set using mind-mapping processes were more appropriate to both a 
constructivist approach to grounded theory, and to my personal learning style.
\
On realising the limitations of NUD*IST for my needs, a decision needed to be made 
as to whether to purchase a different software programme and once more embark on a 
learning programme of how to use it. I considered returning to the ‘tradition’ methods
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of manual manipulation of data. Finally I chose to return to a mind mapping system 
of displaying my data, using a wall display of a cut-and-paste process with post-its 
and a white board to record ideas and make notes on, whilst at the same time 
continuing to manipulate the data within NUD*IST. Input into NUD*IST was carried 
out following changes made on the wall display and visa versa. NUD*IST provided 
the advantage of enabling easy access and manipulation of data and transfer into my 
word document. Essentially the combined systems were complementary. I did not 
however, use the memo writing facility in the NUD*IST programme as I found memo 
writing was an activity that occurred more often away from the computer. Memo 
writing was confined to my research journals.
Fielding and Lee (1991, 1998), Creswell (1998), and Seale (2000) promote the use of 
computer software programmes to analyse qualitative data. In doing so I believe there 
is a danger of returning to the nan ow approaches that were the reasons for much of 
the early development of qualitative research methodologies. Seale himself is a 
scientific, quantitative researcher by background. It could be assumed that his 
background, as with many other researchers who have moved from the quantitative 
school into using qualitative approaches, bring with them the philosophical 
underpinning of the scientific approach with the use of computerised technology. 
However, Seale (2000) is careful to point out that it is important that researchers who 
are using computer software to manipulate qualitative data remember that these 
programmes do not carry out the analysis or ‘build the theory’. Any theory or 
conclusions that are developed are the work of the researcher’s own thinking, intuiting 
and insightful development (Seale 2000).
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As a means of adding rigour to my study I approached an experienced researcher to 
carry out manual coding on my first two data sets (included the pilot data). The 
choice of the person was based on her experience in using grounded theory at PhD 
level, her experience as a post doctoral researcher and supervisor of PhD students. 
The background of this person was in sociology and the focus of my research was 
towards psychosocial frameworks of understanding human activity. Only line-by-line 
coding was carried out by this researcher so comparison could not be made between 
more developed themes or categories from the data. However, codes that were 
congruent with my own were identified with enough concordance to give me 
confidence in my coding.
4.4 Ethical considerations
Ethical approval was granted from the Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee 
(MREC) (Appendix 16) and relevant Local Research Ethics Committees (LREC) 
were informed prior to data collection at each site.
In carrying out research involving clinical situations it is of paramount importance to 
avoid deception and to protect the autonomy of participants and maintain 
confidentiality. Lee and Kristjanson (2003) further point out that in relation to the 
vulnerability of palliative care participants, the first responsibility of the researcher is 
to ensure that there is potential benefit from the question being answered. This has 
also been shown to be a primary concern for ethics committee members (Stevens et al 
2003). de Raeve (1994) goes so far as to question whether research on dying people 
should be undertaken at all. de Raeve (1994) raises the question of: what do the 
participants get out of the experience of participating in a research study. As, in the
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case of a dying person, who may not be alive at the end of the research, the 
judgements made by the researcher would be unchallenged (de Raeve 1994). It was 
one of the primary concerns of this study that my judgements and interpretations of 
the words of all participants were just and valid and would cause them no harm.
Sensitivity issues potentially affect almost every stage of the research process (Lee 
1993). Furthermore this was a sample from whom I was attempting to gain 
information about people who were not able to give consent due to cognitive 
impairment. As a result of concerns about the protection of vulnerable people in 
research studies, accessing participants for research purposes has become very high 
profile within the healthcare arena (COREC 2004). Accessing palliative care patients 
and families has become problematic and some ethics committees serve as powerful 
gatekeepers and may disallow access to this group (Lee and Kristjanson 2003; Ewing 
et al 2004). Some areas of research are considered more sensitive than others. The 
political stance on which areas are more sensitive than others varies with swings in 
political concerns and media interests (Lee 1993). Surveys and research of the variant 
CJD population has been politically encouraged and heavily funded. This research 
has included detailed and lengthy discussion about intimate and traumatic experiences 
of grief and loss for families of people with variant CJD.
Family members of all cases in my study had been interviewed by the CJD 
Surveillance Unit at some stage prior to my approach to them. In the earlier cases 
family members had been inundated by approaches from journalists. I discovered that 
a doctor from the prion centre had embarked on a Medical Doctorate (MD) study of 
the hospice experience of people with variant CJD and was accessing the same group
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as myself. Network sampling is a useful strategy when sampling rare or deviant 
populations (Lee 1993). The ‘network’ of hospice and palliative care is such that 
many people are known to each other and even hospice directors I approached to gain 
access, informed me about the MD study. The sample for variant CJD was very 
small, 136 cases at the time of making my application for ethical approval. Hence, I 
was competing with an array of other researchers and journalists for a very small and 
very vulnerable group, and my concerns about confidentiality and anonymity were 
considerable and justified.
Family member participants had also been interviewed by social services regarding 
social care needs, and two of the families had been interviewed within the same week 
I interviewed them. One had been interviewed by the CJD Surveillance Unit, the 
other by Social Services. The family members informed me that these interviews 
were going to take place. However, when I offered to postpone my interview they 
were adamant that I should go ahead. Their enthusiasm was based on a strong desire 
to assist in any way they could in taking forward any research that would benefit other 
sufferers of variant CJD.
During the collection of data for the pilot study I discussed the subject of 
confidentiality and anonymity with family members and recorded these discussions 
on audio-tape. Essentially I pointed out that considering the small number of cases 
and the detail that I was asking about the events it may be possible to identify the 
person in future publications. The family members did not consider this to be an 
impediment to the study. This was not surprising as intimate details of the
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experiences of people with variant CJD are to be found on the internet and details of 
several cases have been televised since the disease was identified.
Research can also potentially empower participants (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995; 
Osborn 1999). My ‘impression’ was that family members felt empowered in being 
part of a study that they saw as advancing the cause of people with variant CJD. 
Patton (2002) addresses this issue in arguing that there are new directions in informed 
consent where confidentiality versus people ‘owning their own story’. Osborn (1999) 
also takes this stand in relation to research within psychiatry, including dementia care. 
He suggests that whilst the protection of research participants must remain a high 
priority for researchers, the exclusion of some patient groups based on their diagnosis 
or status is now recognised as counter-productive and disenfranchising. Privacy has 
remained the dominant presumption of researchers but is being challenged by 
participants in research who insist on owning their own story as part of healing, 
empowerment and pride, and in some instances researchers offer this option (Patton 
2002). I chose not to take this approach for my study and my stance was to protect 
participants in every possible way. Patton (2002) poses the question; is this protective 
or patronising? This question led me to some lengthy reflection on not only the right 
of families to tell (and own) their stories but also consideration of a collaborative 
approach to the research with other participants, particularly hospice staff. My 
preference would have been to allow participant ownership of the data. However, this 
did not eventuate due to a number of factors that I addressed earlier in participant 
confirmation.
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4.4.1 Consent
Obtaining informed consent from participants in any study is ethically essential. 
Burns and Grove (2001) cite the Nuremberg Code (1949) in emphasising the 
importance of ‘informed’ consent. They define informing as: ‘...the transmission of 
essential ideas and content from the investigator to the prospective subject’. And 
consent as: ‘...the prospective subject’s agreement to participate in a study as a 
subject, which is reached after assimilation of essential information’ (Bums and 
Grove 2001:206). This required rigorous approaches to obtaining consent and 
required negotiation of a number of ethical processes and committees before actually 
meeting the participants. Signed consent was obtained from participants prior to both 
focus group and single interviews (Appendix 3). Participants were informed that they 
could terminate the interview at any time without giving a reason and that the audio­
tapes would be destroyed.
Debates about the requirements for informed consent have been a focus of research 
throughout the 1990s (Osborn 1999). Much of the ethical discussion on the issue of 
consent in palliative care has focused on consent from patients, de Raeve (1994) 
argues that due consideration of the power base of the researcher in transforming the 
data into an abstract analysis, which will include the personal subjectivity of the 
researcher, is not information that will be communicated to the participant. They may 
be unaware of the extent to which the material they have consented to be used will be 
used, de Raeve’s (1994) focus is on participants who are patients. For the purposes 
of this study, patients were not involved directly in the data collection process. 
However, within hospice philosophy and practices family members may be regarded 
as either patients/clients (for bereavement support) or carers (as part of the hospice
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team), often oscillating within these roles. My stance was that family members were 
members of the team who were providing the care. Although there were issues of 
bereavement for all family members, this was not the focus of my research.
4.4,2 Confidentiality
Despite the earlier discussion on empowerment of family members through owning 
their own story and lack of concern about potential loss of confidentiality, one of the 
important issues for me throughout this study has been how to maintain participant 
and hospice site confidentiality and anonymity. This is due to the very small variant 
CJD population and the possibility of identification. As per University regulations, 
audio-tapes and back-up diskettes of transcribed material are kept in a secure 
environment and will be destroyed within five years of completion of the study. To 
further manage maintaining confidentiality and anonymity I have taken care in 
selecting extracts of raw data that I present in full within the findings. These are 
presented in a manner that I hope cannot match the material specifically to identifiable 
incidents or sites. A system of identifying the raw data has been devised that allows 
me to trace the extract but that does not allow easy identification of a specific case or 
site. However, within a constructivist paradigm the final presentation should be a 
conceptually abstract account of the experiences (Charmaz 2003a) and therefore 
reduces any possibility of identification of participants.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter I have provided a detailed description of the methods that I used in 
collecting and analysing my data. Sampling difficulties and how these were 
overcome were addressed. Issues about the use of NUD*IST had implications on
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how I managed and analysed my data sets. My methods of overcoming the problems 
I encountered were elaborate and time consuming and at times frustrating. Much of 
this difficulty related to my personal reactions to the analysis process and how 
qualitative data can be managed. However, I believe the procedures I used ensured 
that data was completely saturated. In the following chapter I present the study 
findings.
Ill
Chapter 5 -  Findings and discussion
‘Dealing with the Unknown’
An explanatory theory of managing the care of the person with variant CJD by
the hospice sei*vice.
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I present the findings and discussion simultaneously, in keeping with 
grounded theory methodology. A series of Figures will be presented as each category 
is described, building up to the complete theoretical explanation. I refer to all cases as 
having variant CJD, as the one case that had an uncertain diagnosis was considered to 
be a ‘possible’ variant case at the time of interview. Due to concerns about 
confidentiality and anonymity specific details of the cases of variant CJD are not 
presented.
The admission of a person with variant CJD into the hospice service and the 
experiences of staff and family in caring for the person represent a ‘micro’ event 
within the organisational context of the hospice service. The theoretical explanation 
presented in this thesis relates to the impact of this micro event on the service. Other 
theoretical models of hospice care influenced the practices that were used in caring for 
the person with variant CJD and also influenced my interpretation of data (Figure 4). 
The models proposed by Froggatt (1995, 1997, 1998), Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 2000), 
Copp (1996, 1999) and Li (2002) were considered the most influential for my 
interpretation of hospice practices but not exclusively.
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Figure 4. Variant CJD as a ‘micro’ event within the scheme of caring for 
dying people within the hospice system.
179
The categories are presented in the following order:
Core category -  ‘Not knowing’,
Not knowing is theoretically presented as ‘Dealing with the unknown’ Not 
knowing is interlinked with all other categories and is addressed within each of the 
categories.
The following four categories support the core category of ‘Not knowing’: 
‘Novelty’. Controlling’, ‘Humility’ and ‘Becoming knowledgeable’.
Novelty reflects the process of finding a place for the new, curiosity and disturbance 
of system equilibrium and expresses the entrance of the new disease into the system. 
Within this category thiee themes were identified. These were fitting in, where 
people with variant CJD were paradoxically seen to both fit and not fit into the 
hospice system. Gossiping occurred as a result of the novelty of the disease and lead 
to behaviour that I have conceptualised as ‘ghoulish voyeurism’, where curiosity and 
fascination about the condition was displayed by ‘others’. This led to participants 
being ‘drawn to stories’ about the subject of variant CJD. These ‘others’ are 
described as ‘ignorant outsiders’, and in some cases children of both people with 
variant CJD and their relatives were subjected to ‘bullying’. Horrifying was a theme 
that emphasised the novelty of the disease and personhood state. It seiwed to identify 
how people with variant CJD were seen to be without personhood due to the cognitive 
impairment caused by the disease.
Controlling relates to the use of strategies to maintain the equilibrium of the system. 
Two themes emerged within this category. The first was managing care, an activity
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that involved ‘restoring dignity’, ‘normalising’ and ‘granting autonomy’, for the 
person with variant CJD and their families’. A second theme within the category of 
controlling was that of maintaining the environment This related to the need to 
maintain the tranquillity of the hospice environment as a means of establishing system 
equilibrium. Humility is a category that posits a concept of experience in caring for 
people with variant CJD that engendered a sense of helplessness and powerlessness 
and recognition of limitations in relieving the suffering of others. Becoming 
knowledgeable refers to change over time, of moving from not knowing to gaining 
knowledge and experience in caring for a person with variant CJD. A theme that was 
identified within this category was that of the ‘bewildered family \
I propose that the experiences of staff and families reflected the organisational 
philosophy and culture of the hospice and I present the hospice service (in-house and 
community) as a metaphorical ‘container’, based on the concept of an open system 
(Katz and Khan 1966). I have argued that the impact of the admission of people (into 
the system) with a new disease entity, of which one of the symptoms was dementia, 
required staff to examine the norms and values embedded in practices and attitudes 
towards end-of-life care in new ways. Scientific developments within the field of 
prion disease continued to add information, not only to the literature discussed, but 
also for the participants over the study period. The results cannot be viewed as a 
static piece of knowledge or interpretation of the events and experiences, but as 
experience and knowledge in a state of flux.
The ‘system’ includes all services provided by the organisation, such as day hospice, 
respite services and community care. There were similarities and differences
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between the experiences of the staff and families who were admitted into a hospice 
unit and those who were managed in the community (at home). There were also 
contradictions, which I refer to as paradoxical situations, within individual cases, 
that will be addressed, and the significance of these discussed. It is suggested that 
some systems tend to move towards a state where components are in equilibrium, 
where a steady state exists and when changes occur this results in an imbalance of the 
system (Katz and Kahn 1966). Imbalance in the system requires adaptation of the 
system to return to its state of equilibrium. I have argued that the hospice service 
(system) was thiown into imbalance by the admission of people with variant CJD.
5.2 Not knowing
A number of terms and phrases that represented not knowing were used repeatedly 
throughout data. Such as; ‘not knowing’, couldn't telV, 'didn't know', 'hard to tell, 
'uncertain ‘it was the unknown ', 'ignorance ’, ‘no one knew ’, 'going in blind', 'in the 
dark' and so on. Reference to ‘not knowing’ was core to the experience of caring for, 
and having a family member with variant CJD. The term was used and understood in 
different and sometimes complex ways. For example participants referred to 
themselves not knowing, 'I don't know', to the group not knowing, '... we didn't 
know to it not being generally known, 'nobody had any idea '. I have interpreted the 
use of not knowing in several ways, firstly, as being without knowledge, i.e. having 
no knowledge about many aspects of the disease of variant CJD. Within this I include 
any reference to not knowing and uncertainty related to risk factors for variant CJD 
This uncertainty about disease and health is not new and preoccupies many ill people 
and their friends, families and carers (Seale and Basiro 1996). Secondly, I have 
interpreted ‘not knowing’ as not being able to communicate adequately with the
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person with variant CJD. This included referring to the person with variant CJD as 
'not knowing what was happening to them and also to staff and family not knowing 
what the person with variant CJD was experiencing. A further interpretation was the 
idea of, 'it was not what we were expecting', denoting having some expectation of 
knowledge that was not realised, or that participants were not prepared for. This 
‘way’ of not knowing added to conceptualising variant CJD symptoms as horrifying. 
A further interpretation was related to others (members of the public) who did, or did 
not, know. Not having, but wanting to have knowledge about the disease, and the 
person with the disease as an object of curiosity. This is addressed under the category 
of Gossiping. ‘Not knowing’ was also interpreted as a term to express that the 
participants just 'did not know what to do ’. They were left with a sense of 
helplessness that also related to a more complex expression of 'The Unknown’, 
suggesting something more esoteric. I have addressed this within the category of 
Humility. Becoming knowledgeable is linked to language or expressions about 
having knowledge. Expressions that indicated moving from not knowing to knowing, 
such as trying to 'get to grips with ‘sort out 'get to the bottom o f’ and 'work out 
demonstrated how participants attempted to move from not knowing to becoming 
knowledgeable.
5.3 Novelty -  finding a place for the new, curiosity, and disturbance of the system 
equilibrium
This category addresses the entrance of the new disease into the system and the 
process that occurred was that of finding a place for, and curiosity about, this new 
disease and is interlinked with not knowing (Figure 5), The term novelty was chosen 
for this category based on the very ‘newness’ of variant CJD, where dictionary
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definitions refer to novel as ‘something interestingly new or unusual’, and novelty to a 
‘new or unfamiliar thing or experience’. Dictionary definitions of novelty also 
suggest it may be something intended to be amusing as a result of its originality or 
unusualness. This definition implies a lightness which was not the position of people 
with variant CJD or their families. Yet the term novelty conveys my interpretation of 
responses to this new disease, particularly the interest, curiosity and fascination that 
people demonstrated. This curiosity was piqued by the very newness and unusualness 
of the disease and the desire to ‘know’. ‘Not knowing’ served as a stimulus to 
treating the disease as a novelty. In using the term novelty I propose that it is without 
any implications of lightness or amusement towards variant CJD.
5.3.1 Fitting in ~ ‘Opening the flood-gates’
Consideration of whether a person with this new disease of variant CJD was an 
‘appropriate admission’ to hospice had a particular focus that served to position the 
hospice service as a metaphorical container which could be entered through the ‘gate’. 
This was a container that could be overwhelmed by a metaphoric ‘flood’, with 
admission to the hospice of a person with variant CJD seen as potentially a 'major 
part o f our wot'k ' with 'tens o f thousands ' of people about to be diagnosed and 
requiring hospice services. It 'could have opened the floodgate ' and 'filled the whole 
hospice ’.
The 'floodgate ' was the hospice entrance/admission and the pressure was of a flood of 
people with variant CJD outside this gate. The hospice service also needed to protect
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Figure 5. Novelty -  finding a place for the new, curiosity and disturbance of 
system equilibrium
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itself from this potential ‘flood’ of people because it did not have capacity to provide 
bed numbers for a possible epidemic. The floodgate was symbolically protecting the 
service capacity. Once the person with variant CJD was admitted into the service the 
‘gate’ then became a protection for  the person with variant CJD from the media 
‘frenzy This frenzy represented a metaphorical flood of journalists.
SW. And it was just a huge press fi'enzy. Terrible, and he is, he was not 
the sort o f man to be able to engage with the media. A part o f my role was 
really to protect him as much as I  could ft'om exposure to the media (VI- 
512, 515)
The idea of a metaphorical flood of people with variant CJD was likened to ‘a dam 
burst’, implying again floods of people filling the hospice. The reference was again 
to potential numbers of people with variant CJD, of which there would be 
implications for hospice services, in the numbers 'still to come through ’* ^. The idea 
of the malevolent and dangerous potential of the numbers of people with variant CJD 
that were waiting to be diagnosed was also expressed as a potential metaphorical 
explosion of air, 'the bubble will burst’, or fiery explosion, that of a 'time bomb The 
implications of the hospice services being unable to take these people as patients 
contributed to the metaphor of the hospice as a container with specific boundaries.
‘Newspaper headlines suggested liidden, but potentially large numbers of cases using tlie ‘tip o f  the 
iceberg ' metaphor. The metaphorical iceberg symbolises a hidden mass, a mass tliat is enormous, 
malevolent, unseen and unknown, and possibly dangerous. CJD’s 48 victhns ‘could be just tlie tip of 
tlie iceberg’ (Daily Telegraph 18/12/1999)
^Kate’s Fiancée: I ’ve even heard hundreds o f  thousands bandied about. This is Just the tip o f  the 
iceberg. The public knows so little, and still so much is unknown about this disease. (TVD-295-297)
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The management of system boundaries is crucial to effective organisational 
functioning and boundaries need both to separate and relate what is inside and what is 
outside. Inside the hospice system very specific activities take place in the 
management and care of dying people, whilst in the wider healthcare/scientific 
community a totally new (terminal) disease had been identified. The management of 
the boundaries, that is, processes by which entry and exit of the system is managed, is 
complex. In relation to hospice admission this is not managed by one person but 
(generally) by a multidisciplinary team. Admission criteria to hospice is 
paradoxically ‘tight’, with a focus on symptom management for people with cancer 
and a shift of emphasis away from psychosocial care (James and Field 1992; Eagle 
2002; Eagle and de Vries 2005; Li 2002; Gannon 2002), and flexible, in that it is 
variable across hospices and is often based on telling the ‘right story’ (Eagle 2002; 
Eagle and de Vries 2005), or as termed by Gannon (2002:17), ‘playing the game’. 
Gannon (2002:53) concludes that ‘the “responsible clinician” deciding a patient’s 
“best interests” regarding hospice admission is not clear, leaving clinical and ethical 
queries’.
The flexibility of admission criteria can also be construed as ‘light’ (being made with 
a level of flippancy or humour) and is reflected in one participant laughingly reporting 
a comment by the Medical Director. 'When I'm away ... don't he sort o f opening the 
doors to all the waifs and strays in relation to taking admissions while he was away. 
This exchange took place shortly before the hospice took the admission of a person 
with variant CJD, but before they even knew of the existence of this person. This 
‘lightness’, coupled with humour, was also a feature of Eagle’s (2002) descriptions of 
telling the ‘right story’ to achieve the hospice admission.
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Modem hospice care is philosophically an environment where patients have agency, 
have the ability to make decisions, and are dying within an open awareness context 
(Walter 1994; Seale 1998). The importance of the shared experience that occurs in 
open awareness was identified by Addington-Hall (2000) as one of the barriers to the 
integration of people with dementia to the hospice environment. Admission to the 
hospice has been determined largely by the cancer death experience, although people 
with Motor Neurone disease (MND) are a group of patients who are more frequently 
associated with hospice admissions. People with variant CJD (and by association 
dementia) were not appropriate because specialist palliative care does not yet have a 
remit for this group.
Within the system’s characteristics and for the purposes of this study I refer to the 
admission to hospice as the stage of ‘inputs’ (Katz and Kahn 1966). In this case the 
input was a ‘new disease’, one that was so new that it had the potential to upset the 
equilibrium of the system. Participants were comfortable and felt knowledgeable 
about caring for people with cancer, as a terminal illness, and much of their 
experience was confined to this area of disease.
DR I  think from a professional aspect it really challenged me because 
whilst I  was responding as i f  it had been a cancer diagnosis or motor 
neurone disease, I  was concerned professionally about my lack of 
understanding o f the illness, o f its origins, and o f its ongoing nature. Um 
and so much o f the psychological wo?k with the family really rested on 
questions being answered about those factors and I  didn't have that and 
people look to professionals to provide those answers. And we're saying 
well I  can't tell you, we don't know, and that's difficult. (VI:640-648)
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C N SI think i t’s difficult because (with) cancer patients, you know about 
the diagnosis i f  its breast cancer, or a brain tumour you can, sort of, say 
well (PAUSE) when i t ’s something that's unknown (PAUSE) (Wl:506- 
508)
The potential for the person with variant CJD to ‘fit’ into this system was of major 
concern to the teams. However, fitting in was paradoxical and reflected the diversity 
and individual nature of the cases and individuals associated with them. The paradox 
was that they both ‘didn’t fit’ and ‘did fit’.
5.3.11 'Didn’t f i t ’
DR ... she actually at the time didn't fit the criteria for admission, but at 
the time we only took patients with MND and um AIDS and I  think, which 
again was very unusual. (VI:58-62)
Although (it was believed) there were potential ‘floods’ or ‘explosions’ of people with 
variant CJD about to be diagnosed, people who would be requiring palliative care, 
hospices did not have a ‘criteria’ for their admission. They ‘didn’t fit’ into the system 
for a number of reasons. There is an understanding, within hospice culture, that 
people who are dying go through established and accepted processes as they move 
towards death (Walter 1994; Seale 1998; James and Field 1992).
CNS He didn't go through the process that some patients go through. Go 
through, you know, like a bereavement process, denial and anger and then 
acceptance. (ZI:359-S6I)
189
This process is embedded in the understanding of how people experience death and 
dying, in this environment. It has become a stereotype of the ‘staging’ of dying and 
bereavement that many hospice staff adopt (James and Field 1996), that is based on 
models of the bereavement process such as Kübler-Ross’s (1970) stages. In the 
hospice environment staff teach dying people how to die; ‘Hospice staff are 
missionaries who see their mission as enabling people to die a certain version of the 
good death’ (Walter 1994:131). Participation in this negotiated dying is ‘crafted’ 
between the staff and dying person (Walter 1994). The idea of ‘crafted’ dying also 
has congmence with the models developed by Froggatt (1995) and Copp (1996, 
1999). It requires the person who is dying to have some degree of agency, that is, to 
be able to discuss death and dying (Seale 1998). Despite criticism of the assumptions 
about the ‘staging’ processes that people go through as they move towards death 
(Walter 1994) much of this thinking still remains amongst hospice staff as 
demonstrated in my study. Participants made the assumption that the person with 
dementia could not go through these ‘stages’. The person with variant CJD did not fit 
into the system because he 'couldn't have taken onboard and gone through the angst \ 
as in a ‘normal’ bereavement process and the teams were not able to navigate the 
person through the process because they didn’t know enough about the disease and 
couldn’t communicate with them.
CNS You've got the mental deterioration going on alongside, rapidly, 
vejy rapidly so even being able to come to terms with them it's not 
possible is it. And nobody could tell him what was going to happen, you 
know, nobody had any idea how it would progress. (21:361-364)
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Admission criteria to hospice, although largely confined to people with cancer, is also 
variable and flexible, but is constrained by a number of factors. Bed numbers are 
small, so the possibility of ‘bed blocking’ by ‘long stay’ patients is an important 
consideration. The concern regarding ‘long stay’ and the dementia diagnosis that was 
attached to variant CJD immediately posed a risk to the system equilibrium, where the 
potential to ‘block’ a bed arises. ‘Long stay’ and ‘long term’ are constructions of 
negativity in relation to aspects of health care in many areas of the health services. 
Most particularly in old age and dementia admissions into acute services, where 
long’ (time) and 'dementia’ are equated. Making a prognosis for the progress of 
dementia to end-stage is problematic due to the variability of the disease trajectory for 
the different types of dementia. Accurate predictions remain one of the difficulties in 
determining an admission to palliative care services for people with dementia 
(Luchins et al 1997; Hanrahan et al 1999; Addington-Hall 2000). People with 
dementia were referred to as 'long terms’, by study participants. Specialist (hospice) 
palliative care is deemed an ‘acute’ service within the category and definition of the 
service as discussed within the literature.
The ‘acute’ category for admission was the means by which people with variant CJD 
could enter the system. This was due to the severity and advanced state of the illness 
that all cases were at. It is a system that does give priority to admissions that are 
clearly at a terminal stage of an illness, even when it is not cancer (Eagle 2002; 
Gannon 2002). All of the cases in this study were at an advanced stage of the illness 
at the time of admission. However, the staff did 'not know’ that this was going to be 
the course of events based on the information they were given regarding the prognosis 
of variant CJD. So there was anxiety and uncertainty about the acceptability of the
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admission as, '...according to the literature that we had we could have been looking 
at a couple o f years \
In taking the admissions I posit it as ‘breaking into the container’, where staff 'broke 
our rules’ to accommodate the 'newest o f new’ thing, an 'unknown’ category of 
patient for whom they believed they would be able to provide appropriate care. 
However, they only needed to break their rules 'a little bit’ because of the belief that 
the person with variant CJD in the advanced stages of the illness 'needed the sort o f 
care that we were able to provide ’.
Or the person with CJD was 'in ’ before the team realised just what the symptoms 
were that they would be dealing with. They 'weren’t aware’ of the ‘degree o f 
dementia’, but by that time they were 'already committed’, they ‘didn’t know’, ‘had 
nothing to go on ’. It was the ‘dementia’ that was focused on, as one of the symptoms 
they were not expecting, and that was not appropriate for a hospice admission.
‘Not knowing’ and the novelty of the disease also impacted on the challenges of 
supporting family members with bereavement issues. It was not a new situation that 
participants had to admit to patients and families that they didn’t have answers to 
certain questions. However, they were knowledgeable enough about the terminal 
processes of cancer (and for most hospices motor neurone disease). That is, they 
generally had confidence in answering questions about end-of-life issues for people 
with these diseases. It was a new experience to have to say they didn’t know, about 
almost every aspect of the disease. Many of these questions were related to the risk
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posed to other members of the family, particularly the children, and not knowing what 
the future held for them.
One CNS proposed that for people who die ‘normally’ ‘it was the end’. In this sense 
she was not referring to ‘the end’ in relation to the death, grieving and bereavement, 
but to the unknown implications of genetic types or vertical transmission of variant 
CJD. It wasn’t necessarily the end for the anxieties of the families where the person 
with variant CJD was a mother (two cases) and had possibly passed the disease to 
their children during pregnancy, referred to as ‘incubating’, by participants. It was 
not publicly acknowledged by the scientific community that this risk was present even 
though by the end of 1988, it was established that ‘species barrier’ could be breached 
and that vertical transmission (from mother to foetus) was possible (Lacey 1994; 
Chesebro 2003). Participants in the earlier cases were not aware of this possibility as 
genetic implications were still under investigation. The only response hospice teams 
could offer family members was that they didn’t know.
CNS And that was a question her husband asked (ABOUT THE 
POSSIBILITY OF THE CHILDREN BEING AT RISK DURING THE 
PREGNANCY) but the only answer we could give was there wasn't any 
evidence for that. But that's because there is so little evidence about the 
disease itself anyway. (WI:584-6I)
SW  And he did talk a lot to me about her pregnancy and wondering 
whether, you know, with the last child, that this was going to manifest 
itself in him later with the incubation period, I  mean we didn't know very 
much about the disease at that stage. (VI:236-240)
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Not fitting also related to the experiences of the person with variant CJD (as related 
by participants) and what they (appeared to feel) about entering the system. My 
interpretation of the (related experiences) was that they also didn’t fit because they 
‘did not want to fit’ or were ‘not able to fit’ and this related to the person with 
dementia being moved from a familiar environment to an unfamiliar one (from home 
to hospice).
Hospice, as a concept, does create fear and anxiety for people, based on the 
connotation of death and dying, and it is understood that it is a place where people go 
to die. For people with dementia, in this case variant CJD, the possibility of them 
‘knowing’ that they were entering a hospice is uncertain. According to family 
members, the person with variant CJD did know when they were not in a familiar 
environment. People with dementia often experience fear and anxiety when moved 
from a familiar environment to an unfamiliar one. They can become distressed when 
out of familiar environments and surrounded by people who are strangers (Pickard 
and Glendinning 2001). Although they may not have known it was a hospice, the 
people with variant CJD would initially have been aware of being in an unfamiliar 
environment. Fear and anxiety as a result of being out of their environment, 
experienced by two of the people with variant CJD, during their day hospice and 
respite admissions, was recognised by the teams and families as a reason for not 
fitting.
Comparing activities carried out in day care for people with dementia, and hospice 
day care, suggests that day hospice care does not provide activities that would be 
appropriate for the dementia group. One CNS from a day hospice described the
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environment of the hospice variously as ‘alien \ ‘where on earth \ ‘a prison \ and it 
was ‘downhill all the way \ in discussing the respite admission of one of the people 
with variant CJD. All of the components of equilibrium imbalance for the system 
were demonstrated as a result of the admission. This confirms findings within the 
dementia literature where it has been shown that the integration of cognitively 
impaired and lucid individuals is problematic. The agitation of the cognitively 
impaired individuals caused anxiety, fear and irritation for those who were lucid 
(Ragneskog et al 2001),
CNS She would slide out o f the recliner onto the floor, she caused a lot o f 
distress to the patients that were there and plus the fact, the physical fact 
o f getting her hack into the recliner, so we sat her in her wheelchair and 
fastened her in that. And she rocked and rocked and rocked to tty and tip 
the wheelchair over. We had to have a nurse with her doing one-to-one all 
the time. And even in the wheelchair she’d  try and slide out o f that. And 
she just looked such a frightened lady and I  just thought (PAUSE) the 
other patients were obviously distressed.
INTERVIEWER What sort o f way did they show they were distressed?
CNS The conversation, the whispering, there wasn’t, they were just 
focused on her all the time and they couldn't PAUSE but I  suppose they 
didn't want to stare, but they couldn't help it And it just, the whole day 
just was focussing on this lady. And they were scared to move out o f their 
chairs. I  think also because with her wriggling and sliding they were 
scared i f  they tripped over or she came out and caught them. (Y:5-20)
This person ‘could not be accommodated’ by the system and she ‘did not want to fit’ 
into the environment of the day hospice, an environment that was not designed to 
cater for people with dementia and where the staff had no experience with this type of 
behaviour. She also appeared to be aware enough of the circumstances of her position
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to be able to articulate a question (that was also an accusation), to her husband when 
he came to collect her.
CNS ... when he first came back, she Just looked at him, and said 'Why?',
That was really the first word she'd uttered all day. 'Why?' (Yl:44-46).
The poignancy of the CNS’s expression in repeating the word 'Why\ during the 
interview cannot be expressed in the written form. She whispered the word with 
intense emotion, and repeated the phrase, ‘she just said why’, several more times 
during the interview. The story the nurse tells is that of a woman who felt betrayed 
and abandoned by her husband.
The survey of day hospice services by Higginson et al (2000) identified that 
behavioural problems were one of the common reasons why patients might be 
excluded from the service, although the survey does not detail what these behaviours 
might be. It is also suggested that this may reflect the concern that staff had over the 
group dynamics in day care and a lack of confidence in dealing with behavioural 
issues (Higginson et al 2000). Both of these reasons appear to have been influential 
in not being able to accommodate the person with variant CJD in day hospice.
The husband’s expression, in relating the experience of seeing her face when she 
returned home from a week of respite care at the hospice, also cannot be adequately 
expressed and he became tearful discussing this experience during the interview. His 
wife ‘did not fit’ into the system, not only because she didn’t want to (because it was 
so distressing), but also because he couldn’t bear to let her experience this anguish. 
On return from a week of respite care in the local hospice the husband of this person
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with variant CJD was adamant that he would not repeat that experience. It was too 
traumatic for both himself and his wife. Confirming other dementia work where it has 
been shown that carers will take up services only if they consider them to be of a 
suitable quality (Pickard and Glendinning 2001).
FM  ... when she came back from the hospice, the result was we spent 
most o f the time up there, for the next five days so it wasn 1 really, I  didn't 
have a rest, that’s what, I  didn't get anything done. Then when she came 
back here if  you’d  seen her face when she saw the house, you'd never 
(PA USE -  TURNING ASIDE TO CRY) my wife is a home loving woman.
(Y3:537-541)
Her experiences of loss, anguish and betrayal confirm how the person with dementia 
may experience a trauma related to separation, loss, powerlessness, displacement and 
homelessness (Miesen 1997, 1999). Her husband likened the experience of the respite 
admission to ‘child abuse ', and was convinced that she had had a very deep emotional 
reaction to the experience, as she experienced her first major ‘myoclonic’ spasm 
during this respite admission. To be likened to a site of ‘abuse’ goes against the 
philosophical foundations of hospice care. However, this event indicates that there 
may be an unacknowledged element to an admission to hospice that can be likened to 
abuse.
FM  I  suppose anyone would be i f  they were in the system, i t ’s like child 
abuse it's somebody left out in the park by themselves and something. I  
can only react on her experience in the hospice. She was alright in the 
hospice, there was no distraught kind o f thing. But there must have been a 
reaction for her to have a deep, to have a first spasm and then to, you 
know, the facial expression I  saw when she came back, so there must have
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been a reaction. And that’s why, you know, as long as I  can keep going 
I ’ll keep her in the house. (¥2:823-830)
Lawton (1998a, 2000) also showed that the admission to hospice could be constructed 
as a type of punishment by some patients.
Whilst it is well established that respite and day care services are an important part of 
a strategy to maintain care of the person with dementia at home, the appropriateness 
of the use of palliative care respite and day hospice for this group needs to be 
carefully considered. The services provided are variable and there has been very little 
systematic evaluation of these (Ingleton et al 2003; Payne et al 2004). It has also 
been identified that the needs and wishes of carers are not prioritised by specialist 
palliative care services (Payne et al 2004).
The type of activity that is conducted in day hospice units generally includes review 
of patients’ symptoms, some treatments and a variation of activities such as 
complementary therapies, art, and music therapy (Higginson et al 2000). Activities 
are heavily focused on socialising and would explain why there is little expertise on 
managing the behaviour of a very distressed person with a dementia syndrome. There 
was no evidence of people with dementia being admitted to this service in the survey 
carried out by Higginson et al (2000).
The impact of being out of familiar surroundings (not at home) was also recognised 
by another day hospice team. Participants suggested that the attendance at the day 
hospice of the person with variant CJD had been not only futile but a traumatic 
experience and that he ‘would have been much happier to have been at home Whilst
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at the day hospice the presence of familiar people had provided some sense of security 
and was an important factor in how his care was managed.
HCA Well he didn't like to think that his sister wasn't here either did he.
■He didn't like, he didn't like (SISTER) being out o f his sight really.
JN  In fact it got to the stage that when she had to leave, she had to 
actually leave her handbag.
HCA Because he, he, that was the only way he could be sure she would 
come back. It a real fear that she would abandon him. (XI:45-49)
Even in their own homes the person with variant CJD had a sense and knowledge of 
who people were and who amongst these people made them feel secure. ‘I f  somebody 
else went in and we weren't with them, he wasn't happy ’.
Distress can be contagious and participants were upset by the distress of the person 
with variant CJD in all cases, to the extent that a JN at one Day Hospice found herself 
‘dreading' the days when he attended. The team consoled themselves that ‘he never 
remembered’ that he had been distressed by the experience. This lack of knowledge 
about memory capacity of the person with dementia demonstrated how dementia care 
is not part of the professional knowledge base of hospice teams. Much of the feeling 
about the experiences of staff in all cases is encompassed in the following exemplar 
fi'om one of the doctors. The quote also demonstrates the paradoxical situation of 
both fitting and not fitting into the system.
DR ... it was sort o f veiy challenging, very time consuming. Um, and at 
times it felt inappropriate because it felt that we were using our skills that 
we would usually, that we'd gained through normally cancer patients but 
some other non-malignant, non cancer patients, and we were trying to f i t
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her into that box and sort her symptoms out in the way that we understand 
fr om patients that were normal at that time. So at that level it felt to be 
inappropriate, but that she had a terminal disease that was progixssing 
rapidly, that was very symptomatic and that the family had extr'eme 
psychological needs and we are experts at all o f those while not having 
much experience with CJD. For those reasons it felt appropriate. Um, 
also o f course you'd have to question, where else could possibly cope with 
her, and um I  know the experience fi'om her care at the local district 
general hospital was that that had been far worse. Um, so although I  don't 
think it felt ideal and we didn't feel we were achieving a good death like a 
normal good hospice admission, um I  think it was appropriate. (W4:147- 
.. 162)
Within this quote are two of the criteria of fitting into the hospice organisation with its 
philosophical principles and care practices that focus predominantly on the cancer 
death. This was seen as fitting the person with variant CJD ‘into that box'. ‘That 
box’ includes achieving the ‘good' death' that is believed to be fundamental to 
hospice care. Within this was the belief that they did offer an appropriate 
environment for this group of dying people. Also that they did offer the best that was 
possible for a person in such an advanced state of disease, even though it was not a 
disease they were familiar with. The skills that they did have were adaptable to 
providing care for a person with variant CJD. This reflected a belief in the 
philosophical principles of hospice care by ‘experts’ in palliative care practices who 
could deal with any terminal illness. It represents the systems adaptation potential, of 
applying specialised cancer care knowledge in providing end-of-life care for any 
person.
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The paradox of ‘fitting in’ was that these were people who did not have cancer so they 
did not fit some levels of criteria. They displayed ‘dementia behaviour’ which was 
considered unsuitable for a hospice admission. They also did not fit because the 
experience was so traumatic (and increased ‘dementia’ behaviour), and family 
members were equally traumatised by the admissions. The contradiction is the variant 
CJD cases (technically) fitted the admission criteria, because they were in need of 
care for ‘acute’ dying, and manifested symptoms that were within the remit of 
specialist hospice services to manage. The family experience (of the in-house 
admissions) was that the person with variant CJD ‘did fit’ into the system, that is, that 
admission was very appropriate.
5.3J.2 ‘DidfiV
The responses of the family members who experienced in-house hospice care confirm 
the literature that suggests the public place hospice care in high esteem (Grande et al 
1996; Fakhoury et al 1997; Seymour 2003). In this respect I classify family members 
as both carers and as patients i.e. bereaved persons. As discussed in my ethical 
section, family members within the hospice may oscillate between patient, relative 
and team member status.
The symbolic act of providing ‘protection’ is embedded in the hospice philosophy and 
the definition of palliation as ‘cloaking’, or sequestration, as a place of sanctuary, a 
‘safe retreat’ (Lawton 1998a, 2000) further emphasises this view albeit, for Lawton, 
only in relation to day hospice admissions. It also returns me to the ‘protecting role’, 
addressed earlier by the social worker who believed it was her role to protect the
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family member from the media, that the hospice system ‘container’ provided, where 
the person with variant CJD was protected from curious visitors.
FM. They were really good at stopping people coming in. (PATIENT'S 
HUSBAND) requested that certain people not be allowed to come in They 
did that, stuck by i f  there was somebody new at the desk. Once people got 
to know it was nice because (PATIENT’S HUSBAND) wanted them to be 
stopped. So she wasn't shown o ff to anybody that was what we wanted. 
(WI-76-80)
The expressions of family members, about patients who were admitted to an in-house 
hospice unit, of how well they felt they ‘fitted in’, were repeated throughout the 
interviews. One family member repeatedly expressed how wonderful the hospice 
was. Family members made a point of saying that they wanted to have the interview 
so they could tell me about their experiences of in-house care and one family member 
referred to the hospice as, '... it was like getting to Shangri La when we got here '. The 
hospice as a metaphorical Shangri La* was repeated on several occasions. Describing 
the hospice as Shangri La correlates with the ideology of the model of liminality 
proposed by Froggatt (1995, 1997). The concept of Shangri La fits within attributes 
of liminality, where this is applied to sacred places such as monasteries. It is 
particularly interesting that this family member chose to use this term in relation to 
hospice which is a place connected to death and dying. ‘Shangri L a’ provided a 
symbolic metaphor for the hospice, reflecting the origins of hospice and the ideology 
of liminality. Implicit within the symbol of Shangri La is that a space is created in
* Tlie tenn Sliangri La originates from the novel ‘Lost Horizon’ by James Hilton (1933), and refers to a 
‘hidden’ valley in the Himalayas where people lived in peace and harmony and had tl\e potential to 
retain eternal youtli, and live for ever.
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which people are ‘living’ in peace and harmony and where there is potential for 
everlasting life. The original philosophy of hospice as a sanctuary, a place of 
hospitality where dying was ‘cloaked’ is by definition a primary task of hospice. 
Families (in-house) experienced the hospice as the epitome of what the organisation 
stands for in the eyes of the public, a place of hospitality and a safe retreat, a 
sanctuary, being like ‘home’ or ‘family’ (Seymour 2003).
Within this is the ‘rite of passage’ idea of being cared for during the journey to death 
(van Gennep 1960; Froggatt 1995, 1997). van Gennep (1960) considers these within 
the complex rites of transition through the funeral rites. Funeral rites, according to 
van Gennep (1960) are the most extensively elaborated and assigned the greatest 
importance. In this instance I refer to the dying person with variant CJD as, although 
not already dead, in a position that may be equated with the transition accorded within 
a funeral rite of passage.
In trying to express what he meant by 'Shangri L a \ the family member made the 
connection with the use of aromatherapy massage, and other care practices that the 
family found difficult to articulate. He struggled to describe how the experience was 
something that was more than just nursing care, providing descriptions that fit with 
the level of presence proposed by a number of researchers (Zerwekh 1993; Nebauer et 
al 1996). The model of hospice as a liminal space, likened to a family (Froggatt 1995, 
1997), is also particularly apt in describing some of the family responses to the 
admission. Family members described the experience as becoming accepted, being 
like a family member, even to likening the hospice to a 'holiday camp \
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FM  It was like a family, whatever, it was more, it was like being almost 
like a holiday camp wasn't it, I  mean I  know that sounds silly (BOTH 
LAUGHING) but thinking o f doing jigsaws with people who actually ... a 
fellow came in to have his blood changed ... and his wife as well you'd 
think, to put up with that, and we were doing jigsaws together and 
laughing... (Z2:84-89)
Family members spoke of becoming ‘very ‘paly ’ with some o f the nurses \ making 
friends with other families who had relatives dying at the hospice, and that whilst they 
were unhappy that the person was dying, the experience ‘wasn't miserable
FM-1 I  didn't know anything about aromatherapy but I  think it's 
extremely good now, seeing it in action, you know (PAUSE) But it was, it 
was more than that, more than just nursing care, it was...
FM-2 It was the ambience ...
FM-1 Yes, but it waj like um, it might sound corny but it was holistic 
really in that, there was more, there was, you know the nurses seemed to 
have some sort o f extra thing that they passed on to you without speaking 
about it...
FM-2 Absolutely and when we come here now which we do quite 
regularly for counselling and we come, and we have eveiything that's on 
offer really, and the nurses come out from all corners and throw their 
arms round us and it's as i f  we're all oldfriends, you know. It's wonderful, 
it is, it's wonderful (Z2:59-72)
Another family member reported how she had ‘lived here ' during the admission and 
that, ‘Everybody was so nice it made you cry’. Family members were able to visit at 
any time, to stay as long as they wanted and to bring children in. This high degree of 
support and homeliness of the hospice was frequently compared to the strict visiting
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regimes of the ÎSIHS hospital ward where the person with variant CJD had previously 
been a patient.
FM. I  mean you could bring the kids as well and he (YOUNGEST 
CHILD) used to love coming in, and I  think she knew that he was there. I  
could just come in and out whenever I  wanted you know and they offered 
to give me lunch! (W3:2I8-22I)
Family members even went so far as to describe the care as loving care \ proposing 
that they ‘couldn't get it more right
FM  And it was done with such loving care you know, it was as though, I  
felt, they all loved (PATIENT) better than they loved anybody else in the 
hospice and that probably everybody felt that, you know ... and it really, it 
really was true, I  thought, well, you said once i f  you was a king you 
couldn't get better tt'eatment (PATIENT), you know. (Z2:1163-1180)
This is the symbolic and idealised, ‘loving’ ‘family system’ that was identified as one 
of the attributes of liminality that may be found in the hospice environment (Froggatt 
1995, 1997). It is the ‘love’ attributed to the hospice staff that assists the dying 
through the ‘funeral’ transition. Nursing without love has been described as empty, 
cold and technical, whereas love can give meaning to nursing and may enable the 
nurse to ‘care’ for the person (Lanara 1991). Love, in nursing, was understood as 
something qualitatively different from ‘caring’ and Fitzgerald and van Ho oft (2000) 
concluded that ‘love in nursing’ was understood as the willingness and commitment 
of the nurse to want the good of the other before self, without reciprocity. The 
interpretation by the family member of the nurses’ actions as love correlates with the 
above and also with the theology of ‘moderated love’ proposed by Campbell (1984).
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Campbell refers to the tension between ‘being with’ and ‘doing to’ using the metaphor 
of ‘skilled companionship’ to suggest a type of moderated love offered by nurses, 
doctors and social workers in their provision of care for patients.
Li (2002) suggests that these relationships could be construed as a co-performance of 
‘niceness’ occurring between family members and staff. I would argue that 
something occurred (at least for family members) within the relationships that went 
deeper than a socially constructed therapeutic interaction that could be termed as 
‘being nice’. The interactions fit more within the original concept of hospice where 
the term hospice originates from French from Latin hospitium, from hospes, hospit, 
meaning a home providing care for the sick or terminally ill and lodging for travellers, 
especially one run by a religious order. The medieval concept of hospice was of a 
place offering a welcome to all those in need, not only the sick and dying but also as 
an act of hospitality (Stoddard 1978; Lattanzi-Licht and Connor 1995).
These experiences express the components for which hospice has come to be 
recognised, and represents the hospice in a state of equilibrium. Hospice culture is 
frequently viewed by members of the public as a place of serenity and tranquillity, 
with a family atmosphere. Family members highlighted this focus by repeatedly 
making comparisons between experiences of other healthcare sites and the hospice, a 
feature also identified by Douglas et al (1999). Philosophically the hospice provides a 
tranquil, safe and ambient environment where the family or significant others are 
considered integral members of the team. It reflected more than just care and 
emphasised the importance of developing relationships with people.
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The subject of variant CJD, usually prefaced with Tnad cow disease’, was headline 
news and the novelty of this new disease was heavily fuelled by the media. Although 
the hospice was seen by family members as a place where the person with variant 
CJD was protected from curiosity, there remained a more than usual interest in these 
patients. This led to people talking about it in a manner that I have categorised as 
gossiping. Novelty engenders gossip at all levels of the community as people are 
curious about the new and need to talk about it. Gossiping was a component in all 
cases and linked to not knowing as a component of novelty and wanting to know 
about this new disease.
5.3.2 Gossiping
Gossip is considered to be universal because it is psychologically and socially useful 
(McAndrew and Milenkovic (2002). It has also been pointed out that there may be an 
equally valid evolutionary argument for gossip as there have been arguments about 
the social value and construction of gossip (Crawford 1998). McAndrew and 
Milenkovic (2002) propose that both social comparison and gossip are social 
strategies and that these have developed in human beings in response to evolutionary 
pressures experienced throughout human history. I propose that (some of) the gossip 
that occurred in my study participants fitted with the evolutionary concept where 
humans need to have this information as a means of adaptation to the environment 
and for their survival and was a response to sensational news. The appeal of 
sensational news has been well explored within sociology and journalism (Seale 2002; 
Aust 2003). Sensational news as having purpose is not addressed in detail in the 
above literature and when it is addressed it is frequently with a negative connotation, 
such as the media’s need to ‘acquire, keep and expand their audiences’ (Seale
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2002:40) that appeals to the public interest and enjoyment of drama (Aust 2003). 
There is agreement amongst analysts and critics that the emotional impact of a story 
or its presentation are what decide whether or not it is afforded valuable space on the 
front page of a newspaper (Seale 2002). A number of sociologists suggest that 
sensational news is socially constructed through discourse and journalists also incline 
to this view (Seale 2002).
Others have argued that sensational news has an important purpose within 
evolutionary psychology. Davis and McLeod (2003) argue that emotional appeal to 
sensational news is uncorrelated with frequency of occurrence. They believe that 
emotional responses are not socially constructed particular to time and place, but 
reflect human universals. They base this argument on matching determinants of our 
ancestors’ ability to pass on their genes (environment of evolutionary adaptedness 
(EEA)), with sensational news items, published between 1700 and 2001, Twelve 
distinct categories were identified that remained stable over the 300 years and 
matched those of topics that evolutionary psychology identifies as having greatly 
influenced the success of humans in evolutionary adapteness. Three of these are 
relevant to this study; accidental/natural injury/death, harm to child, and taking a 
stand/fighting back* The authors argue that these topics are not socially constructed 
on the basis of time or local cultural values but reflect human universals, and that 
newspapers did not exist in the EEA, but gossiping probably did. This served a higher 
intellectual function allowing communication about social information.
*The documentary on Jonathan was based on tlie family’s fight to have treatment using PPS.
Jonathan's Father: I f  we have to fight the rest o f out lives, we will continue thatfight. (TVD:8)
Jonathan's Father: We had two choices and only one answer. And that for us to lie down and let 
this evil consume us. Or get up andfight.
Jonathan's Mother: We fought from day one, non-stop. (TVD:30-32)
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This functionalist conceptualisation of gossip is confirmed by the UK (and global) 
responses to beef consumption, tissue transplantation and blood transfusion policies 
and protocols that have emerged following the discovery of variant CJD. The gossip 
that occurred appeared to encompass components of the above in the anxiety that was 
expressed about the risks from food and other sources of contamination.
Four themes support the category of gossip. These were ‘ghoulish voyeurism’, 
‘outsider ignorance’, ‘drawn to stories’ and ‘bullying’, all of which occurred due to 
the unknown and novelty factors of variant CJD.
5.3,2.1 Ghoulish voyeurism — ‘a peep show ’
Much in the manner in which people are drawn to horror stories and movies 
(Tamborini 2003), or other displays of the grotesque or unusual (Waskul and van der 
Riet 2002), fascination with people who are different, particularly who overtly display 
psychiatric or neurological symptoms, led to the categoiy of ghoulish voyeurism, 
suggesting a metaphorical 'peep show \ Voyeurism is defined as obtaining enjoyment 
at seeing the pain and distress of others and may be seen as taking this interpretation 
‘too far’, however, the term fascination proved ‘too light’ to hold my interpretation. 
Adding ghoulish (being morbidly interested in death and disaster) to voyeurism I 
believe accurately portrays the experiences described by participants of the type of 
interest taken in people with variant CJD.
CNS Her (ESTRANGED FAMILY MEMBER) bringing, as far as 
(HUSBAND) and her sister were concerned, bringing strangers to 
observe and see what was happening, a peep show. The ‘mad cow ' title.
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Here's (PATIENT), she's got ‘mad cow ’ disease. They were getting a lot of 
stick apparently, fi'om neighbours and people. (WI:303-306)
HCA The neighbours who hadn't spoken to him for years, had to come 
and visit ... the fact that they just said, just coming to have a look. 
(11:667-669)
There is a compulsion to look at anything different, ‘they always looked’, (people 
passing the room of one of the people with variant CID at the hospice). It is reflected 
in how, for example, motorists slow down on motor-ways to Took’ at an accident, 
described by Mazairac (2004) as ‘a socially accepted horror movie’. One family 
member likened this type of behaviour to looking at a hanging, emphasising a 
ghoulish fascination. This fascination is confirmed in historical accounts of public 
hangings and autopsies (Richardson 1988) and more recently on the autopsy carried 
out by von Hagens on television and the interest in the internet images of beheadings 
in Iraq. One family member spoke of this potential when we were discussing the 
responses of people to his wife. He spoke of how people were fascinated by 
things/events that were unusual.
FM  People are nosey. I t ’s like when you see someone hanging, just a 
thought, if  you went down the street and someone hung themselves, 
there’d be loads o f people staring at i t ... (¥2:868-870)
The novelty element was clearly linked to the concept of ‘mad cow’. The language to 
describe BSE and CJD has become symbolically linked to the term ‘mad cow’. The 
information and discussion about variant CJD could not be contained, because it was 
novel, interesting and fascinating to the public. I include here the participants as also
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being ‘members of the public’. The media does not try to contain sensational news, 
such as the variant CJD stories, and through the media the concept of the 
awesomeness of the disease was hielled and variant CJD is repeatedly referred to as 
‘Mad Cow Disease, the human form of BSE’.
CNS People don't associate it with CJD. A lot o f people have no idea 
what that means, hut the minute you say mad cow disease they 
automatically have this total horror picture in their minds. (Xl:863-865)
This is the language that the public identifies as variant CJD, and indeed all forms of 
CJD. This point was made with emphasis and also with irony by one family member 
in relation to his experience, where the person with CJD was not a certain diagnosis of 
the variant type.
FM  People i t ’s just, you know, people think, anyone who speaks to you 
say that they always associate it with mad cow disease you know. I t ’s just 
CJD, CJD, mad cow disease. CJD is mad cow disease, when you say i t ’s 
CJD, they just say mad cow disease, they think it all comes ft'om meat, 
everyone you speak to, always one hundred percent. One hundred percent 
o f people associate CJD with mad cow disease (LAUGHS -  IRONICAL) 
(¥2:893-900)
The youth of the people infected with variant CJD and the horror of the disease 
symptoms were contributing factors to the fascination that led to gossiping. However, 
being the ‘object’ of fascination changes the orientation to the event or situation. 
When a person has not had a close personal experience of a traumatic event or 
situation it is possible to be curious without any feeling of emotional risk, and one 
family member struggled to put into words how it felt to be the object of people’s
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curiosity. ‘You thank God’ that it is not you when you witness others being subjected 
to curiosity. It is only after personal experience that it makes ‘you look at life 
differently ’. At this stage he was speaking of how some friends and visitors had come 
to the house after her illness had started, and then did not come back again.
Gossip occurred because people ‘outside’ of the system, were not informed enough 
about the circumstances of the individuals who had variant CJD. Their behaviour was 
seen as displaying ignorance. The ‘knowledge’ referred to here is not just about the 
disease progress but also about the personal lives of the person with variant CJD and 
their families.
5.3.2.2 Ignorant outsiders
Outsider ignorance was seen as the opposite to insider knowledge (professional 
knowledge). Knowledge contained within the boundaries of the hospice (system) was 
seen as accurate knowledge and talk/gossip outside of the boundaries of the 
professional ‘inside’ knowledge was seen as occurring because they ‘didn’t know, 
‘they don’t have all the facts’, ‘don’t have the knowledge’. Gossip and ghoulish 
voyeurism that occurred ‘outside’ was seen as the result of ‘ignorance’. Making 
judgements about the curiosity of others is demonstrated in the following extract 
where the ‘outsider’ is judged as ignorant. The term ignorance served as a symbol of 
gossip and of ‘not knowing’. Ignorance here was seen as a manifestation of the 
curiosity and rudeness of people ‘not in the know’ (not insiders). Ignorance and 
rudeness were also associated with using the term ‘mad cow’.
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HCA-11 think it's um, people are like that out o f ignorance aren't they.
JN  Yes, it's the unknown. I  think it was good that the other patients didn't 
know.
HCA-11 do think, you know, I  mean, we didn't have that problem here did 
we. Because they didn't know, hut i f  they did we don't know what they 
would have been like because it is ignorance.
CNS No.
HCA-1 Some people behave really bizarre because you know they're so 
ignorant. But it's curiosity because if  you take somebocfy out into S High 
Street in a wheelchair, people stare at you and they have to look, and I  
think it's just curiosity.
HCA-2 Yes.
HCA-1 It's rude, it's very rude, because you know i f  I  wds in a wheelchair 
I  wouldn't want to be stared at.
HCA-2 No.
HCA-1 But some people are so, I  don't know, but they don't even know 
what CJD means. They only know the language o f mad cow as well 
(Xl:84I-858)
In the above extract there is an assumption made that gossip was an ‘outsider’ 
occupation, caused through ignorance. However, gossip also did occur within the 
system. The boundaries of the system (professional boundaries) suppose that 
confidential medical knowledge and information is (ethically) contained, but the 
power of curiosity about the novelty element of the subject caused ‘breaches' in the 
containment of this information. It was likened to the early days of HIV and AIDS 
and how the novelty of that may have also broken tlirough the boundaries of 
confidential knowledge.
CNS There were a lot o f breaches in confidentiality throughout the 
hospice. It discussed in the staff restaurant and I  think this was all
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because it is a new disease, an unknown, and affecting young people. I  
don't know i f  it was the same with first HIV AIDS patients here. (WI : 789- 
793)
The comparison between the early days of HIV and AIDS is a feature throughout data 
and literature (Brookes 1999). ADDS set in place the beginnings of the concept of 
‘public death’. Not the public deaths identified by Richardson (1988), but that of the 
globalisation of death (through sensational media stories) where death experiences are 
shared through the media*. As pointed out by Small (1993) in relation to what he 
refers to as the paradoxes that defined AIDS, stereotyping the epidemic has made its 
public face what it is. People with AIDS were able to personalise the epidemic and by 
doing so make considerable individual achievements, but they also experienced 
considerable individual grief and crass exploitation.
Despite the small number of variant CJD deaths (compared to the AIDS numbers, 
even in the earlier days) the interest and fascination about variant CJD disease was 
initially fuelled by the media. However, the exploitation holds a different position to 
that of the early days of AIDS. The variant CJD death is about ‘innocent’ victims of 
‘biotechnology’, of human manufactured disease within the new risk society (Beck 
1995; Lupton 1999; Giddens 1999). This fuelled the media exploitation of variant 
CJD stories that participants in this study were drawn to.
In the 1997 case it was news that there was a person with variant CJD within the 
local community and this was 'leaked out’ to the media. The presence of a 
person with variant CJD could not be contained within the system. There was
’Millions watched Zee’s final hours (Daily Telegraph 29/10/2000).
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'constant pressure’ to 'get the stories’ of family experiences and such a 
sensational stoiy could not be kept out of the public sphere. The boundaries of 
the system were breached by the novelty of the disease and this lack of 
information on potential risk made participants take more than a ‘general’ 
interest in the subject of variant CJD.
5.5.2.3 'Drawn ’ to stories
HCA Certainly i f  I  ever see anything about CJD in the paper I  
immediately read it. Immediately drawn to it. And sometimes it'll talk 
about somebody who's ill with it or someone that's just died with it and it 
brings it all back very, very vividly. (XI:327-330)
Being ‘drawn to stories’ interlinks with ‘ghoulish voyeurism’. Anything on variant 
CJD that participants had read in the papers, heard on the radio or seen on television 
was discussed and related to the novelty element of the disease. Being drawn to 
stories also serves as an indicator of the importance/relevance of Davis and McLeod 
(2003) concepts of sensational news and Evolutionary Environmental Adaptedness, 
where participants highlight that the disease was 'caused, technically by humans’. 
Participants, in all cases, gave examples of ‘individuals’ they had heard or read of 
within the media, and appeared fascinated by the subject. The fascination was related 
to a number of factors. For healthcare workers it was the mode of infection for 
variant CJD, potential risk to themselves, the potential numbers of people who could 
become infected, and the age and circumstances of the patient group. Stories in the 
media brought back vivid recollection of the experience of providing care for the 
person with variant CJD, and the horror of the impact this had on families and friends 
and I posit that the ‘talk’ within the focus group can be construed as gossiping.
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CNS And its because its been caused, technically, by humans. That makes 
it all the worse really. Listening to the news last night and they have 
compensation and care packages for them. Did you see they showed a 
family whose 14 year old is dying from it. That was just (PATIENT) all 
over again. That must be awful for these people. (WI:338-342)
JN  And I  just kept on thinking to myself, how many cases are there that 
we don’t know o f That is what I  kept thinking, and must admit even now I  
think you know sort o f i f  you do read anything in the newspapers, you 
know, how many cases are there? (XI:321-326)
Being drawn to stories was not confined to the healthcare participants, and family 
members compared their experiences with the experiences of others. For families it 
was a much more personal matter. One family member showed me a poem written by 
another carer and copies of the CJD newsletters, and they all talked about case 
numbers and other political and financial issues related to support for people with 
variant CJD and their carers.
Just as people who have had traumatic experiences do not want to return to the site of 
the trauma, some family members found it difficult to return to the hospice, where 
they had agreed to be interviewed, as it brought back too many memories. The visual 
impact of someone experiencing the disease was ‘unbearable’ for one family member. 
When a person has direct experience or can relate personally to a situation the impact 
is more powerful and lasting.
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F M I don't like watching things on telly. I  can't bear that. I  have to turn it 
over. I  don't mind listening to something. To watch someone the same I  
find  that quite hard at the moment. (W2:255-256)
The teams also did not know if they were at any risk in taking the variant CJD 
admission, a concern that was still present in the 2003 cases. This was contributed to 
by the ongoing research on the subject of variant CJD and media discussion on risk 
factors. They were drawn to media stories about potential risk of variant CJD for 
health care professionals also making links to the early days of HIV and AIDS. There 
is global uncertainty and anxiety regarding the implications of variant CJD (Giddens 
1999; Beck 2000, Rose 2000; van Loon 2000). Lessons learned from the early days 
of HIV and AIDS were indicated in comments on how someone may say in the future 
'well you were at risk’. Participants in the early cases had already identified that 
information they had been initially given was inaccurate. These concerns have been 
vindicated by the recent confirmation of transmission by blood transftision.
JN  And the other thing is, you know, I  know they say you can't really 
catch it you know cross-contamination from human to human ...
HCA We don't know ...
JN  But we don't know that and will it be in years to come that yes you 
can.
HCA Especially ...
JN  We're actually finding out things now that we were told weren't true, I  
mean, in another year are they going to be saying that you can catch it 
through something else.
HCA Droplet infection ...
CNS The girls fi'om the prion unit said they weren't sure whether it could 
be passed on by body fluids, they didn't know i f  it was held in the blood,
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they weren't able to say that it is. But equally they were not able to say 
that it isn't. (WI:62-75)
For family members the potential for risk was much more real than for the hospice 
teams. There was potential risk for their own children and themselves and one family 
member became very anxious, at any stage that she felt unwell, particularly if it was 
psychological in nature.
FM. I  mean everyday you sit there and think Oh I'm feeling a bit 
depressed, Oh God, you know, has it happened. That plays on your mind 
as well, because you think you're going to get the same and I've never 
really eaten much beef in my life anyway, but I  mean, except for baby 
food, and you worry yourself You know i f  you get a little bit upset you 
worry that you might have got it. (W2:429-436)
The novelty of this disease and the ‘mad cow’ connotation also led to bullying of the 
younger children of families. This was not only direct relatives but also nieces and 
nephews of one of the patients. As no children were interviewed for this study these 
were not firsthand reports of the bullying but were events related by others.
5.3.2.4 Bullying
Name-calling and other types of verbal harassment represent some of the most 
prevalent forms of bullying (Crozier and Dimmock 1999:506; Cowie 2004). Being 
called ‘mad cow’ or subjected to taunting, such as 'your mother is a mad cow ’ were 
the experiences of children of three families of variant CJD patients and their 
relatives. As none of these children were interviewed for this study this information 
was reported by others who made assumptions that these experiences were distressing
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to the children, as did the social workers who were involved in addressing these issues 
with the children. The impact of name-calling as a form of bullying in schools is an 
under researched area and the small existing literature suggests that it is difficult to 
identify because it is often a hidden type of bullying (Crozier and Dimmock 1999).
Following a study, using a questionnaire measure for 60 pupils, with interviews 
carried out with 20 children from the junior department of an inner-city primary 
school in South Wales, Crozier and Dimmock (1999) conclude that name-calling and 
the assignment of unkind nicknames are prevalent and hurtful features of school life. 
Although this study is small it was carried out with rigour, sensitivity and ethically 
sound procedures and I believe allows the assumption to be made that these 
experiences were hurtful to the children discussed in my study. This form of bullying 
was closely linked to the novelty aspect of the ‘mad cow’ title.
Bullying implies an element of malice, and ‘taunting’ and ‘teasing’. Where there 
were children involved social workers dealt with issues about bereavement and the 
bullying that arose, up to, and more than a year after, the deaths of the family 
members, in two cases.
CNS The hoy was told that his mum had 'mad cow’ disease, in the 
playgi'ound. And (THATSHE WAS) she was dying. (WI:307-308)
S W ... and they weren't happy because o f the 'Your Mother's a mad cow' 
and all of this in the playground, just bullying going on. (VI:269-271)
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Bullying was also attributed to the cruelty and ignorance of others and discussion 
about bullying engendered considerable emotion within the focus group discussions 
when this subject arose and was again equated with ignorance.
HCA-2 The son was teased basically. They'd make noises, that sort o f 
thing. Like a cow. Yes, that sort o f thing. And there was an occasion in the 
canteen with the little girl and there were beef-burgers on the menu and 
they were throwing beef-burgers at her, that kind of taunting.
HCA-1 Isn't that awful.
HCA-2 Yes, terrible, just terrible.
HCA-1 Because children can be so cruel, that's the thing.
HCA-2 Just ignorance. (XI:173-180)
The manifestations of the disease was particularly frightening for the children, so not 
only were these children bullied in their respective schools, but they also had to deal 
with seeing their family member go through a rapid deterioration to a person who 
could no longer speak, walk, eat or behave in a ‘normal’ manner.
There is very little research on responses to horror and these are largely confined to 
studies on horror within the cinema, that is, horror movies. The number of, and 
variations on, expressions of horror, made this an important theme within the category 
of novelty. These same expressions of horror do not appear in data from the team 
who had previous experience in caring for people with variant CJD, compared to the 
other cases. I propose that honor was ‘blunted’ by previous exposure. Expressions of 
horror do, however, appear repeatedly in the experiences of the family members 
throughout data.
220
5.3,3 Horrifying -  ‘worstpossible nightmare ’
The ‘horrific ' nature of the disease was portrayed in many ways and all of the 
following terms and phrases are found repeatedly within the data, 'worst thing I ’ve 
ever seen’, 'worst possible nishtmare ’. 'just a nightmare’, 'horrendous’, 'the most 
horrific disease I've ever seen’, 'I've never seen anything like i t ’ and ‘the shock of 
actually seeing her
The abject body is both fascinating and repulsively horrifying (Waskul and van der 
Riet 2002). To witness a young person displaying all of the neurological symptoms 
and behaviours that are associated with dementia was profoundly horrifying and 
disturbing for participants. Horror was expressed about the disease process and 
symptoms, and at how the people with variant CJD were treated at other sites. The 
horror expressed by the parents of one of the patients was not about the death, it was 
about the manifestation of the illness and how closely aligned it was to the horror of 
psychiatric illness, presented as a metaphorical 'straightjacket ’.
FM-1 Well, through all the places we went and all you know, it's the 
horror o f it, it's not that (PATIENT) died, it..,
FM-2 ... it is incomparable with any other illness.
FM-1 It's the way, I  mean I  imagine i f  (PATIENT) were to be taken away 
and put in a straightjacket, you know it was that horrible, it was 
nightmarish you know, the illness is so ...
FM-2 ... and (PREVIOUS SITE) almost made it that way didn't it, er the 
sti'aightjacket bit, it was all but, wasn't it. (12:1230-1239)
*Kate’s Fiancée: Watching somebody actually um, starve to death is the most horrendous, horrendous 
thing to watch. Someone who had been so vibrant, somebody so young. That last, that last week when 
everything had been taken away from her. When she couldn't hear, couldn't move, couldn't eat, when 
she couldn't drink, she couldn't laugh, smile, talk, listen, eyes half closed A nd just praying she would 
go soon ... (CRYING) (TVD:270-277)
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People who are so neurologically damaged that they display behaviours described 
earlier are frequently perceived as without personhood. These were the symptoms 
that variant CJD people displayed that led participants to use terminology about them 
that indicated them being attributed a non-personhood status.
5.3.3.1 Personhood status
Issues of underestimating the potential for emotional expression, lucidity and 
personhood status, specific to dementia care, have been substantially developed 
within the dementia literature (Kitwood 1990, 1993; Kitwood and Bredin 1992; 
Miesen 1993, 1997, 1999; Normann et al 1998, 2002). The status of the person with 
variant CJD was of one who had lost personhood status, even when they remained 
fully conscious. In this context they fitted the description of ‘total annihilation of the 
person, body and self, i.e. Copp’s (1996, 1999) conceptualisation of person-body 
split or separation. An absence of a separation, as proposed by Copp (1996, 1999), is 
a position that is granted to patients by the hospice staff and depends on them having 
some knowledge and understanding of the person, previous to the state of 
unconsciousness. If there was no previous knowledge of the person then the person 
and ‘dead’ body could not be separated. This was also acknowledged by Kabel and 
Roberts (2003:286) where one of their participants is quoted as saying ‘... we have 
the time to form the special bonds’ (AOl) which then allowed the person who was 
dying to maintain their personhood.
Staff had not had the opportunity to make a relationship with the person with variant 
CJD during the admission due to their cognitive status. Time has been identified as
Ill
essential to forming nurse/patient relationships in hospice (Froggatt 1995; Copp 1996; 
Andershed and Ternestedt 2001; Li 2002; Kabel and Roberts 2003). This forming of 
relationships could be instant or it could take time (Froggatt 1995), however, the 
formulae always required a cognitively intact patient.
Family members believed that the person with variant CJD was aware of them and 
their surroundings, a finding confirmed by Douglas et al (1999). Hospice staff 
participants did not overtly make a connection between demonstrations of awareness 
by the person and their behaviours. However, there were indications within the data 
that they did attribute the person with variant CJD some degree of awareness. I also 
posit that they were not aware that, within their talk, they were presenting these 
patients as non-persons. Generally family members used analogies that demonstrated 
a closer personal relationship with the person, such as, 'like a zombie ', 'like a rag- 
doll 'like a babe again and 'just an empty shell really \ Although Post (1990:325) 
suggests, metaphors of ‘shell’ and ‘husk’ may lead to an exaggerated view of the 
extent to which the person with dementia is no longer what he or she once was and 
establish a ‘tyranny of the normal’, they did have a quality of endearment that was not 
always apparent in those used by hospice staff participants. Analogies used by 
hospice staff likened the person with variant CJD to an animal, a thing or object such 
as a stick. All participants, at some stage, used analogies of non-personhood. 
'Turned into this ... thing’, 'howling and screaming like an animal in a corner’, 'a 
little, tiny, curled up stick, 'apuppy dog’, or referred to them as 'already gone’, no
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longer a person ‘had no personality and ‘lost the person Seeing a person in 
these states caused fear and aversion in others, particularly the children.
SW  ... and the children were very frightened because Mum had turned 
into this ... ‘thing' that they didn't recognise. And in such a short space o f 
time, it hadn't happened over years, it was just so rapid and frightening. 
(¥1:734-737)
The inability to communicate in a ‘normal’ way was equated to being without 
personhood. Not being able to communicate appeared to also place the person with 
variant CJD as one without a face. This offered further evidence of how having 
agency has become an important aspect of having meaningful communication within 
hospice philosophy and practice.
DR I  don’t actually remember the patient's face because, you know, he 
never alert enough, you know, to have any sort o f verbal 
communication. (Z3:3-5)
I also propose that ‘getting something back’ was an ‘unspoken’ criteria for admission 
to a hospice unit and is closely linked to the need to have a meaningful relationship 
with the dying person, a finding present in other studies (Froggatt 1995, 1998; Copp 
1996, 1999; Li 2002).
CNS Because most o f the patients that come are able to speak for 
themselves and ask, a lot of them gasp with relief at being here.
*Kate's Fiancée: 'Just a gradual degeneration jrom really, somebody so bright, intelligent and happy 
to ... something more like a frightened animal (TVD: 175-177)
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HCA-1 But he didn’t and that's what made it hard, because he couldn't 
speak at all
HCA-2 We got nothing back. (Zl:586-590)
One CNS used the analogy that is not uncommon in speaking of people with 
dementia, wondering ‘i f  there's anything there This is an observation made by 
others in research with family members of people with dementia (Gubrium 1986; 
Orona 1990; Herskovits 1995). The observation made by this CNS was, however, 
made based on the obseiwation of the possibility of the person being ‘locked-in'. It 
was reported in relation to discussing the person with variant CJD whilst in her 
presence. She had concerns that her husband spoke about her as though she couldn’t 
hear what was being discussed. The CNS felt uncomfortable and maintained a stance 
of conducting conversations as though the person with CJD could hear these. The 
possibility of the person with variant CJD being ‘locked-in’ was not suggested by any 
other participant.
Although they didn’t associate the behaviour with ‘locked-in’ syndrome, the eyes of 
the person with variant CJD were seen as indications of awareness and the possibility 
of a presence ‘inside’ the person. Uncertainty was expressed about whether the 
person with variant CJD was actually looking out of the window when facing it. They 
did, however, place the person in such way as to enable them to look out at the 
gardens. The team was in agreement that this person did have some awareness of the 
surroundings, commenting that the person’s ‘eyes weren V empty '. This comment was 
not made in relation to the eyes of a dying person but in relation to the eyes of a 
person with variant CJD, i.e. dementia.
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Here I propose that the personhood status is not as clear-cut as some of the participant 
discussion may suggest it is. Participants appeared ‘torn’ between the allocation of 
non-personhood status and uncertainty of the neurological symptoms of the disease 
and aggressive manifestations that can occur in dementia or when a person cannot 
communicate verbally.
HCA She tried to bite you and she also clawed out as well I  think it was 
just her way o f communicating or whatever. I  don't think it was meant as 
nasty. She didn't come across as a nasty person at all It was just part o f 
the condition.
INTERVIEWER What would be the reason for her to do that?
HCA I f  you were feeding her, and she didn't want any more. (WI:87-92)
An aspect that contributed to the horror of the disease and the reaction of people to the 
patient was just how frightened the person with variant CJD was. In all cases, family 
members and staff, participants described the person with variant CJD as being 
frightened, a factor confirmed in other cases (Beyless 2001). In doing so they granted 
them a degree of personhood that contrasted with the analogies offered above, and 
again eyes were important in relating to the experiences. Terms such as ‘petrified', 
‘anxious looking’, ‘disti^aught’, ‘fear showed in his eyes', ‘tormented', and ‘had wild 
eyes ’, were used* They all indicated a response that demonstrated neurological 
damage that was not directly equated with dementia.
*Kate's Mother: Well she -went back to being a child really. She -was very, very jrightened o f  everything. 
I  suppose they were frightened get frightened, o f  what's happening within them. And she used to get so 
frightened. The most distressing thing for me was to see how her teeth, literally, I  mean you read about 
teeth chattering with fright literally, and her teeth used to actually chatter. (TVD: 186-191)
^Claire's Mother: As for that spooked look she got in the eye o f her tantrums: I  thought it rage; 
now I  could see it waj terror. (Pearson 2000).
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CNS He used to see things in his peripheral vision. Um, i f  we were 
walking round the garden and there'd be a movement over here, he'd be 
petrified o f it, and then latterly he would turn and spit in that direction, 
um. I  don't know what he could see because when we asked him he wasn't 
able to tell us, he was terrified o f any movement in the peripheral vision, 
um, so even doing that was difficult. It was always difficult to distract him 
from his fear and his torment because whatever you did was ... (XI:382- 
389)
The possibility that these symptoms were linked to neurological changes and the 
implications of these in relation to psychological state was only addressed by one 
doctor, although it was hinted at by the CNS in the above extract.
DR I  think that was one o f the things that seemed hard and at the end, and 
in assessing what she was frightened of, also due to partly pain, whether 
she was responding to hallucinations or was not understanding what was 
happening. Looking at her face she appeared frightened, her, her body 
language although I've already said she had quite an abnormal posture, 
and the abnormal movements, but she also looked startled and ftightened 
and certainly, I  mentioned being quiet as you came in, more easily, she 
had strong sort o f startle reflex. Yes, and I  guess again, that cognitively 
limited you wondering how much it's Jrightened as we know it, or whether 
it's primitive reflexes and a lot o f it looks like primitive reflexes and yet 
the human part o f you has to hunt out anything else that you think they 
might be frightened of in case you can alleviate it and help. Um, so yes 
she appearedfrightened. (W4:I07-I22)
The issue of communication (difficulties) returns again and again, supporting the core 
category of ‘not knowing’. It is seen as a reason why people with variant CJD were 
not appropriate as admissions to hospice. Inability to communicate with the patient 
occurred because the symptoms of variant CJD and was a new experience for
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participants. The point made that ‘nobody could tell him what was going to happen 
served to introduce the view participants held of the people with variant CJD, in 
relation to their cognitive status.
Understanding the psychology of grief has been a major focus of how bereavement 
counselling is managed (Walter 1993:283). This ‘understanding’ has been based on 
the awareness context framework (Glaser and Strauss 1965) through communicating 
with dying people. In the field of hospice work this has not extended to exploring the 
grief of dying people who are cognitively impaired and research is sparse in this area 
(Regnard et al 2003). This is despite the growing numbers of cases of dementia plus 
rhetoric about developing and promoting palliative care services for older people and 
people with non-malignant terminal illnesses, including dementia.
Staff appeared not to be able to differentiate or make the connections (of the 
differences) between psychological and emotional needs and physical needs, based on 
the behaviour of the person. I suggest that they were unable to make these 
connections because they could not have a normal communication relationship with 
the person who was unable to express themselves due to the dementia component of 
the disease. They did not have a repertoire for caring for people with cancer that they 
could apply to the variant CJD group. Interestingly, the patient group was not likened 
to people with brain tumours, a group which has the most potential commonality to 
people with variant CJD.
Attempts were made to make the connection between the emotional responses of the 
patient and their psychological anguish, but these were more often interpreted as signs
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of physical distress/pain. Thioughout this entire focus group interview CNS-2 was 
very focused on physical symptoms and returned to this as a cause of any distress 
demonstrated by the person with variant CJD.
CNS-1 On the Friday o f the day after the student left and (STUDENT) 
left. She was really distressed on Friday afternoon and we just could not 
get her settled. And I  don't know whether or not there was some 
understanding. She was in therefor a while. She popped into the room to 
say good-bye to (PATIENT). I'm away now. Was that not the day she 
started. She was really distressed that Friday afternoon and we could not 
get her settled and I  don't know whether or not there was some 
understanding because she was in there for a while with her. And the 
student herself was upset at having to go and leave her and she said right, 
bye, bye (PATIENT) I'm leaving now, I  won't see you again because I  
have to go back into a surgical ward or whatever it was. And 10 to 15 
minutes later and we heard all this crying coming from the side room and 
we went in and there was no body there with her and she was just sitting 
there crying.
HCA That was when we thought she had a really bad back pain.
CNS-2 That's right... (WI: 738-749)
The nurses could not make the connection that this person with dementia was ‘intact’ 
enough to be able to have emotional responses or to have been psychologically 
distressed at the loss of a friend and a reminder of her own imminent death*.
*Kate's Mother: She crying one morning and I  went back in there and, come on, what you crying 
for. She said, Mum I  think I've got something really bad wrong with me. I  said what do you think you've 
got wrong with you Kate? She said I  can't remember, my brain mum, I  think its three letters. And I  
thought Oh no, try and think what it is. And she said, BSE. Why do you think you've got this Kate? And 
she said I  don't Icnoyv, I  just do. I  said why are you crying and why, and she said I'm worried. And I  
said why are you so worried about, and she said I'm worried that, like, you and Dad, and everyone who 
comes in contact with me are going to get infected with it and they're going to be like me. (TVD:246- 
252)
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They failed to recognise that the family member and the person with variant CJD 
were able to have a mutual appreciation of each other and share in a symbolic way 
that facilitated joint understanding of their situation (Nolan et al 2002). My 
interpretation of this inability to make the connection was that it was due to her 
inability to communicate her psychological needs in a ‘normal’ manner. That is, in a 
manner that the hospice staff were familiar with.
When the system is unbalanced individuals become anxious and this further disturbs 
the equilibrium. Anxiety within the system can lead to the need to take controlling 
action. The concept of controlling lies at the core of most discussions on healthcare 
organisations (Clulow 1994; Hinshelwood and Skogstad 2000). My use of the term is 
closely allied to work that has been carried out on managing the emotional life of 
organisations, where emotions are seen as resources to be controlled and is directly 
related to maintaining system equilibrium.
5.4 Controlling -  use of strategies to maintain the equilibrium of the system
The conflict between care and control is endemic to organisational life (Clulow 1994; 
Hinshelwood and Skogstad 2000). ‘Control’ is a term that is closely associated with 
hospice practices in that it is synonymous with the practice of managing pain and 
symptoms (pain control/symptom control). Controlling has been identified as one of 
the complex strategies of interplay of interactions between nurses and dying patients 
(Froggatt 1995; Copp 1996, 1999). In many ways it is an inappropriate term to use in 
conjunction with terms that align palliative care with concepts such as autonomy and 
choice. I argue that it is possible that the controlling aspect of providing palliative 
care has taken a prominent position in many of the care practices. I propose
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controlling as a first level category and as being central to management of in-house 
hospice cai*e (Figure 6). Within the community, the locus of control was with the 
carer/family member in the home. The ‘agenda’ of hospice in-house teams was not 
the same as those of family members and both parties were often unaware of these 
differences, but not always.
Equilibrium seeking is central to maintaining the steady state of the system (Katz and 
Kahn 1966) and the feelings of insecurity and uncertainty which the novelty of variant 
CJD engendered in the system led to an increase in the need to reduce anxiety and 
manage the system (Menzies Lyth 1988, 1990). Controlling was essential to maintain 
the inner balance and equilibrium of the ‘container’. Not knowing unbalanced the 
system equilibrium and I argue that not having answers for many of the questions, the 
novelty, and horrifying disease trajectory of variant CJD engendered a need to be in 
control. In discussing this category I will highlight the differences and similarities 
between the in-house and community experiences and between family and hospice 
staff. Two themes supported this category. These were ‘managing care’ and 
‘maintaining the environment’.
5,4.1 Managing care
A significant part of the data addressed how the teams managed the care of the people 
with variant CJD, identifying issues and concerns that arose in doing this. As 
discussed above they were initially ‘in the dark’, having little knowledge of what the 
care needs were for this patient group. They needed to use background skills they had 
from managing, generally, the cancer patient group, and apply this to people with
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A new disease (variant CJD)
Hospice Service entering the system 
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(Open system)
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Figure 6. Controlling -  use of strategies to maintain the equilibrium of the 
system
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variant CJD. For in-house nursing staff I propose that it was believed that in taking 
control of the physical body of the person with variant CJD ‘dignity’ was restored and 
‘quality of life’ maintained.
5.4. L 1 Restoring dignity
Hospice philosophy has a focus on the process of the person ‘being allowed to die’ 
and is frequently equated with ‘maintaining dignity’ and providing ‘quality of life’, 
both concepts laden with subjective values and judgements. Participants in this study 
used both of these terms repeatedly. However, as pointed out, in relation to tabulation 
of other terms (e.g. ignorance), ‘dignity’ and ‘quality of life’ were terms that were 
used more frequently by some participants, highlighting the subjectivity of these 
terms. They were used only by staff, at no time did family members actually use the 
terms dignity and quality of life, however, dignity and quality of life issues for the 
person with variant CJD were implicit in their language.
The dementia type symptoms that were experienced by people with variant CJD were 
the main cause of the use of these terms. All of the illness-specific factors for a ‘bad 
death’ identified by Kristjanson et al (2001) were present. The person was believed to 
be suffering, was undignified and had intractable symptoms. The judgement on the 
dignity status of the person with variant CJD was determined by the ‘spectators’, i.e. 
dignity as a spectacle (Radley 2004). Dignity (as understood by some of the 
participants) was restored primarily through the practice of symptom control, but 
included other means of ‘making the person comfortable’. Quality of life was also 
equated with being ‘allowed to die’ as opposed to supporting care practices that 
maintain life, where the death is ‘postponed’.
233
Not postponing death is one of the fundamental principles of hospice care and 
appeared to have a high priority in the practices of the in-house teams. Keeping 
going, maintaining hydration and food supply would appear to be the antithesis to the 
hospice care where ‘not dying’ creates an imbalance. The safety of the patient was 
also a significant reason for taking control. This highlights dilemmas and conflicts 
that teams faced in attempting to allow control (family autonomy) whilst believing 
they needed to keep the person ‘safe’ and also ‘let’ the person die. These practices are 
understood philosophical principles of hospice care where the person is ‘allowed’ to 
deteriorate, is allowed to die. It also captures the concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deaths 
which may be equally attributed to family member responses, when the patient can no 
longer respond (Hart et al 1998). In this case the implication was that the family 
member was contributing to the ‘bad’ death by not wanting to allow the patient to 
deteriorate. The following extract exemplifies how the nurses struggled with their 
beliefs in the practice of ‘letting die’, in preventing the ‘bad’ death, and also how this 
needing to let die was closely allied to the communication ability of the person who 
was dying.
CNS He was eating and drinking, very small amounts, and we were 
worried because we didn't think he was safe with his swallowing and the 
impression we had before meeting the family was that they would want to 
be going with all the, you know, keeping going and stuff, um and the 
message we got was that his mum felt that although he didn't seem to be 
responding he was responding to her. And we were all thinking no, you 
know, this, i t ’s one o f the situations when this poor patient is deteriorating 
and not being allowed to deteriorate, so to speak. Um, (PAUSE). And 
then it was very soon after admission within a couple o f days when he 
stopped taking anything by mouth because then we had the issue of
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approaching the family and explaining that we don’t normally sort o f um, 
give intravenous fluid and they were absolutely fine with that and I  
remember them saying, I  think it was to me and (HCA), um, you know, all 
we want to do is make him comfortable and then we could actually see 
how he did respond to her voice, because we didn Y think he was taking 
anything in, (11:76-91)
There was an element of surprise expressed by participants to find that the person they 
thought was unable to communicate, who met all of the criteria of someone without 
personhood, was responding to the voice of family members. Due to this (assumed) 
inability to communicate, people with cognitive impairment had no (assumed) real 
quality of life and were not able to recognise other people. This is in direct 
contradiction of the views of family members, all of whom repeatedly reiterated that 
the person with variant CJD recognised people that they were already familiar with.
FM  You knew when she knew somebody. She'd recognise the voice or 
something she would ... (PAUSE) ... She was more relaxed. Holding the 
nurse’s hand that was quite nice. I  think she did. She knew who I  was a lot 
o f the time, I  don't blame her because I  was there all the time (LAUGHS). 
(W4:126-130)
The relational-based model of being fully human has implications in the belief of the 
family that the person with variant CJD was aware of them and fits with the 
Confucian definition of personhood (Fu-Chang Tsai 2001). This can occur within the 
family relationship where boundaries between the self and others may not be clear. 
Within families there may be continuous interaction between members in such a way 
that allows dignity to be seen as an ‘event’ happening between persons (Frank 2004a).
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The view that the person should be ‘allowed to die’ was in direct opposition to the 
desires and perceptions of the families. The process of stopping interventions was not 
always the desire of family members. They never the less agreed to reducing or 
removing interventions because they believed that the health professional ‘knew 
better \ that they were in control. I propose that the staff, working in the in-house 
hospice system, may (at times) forget, or lose sight of, the hope that remains with 
families, even to the very end.
FM-1 But I, /, you know I  just think o f all the places (PATIENT) went to, 
even 24 hours before he died I  still had hope you know (TURNING AWAY 
— CRYING) ... And here it made me feel that way, I  still had the hope ... 
(CRYING).
FM-2 Yes, somebody...
FM-1 Something's going to happen. A doctor's going to turn up from 
somewhere and say I've got, I  know what it is, you know. (Zl-1323-1330)
In all cases family members retained a ‘hope of a cure’ even when all possibility for 
this had passed*. This was due to the nature of the newness of the disease and that 
much was still unknown about it. This hope-to-the-end was particularly pertinent to 
variant CJD. It was a disease that so little was known about and potential for cure 
was of paramount interest to families (and the scientific community) and is confirmed 
in the Douglas et al (1999) findings on the experiences of the families of people with 
variant CJD and in the media stories of families accessing potential ‘cure’ regimes. 
Family members, ‘wanted to keep him going’, ‘did not believe she was going to die ’ 
and struggled with the potential loss as a result of this previously ‘unknown’ disease.
* Claire‘s Mother: One morning Claire woke and said. Mummy, if  I ’m in a coma and they come to you 
and scy there's a cure but i t ’s really painful, no matter what it is and if  they askyour permission I  want 
you to say yes. Because I  want to live. (Pearson 2000).
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The hope for ‘miracles’ remained, and any means, such as ‘life support machines’ to 
prolong the life of the person they are losing were considered desirable.
CNS I  remember a conversation with the doctor and (HUSBAND) and 
(SOCIAL WORKER). And (HUSBAND) saying there must be something 
else you can do, this can't be it, there has to be more, (Wl:289-292)
One of the most common practices in hospices towards achieving dignity and quality 
of life is the use of sedation where sedation is frequently seen as a means of restoring 
dignity for the agitated patient and achieving the ‘good death’ (Walter 1994; Lawton 
2000). There is no agreement on what criteria should be used in identification of 
‘intractable distress’ in the dying and personal judgements to administer sedation are 
often made by palliative care clinicians. This was an important factor for in-house 
teams but less so for community teams where sedation practices were carefully 
negotiated with family members.
In-house participants equated dignity with death or letting die and used this to 
convince and reassure family members that they should not continue with any 
interventions that would prolong life.
JN  But he was still asking the weekend we put that syringe driver up. I  
remember speaking to (HUSBAND), and (PATIENT)'s father was there, 
they all came in together and even then (HUSBAND) was saying what 
about life support machines. He was still asking that while at the same 
time when you explained the rest o f it and talked about her dignity he also 
agreed with that. So he just, was finding it very hard. (Wl:314-S19)
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The dementia type symptoms that were experienced by people with variant CJD were 
the main cause of the use of the term dignity. The conceptualisation of dignity 
developed by Enes (2000, 2003) within a hospice framework is useful in attempting to 
explain the responses of participants to the symptoms of variant CJD, particularly 
personhood status. The dimensions ‘being human’, ‘having control’, ‘relationship and 
belonging’, and ‘maintaining the individual self appeared to be considered absent for 
people with variant CJD by many of the participants, including family members. 
Dying with dignity then, as seen by participants, required the person who was dying 
to be as fully human as they themselves were. Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Copp (1996, 
1999) also suggest that bodily autonomy is central for personhood and that the 
modern person/self cannot be understood apart from the irreducible fact of 
embodiment (Lawton 2000:185).
Although some connection was made about the hope that remained for the family 
members, data suggests that the dying process, in hospice, may become a ‘conveyer 
belt’ process for some staff who see so many deaths, and regularly deal with the dying 
process. That is, that death itself was seen as the ultimate state of dignity. For staff 
each death is an ending and moving onto the next patient, whereas for families it is a 
lifetime of loss.
Dignity restoration and sedation appear to be one and the same, and discussion always 
returned to sedation. ‘The way she looked', when she was sedated was seen a 
restoring dignity. The findings support literature where reasons for using ‘terminal 
sedation’, were the anguish, agitation, delirium, confusion, hallucinations, fear, panic, 
anxiety and terror of the patient (Chater et al 1998; Fainsinger et al 2000a, 2000b).
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The practice of sedating patients in the hospice environment has become a 
controversial topic (Chater et al 1998; Morita et al 1999; Fainsinger et al 2000a, 
2000b; Broeckaert and NùAez Olarte 2002), however, very little research on this 
subject has been conducted in the UK. The most common problem requiring sedation 
is delirium (Fainsinger et al 2000a; Lawlor et al 2000), or physical restlessness with 
or without delirium (Morita et al 1999) and 10-50% of palliative care patients receive 
sedation in the last days of life (Cowan and Walsh 2001; Sales 2001). Chater et al
(1998) provide a scale of reasons for ‘terminal sedation’, following a postal survey of 
61, selected palliative care experts. They identified pain as the most common reason 
for using ‘terminal sedation’, followed by anguish. Agitation, delirium, confusion, 
hallucinations fear, panic, anxiety and terror were identified as the third most common 
reasons. These are states that clearly do not allow straightforward assessment or 
consent processes to take place prior to administration of sedating medications.
A debate has arisen on the use of the term ‘terminal sedation’, based on the potential 
for it to be misleading in relation to using sedation for symptom management and the 
subject of euthanasia (Morita et al 1999, 2004; Broeckaert and Nunez Olarte 2002). 
Within this debate it is evident that there is no firm agreement as to what ‘terminal 
agitation’ or ‘intractable distress’ mean, yet they are terms used frequently within 
hospice settings. They are used often in conjunction with a judgement that delirium is 
present, and delirium has been identified as an indication for sedation (Chater et al 
1998; Fainsinger et al 2000a, 2000b; Sales 2001; Lawlor et al 2000). Sedation is 
considered to be an appropriate treatment for delirium in palliative care settings, 
however it is a condition that is under-assessed and under researched within the field 
of palliative care (Caraceni and Grassi 2003; Caraceni et al 2004; Hjermstad et al
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2004) and it has been shown to be misdiagnosed or overlooked by nurses (Inouye 
1994; Inouye et al 2001).
The results of a questionnaire survey of 2,607 Japanese nurses by Morita et al (2004) 
found that a majority of the nurses experienced serious emotional distress when 
sedation was not initiated for patients with refractory and intolerable symptoms at the 
end of life. Centeno et al (2004:187-188) refer to this as the emotional overload that 
leads clinicians to administer sedation prematurely, describing the process as a 
‘destructive triangle’ of delirium-induced stress of proxies and overload in the 
therapeutic team.
The study by Morita et al (2004) is one of the few that has explored nurses’ 
experiences of using sedation at the end of life, and whilst the Japanese experience 
cannot be directly applicable to other cultures the study raises a number of questions 
that require further study. Of note, Morita et al (2004) point out that other studies 
have shown that 50% of sedated patients are not able to participate in the decision­
making process about the use of sedation due to cognitive impairment. In a Canadian 
study using focus group data from an interdisciplinary palliative care team Brajtman 
(2005) examined the challenges involved in providing care for patients who 
experienced terminal restlessness in Canada. ‘Suffering’ experienced by the patient 
led to using sedation as a treatment of choice and sedation allowed the team a critical 
measure of control over the patient’s behaviour. However, there was conflict between 
staff and families in using these measures as families displayed strong feelings of 
ambivalence to the use of sedation and wanted to be able to communicate with the 
dying family member at this critical time.
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Palliative care nurses are not experienced in dementia assessment and may 
misinterpret dementia behaviour as delirium, or simply be intolerant of, or distressed 
by, the way in which the person with dementia emotionally expresses their anguish. 
Equally non-palliative care nurses may not recognise delirium in a person with 
dementia (Marshelle 2002). Delirium generally develops as an acute event as a result 
of medication toxicity or multi-organ failure in the last days of life, whereas a 
dementia will have been present for some time prior to the terminal stage. Knowledge 
about the cognitive state of the person is crucial in enabling a judgement to be made 
about changes that may require medical intervention. In the absence of a history 
many tools exist for assessment of cognitive state however these tools are rarely used 
in hospice settings.
Lawton (1998a, 2000) found that hospice patients who became distressed, and 
particularly if they displayed aggressive behaviour and were shouting, were often 
sedated heavily. The reasons given for this were so that the person ‘looked peaceful’ 
(2000:120), and as part of the process of achieving the ‘good death’. In their study 
examining the ‘good death’ for people with Alzheimer’s disease, Bosek et al (2003) 
found that vigilance in assessment and interventions for symptom management during 
the dying process were desired by family members. A further, highly desired standard 
of care practice for family members was that the death of the person with dementia 
should occur in familiar surroundings. This potential was however, hampered by the 
uncertainty that the nursing home environment, in which many of the study cases 
died, would ever have been a familiar environment. This was due to most admissions
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having taken place after the person had been diagnosed with dementia (Bosek et al 
2003).
Most of these symptoms were displayed by people with variant CJD at some time 
during the dying period. The responses of staff also had components of 
depersonalized routines and rituals that are used in healthcare environments to screen 
out thieatening emotional involvements (Menzies Lyth 1988, 1990). Both Lawton 
(1998a, 2000) and Copp (1996, 1999) found that patients were distressed by the 
drawn-out period of dependency and dying and often wished they had died suddenly 
of a heart attack. Copp (1996) also showed how nurses hoped that the dying person 
would die sooner rather than later so anguish was not prolonged.
This restoration of dignity through death, and control of dignity by sedation, appeared 
to be a means of dealing with staff anxiety and distress as found by Morita et al 
(2004). This suggests the emergence of another primary task of which participants 
were not conscious. The nurses needed to control the symptoms, not only to relieve 
the ‘suffering’ of the person with variant CJD, but also to relieve their own ‘suffering’ 
at having to be witness to the suffering that the disease caused. In the following 
extract the HCA acknowledges that she managed the care better when the patient was 
sedated, clearly indicating that it relieved of her distress.
JN  It wasn't a problem with the relatives I  think. They were quite pleased 
at the way she was looked after. They were very pleased once that syringe 
driver went up, they were.
HCA-1 They were. And I  think for my part, I  know damn well that I  didn't 
enjoy nursing her one bit. It hurt me to nurse her, to hear her. And I  
nursed her far better when she was sedated than when she wasn 't, it used
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to just make, break you up basically, really, just to hurt her. You do 
everything in your power...
HCA-2 She would be screaming, and you would try to go very slow ... 
(Wl:252-260)
For one CNS, sedation was the primary means of controlling the situation. From the 
outset of the focus group interviews she took this stand and repeatedly returned to it, 
constantly reiterating that sedation (control) was necessary because o f ‘not knowing’. 
Not getting ‘any pleasure out o f anything’, also appeared to be equated with dignity 
and I propose indicated an ‘assumed’ judgement of quality of life of people with 
cognitive impairment, highlighting the individual interpretations that abound on what 
exactly ‘dignity’ and ‘quality of life’ mean.
CNS The main issues seemed to be for me was that we didn't actually 
know what she was experiencing. We didn't know whether she was in 
pain, whether she was actually aware o f her surroundings, or her or 
whether she actually got any pleasure out o f anything that was going on 
whilst she was here. And the issue o f sedation, personally for me is the 
biggest thing. I  felt, I  thought, we should have gone in with sedation 
earlier, than we did. (Wl: 1-7)
This CNS justifies herself, during a discussion about sedation by pointing out that 
sedation can ‘be withdrawn at any time ', that they are not doing anything ‘that is 
irreversible ’. The question of reversing sedation at end-stage in the hospice setting is 
a moot point, as this is rarely done. In cases of sedation of people already displaying 
dementia behaviour, the possibility of recognising symptoms of delirium, should they 
occur, are reduced and further lessen any possibility of the sedation being withdrawn.
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Restoring dignity, and ‘controlling’ the events through sedation, was seen as a 
‘positive’ practice and also a means of supporting the family, particularly the children. 
This was seen as protecting them from seeing their mother ‘like that ’. Demented, no 
longer a person, with no quality of life and unable to communicate. Protecting, as a 
strategy for coping with losses was also identified by Copp (1996, 1999). Metaphors 
identifying the patient as already gone (dead) such as; ‘they were grieving for her for 
ages \ 'had already lost her ‘couldn't say goodbye ’ and ‘not able to speak to her ’ are 
used to justify giving the sedation and are directly related to the inability to 
communicate. What they saw at the end (sedated) was seen as preferable to 
witnessing the person when they were displaying dementia type behaviours.
JN  It was her inability to communicate, the inability for her to 
communicate with the family and for them to scy their goodbyes to talk 
about their feelings. Then there was never any o f that and I  don't know 
about the little girl but the little boy I  would imagine there would be some 
memories o f what his mum was like. That she was like that.
CNS-1 And that would be really tough.
CNS-2 Just about every conceivable . ..
JN  Nightmare. What they saw at the end was a lot more preferable to that 
what they saw all along.
CNS-2 They lost the person, the person she was before she was ill.
JN  Yes. Which is why you'd think there would be less issue about sedation 
really because they felt they were grieving for her ages before that. They 
had already lost her. They couldn't say goodbye to her, were not able to 
speak to her so she didn't have any quality o f life.
CNS-2 There were only positive differences to be made from it 
(SEDATION). (Wl:509-524)
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Personal identification and the interconnection of the dreaded disease and horror of 
the disease contributed to the need to control the situation. Personal identification 
with the events led, in some instances to making the assumption that what the team 
member would want for themselves, if their family member had this disease, was the 
same for family members. Decisions about treatment and care were often related to 
how they personally would feel in similar circumstances. I ’ve got a daughter that age 
and I  would want her sedated’, and ‘i f  that was my sister you wouldn't want to come 
in and see that would you ’, putting themselves in the place of the family and how they 
would not like to be treated. The above correlates with conceptualisations of the 
hospice as a liminal space where the ‘symbolic family’ allows identification of the 
staff with family experiences (Froggatt 1995, 1997). Froggatt (1995) refers 
specifically to the nurse/patient relationship but it is equally applicable to the 
nurse/family-member relationship.
Part of the philosophy of hospice practice is to grant a high degree of control 
(autonomy) to patients and their families using a partnership model (Saunders 1990). 
However, the process of how this partnership model functions within hospice has not 
been explored in any depth (Martin 1998). A partnership model assumes a 
relationship that is structured on power sharing and negotiation with an assumed high 
degree of choice allocated to patients and family about treatment strategies (Gallant et 
al 2002). What the data showed was that there were significant differences in the 
approaches to granting autonomy between in-house and community teams.
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5.4. L 2 Granting autonomy (in-house)
The debate within palliative care on the subject of autonomy is wide ranging and will 
not be addressed in detail within this thesis. Wood (2002) proposes that although 
there are now recognised differences in priority and scope accorded to the principle of 
autonomy, there is general agreement that it replaces the ethic of paternalism. For the 
purposes of my study I have used a simple definition of autonomy, in that it refers to 
the family members’ possession of autonomous choice in relation to care 
interventions. This choice was either taken by them or granted to them by hospice 
staff. The subject of granting autonomy sparked a heated exchange within an in- 
house focus group on how much control (autonomy) should be ‘allowed’ by families 
in decision making about care of the person who was unable to communicate their 
own needs. This exchange demonstrated views that are directly contrary to the 
hospice philosophy of supporting maximum autonomy for patients and families. The 
two junior nurses were new to the hospice but were powerful and forceful in their 
opinions and views of how someone who was unable to communicate their own needs 
should be ‘managed’. The CNS tried to suggest that these decisions were part of the 
decision making process that underpin hospice care and that sedation itself could 
contribute to taking away a person’s personality. However, the belief that as 
professionals they were the ones in control caused her to lose the argument to the 
junior nurses and to even concede to the person with variant CJD not having a 
personality at all.
INTERVIEWER Did anyone ask the family what they wanted?
CNS We talked to (PATIENT’S SISTER) about sedation and she wasn't 
very keen for us to do that. (PATIENT’S HUSBAND) never stopped for
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very long and I  only had very short conversations with him. And he 
couldn't deal with it at all That was more difficult...
JN-1 Its all very well to feel around and get an opinion hut at the end of 
the day he didn't want the decision he didn't want to make that decision 
and why should he.
JN-2 We're the professionals surely we should do what we think is right in 
that situation. O f course when we did, and it happened he much preferred 
what he saw then.
CNS At least we had an idea o f what the relatives felt then. But for us to 
go in and say this is we feel, consider. It might be somebody's mother ... 
JN-1 Yes I  know ...
JN-2 For him to say we have to wait for him to say right do it now. That 
■was the kind offeedback and I  think he felt pressure I  don't see why it has 
to be his decision.
JN-1 I  think it is inappropriate that it is his decision because it's the 
patients' rights that we're looking after at the end o f the day. It's like the 
business o f telling the patients relatives what's going on with the patient. 
JN-2 It's all the wrong way around. It shouldn't be his decision it should 
be our decision.
CNS Surely its part o f the decision process. I  don't think the final decision 
should rest with him, I  think their opinion should be considered as much 
as anybody else’s.
JN-1 Yes.
JN-2 But as you say ...
CNS But some people look at it as long as they're shouting and screaming 
they're alive. You take that away and sedate them you've taken away their 
personality and everything else. They're just lying in a bed and you're 
turning them ...
JN-1 But she didn't have apei'sonality.
CNS I  know she didn't. But she was shouting and ... I'm just looking at it 
fi'om the other side ... (Vl:518-617)
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In this case the assumptions of the less experienced staff were that they were 
promoting what is the philosophical foundation of hospice care. The moral 
ground on which they took their stand was that decision making was the 
responsibility of the team. This view was based primarily on the inability of the 
person with variant CJD to communicate, their lack of personhood and to the 
family members (assumed) inability to make decisions. It also appeared that 
when the family couldn’t deal with the situation decision making was made 
more difficult for the nurses. And he couldn’t deal with it at all That was more 
difficult The issue of emotional burden experienced by family members of 
people with dementia in their roles as decision makers was identified by (Forbes 
et al 2000). Decisions on behalf of their cognitively impaired relatives were an 
‘overwhelming burden’ causing ‘undying guilt’ (Forbes et al 2000:253). 
Conflict in relation to the experience of decision making in hospice practices 
both within and between disciplines is a subject that has received little empirical 
study.
The approach of not including families in discussions about care did not occur in all 
circumstances. Families repeatedly reported on how they were included in any 
discussion on the interventions and care practices for the person with variant CJD and 
how their views were respected.
FMHedid, (HAD ARTIFICIAL FEEDING IN PLACE) yes, because, and 
then the doctors wanted to stop it and I  said, I  well, because I  wanted him 
to still have nutriments, and she said, well i f  that makes you happy that's, 
that's what was so lovely here. (Z2:671-673)
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5.4.1.3 Granting autonomy (community)
Three of the people with variant CJD in this study were managed within the 
community and the family focus was that they should remain at home where they (the 
family) would be in control of the care. Two of these patients also attended day 
hospice and accessed respite (in-house) services. For both of these the experience of 
day hospice/respite was traumatic and in one case the person with variant CJD was 
not readmitted to the hospice after one attempt of a day hospice and one attempt of a 
in-house respite admission, as discussed earlier.
FM  She *s not, you 're not, you know, she's not distressed (WHEN SHE IS 
A T HOME). My main thing is that I  don't want her distressed. (¥2:578- 
579)
The control of care at home by the family was all encompassing. One family member 
only contacted those whom he wanted to at the time. That is, those who would be of 
most use to him. Support from the CJD Society, and the funding support that was 
then in place, enabled this control. The effectiveness of a comprehensive home-care 
package for people with dementia was also demonstrated in the USA study by Volicer 
et al (2003). The researchers found that care recipients who received psychiatric care, 
were involved in hospice programmes, and had effective pain relief for chronic 
conditions that caused chronic pain, particularly arthritis, were more likely to die at 
home. Or stay at home significantly longer than those who did not receive this input. 
It was recognised that chronic pain worsened behavioural symptoms of the dementia 
and made it more difficult to keep the person at home (Volicer et al 2003).
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In the cancer care literature it has been reported that limited resources and over­
stretched health professionals can be problematic in the management of dying at home 
(Grande et al 1997; Jarrett et al 1999). This, however, was not the case for the variant 
CJD group, as the home care package is elaborate (Turner 2004; CJD Support 
Network 2004). The family member was so well supported from this care package 
that the community team had relatively minimal input into the care, as they were only 
invited in when the carer wanted advice from them.
CNS He knows who to contact, he, he taps into each one o f us now, 
individually as he wants, he knows who to contact with each one. And 
sometimes if  he doesn ’t want to he won’t contact any o f us, we have to do 
it would, I  think he initially will contact one o f us. I  suspect i f  she stopped 
swallowing it would he (CJD Unit) that he contacts, not the speech 
therapist or the dietician, I  think he, she (CJD UNIT LIASION) tends to be 
his main (CONTACT) because he's involved with the CJD Society. 
(¥3:221-228)
The 1997 case did not have this input, but the desire to maintain care at home was just 
as focused as is was for later cases, even without the support and care packages that 
have since been instigated. One family member did experience anxiety that he would 
lose control over the management of care. He had already removed his wife from 
other NHS care environments, including a psychiatric unit, because of several ‘bad’ 
experiences.
SW  He wanted to keep her at home, he was nursing her very caringly and 
one o f his gi'eatest fears when I  visited was that we were going to whip 
her off and take her into hospital and he really needed to be reassured 
that it would be possible for him to care for her at home. (VL45-49)
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The emphasis of control in the community was in maintaining the autonomy of the 
family members in any decision making about care and events was seen as a 
'delicate ’ process. Any approach was seen as requiring care and sensitivity in not 
taking away control from the family. There was an understanding that what took 
place within the hospice was fundamentally different to what took place in the 
community and that at home the person was on their own ground, which gave the 
power and control to the families and by proxy to the person with variant CJD.
When discussing care options one CNS was careful ‘... not to sway him either wcy\ 
Suggesting that "... he doesn’t like to be cornered’, implied that attempts were made 
to convince this family member of other ways of managing care, that were rejected. 
Maintaining the stability of the home environment, and the wellbeing of the person 
with variant CJD, were the pivot of all decisions that were made in the community. 
How care was managed indicated that within the community the focus was on 
negotiation of care options. The following comment (that was a feature in the three 
community cases) that they would not do the same as they 'would normally do I 
interpret as meaning that they were fully aware that the practice in-house would be 
fundamentally different, and that decisions at home would be based entirely on what 
was acceptable to the family members.
SW  And again it was a case o f thinking on your feet and not doing 
necessarily the same as you would normally do. But you know what was 
going to be most acceptable to him. (¥1:474-476)
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Armes and Addington-Hall (2003) found that patients in the community did not 
always adhere to the prescribed drug regime. In this study it was the family member, 
responsible for the administration of medication, who did not adhere to the regime. 
This caused (internal) professional conflict for one CNS. Medications that were used 
for the patient, during the respite admission, were considered acceptable within the in- 
house system. The CNS had to deal with the conflict of believing that the 
medications were still necessary whilst supporting autonomy in the home. This 
suggested that internal conflict about treatment options and also supporting family 
autonomy may be more likely to occur in the community.
CNS But I  think she had a lot o f myoclonus then, that he wasn’t 
addressing so they were giving her midazalom and diazepam and things 
like that and he didn’t like it and when, as soon as she got home he cut her 
down again, so she does have more myoclonic jerking events and things 
but he doesn’t think it needs to be addressed. Whereas in a specialist unit 
like this if  they see it they will deal with it. (¥3:175-181)
The final statement in the above extract explicitly refers to the difference between in- 
house and community approaches to practice. Underpinning this is the question of 
what is the ‘best practice’, particularly in using sedation. The community teams 
believed, based on their professional knowledge, that medications were important in 
managing some of the symptoms.
However, in one case the home environment and the presence of family members, 
were in themselves, seen as a treatment that had the same effect as the medication. 
This was described as being, 'sedated without sedation’, and suggested that 
reassurance was a form of sedation. In one case the sister of the person with variant
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CJD did not want to have him sedated and wanted to, ‘hang on to (PATIENT-as- 
PATIENT) as long as possible This confirms, again, how the family is frequently 
not ready to let go of the dying person and will strive to maintain them ‘intact’ and not 
sedated. The focus group, on this occasion, discussed the use of sedation as '... an 
easy option or an option to make it easier in the care and correlates with the earlier 
extract referring to finding it easier to nurse the person when they were sedated. The 
fundamental difficulty that they had was not knowing what was the ‘right’ thing to do, 
the right practice to follow.
JN  ... hut maybe it would have been easier for (PATIENT) as well I  mean 
nobody knows what was going on in his brain, as I  was saying i f  he was 
seeing things peripherally they were frightening him, upsetting him, it 
might have been easier for him.
HCA But (SISTER) used to sit with him a great deal, and cuddle him and 
talk to him, and she used to get his motorcycle magazines out. And he was 
quite content with that. So how much o f it was going in I  don't know, hut 
um. The reassurance had kept him sedated if  you like.
JN  Sedated without sedation.
HCA Yes. And it worked. (XI:954-968)
Having a high level of autonomy gave family members confidence to maintain the 
control of the care within the home. Proot et al (2004) refers to this process as 
‘directing’, rather than controlling, based on a grounded theory study of the terminally 
ill person’s experience of care at home. Directing was seen as a process much like 
directing a play or orchestra, ‘deliberation with the players as to what sort of actions 
you want or not, asking for properties, and anticipating future scenes’ (Proot et al 
2004:55). The term directing is useful, and in the situation of the person with 
cognitive impairment the family member could be seen to be directing by proxy. This
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fits with the process of negotiation, Proot et al (2004) propose that ‘actual autonomy’ 
is the situation of the terminally ill at home when directing their care. The context of 
home was important for realizing autonomy for the dying person (Proot et al 2004).
The emphasis, for one of the family members, was so strong and aggressive that I 
would suggest there was no negotiation as far as he was concerned. In the following 
extract the reason for such a determined approach to maintaining this control was 
based on the family member feeling that they are somehow being criticised for their 
methods of providing care, suggesting that negotiation within the community is a 
delicate process.
SfV  ‘Go to helV, basically he said to people who knocked at the door. The 
district nurses had very big problems and I  did a kind o f um with my 
colleague in the domiciliaty team who shoidd have been here today but 
couldn't, and we did a support group for them both before and after the 
death. Because they found him vejy difficult to cope with and I  think 
somebody said something that he didn't agree with and (he) said I  don't 
want them back again and he didn't allow them back again. (VJ:299-305)
Family members having the power to allow, or not, the hospice teams access to the 
person at home forced community teams to carry out practices that are congruent with 
the philosophy of hospice care. That is, to provide maximum autonomy to patients 
and families.
There was a belief (in-house) that through sedation the person had their dignity 
restored and quality of life improved. What did not ‘appear’ to be recognised was that
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a high standard of care practices could have the same effect, as that suggested in 
'sedated without sedation \ I refer to these as ‘normalising’ practices.
5.4.1.4 Normalising
Normalising is defined as a means of achieving a standard or ‘normal’ state, although 
this ‘normal’ state can only be individually defined. My interpretation was that 
‘normalising’ was about practice that was not directly connected to the control 
through sedation. It represents the very ‘ambiance ' identified by family members 
where they refer to the friendliness and homeliness of the hospice. Clarke (1999) 
proposes a theory of normalisation for people with dementia. Within this model are 
several processes deemed to occur that support the process of normalisation. 
Amongst these was the kinship role and affection (love) within the relationship 
between the person with dementia and family carer. Through a process of interfacing 
(negotiation) and interacting (working together) normalisation was achieved, with 
however, some costs to the relationship, particularly the perceived dominance of the 
illness pathology suffered by the person with dementia.
In an attempt to identify professionals’ perceptions of maintaining personhood in 
hospice care, Kabel and Roberts (2003) challenge Lawton’s thesis, using a thematic 
analysis of interviews of 30 staff in two hospices. They propose that hospice staff do 
carry out normalising practices to assist patients in maintaining a sense of personhood, 
a process that Lawton suggests does not occur. Kabel and Roberts (2003) propose 
that when the patient was in a state of unconsciousness, the potential of the person 
remaining intact whilst the body disintegrated was allowed. They base this premise 
drawing on Copp’s (1999) work on body-person split. Responses of staff towards the
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personhood status that was attributed to the person with variant CJD has not been 
interpreted as a process of infantilisation and humiliation, as identified by Oliver
(1999) in relation to dementia in old age. Although there was evidence of assumed 
loss of personhood there was no evidence of poor dementia care practices taking 
place. It was by far the reverse. Normalising practices were carried out much in the 
manner outline by Clarke (1999). Staff used care practices in their assessment and 
care and in normalising the lives of these people that I identified as ‘good’ care 
practices for people with dementia where family relationships and participation in 
care was supported. They used practices that could have enhanced lucidity as 
identified within dementia care literature, although they did not appear to be aware of 
this potential. This included playing music and dimming lights to create a calm and 
tranquil atmosphere. They were uncertain of the success of their practices because 
they did not receive confirmation from the patient due to the communication 
difficulties and inexperience in communicating with people with dementia. As a 
result they had difficulty making the connections between their practices and patient 
responses. That is, they had difficulty in believing or being confident of success in 
any practices they used and often related success to medication.
One JN comments that: ‘They were quite pleased at the way she was looked after. 
They were very pleased once that syringe driver went up, they were', making no 
connections about the two very different care practices. That of sedating and that of 
normalising through care practices that were not related to medication. The above 
statement refers to the children being less distressed when their mother was sedated. 
However, data (confirmed by hospice records) shows that the children in this family 
became less distressed early in the admission. Specifically, when their mother was
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moved from the floor to a bed (normalised) and before any sedating medications were 
given.
Some connections were made about psychological, rather than physical, responses 
that the person with variant CJD has to others and to the environment.
CNS-1 When (SISTER) left, she generally got more distressed shortly 
after (SISTER) went. We used to wonder why she was so quiet when she 
was there talking to her. As soon as (SISTER) went it was when she 
normally started to cry.
CNS-2 Within about a week (THE NOTES AND EARLIER FOCUS 
GROUP DISCUSSION SUGGEST THIS OCCURRED WITHIN A DAY,
AND INCLUDED BEING PUT INTO A BED RATHER THAN NURSED 
ON THE FLOOR), I  think, o f being in a side room. She became much, 
much calmer. Whether that was the progression o f the disease or the fact 
that she became more comfortable I  don't know. She did change quite 
significantly. (WI:I80-186)
Although there is some move towards making connections these were not often 
explicit.. The understanding of the families (of the two in-house patients) appeared to 
be that they were calm because of the ‘care’ the people with variant CJD were 
receiving. Such as the aromatherapy that had a profound impact on one of them for 
24 hours. It had such an impact that the family saw it as a potential 'miracle'. 
Normalising practices, such as having their hair cut, a factor that was acknowledged 
by one HCA who refers to the patient having her hair cut as ‘the biggest thing', for the 
family. Having their hair washed and brushed, being washed and having clean clothes 
were seen by family members as dignity restored and the person looking normal 
again.
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These were also the type of activities that Kabel and Roberts (2003) categorised as 
normalising practices. The person with variant CJD being moved from the mattresses 
on the floor into a bed was a profoundly normalising event for family members. The 
two families constantly compared their experiences in NHS Units with the hospice 
experiences, where the person with variant CJD had been nursed on mattresses on the 
floor. Expressed by one family member as, ‘that's no way to treat humans ’. This 
confirms the findings of Douglas et al (1999) on cases of variant CJD up to 1999, 
where it was found that most of the families were unhappy about the care they 
received in the acute units and where examples of what families felt to be ‘poor’ care 
are cited.
FM  No she, she seemed really restless up there. (FRIGHTENED) of 
things up there, you know. Yeah, so the difference was, there was a major 
difference in the care compared to ... Yes because they care here 
(HOSPICE). The first night she was on the floor here and I  came again 
they changed her room, so she outside reception bit, and she was 
back in bed. Yeah, it was sort o f a caring, you know, she was washed, you 
know, brushed her hair. The other places didn't seem to care. (W3:77-83)
These findings are confirmed by Enes (2000) who showed how (as seen by family 
members) the hospice reaffirmed the worth and restored dignity that had been lost in 
other settings. The relatives feelings about dignity appeared to be ‘shaped by negative 
experiences of seeing the loved ones treated without humanity or love and of their 
own love for them’ (Enes 2000:72).
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Interestingly, for some of the nurses the importance of not being nursed on the floor 
was the difficulty and risk implications for nurses managing the care of a patient on 
the floor, not the implications of normalisation that the families identified with. 
According to one CNS, ‘it was something quite terrible to have somebody on the 
floor. This was expressed in relation to the nursing management and risk to nurses 
crawling around on the floor, but wasn’t such a bad thing 'from his comfort point o f 
view ’. It was not comfort but the indignity of the position of the person that the 
family members were concerned about. This further supports the subjectivity of the 
use of the term dignity. The distress of the family at seeing the person nursed on the 
floor and as one family member considered, the inhumanness of it, which are all the 
implications of loss of personhood, does not appear to be an important issue for this 
CNS.
One CNS comments on the difference between the responses of the daughter of a 
patient, where, when her mother (with variant CJD) was crawling around on the floor 
the daughter responded to her as if she was something like a 'puppy dog’. Not 
referring to her as her mother but calling her by her name. When the illness became 
more advanced and she became bed-bound (in a normalised position) the daughter 
returned to calling her Mum.
Managing care through maintaining ‘dignity’ and providing ‘quality of life’ are 
considered the cornerstone of hospice care, even without clear conceptualisations of 
the terms dignity and quality of life. Promoting and maintaining this philosophy is 
considered to be the role of individuals within the organisation (system). One of the
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means by which the system is maintained in a state of equilibrium is through 
controlling, of not only patients, but implicit within this is control of the environment.
5.4.2 Maintaining the environment -  In-house
Hospices are considered to be environments of serenity and peace (Lawton 1998a, 
2000; Walter 1994) and maintenance of the tranquillity of the hospice environment is 
of paramount importance for system equilibrium. This tranquillity includes the décor 
of the ward, and other typical features of hospice environments such as an abundance 
of flowers, integrated gardens often with water features, easily accessed chapel and 
Chaplain and an atmosphere of homeliness and calm. Dementia behaviour, or indeed 
any disturbing behaviour, disrupts the environment and disturbs the tranquillity of this 
and is considered to be distressing for other patients, visitors and staff (Walter 1994). 
People who displayed this type of behaviour are deemed inappropriate admissions to a 
hospice due to the impact their behaviour may have on others. In considering the 
impact of witnessing death on hospice patients Payne et al (1996a) found that other 
patients found a noisy or agitated dying patient distressing. Equally, within hospitals, 
nursing and residential homes, agitated individuals with dementia caused anxiety, fear 
and irritation for people who were lucid (Ragneskog et al 2001). Such behaviour 
upsets the equilibrium of the system and potential for system survival (Katz and Kahn 
1966).
CNS We don't have, we don't take patients who have dementia. Um, 
because it's distressing for the other patients and to take somebody who is 
demented out o f their normal surroundings, put them into new 
surroundings with other people they haven't seen before, it just makes the, 
makes them agitated, distressed, it makes everything more. It's the worst 
thing you can do. (Xl:228-233)
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Included in this is the acknowledgement that the experience could be equally 
distressful for the person with dementia, as discussed in relation to fitting in to the 
system. The admission of people with variant CJD, and the behavioural symptoms 
that manifested as a result of the disease were seen as profoundly disturbing to others. 
Douglas et al (1999) also found one hospice wanted to discharge the person with 
variant CJD because the admission was lasting too long and the patient was 
hallucinating, shouting out and disturbing other patients.
JN  And what about the other patients. What the other patients were 
thinking about all the screaming. It must have been awful (Wl:261-262)
CNS It would have been nice for the family (IF SHE COULD HAVE 
BEEN ADMITTED ElARIIER). But I  just wonder, from a selfish point o f 
view, i f  she had come here earlier i f  she was screaming and calling what 
it would have done for the rest o f the unit i f  it was going to take that long 
for her to change. She would have been two weeks screaming like she wa.? 
and that (WI:426-430)
The need to ‘do something’, to stop this behaviour, becomes paramount, in 
maintaining and controlling the environment. The means by which hospices ‘control’ 
the environment is primarily with medication as discussed earlier. This focus led to 
conflict between participants within the system where different perspectives on this 
approach were present. The need to sedate and maintain the patient in a state that is 
conducive to the serenity of the hospice environment was couched in terms of 
‘tt'eating’ noisiness and distress.
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The following exchange exemplifies the conflict within the system of different 
opinions or approaches to maintaining the tranquillity of the environment through 
control processes. My interpretation of the CNS saying, ‘We're not saying that 
hospices should be calm and serene and no noise, we're s a y i n g is that they really 
do believe that the real world of hospice care is that of a calm and serene 
environment. This belief in the need to maintain a calm environment was not held by 
all team members and this focus group singled out the medical members as those who 
did not support this. The one short (interrupted) comment by the HCA ‘They weren’t 
there ... ' is not taken up by the group as a significant factor in confirming that the 
doctor not being present was why they lacked understanding and were unsupportive in 
sedation of patients due to noisiness and general disruption of the environment.
CNS And we've always had an issue, especially with the patients who are 
noisy and screaming, about sedation. We did have had one incident, a 
chappie screamed and screamed all weekend none o f the doctors wanted 
to sedate him, at all 
HCA They weren't there ...
CNS Plus you have to take into consideration, is he in pain, why is he 
doing that? The other patients who are dying, relatives, and staff and how 
they fee l We're not saying that hospices should be calm and serene and 
no noise, we're scqfing ...
JN  ... but, A, its not dignified is it. No ones got dignity i f  they're like that 
And B, I  don't see why I  should be in a position where I  get myself at risk 
ffom  someone who is aggressive or whatnot, or they are putting 
themselves at risk. I  think you should be ...
CNS ... but the medical opinion seems to always be to stand on a soapbox 
and say we have to let the patients he themselves ...
JN  ...we can't consider the other patients. But you do in the real world 
have to consider the other patients too. (W l.’-554-570)
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Conflict over people being allowed to ‘be themselves was also identified by Walter 
(1994) where the peacefulness of the hospice has been couched in terms such as ‘the 
hospice smile’ (Walter 1994) and ‘chronic niceness’ (Speck 1994) which requires 
patients and staff to maintain this ambiance. The practice of ‘symbiotic niceness’ also 
contributed to conceptualising strategies of maintaining the peaceful hospice 
environment. However, Li (2002) does not provide a specific category for dealing 
with disruptive and cognitively impaired patients. I propose that one of the most 
important agendas held by the hospice nurses (in-house) is that of maintaining the 
tranquillity of the environment. They see this as upholding good hospice practice. 
The culture of the hospice is philosophically one that allows maximum autonomy for 
patients and families yet there remains a contradiction in this that clashed with the 
interests of ‘preserving’ the environment where any disruptive behaviour cannot be 
allowed to occur. It was not clear however, that this was the agenda for all members 
of the teams.
Hospice team participants in this study spoke and behaved differently depending on 
their profession. For example, the language used by HCAs can be equated (to some 
degree) with the ‘lay’ language of family members, it was spontaneous and generally 
unconstrained by medical jargon. The nursing staff used a more constrained 
language, maintaining a professional stance, except when the discussion became 
heated during the focus group interviews. Then the discussions were often as 
spontaneous as those of the HCAs’. Doctors and social workers, on the other hand, 
were generally very careful about the language they used, and in most cases needed to 
have the notes with them to refer to during the interview.
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This raises questions about the oft idealised multidisciplinary team (MDT) work of 
hospice organisations. The concept of a MDT that has coherence and shared common 
purpose is also questioned by Stokes (1994a), as these members come ffom different 
trainings with different values, priorities and preoccupation. Stokes (1994a) proposes 
that these teams often have lack of clarity about the primary task which can lead to 
confusion, fiustration and bad feeling that interferes with the working of the 
organisation. This aspect is highlighted by Walter (1994) where the following quote 
made by the social worker is clearly a criticism of other (unidentified) team members. 
This peacefulness is extended to producing environmental calm (Walter 1994).
It’s very difficult to refuse or query treatment in our hospice, because the 
hospice is above criticism; the result is that patients are over-drugged in 
order to render them peaceful (Walter’s 1994:132).
Carers within the hospice system experience many powerful and moving events that 
are related to death and dying experiences of others. With this there can often be a 
sense of powerlessness and awe. At one level I propose this as creating both a sense 
of loss of control which leads to a need to control. At a further level I propose that 
this powerlessness, helplessness or being out of control that was experienced by the 
participants in the care of people with variant CJD caused them to be humbled.
5.5 Humility -  helplessness and realisation of system limitations
The culture of hospice still retains much of the historical Christian foundations and a 
religious presence, within which are implications of humility, at a level not found in 
other health care settings. This culture supports positing a model of liminality and 
sacredness for hospices (Froggatt 1995, 1997). It is possible that this so called 
‘sacredness’ of hospice has become somewhat diluted and overshadowed by the
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médicalisation of hospice care as discussed in the literature section of this thesis. 
However, as shown by Froggatt (1995) a ‘new’ sacredness has emerged that embraces 
the medical interventions where the nurses, as ritual specialists hold the special 
‘knowledge’ of pain and symptom control.
Regardless of medical interventions hospice remains the one organisation that 
provides an environment in which, death, one of the greatest mysteries of life, is a 
regular and repeated occurrence. This must suggest that humility is present at some 
moments within this environment. I propose humility (Figure 7) as a first level 
category and base this on Kunz’s (1998) concept of the ‘power of weakness’. This 
‘power of weakness’ proposes that the experience of meeting the weakness of the 
other, in this case the dying person with this new, horrific disease, moved participants 
in a way that is congruent with a concept of humility. Suffering is at the heart of the 
paradox of the power of weakness (Kunz 1998), and the hospice teams ‘suffered’ in 
the presence of the ‘powerful weakness’ of the person with variant CJD. This sense 
of the power of weakness is articulated by Ramsay (2000) in her response to canying 
out an observation study in a hospice. ‘There was something much older and more 
powerful in the face of which modem medicine and my professional training was 
impotent’ (Ramsay 2000:147).
Kunz’s concept of the power of weakness is based on Levinas (1985) ethics of the 
responsibility of self-to-Other and is particularly fitting for people with variant CJD 
These are considered ‘innocent victims’ of biotechnological tampering, the 
‘undeserving’ sufferer (Kunz 1998). The weakness of the other calls to the 
responsibility of the carer, yet the carer does not have the power to reduce the
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Figure 7. Humility -  helplessness and realisation of system limitations
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suffering and is humbled by this limitation. This is particularly pertinent in that the 
sufferers of variant CJD could not adequately communicate their suffering.
The Other is infinitely nearby commanding help, and infinitely distant, 
always exceeding our total understanding and our power to control (Kunz 
1998:17).
The struggle to reduce the suffering of the dying does (to some extent) explain the use 
of sedation in hospice environments, as discussed earlier. This does not negate the 
need to administer sedation but does call into question some of the reasons that may 
be given for choosing to take that route. On some occasions the sedation may be 
administered not only to reduce the suffering of the Other but to reduce the carers own 
suffering or distress and anxiety, and those of others within the immediate 
environment.
Humility has been a neglected virtue in social and psychological studies (Tangney 
2000). Within the literature, the term humility is used regularly without clarification 
and with an assumption that it is a virtue, particularly within theology, where it is 
more commonly associated with the concept of forgiveness. There has been little 
empirical work carried out that has directly addressed this construct (Tangney 2000). 
Means et al (1990) propose a concept of humility where they believe that humility is 
characterised in four ways. A willingness to admit one’s real inadequacies, a 
recognition that one cannot control all interpersonal interactions, a general attitude of 
patience and gentleness with others, and a platform from which empathy is fostered. 
Humility has variously been equated with forgiveness (Sandage and Wiens 2001), 
attention (Sandage et al 2001), compassion, generosity, courage, loyalty, mercy, 
forgiveness, love, honesty, faith, tolerance, altruism and empathy (Brehony 1999) and
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good psychological adjustment (Exline and Geyer 2004). Of note, in exploring the 
implications of the postmodern conceptualisation of the Other, Sundararajan (1995) 
proposes that what is needed is a new paradigm of healing, focusing on care instead of 
cure and measuring excellence in terms of humility and sensibility as opposed to 
power and mastery, concepts that very aptly fit the ‘ideal’ of hospice care.
I have chosen to use the Kunz et al (1987) construct of humility in my interpretation. 
Kunz et al (1987) carried out a dialogal phenomenological study of the experiences of
II individuals, of being humbled. The researchers concluded that the phenomenon of 
humility cannot be identified or grasped in its entirety.
It eludes literal interpretation. It is the mysterious ground from which 
words and actions speak to another. By definition, it is hidden from the 
humble person. It evokes admiration from others, but cannot be managed 
by the humble person. Through the humbling event, humility emerges as 
a momentary self-acceptance from the ground of personal limitation. This 
is preceded by an experience of surprise, awe, and wonder. The humbled 
is disengaged from the trap of striving for an achievable perfection by 
beginning to accept his/her own imperfection. A person finds a new 
perspective for an understanding of his/her place in-the-world. Humility 
is manifest in compassion for others through the desire and felt-sense of 
responsibility to care for those in need. It is a nurturing respect for life in 
all its aberrant manifestation, as well as its beauty. Humility is an act of 
hospitality, which embraces the wounds of life’s alienation, and invites us 
into a larger, human community (Kunz et al 1987:18,19).
This definition has congruency with the origin of the word hospice in proposing 
humility as an act of hospitality, and much of the rhetoric on the origins of hospice 
use a language that proposes a humble approach to caring for the dying.
Humility occurs in the presence of the ‘powerful weakness’ of the dying Other, and 
was heightened in the presence of the person dying as a result of variant CJD. Some
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experiences were emotional in nature, however, they were more often ‘indescribable’ 
and always related to ‘not knowing’, and at times participants became inarticulate. 
When I tried to press the nurses to say that they had managed the care of a person 
with variant CJD very well, as was repeatedly reiterated by family members, they 
became even more reticent or unable to articulate their experiences. They returned to 
the unknown factor with long pauses in the conversation, attributing any success to 
continuity of care and team work. Their performance (care practices) had evoked 
admiration from others, but dealing with this admiration was not easily managed by 
the humble person (the team). There was recognition that the team cohesion is part of 
the culture of hospice care and the desire and felt-sense of responsibility to care for 
those in need.
CNS I  think the big thing was continuity o f staff. You have a patient 
anywhere else you've got different people looking after them. You might 
miss something.
HCA-1 Yes.
(LONG PAUSE)
HCA-21 think because you were working as a team, with the same people 
looking after her you can sc^, well yesterday I  did this and it worked.
HCA-1 Definitely helps. Yes.
(PAUSE)
HCA-2 And you spread things between you. That's a big thing of 
continuity o f the people looking after her. (Wl:670-679)
Helplessness and powerlessness were expressed in many different ways by 
participants, and were generally couched in terms of ‘not knowing’. They found it 
difficult to agree that they had achieved a high level of care because they could not 
communicate adequately with people with variant CJD. They could only guess and
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hope that they had managed this. The teams had disengaged from the trap of striving 
for an achievable perfection by beginning to accept their limitations (Kunz et al 
1987). They were silenced by the inability of the person to demonstrate (through 
communication that they could recognise), that she has died peacefully, died a ‘good 
death’, by their definitions.
HCA-1 We hope . . .
CNS-1 We like to think we d id . ..
HCA-2 We like to think she recognised our voices when we went in.
HCA-1 This is something you'll never know. . .
CNS-2 This is the hard thing. ..
CNS-1 We'll never know . . .
LONG PAUSE (Wl:683-689)
In a short critique of Levinas and his ethical stance, Wyschogrod (1992:66) offers a 
description of the ‘space of ethics’, as where the power of the vulnerability of the 
extremely sick ‘solicit assistance in helpless silence’. This powerfiil silence of the 
dying appeared to have an even greater impact when the dying person was cognitively 
impaired. This also rendered the carer silent.
When I took my pilot findings (first data set) back to this focus group to confirm my 
interpretation, they could identify with and confirm all of the categories except that of 
humility. Their responses to this were, ‘we were just doing our job \ ‘it was the team 
effort' and ‘it was continuity o f care', a point they had already made in the original 
focus group interview. My interpretation of this response was that what they were 
(again) expressing was humility, in that they were understating the high standard of 
care that was carried out.
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Humility appears to be less a personality attribute that qualifies the individual person, 
and more a quality of an interpersonal relationship between people, or as the context 
of this relation (Kunz et al 1987; 10). Disinterested effort in work for others requires 
collective humility, in which people labour for each other and the common good 
(Kunz 1998:187). I propose that the teams manifested a collective humility of this 
type and that it is a (paradoxical) feature of hospice care. I call this paradoxical as 
humility was present despite the earlier criticisms (I make) within the category of 
controlling. This sense of helplessness, of not knowing, of realisation of limitations 
permeated the hospice teams and family members at every level.
CNS They just didn't know what to do (DAY HOSPICE TEAM), they kept 
coming to me scying what can we do? How can we cope with this. And in 
the same, in a way we were all blind, never having come across it. (Yl:91- 
94)
Community teams were both moved and inspired by the level and standard of care 
provided by family members and felt privileged to be able to be with them. I equate 
'privileged' in this way with humility as part of the compassion they felt in the face of 
the circumstances of family members’ experiences, the sheer ‘awfulness’ of the 
situation that families found themselves in.
SW  And a very positive man and his values and his traditions really did 
help him to cope with the uncopable with Um and I  think it's being 
alongside him really sort o f inspired me to see how he did cope with this 
awfulness. The illness and its consequences. So, yes it was a privilege to 
try. (VI:678-682)
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Witnessing the distress of the family members was profoundly humbling for 
participants and they were rendered helpless by the helplessness of the family. ‘She 
knows ' is uttered in a tone that expresses the sheer helplessness this JN felt about what 
impact the following (observed) experience must have been having on the couple.
JN  One day he (HUSBAND) came to visit her and she was in a chair and 
he just sat there and put his head on her knee and absolutely sobbed and 
sobbed and we were saying, she knows. I f  she has got any perception o f 
what's going on that must be very hard for her to bear. He can't even 
touch her (BECAUSE OF HYPERSENSITIVITY) he couldn't even help or 
reassure her in any way, hold her. I t ’s not knowing what she's feeling, 
what she's thinking. (WI:221-326)
As discussed earlier, particularly regarding earlier cases, staff had no information that 
could assist them in providing the type of hospice care that they were familiar with 
and aspired to provide. Added to this were concerns that changes in the condition of 
the patient may have been due to some fault, ‘whether it was something that we had 
or hadn't done \ in their management of care, reminding them of their limitations.
HCA We couldn't help. Do anything ...
JN  You know, you couldn't make it better in any way.
HCA Hying to put his socks on because his feet were always cold. Always 
cold so he had two pairs o f socks, wasn't there. And tiying to get them on 
without him screaming because, because you were hurting him (LONG 
PAUSE) (XI:498-504)
Participants were completely open about their limitations and made no pretence at 
having a specialised knowledge about the disease to family members (for the earlier 
cases). As one CNS expressed, she was '... learning in the same way as he is', and
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that 'potentially he knows far more ’ than she did and that this is ‘because he's also 
there with her and because he's with the (CJD) Association She considered that her 
knowledge base was limited to the basis of hospice speciality, bereavement and 
symptom control for people who have cancer. This ability of the participants to admit 
to limitations, to not having answers, was seen as one of the reasons why the husband 
of one of the people with variant CJD had developed a close and trusting relationship 
with the hospice team.
SW  But then I  think that was really important for him because he had so 
many people telling him things that were wrong that he probably had a lot 
more trust in you because you were saying, ‘I  don't know \ Then he was 
with all the people that were saying it was this, this and this. (VI :649- 
652)
The horror of the image of the symptoms of CJD (dementia behaviour in a young 
person) was equated as being without dignity, as has been previously discussed. 
Helplessness in the face of ‘perceived’ indignity was expressed repeatedly and this 
was particularly poignant for participants due to the youth of the people with variant 
CJD.
CNS It was just that image o f her looking so young with two kids sort o f 
kneeling on the mattress beside her and her screaming. And then it was 
just that there was no dignity, you just did not know how you were going 
to help the husband who was standing there and the sister who was veiy 
close to her and it was just like. Oh God, where do we start. (Wl:32-36)
There was outright acknowledgement and acceptance of what may have (possibly) 
happened to people with variant CJD in another environment, with 'sedation ’ as the
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straightjacket metaphor equivalent. The team were moved by the fact that (they 
believed) the family knew that they had gone to all possible lengths to provide the 
best care and is congruent with Seale’s (1990) premise that much of the care that is 
carried out at home by family members of people with advanced disease, including 
dementia, is essentially altruistic.
JN  You know, i f  he hadn't had family who cared that much, what would 
have happened to him?
HCA-11 suppose he would have been on a hospital ward, probably.
JN  A psychiatric unit 
HCA-2 Heavily sedated,
HCA-1 Heavily sedated.
JN  Mm, which would have been awful, really. But it would have been the 
only way 1 suppose that that kind o f distress and agitation could be dealt 
with on a general ward. It's not. Well they (THE FAMILY) were able to 
give him some quality o f life, weren't they. I  mean, you know, that must be 
such a you know, well they must be feeling that now, now he's gone, they 
must be able to think, well we couldn't have done any more. You know, I  
mean it is on their conscience that they can't have done any more then ... 
(Xl:692-705)
Family members were also humbled through their experiences of the deterioration of 
the person with variant CJD, experiences that Kunz et al (1984:13) express as ‘gut- 
wrenching’* K
* Claire’s Mother: Dignity was the thing with Claire all the way through. The first time she crawled in 
here I  thought my heart would break because I  knew i f  she was crawling in front o f  anyone she had to 
be desperate. (2000)
 ^Jonathan's Father: And what we were told was. Nothing works. Take him home. Basically take him 
home, make him comfortable, there is no cure. He has a year to live almost. I'm sorry. Then, I  mean, I  
recall going up to his bedroom, in the early hours. And he was laying sleeping. This is not something 
that I'm proud of, the fact is, but I'm truthful. He looked as if  he wm so at peace. I  actually 
contemplated putting the pillow over his head and smothering him. (TVD: 13-19)
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FM  And I  think one o f the, there were two sad times in my life, one when 
Rob himself asked if  he was getting better, and the other when I  said to the 
children, you have to say goodbye ... (TURNING AWAY CRYING)
(Z2:751-753)
FM  ... they had had a big argument and I  sat there. She came and sat on 
my knees ciying and said please help me, please help me ... (W2:148-149) 
Participants were humbled by the impact of the disease on the person who had variant
CJD where they had progressed from a state of having some understanding of the
disease to one where they struggled to retain some cognition of what was happening
to them. One person with variant CJD had been given his diagnosis at the early stages
of his illness and at that stage was aware of the causes and implications of the disease.
However, as the dementia progressed he could not remember what this illness was,
but could still connect it with cows. The extent of the sense of helplessness and
limitations in being able to deal with his anguish as the disease progressed was
expressed in a number of ways. The tone used in the discussion reflected how moved
the team were by this experience, by how he felt because he also ‘didn’t know’. It
was beyond their experiences to work with a person who had this type of cognitive
impairment and to manage his dying as well.
CNS And to watch such deterio?'ation, I  think, (PATIENT), his problem 
was he didn't know how it was going to end, how he was going to die.
JN  And that worried him, it worried him a lot.
CNS Right ft'om when I  first saw him. The first time we followed up, that 
was virtually the first question he asked, was, how long have I  got, how 
long is this going to go on, and he couldn't, he couldn't tell what it was 
that wrong with him, um, he, what was it he thought he had. Um, foot and 
mouth ...
JN  Yes, he knew it was something to do with animals.
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CNS Yes. That was, and, and he said is it foot and mouth that I've got,
that was it. (XI:145-152)
What was occurring within the system was beyond any previous experience. Even 
though they were experienced in caring for dying younger people, which is recognised 
as stressful for hospice teams (Saunders 1993), these were not only young people but 
they were also unable to communicate due to the dementia. The death of a young 
person is recognised as a ‘bad death’, as is a death over which the nurses had no 
control (Froggatt 1995). They believed that it shouldn’t have been any different for 
them than dealing with the care of other terminally ill people. It was ‘the fear o f the 
unknown', and ‘dealing with not knowing' that made the experience distressful for 
families and hospice teams. Family members were left with a sense of living in 
limbo, 'you still feel your life's on hold but you can't change it because you don't 
want her to ... (DIE) ', of having no control over events.
The care provided by family members was inspired by a type of love that I have 
equated with humility and altmism. I place their behaviour within Kunz’s concept of 
‘radical altruism’. Radical altruism, according to Kunz (1998), is a radical alternative 
to egoistic theories of ethics. Egoistic theories centre on the assumption that the ego 
is instrumental in self-initiating its good intentions and actions.
The radical alternative to egoistic theories of ethics points out that the 
neediness and worthiness of others, calls us to responsibility prior to our 
reason, beyond our individual desire for happiness, before forming any 
contract with others, generates the ethical command (Kunz 1998:20).
Community hospice team members were essentially guests in the home of the family 
who were caring for a person with variant CJD. In all three community cases, the
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team members expressed awe and great respect for the level of care, dedication and 
love (altruism) that was shown by the family member who was providing care. The 
use of the term dignity, in the following extract, again signifies the subjectivity of the 
term dignity and the different ways in which the term can be used. In this case dignity 
is depicted as ‘achievement’, where the family demonstrated how they suffered and 
yet remained dignified (Hadley 2004).
DR I'm just amazed by how much he'd managed to do and how well he 
was coping, and I  think it was sort o f unforgettable going into a room with 
this poor lady who was totally unable to communicate with me at all 
Really unable to communicate with him but aware that he was there, in 
absolutely squalid circumstances with an, an, I  think it was a nappy he'd 
got on her you know, and little else other than that In a room that was 
sort o f totally bare, with just the bed in the corner. Um you know I  can 
still see that now and it was, it was just incredible to see how somebody 
could be so dignified and you could tell that there was dignity in 
circumstances that were just so dire. You know that, you know I  hadn't 
come across, well I  had come across difficult circumstances but I  don't 
think I've come across anything like that before or since actually. 
(VI:691-703)
There was also a sense of ‘satisfaction’ in having done a good job that is not 
incompatible with humility. If one can say one is humble then by definition this is not 
so (Kunz 1987). However, participants were not claiming humility, I am claiming 
that for them. Although they do not refer specifically to humility Norberg and 
Asplund (1990) showed how the helplessness of the dying person with dementia gave 
meaning to the carers caring. The carers felt an inner need to care for the patient. 
Norberg and Asplund (1990:83) further state that ‘the fact that the caregiver fulfils his 
or her own needs by caring for the patient does not necessarily mean selfishness’.
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The hospice teams had ‘done the best they could', reached their limits of expertise, 
and were prepared to admit to this. However, there was a ‘sense o f self satisfaction' 
in this that suggests pride in their work. One HCA excuses herself by suggesting 'that 
sounds terribly pompous', when talking with pride about the fact that the patient’s 
skin was still intact ‘and part o f that was due to me I interpret this as humility in 
having felt she had overstepped the mark in even being proud of her work. This sense 
of satisfaction was also a component of the community experience that I interpreted 
from the behaviour of one of the family members when I visited his home to carry out 
the interview. When I arrived he was caiTying out care activities. My (impression) 
was that he wanted to show me how well he was caring for his wife and that he felt a 
sense of pride in this and he had waited until I arrived so he could show me how well 
he was caring. The very high standard of care and the love that he put into this care is 
verified in interviews with others who were involved with this particular case*. The 
reward for caring is internal and comes in relation to a pride in a job well done that is 
not contrary to humility.
Pride in a job well done is not pretentious, it does not distance; rather it 
goes with an honest awareness of what I have done and the extent of my 
dependence on the co-operation of others and on various conditions. There 
is nothing incompatible between pride, in this sense, and humility 
(Mayeroff 1972:25).
Humility implies a space beyond emotion, a space that is silent because there is no 
way of expressing what is experienced, where there are no more questions that can be 
asked and therefore no answers to what is experienced. Being in the presence of the
* Jonathan's Father: We just put it down to love. It's the only thing that I can think of. I'm just doing 
what he would want us to do. (TVD: 183-184)
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overwhelming weakness of the Other, took participants into a space and experience of 
complete powerlessness, helplessness that is however, transient (Kunz 1989). 
Although humility, within the hospice environment, has not been researched I believe 
that this category reflected the historical and founding basis of the religiosity and 
spiritual focus of the hospice movement. It also, perhaps, reflects the ‘type’ of person 
who is drawn to work in the environment, where the ability to be present with the 
dying I believe contributes to experiencing humility. The ‘ritual specialist’ (Froggatt 
1995) then becomes a very apt title for the nurse who is holding the dying person 
within this liminal space. Holding specialist knowledge, as in the ‘ritual specialist’ 
nurse, is a crucial ingredient for the management of the hospice system and the means 
by which care is controlled and the equilibrium is maintained in a balanced state. 
When the knowledge is ‘missing’, the system must adapt, i.e. gain this knowledge.
5.6 Becoming knowledgeable -  adaptation within the system
To survive, the system must adapt, and here I propose that adaptation is the ability to 
maintain balanced, successful transactions, such as gaining knowledge, with the outer 
environment. Maintaining equilibrium through control requires the system to regulate 
the input and transformation processes (Katz and Kahn 1966). Gaining more 
knowledge contributes to maintaining equilibrium and can be a means of control. 
Staff needed to become knowledgeable about the new disease as a strategy to 
maintain the system equilibrium. I propose ‘becoming knowledgeable’ (Figure 8) as a 
first level category due to the novelty of the disease. At the stage of not knowing, the 
‘need to know’ and curiosity and horror about the disease was heightened for hospice 
teams and the public. Becoming knowledgeable increased the confidence of the 
hospice staff but had a bewildering effect on family members. This category
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Figure 8. Becoming knowledgeable -  adaptation within the system
Dealing with the Unknown’
An explanatory theory of managing the care of the person with variant CJD by
the hospice service.
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completes the theoretical explanation of dealing with the unknown in managing the 
care of people with variant CJD by the hospice service. When an admission was 
achieved, both into the community and inpatient services, a number of metaphors 
express the experiences of the participants in fitting a case of variant CJD into the 
hospice service for the first time. They were dealing with the death of younger 
people, extreme bereavement issues for very distraught relatives and attempting to 
answer questions they did not have answers for. Dealing with the death of young 
people is not unusual for hospice teams, but the mode of the death and the symptoms 
of the disease created disturbance (imbalance) within the system and they needed to 
work towards restoring the balance. Participants did not use malevolent watery or 
fiery metaphors, reflecting a sense of having some power over the situation that they 
didn’t have over potential numbers of people to become infected with variant CJD. 
They were not so powerless that they could be overwhelmed by it, nor even a 
suggestion that they would have been out of their depth. The metaphors reflected not 
knowing and a sense of not being able to ‘see’. They were ‘in the dark', ‘we were all 
blind', ‘going in blind'. This idea of ‘blindness’ or being ‘in the dark’ is 
demonstrated in Andershed and Ternestedt’s (2001) metaphorical model of hospice 
work, where the rapid illness trajectory was conceived as having ‘involvement in the 
dark’ and created a sense of non-meaningful involvement for staff and families.
Becoming knowledgeable was seen as a ‘constant challenge ' and was connected to 
the assessment process. Metaphors that reflected needing to get hold of the situation 
where, ‘get to grips with ', 'sort out ', ‘trying to nail it down ', 'get to the bottom of', 
‘work out ', get ‘things in place ', and becoming ‘switched on ', indicated potential for 
moving towards becoming more knowledgeable about variant CJD. At the very
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beginning of learning how to manage the cases they were, ‘starting from scratch 
The metaphors suggested some sense of being able to become knowledgeable, that it 
wasn’t impossible but that it was ‘a tall order’. They saw gaining of knowledge as a 
requirement, 'going on an information hunt’, and they attributed the successes they 
did make, particularly in relation to symptom management, as that of ‘trial and 
error ’.
Although the teams were expert enough to apply knowledge of other terminal diseases 
to the management of variant CJD, such was the ‘newness’ of variant CJD that 
members of the system were hampered by the lack of access to the ‘scientific 
knowledge’ (earlier cases). Teams found they were missing information. It was 
coming out in, ‘little pieces ‘little leaks ’, almost exclusively, at that time, through 
the media, and the information was ‘all very patchy’. The release of scientific 
information through the media has been a matter of debate for decades and remains a 
matter of debate (Pini 1995). As suggested by Lacey (1994) on the subject of BSE, 
there were serious implication for humans, identified by the BSE crisis, that were 
completely ignored by politicians and health care policy makers. This lack of 
important input from other sectors of the scientific/healthcare community also 
threatened the equilibrium of the system, in that knowledge on how to ‘control the 
symptoms ’ of any disease was an important component of maintaining balance.
One hospice team did have some experience of caring for other types of CJD but these 
experiences were different and not applicable to the case of variant CJD. The person 
with variant CJD presented with a completely different pattern of the disease to a
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person with iatrogenic CJD. As discussed within the CJD literature cognitive 
impairment is not a major symptom of iatrogenic CJD.
CNS ... we had one other CJD patient but his was through gi'owth 
hormone and it a completely different pattern he was able to 
communicate to a certain degree right up until he deteriorated. (Wl:40- 
48)
The important point, in relation to the ability to fit the person with variant CJD into 
the system, was that the person with iatrogenic CJD could communicate until at a very 
advanced stage of the disease.
The result of the ‘new’ admission and the decisions involved caused changes in the 
practices of some of the hospice staff. It manifested in attitude changes to the 
appropriateness of admission of ‘unusual’ cases to the hospice services. These were 
reviewed by teams. The following extract reflects how such an event can lead to 
reformulation of admission criteria into a service that was predominately focused on 
the cancer death.
DR I  think once we'd all been in we felt that it was so right that there 
wasn't a problem but you obviously don't know what to expect. And I  think 
um, I  think it probably does I'eflect, I  mean I  think it, it changed. I  think it 
sort o f changed my attitude a little bit to, you know how precise we are 
about who we take on and we've got to do the best or whatever your 
criteria claim that you have to be a bit flexible. (¥1:847-852)
Decisions about treatment changes needed to made quickly, ‘thinking on your feet ’. 
This idea of ‘thinking on your feet ’ is not new for hospice environments, where
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assessment is a constant process. Gaining more knowledge increases confidence. 
This then lessens the need to control. Knowledge was also seen as providing security 
for the families and giving them confidence in the care they were receiving in the 
hospice. It also served to give relief from anxiety to the team as well. The following 
comment made by the CNS is made with confidence in her ability to manage a case of 
variant CJD by dint of her previous experience. She uses this to inspire confidence in 
the family members of the ability of the hospice service to provide good care for the 
person with variant CJD.
CNS His parents hadn't realised until they got here that we'd ever looked 
after anybody with CJD before and we talked to them about we'd looked 
after three or four people and they were really relieved then weren Y they. 
(21:591-594)
The disease was no longer a ‘novelty’, and even suggested by one doctor, in relation 
to a 2003 case, to be ‘quite uneventful The number of times and various ways of 
expressing not knowing was reduced substantially in the focus group and single 
interviews with the team who had previous experience of caring for a range of types 
of CJD. This confidence in symptom management is also verified in the patient’s 
hospice records. That is, there was no record of concerns about not knowing what 
interventions to use. Scientific developments and research into the disease was 
ongoing and it was no longer really new, at least not on the scale of the earlier cases.
DR I  suppose looking back, his um terminal care overall was quite 
uneventful and you know quite sort o f you know, he didn’t have any very 
unusual difficult to handle kind o f symptoms, which I  perhaps go by the 
book you know. I  certainly, you know, I  can’t remember his terminal care
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being any different from terminal care o f a patient with a brain tumour or, 
you know. (23:14-19)
Kunz (1998:63) maintains that knowledge is only powerful when it motivates. He 
equates understanding and intelligence with knowledge and proposes that 
understanding strengthens the possibility of, but does not guarantee, making good 
judgements and choices (Kunz 1998). By becoming knowledgeable, the practices 
within the system did not change substantially. That is, sedation practices were not 
reduced and changes in attitudes towards maintaining a serene environment had not 
occurred. Attitudes toward and understanding of, awareness contexts or emotional 
responses of people with cognitive impairment of the type occurring in variant CJD 
had not changed. The change that took place appeared to be merely functional. The 
team (who had gained some experience through repeated admissions of people with 
different types of CJD including variant CJD) used sedation measures earlier in the 
treatment rather than later. They used sedation for the same reasons as discussed in 
the section on restoring dignity. The focus of discussion was on symptom control and 
they felt confident enough to use the treatments they were familiar with. It remained 
based on ‘not knowing’ what the person was experiencing and making the assumption 
that any agitation equalled physical pain, or, even using pain controlling measure 
based on the ‘possibility’ of pain being present.
CNS We went in fairly quickly with the midazalom, between 10 and 20 
milligrams, it wasn’t a lot, but I  remember we went in fairly quickly with 
them and some diamorphine because we didn’t know i f  he was in pain ... 
(21:267-270)
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The use of sedation measures are however, advocated as part of ‘good’ practice in 
managing the care of people with CJD (Barnett 2002; de Vries 2003a), so they were 
acting within the accepted medical practices of symptom control for this disease.
The experiences discussed in the sections related to personhood status and control still 
remained. The perceived need to ‘get something hack’, analogies of non-personhood 
and surprise at the family claim that the person with variant CJD recognised familiar 
people, were still present. For this group it was no longer new and therefore no longer 
novel, so curiosity and horror specific to the disease was ‘blunted’. However, the 
second case of variant CJD that the team cared for presented a totally different profile 
from the first case. That is, their first experience was with a young woman who had 
young children. The second case was an unmarried man in his mid 30s, who also has 
a learning disability. Identification with the personal circumstances of the dying 
person had a strong emotional impact on the hospice teams, especially those who 
were at a similar stage of life and had similar circumstance as the dying person i.e. 
young children.
Variant CJD did remain a novelty for members of the public and this was recognised 
by the team. Surprise was expressed that family members were so open about telling 
other families at the hospice about the variant CJD diagnosis. The comment reminded 
the group about AIDS, a factor in all cases. There was a suggestion that there was 
more stigma attached to AIDS than to variant CJD and may explain why the family 
felt free about revealing their son’s diagnosis. This was the only time in the entire 
data that the term stigma was used and this was in reference to AIDS. ‘Stigma’ was 
however, implied at times (see categoiy of ghoulish voyeurism). It can be argued that
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despite Sontag (1988) suggesting that diseases, for example tuberculosis, cancer, and 
HIV, whose cause is uncertain and whose treatment is limited tend to evoke fear and 
revulsion, i.e. stigma, this has not extended to the variant CJD group. The mode of 
infection for variant CJD and the age of those infected fits with Sontag’s (1988) 
premise that some individuals do not necessarily experience stigma, such as ‘innocent 
victims of HEV’. That is, haemophiliacs and babies who have acquired HIV through 
blood products or maternal transmission.
The experience may have been less horrific for the hospice team but for the family it 
was new, horrific and profoundly traumatic to have a family member with variant 
CJD. This is also demonstrated in the continuing media reports of families as new 
cases are diagnosed. Any move towards becoming knowledgeable depended on 
individual responses to the experience, (see literature section on the drive for cure by 
families). Control, as a fundamental function of the hospice practice, as in all health 
care environments (Hinshelwood and Skogstad 2000), remained a feature for the team 
who had experience of previous cases of variant CJD. Becoming knowledgeable 
maintained a strong link with control and little link with the category of humility. 
Data that I interpreted and categorised as being humbled by helplessness and a 
realisation of limitations (from earlier cases) was absent in the team who had previous 
exposure to CJD cases. This absence suggested that humility was no longer present 
when the team felt more knowledgeable and in control. This has implications for 
even suggesting a category of humility. However, according to Kunz (1989), humility 
is a momentary experience. The lessening of expressions of shock and horror, 
lessening of in-articulation of the team who had previous experience in caring for
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variant CJD, suggests a similar response of ‘blunting’ to the now-not-new that also 
lessens potential to be humbled.
The learning that took place for the hospice organisation falls into the ‘single-loop’ 
learning process proposed by Morgan (1997:87) who also raised the question of 
whether organisations can learn to learn. Single-loop learning requires the ability to 
detect and correct error in relation to a set of operating norms and is presented in a 
process of steps. Step one is the process ‘... developing an ability to scan the 
environment, set objectives, and monitor the general performance of the system in 
relation to these objectives’. This basic skill is often institutionalized in the form of 
information systems designed to keep the organization ‘on course’, or, in the language 
of Katz and Khan (1966), in equilibrium. In step two, this information is compared 
against operational norms, and step three is the process of initiating appropriate action 
(Morgan 1997). In ‘double-loop’ learning a fijrther loop (at step two) is proposed 
where the process of questioning whether operating nonns are appropriate takes place. 
The ability to achieve proficiency at double-loop learning often proves elusive for 
organisations (Morgan 1997). My findings confirm that very little ‘double-loop’ 
learning took place and that learning only occurred at step two of the process, i.e. that 
the hospice service was kept ‘on course’ and médicalisation was the focus.
Morgan (1997:89) discusses the universality of ‘defensive routines’ that may have 
become a central part of the culture of the organisation, as barriers to the double-loop 
learning. These defensive routines generate shared norms, and patterns of 
‘groupthink’ that may prevent people ft"om addressing key aspects of the reality with 
which they are dealing. New knowledge was focused on symptom control and
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gaining practical skills in controlling variant CJD ‘symptoms’. There was little focus 
or development towards understanding and attitudes to the dementia behaviour, or 
consideration of the appropriateness of sedation for this type of illness. I suggest the 
person with variant CJD came to be seen as just another person with a range of 
neurological symptoms that needed to be dealt with pharmacologically. Normal 
‘medicalised’ hospice practices of symptom control were integrated into the repertoire 
of skills used for other types of terminal illnesses.
For family members this heightened state was related to the ‘need to know’ and horror 
of the experience. For the family, curiosity was something they wanted to be 
protected from as they were the target of the curiosity. In becoming knowledgeable 
the horror and curiosity was blunted for the hospice team that had previous experience 
of the disease and they felt confident and ‘in control’. For family members there was 
no blunting of the experience, the effect of becoming knowledgeable manifested a 
state that I have categorised as the ‘bewildered family’.
5.6.1 Bewildered family
Finding out more about the disease was a bewildering experience for family members. 
They were bewildered by the media information and the scientific and medical 
information they were given, some of it conflicting. They were in some ways dealing 
with an equally bewildered scientific community. These experiences interlink with 
the concept of horrifying. It was difficult for them to come to terms with the concept 
of a new disease, with questions of how did it happen to them, what had they done
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wrong, elements of guilt about food and anxiety about potential of other family
members also being infected by the disease*.
FM  You realise that sort o f thing's happening. Because, um, well in a lot 
o f wc^s she's been killed, it's like putting a bullet to her head, a gun 
perhaps and pressing the trigger really, because you know, they should be 
more careful with what they give their animals. We don't even know how it 
starts which is hard but then you think that anyway. (W1:494-498)
In one case the family member made the diagnosis based on listening to a radio 
programme. Another family member (2003 case) couldn’t understand why his 
brother was not diagnosed earlier when he remembered an article he had read earlier 
that clearly identified the symptoms. Confidence in the medical and scientific 
community was undermined for all family members with expressions of bitterness and 
disappointment on how the diagnosis was made and how they were informed of this.
FM  It was only this Sunday he came to dinner with us and he said he 
couldn't understand why doctors couldn't diagnose it earlier because um 
after we found out what was wrong with (PATIENT), he remembered 
having read an article about CJD in a magazine, and thinking my God 
this is just like (PATIENT), so he said if  I  could pick that up, why can't 
doctors pick it up earlier. (22:537-543)
One family member also found the language related to variant CJD and the neurology 
of prion disease extremely confusing, ‘to me its in gibberish, and you don't 
understand the words that are written there’. The public has expectations of the
*Kate’s Mother: I  personally myself, being a mother, mother puts the food on the table, I  still feel a 
certain amount o f  guilt really. Because I  think she could still be alive if  we, you know, hadn't been. I f  
we had fed  her vegetarian food all her life, she would ha\>e still been with us and to think what an ea ^  
thing to have done and we didn't do it. (TVD:223-227)
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scientific community to provide accurate information on health risks, often based on 
research (Pini 1995). Variant CJD, as occurred in the early days of HEV and AIDS 
threw the public into confusion and turmoil. They did not know when or how their 
family members had contracted the disease* Or why it happened to one family 
member and not another. Furthermore there was bewilderment for parents about the 
future potential for their children to become infected and for siblings what their risk 
might be.
5.7 Summary
‘Dealing with the unknown’ provided a theoretical explanation of the experience of 
caring for a person with variant CJD by the hospice service. ‘Not knowing’ or the 
unknown’ was a core category that underpinned the four categories of novelty, 
controlling, humility and becoming knowledgeable. Other theories of hospice 
practice were used to inform the findings. The theoretical explanation also 
demonstrated change over time of the participant experiences which were presented 
within the category of becoming knowledgeable. I have presented the hospice as a 
metaphorical container in which dying was managed by staff who had specialist 
training and experience in the subject of death, dying and bereavement, that is focused 
on the cancer death. The experience of the admission of people with variant CJD into 
the ‘container’ caused an imbalance in the equilibrium of the system. The hospice is 
an open system with boundaries that are managed in a very flexible manner. This
* Claire's Mother: And I  look at the pictures o f her at parties back then (when she six) and I  think,
did she eat a sausage roll? Is it then? Is it then? (Pearson 2000)
^Kate's Mother: I look at her, all the photographs o f Kate. I  think she the most photographed child
that ever lived, because she was the baby. I  look at her now and I think, you know, had she got it in her 
brain now. I  look at her, six, seven, eight nine ten. We'll never know. (TVD:240~243)
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flexibility of the criteria for admission allowed the entrance of the new disease of 
variant CJD. The appropriateness of the hospice as an environment in which such a 
disease should be managed was paradoxical. It was both appropriate and 
inappropriate based on individual family circumstances and attitudes towards hospice 
semces. There remained an ‘agenda’ within the system where it was understood that 
all measures should be used to maintain a peaceful and calm enviromnent. The in- 
house teams did not appear to be aware that they practiced in a controlling manner 
and that the practices did not correlate with how these were viewed by in-house 
admission family members, who saw the hospice as a site of excellence in care 
practices. This was contrary to the view held by one family member who likened the 
hospice admission to 'abuse '. Repeated exposure to the disease may have caused a 
‘blunting’ of responses to the horrific nature of the symptoms and allowed the easing 
of anxiety where becoming knowledgeable about the disease inspired confidence for 
the teams giving them a sense of retaining control.
In Chapter 6 I conclude my thesis and provide a critique of the chosen methodology 
and methods of data collection and data analysis. I also offer recommendations for 
education, practice and further research.
292
Chapter 6 -  Critique of the study and conclusion
6.1 Introduction
In the first section of this chapter I address the contribution the thesis makes to 
knowledge and provide a discussion on the theoretical implications of my findings. A 
critique of the methodology and methods used to conduct the study is offered. This is 
followed by a discussion on the education, practice and research implications of my 
findings and recommendations for further development are made. I then conclude the 
chapter with a discussion on the contribution the study makes to an understanding of 
hospice culture and practice and how this may be understood within an open systems 
framework.
The first and important point that must be made is that this study does not provide an 
explanation of activities within hospice services per se. It provides an explanation of 
what occurred in the event of the variant CJD admission. Wliat the study primarily 
revealed was a number of paradoxes about how the practices within the hospice 
system were constructed, or understood, by staff, as opposed to family members, 
when they were caring for a person with variant CJD.
6.2 Contribution to knowledge
One of my research aims was to provide a theoretical explanation of participant 
experiences, in keeping with grounded theory methodology using a constructivist 
approach, i.e. a substantive theory would have been the outcome based on confining 
the findings to a specific gioup and tlirough gi'oup consensus of the experience. This 
did not occur due to sampling issues, however, substantive theory is a strategic link to 
the formulation and generation of formal theory and emergent fit of existing
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substantive theories of hospice care, plus open systems theory were used to develop 
the beginnings of foimal theory. As pointed out by Glaser and Strauss (1967) the 
main benefit yielded by grand theories i.e. open systems, is their use of abstract 
models and that the integration of formal theory often requires more guidance from 
explicit models (grand theories) because of a greater level of abstraction. The theory 
presented thus has been derived fiom a small sample but lays the foundations for 
formal grounded theory about understanding how health care workers, family 
members and others may respond to ‘not knowing’ when faced with a new situation 
or a situation with which they were not familiar, within an organisation or system. To 
develop formal theory more completely the phenomenon would need be studied in 
multiple contexts and applied to a wider range of disciplinary concerns and problems 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998).
In presenting a theory of ‘Dealing with the unknown’ I have shown that the core 
category of ‘not knowing’ meets the criteria set out by Strauss and Corbin (1998) in 
that all other major categories could be related to it. It appeared fi*equently in the data 
and its relationship to other categories is logical and consistent. This included how 
‘Dealing with the unknown’ was used to demonstrate change over time, moving from 
‘not knowing’ to ‘becoming knowledgeable’. Categories were congruent with the 
research objectives and related to the experience of the hospice team in providing care 
for the person with variant CJD, at the end of life, and within the hospice context. 
The meanings have been conveyed tlirough rhetorical means such as metaphors, 
analogies, and paradoxes.
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The results of this study cannot be viewed as a static piece of knowledge or 
interpretation of the events and experiences, but as experience and knowledge in a 
state of flux, as demonstrated by the change over time that occurred with participants 
moving from a state of not knowing to ‘becoming knowledgeable’. According to 
Rock (1979:30), ‘at best, a synthesis can lead to a temporary fr eezing of knowledge so 
that it becomes available for inspection, but it cannot do more’. No sociological 
understanding can attain a state of finality and closure and thought must generate 
more thought, just as action multiples itself. The successful communication of theory 
intelligibility provides the grounds for theory usefulness (Hassard 1993). That is, one 
criterion of credibility is satisfied ‘if a reader becomes sufficiently caught up in the 
description so that he feels vicariously that he was also in the field’ (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967:230).
Some confirmation of my findings conveying to others the immediacy of the 
experiences of participants was revealed to me on presenting data from my 
preliminary theoretical fr amework at a number of conferences (de Vries 2003b, 2004). 
This also occurred during teaching sessions on providing palliative care for people 
with dementia. Following the presentation, and at a number of teaching sessions, I 
have been approached by district nuises who have related to me how closely they 
identified with the experiences of my study participants. They reported how it 
brought back vividly their own experiences of having looked after people with variant 
CJD. However, I approach this confirmation with caution, in keeping with Rock’s 
(1979:30) suggestion, that ‘a theory cannot be more than one of an indefinite number 
of legitimate vantage points on social processes’. The real can never be wholly 
known, there is a most profound difference between a description and what is
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described and all that may be accomplished is a cautious reconstruction by means of 
intellectual categories that enhance understanding (Rock 1979). I have presented the 
theory with these premises in mind.
I believe that the theoretical explanation presented in this thesis may provide an image 
of one aspect of hospice organisation. However, it is important to remember that the 
experiences of the admission of a person with variant CJD, into the hospice system, 
provides only a ‘micro’ view of one type of event amongst the many processes in 
providing care for the dying and bereaved within hospice services. As shown in 
Figure 4 the findings need to be understood within the wider context of other theories 
of hospice practice. It is however, a theoretical construct that could be explored, 
developed and applied to other settings (systems) where a new type of condition is 
introduced. For example, a case of SARS admitted to an NHS ward, or the 
intiuduction of children with learning disabilities into mainstream schools.
My findings contribute to, and build on, other studies that have presented hospice as 
an organisation, albeit not explicitly, particularly the work of Lawton (1998a, 1998b, 
2000), where it has been suggested that hospice practices maintain a sequestered and 
controlled environment for dying people. They also provide some confirmation of 
Lawton’s (1998a, 1998b, 2000) premise that hospice is an environment in which 
death is ‘processed’. This processing is carried out by ‘expert’ palliative care staff or 
as Froggatt (1995) termed ‘ritual specialists’, who control the passage of dying in 
various ways. My findings confirm the view of hospice as a liminal space, as 
described by Lawton (1998a, 2000) and Froggatt (1995, 1997). Hospice was shown 
to be a place of protection and an environment of ‘family like’ ambiance, where close
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and intimate relationships are formed between nurses and patients (Froggatt 1995, 
Copp 1996, 1999; Li 2002), in the case of my study, between nurses (more 
particularly than other hospice stafO family members.
I believe my thesis makes an original contribution to the concept of humility. 
Humility is a mysterious and unexplainable event/experience that is difficult to define. 
It cannot be ‘known’ by the experiencer and can only be partially explained or 
interpreted by the researcher, through observation and interpretation of discourse, 
including ‘silent discourse’. I use the teim ‘silent’ as an expression of being beyond 
words to articulate the experiences of participants in being faced with their limitations 
in dealing with the perceived horror of, and helplessness in, providing care in the 
event of the variant CJD death.
6.3 Methodological and method critique and study limitations
6.3,1 Sampling
Sampling issues were discussed in detail in the Methods chapter. The study was 
constrained by the small sample size but this was an issue that could not be overcome 
due to the peaking of numbers of people diagnosed with variant CJD during 2000 
(Andrews et al 2003; Andrews 2005) and thus puts limitations on the generalisability 
of my findings. The continuing decline in numbers, coupled with the support 
packages that were put in place, made access to the patient group even more difficult. 
The sample is fiom three hospices in the South of England, a larger sample could 
have enabled a broader perspective from a wider range of hospice sites. A further 
limitation was that I only had three full data sets, i.e. data sets that included interviews 
with family members. This was due to gate-keeping by hospice staff, and to
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inaccessibility of family members. However, the data was comprehensive and rich 
and provided ample material for analysis of their experiences, particularly of the 
hospice teams. Although the data from the community family perspective was rich 
and detailed, only one family member of a person with variant CJD who was nursed 
at home was recruited. A lai'ger data source for analysis may have affected 
interpretation of the experiences of this group. I was not able to interview all staff 
involved in the care of the people with variant CJD from each hospice site, as many 
had moved on to other positions by the time I gained access.
I had also planned to use a second moderator in facilitating the focus groups to enable 
better note-taking that would have assisted me in identifying and recording group 
member interactions more precisely. This was not achieved because it required the 
person who had agreed to act as a second moderator to take time off work and travel 
with me to the different sites.
A further issue of interpretation of the experiences of the sample used in this study is 
the diversity of each situation. Each of the family stories and circumstances were 
individual, as were particular practices of the hospices and from this I have created a 
conceptual model that incorporates the commonalities within the participant 
experiences.
6.3,2 Trustworthiness
Every effort was made to maintain rigour throughout the study. One of the strategies 
for establishing trustworthiness is the use of participant confirmation (Silverman 
2000; Stake 1995), although there are arguments against this process as discussed in
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the Methodology chapter. This process was used only for the pilot study. A full 
manual analysis of this was conducted and taken back to some (not all were available) 
of the participants. Much to my regret I did not audiotape this focus group interview 
and had only field notes to use in further analysis of the interactions and discussion 
that took place within the group. This second focus gi'oup was useful in providing 
confirmation of my interpretation of the pilot data. Responses were similar to those 
from delegates at conferences and study session presentations on the preliminary 
theoretical explanation developed from my pilot as mentioned previously. Due to 
time constraints, distances to travel, difficulties in arranging even a first focus group 
intei-view, let alone repeated interviews, and changes in staff at different sites, I was 
not able to use this process for further data sets as I had initially planned.
Charmaz (2003b) makes the point that one-shot interviewing undermines grounded 
theory research. The logic of grounded theory method calls for ongoing analysis to 
direct data collection, in a self-correcting analytical, expanding process (Charmaz 
2003b). According to Charmaz (2003b) one-shot interviews miss opportunities to 
correct earlier errors and omissions and construct a denser more complex analysis. 
Multiple sequential interviews chart a person’s path and permit independent checks 
over time allowing the ‘story’ to gain depth, detail and resonance (Charmaz 2003b).
I would have also liked to have carried out repeat interviews with family members, 
particularly following audio-tape transcription and early analysis, for the reason 
outlined by Charmaz (2003b). However, to do this I believe would have been 
ethically inappropriate based on the number of times that family members had already 
been interviewed and on the perceived traumatic nature of the experiences they were
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being interviewed about. The interviews were also deeply emotional experiences and 
had a powerful impact on me. On one occasion I needed to speak at length to the 
social worker I had identified as support for myself and the family member. I was 
anxious that I had stiired up memories and caused distress to this family member. I 
had no ‘real’ evidence of having distressed him. I based this judgement on his 
reluctance to talk in detail about his experiences, and although I attempted to prompt 
and probe for responses I was also reluctant to do this at any length. I did not 
terminate the interview early but I allowed it to become a long conversation about 
work and travel and sport, subjects that he appeared to prefer to discuss. I had this 
sense of invading the world of this person’s suffering, trying to collect research data 
about events that I could not imagine for myself.
Based on his own experiences Frank (2004b) offers a personal critique of suffering, 
asking; Can we research suffering and still show that we care about the person who is 
suffering? This is a dilemma for any person who is conducting research about the 
suffering of others. In dealing with some of the difficulties in conducting this type of 
research Frank (2004b:424) proposes that based on his own work, one method is, ‘to 
use academic privileges of publication and platfonn to amplify the voices of the ill 
themselves, offering them previously unrecognised connections and a sense of 
community,’ This also raises the point made in my ethical discussion about 
empowering participants in research. My feelings now, for post-doctoral research, 
would be to develop an approach that offered potential for research participants to 
openly own their own story. To move away from what Patton (2002) posed as a 
possible protective or patronising stance towards research participants. Further 
development of this work, i.e. post-doctoral work on end-of-life dementia care, where
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Other methods of data collection, such as repeated intemews, participant or non­
participant observation or prospective longitudinal study methods, will enable the 
expansion of the findings presented in the thesis.
6.3,3 Retrospective accounts
The data for this study involved retr ospective accounts of experience and as pointed 
out by Addington-Hall and McPherson (2001) the impact of bereavement on the 
memory of bereaved family members is as yet unexplored. Credibility is therefore 
questionable, as the data relies on accuracy of memory of events that occurred 
approximately a year previous to the interviews. All except one interview was 
conducted within a year of the death of the person with variant CJD. The hospice 
records did, however, provide a source of cross-checking data from the interviews. In 
the three-year-old case, participants referred to the hospice notes throughout the 
interview. They had also developed teaching material following their experience 
which they referred to during the interview. Their memory of the events appeared 
very vivid and may have been reinforced by the teaching sessions they had provided 
on the subject of variant CJD over the three years.
Retrospective memories could account for the discrepancies between what different 
members of staff remembered about the patients. Nevertheless, claims to obtaining 
accurate participant memory recall on any experiences must be viewed with caution. 
Focus groups did however, sei-ve as memory prompting interactions. They allowed 
the potential of reminding each other and building a picture of the experience between 
the members.
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6.3.4 Data analysis (tabulation)
A critique of my methods of analysis has been given in Chapter 4. However, I return 
briefly to the subject of the use of tabulation in qualitative research. Tabulation is an 
approach that needs to be used with caution, as discussed earlier, particularly using 
interview data. Its use in ethnographic methodology, for example using discourse and 
conversation analysis, provides a naturally occurring data, as opposed to the 
‘artificial’ situation of an interview. However, I would argue that interpretation of the 
‘naturally occurring’ data remains subjective, as does all qualitative research data. In 
their critique of participant observation and interviewing Atkinson and Coffey (2003) 
state that if we accept that interview talk is action it is therefore as legitimate a 
representation of events as an ethnographer’s field notes, often written down 
retrospectively. Free discussion was intentionally developed within the focus group 
and interviews. This did provide a degree of naturally occurring conversation and 
may have provided a close representation of the actors’ ‘real’ actions, expressions and 
feelings, therefore justifying the use of tabulation as a form of increasing rigour. 
Every effort was made to ensure that the use of tabulation was rigorously 
contextualised to the conversation. The use of tabulation within qualitative research 
has been likened to ‘building bridges’ between methodologies to add credibility to 
qualitative research (Garnett 2000; Li 2002) and is in keeping with the view that we 
are now in the decade of grounded theory diversification (Benoliel 1996).
6.4 Implications for education and practice
Education and practice implications are integral to the need for research that examines 
interventions that may enliance the care of all people with end-stage dementia. The 
predictions of numbers of people who may become infected with variant CJD are as
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yet unquaiitifiable. Whilst variant CJD has a somewhat different disease trajectory to 
other dementias, my findings have implications for the education of health care 
professionals who are exposed to the end-of-life needs of people with other types of 
dementia. I make the following recommendations in relation to education and 
practice.
• The success of the variant CJD home-care package, where most people with 
all types of CJD are now cared for at home, suggests that these could provide a 
template for developing care packages for the wider dementia group and 
should involve collaboration between hospice and dementia care specialists. 
The success of such packages of care being put in place for the old age group 
with dementia has been demonstrated in the USA (Volicer et al 2003).
• In the coming climate of increased numbers of people with dementia of old- 
age, and the possible increase in numbers of people with CJD, either variant or 
sporadic, education initiatives are of paramount importance. Neither palliative 
care or dementia care knowledge and skills are taught as a core component of 
undergraduate nursing education whilst, most people with dementia are cared 
for by general nurses and approximately 56% of all people die in hospitals 
(NCHSPCS 2004). This anomaly needs to be rectified within nurse education 
programmes at both pre and post registration levels.
• Dementia syndromes are, in the majority of cases, caused by tenninal 
illnesses, as in the case of CJD. Therefore assessment processes need to 
include making preparation for support during the dying process for this group
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of people. This could be achieved through early discussion and 
documentation of preferred place of care, at the end-of-life (Pemberton et al 
2003; Storey et al 2003), so that support mechanisms can be put in place as the 
dementia progresses. It could helpfully involve collaboration with palliative 
care community services and other primary care workers, to ensure a 
streamlined service of care provision. Practice developed through the 
Preferred Place of Care research for people with cancer could be further 
developed for the dementia group.
• Whilst it is important for palliative care professionals to extend existing skills 
in end-of-life care to include the needs of people with dementia, initiatives 
may be better employed in developing palliative care skills for people who 
already have skills in caring for people who are cognitively impaired. This 
calls for a more collaborative approach to the education on end-of-life 
dementia care, where the skills are shared between the specialities.
6.5 Recommendations for further research
The above recommendations for education and practice development also offer 
potentially areas for research in the field of CJD and dementia care. I make the 
following recommendations specific to potential research that stems from this study.
• Further study is required on the experiences of families and carers of people 
with valiant CJD that is located within the community, with participants 
drawn from the wider primary care team of district nurses, community 
psychiatric nurses, general practitioners and social service professionals. As
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this is a relatively unexplored area within the UK qualitative research 
approaches would be the most appropriate for early exploration of tliese 
experiences.
An area of potential research is to explore nurses’ use of sedation within 
hospice practices. As demonstrated in this thesis, and shown by Morita et al
(2004), there are implications of how sedation is used in dealing with 
organisational anxiety in end-of-life care. Based on her personal responses to 
an observation study within a hospice Ramsay (2000:151) notes, ‘Until 
professionals acknowledge the impact on themselves of working closely with 
dying patients, they are unlikely to recognise its impact on their clinical 
practice’. There are a number of methodologies that could be used to examine 
the use of sedation by nurses, both quantitatively, possibly replicating Morita 
et al (2004) questionnaire study, and qualitatively, tluough observation and 
interviewing processes. The focus group and interview approach used by 
Brajtman (2005) examining challenges experienced by the interdisciplinary 
palliative care team in managing terminal restlessness using sedation as a 
treatment of choice provides a basis on which to develop a more extensive 
qualitative study.
The hospice movement has always placed the multi-professional team as 
central to its philosophy (Saunders 1990; Clark 1993; Clark et al 2005), yet a 
range of mono-professional grouping representing the individual teams of 
hospice professionals has emerged (Clark 1993). This confirms the diversity 
of roles, norms, values, priorities, preoccupations and culture of these teams
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(Stokes 1994a; Haslam 2004) and suggests that these may have a range of 
influences on service provision within the system. There were variations in 
the type of talk and attitudes to practice between the different members of the 
hospice teams in this study. I did not attempt to separate the differences 
between health care assistants, nurses, doctors or social workers, as I wanted 
to retain a focus on the organisation as a whole in the management of the 
variant CJD death. Further research is needed that delineates between the 
roles that members of the team have, and how these contribute to 
understanding the organisational primary tasks, and to the balance and 
equilibrium of the hospice system as a whole. Research approaches that use 
organisational observation methods developed by the Tavistock Institute 
would be an appropriate and useful means of investigating these processes.
6.6 Conclusion
This study set out to explore the issues that arose in caring for people with variant 
CJD within hospice services, to describe those experiences, to identify strategies used 
by hospice teams and family members in providing care for people with variant CJD 
and to provide a theoretical explanation of the events.
The impact of the experiences of providing care for people with variant CJD was 
complex and challenged hospice staff to consider elements of care in different ways. 
It was evident that hospice palliative care skills could be applied in caring for this 
patient gi'oup. Hospices appear to be suitable and appropriate environments in which 
to provide end-of-life care for people with variant CJD and community palliative care 
teams are appropriately placed to work with the wider primary care team in managing
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these deaths at home. I believe the success of this can be attributed to two aspects of 
hospice care. These are the level of specialist expertise that exist to manage 
symptoms that change rapidly and require constant reassessment, and the high nurse 
patient ratio (of in-house units) that enabled and created the atmosphere of ‘family 
ambiance’ identified by family members.
I have shown how the hospice may be viewed as an open system in which the variant 
CJD death was processed, using skills and knowledge that were extrapolated from 
those used to manage the cancer death. I have argued that hospices appear to operate 
at three different levels of consciousness in carrying out their primary tasks in the 
delivery of specialist palliative care. What they say they are doing and what they 
really believe they are doing is providing the so called ‘good death’. What may 
actually be going on, at an unconscious level, is related to how the ‘good death’ is 
achieved. The primary strategy that was used (in-house) was that of controlling the 
anxiety that the event of the variant CJD death created within the hospice 
environment. The findings confirm other work that has examined the management of 
organisational anxiety within health care environments.
I have presented the hospice as a metaphorical ‘container’, i.e. an open system, with 
input, throughput and output of people who are dying, and their families. Within this 
model boundary management was an important consideration. The ‘container’, was 
shown to have metaphorical ‘floodgates’, through which the inputs and outputs were 
controlled. These ‘floodgates’ could both hold-out the ‘floods’ of potential cases of 
variant CJD, and close-in and protect the person with variant CJD and their family
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after admission. The opening and shutting of these gates was the way in which the 
system boundaries were managed.
This thesis will always be a ‘work in progress’ and ‘Dealing with the unknown’ is a 
theoretical explanation that offers some insights into hospice practices and how 
practitioners dealt with the new disease of variant CJD. It is also a theory that could 
be offered to explain a new event in other settings and as a fr amework for others to 
refine, revoke or develop.
308
References
A804322 (Entry ID to von Hagen website) (2003) Gunther Von Hagen and 
Piastination. www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A804322 (Accessed 20/01/03)
Aakerlund B. M. and Norberg A. (1986) Group psychotherapy with demented 
patients. Geriatric Nursing, 7: 83-84.
Adams T. (1999) Developing partnership in dementia care: a discursive model of 
practice. In: Adams T. and Clarke C. (eds) Dementia Care: Developing Partnerships 
in Practice. Bailliere Tindall: London. 37-56.
Adams T. and Bartlett R. (2003) Constructing dementia. In: Adams T. and Manthorpe 
J. (eds) Dementia Care. Arnold: London. 3-21.
Adams T. and Gardiner P. (2005) Communication and interaction with dementia care 
\n?Ldis. Dementia. 4(2) 185-205.
Addington-Hall J. M. (1998) Reaching Out: Specialist Palliative Care for Adults with 
Non-malignant Disease. National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care 
Services and Scottish Partnership Agency for Palliative and Cancer Care. Occasional 
Paper 14, Department of Palliative Care and Policy: London.
Addington-Hall J. M. (2000) Positive Partnerships: Palliative Care for Adults with 
Severe Mental Health Problems. National Council for Hospice and Specialist 
Palliative Care Services and Scottish Partnership Agency for Palliative and Cancer 
Care. Occasional Paper 17, Department of Palliative Care and Policy: London.
Addington-Hall J. M. and McCarthy M. (1995a) Regional study of the care for the 
dying: methods and sample characteristics. Palliative Medicine. 9:27-35.
Addington-Hall J. M. and McCaifhy M. (1995b) Dying form cancer: results of a 
national population-based investigation. Palliative Medicine. 9:295-305.
Addington-Hall J. M., Fakhoury W. and McCarthy M. (1998) Specialist palliative 
care in non-malignant disease. Palliative Medicine. 12:417-427.
Addington-Hall J. M. and McPherson C. (2001) After-death interviews with 
surrogate/bereaved family members: some issues of validity. Journal o f Pain and 
Symptom Management, 22(3) 784-790.
Addington-Hall J. M. and Higginson I. J. (eds) (2001) Palliative Care for Non-Cancer 
Patients. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Ahmedzai S. (1993) The medicalization of dying: a doctor’s view. In: Clark D. (ed) 
The Future for Palliative Care. Open University Press: Buckingham. 140-147.
Alunedzai S. (1994) A defence of médicalisation. (Editorial) Progress in Palliative 
Care. 2(4) 121-125.
309
Ahuja A. (2002) The metal detector. The Times, Monday, February 4:11.
Albinsson L. and Strang P. (2002) A palliative approach to existential issues and 
death in end-stage dementia care. Journal o f Palliative Care, 18:168-174.
Albinsson L. and Strang P. (2003) Differences in supporting families of dementia 
patients and cancer patients: a palliative perspective. Palliative Medicine. 17:359-367.
Allmark P. (2002) Death with dignity. Journal o f Medical Ethics. 28:255-257.
Allroggen H., Dennis G., Abbott R. J. and Pye I, F. (2000) New variant Creutzfeldt- 
Jakob disease: three case reports from Leicestershire. Journal o f Neurological and 
Neurosurgical Psychiatry. 68:375-378.
Andershed B. and Temestedt B. (2001) Development of a theoretical framework 
describing relatives’ involvement in palliative care. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 
34(4) 554-562.
Andrews N. J. (2005) Incidence o f variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease onsets and 
deaths in the UK. Statistics Unit, CD SC, Health Protection Agency. 
www.cid.ed.ac.uk/vcidq.htm f Accessed 18/03/05)
Andrews N. J., Farrington C. P., Ward H. J. T., Consens S. N., Smith P. G., 
Molesworth A. M., Knight R. S. G., Ironside J. W. and Will R. G. (2003) Deaths from 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet. 361(9359) 751-752.
Armes P. J. and Addington-Hall J. M. (2003) Perspectives on symptom control in 
patients receiving community palliative care. Palliative Medicine. 17:608-615.
Armstrong D., Gosling A., Weimnan J. and Marteau T. (1997) The place of inter-rater 
reliability in qualitative research: an empirical study. Sociology. 31(3) 597-606.
Asia News Yahoo. (2005) 1st CJD patient in Japan likely infected in stay in Britain. 
www.asia.news.vahoo.eom/050307/kvodo/d88m71do0.htm (Accessed 11/03/05)
Atkinson P. and Coffey A. (1997) Analysing documentary realities. In: Silverman D. 
(ed) Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 45-62.
Atkinson P. and Coffey A. (2003) Revisiting the relationship between participant 
observation and interviewing. In: Gubrium J. F. and Holstein J. A. (eds) Postmodern 
Interviewing. Sage: London. 109-122
Atkinson P. and Housley W. (2003) Interactionism. Sage: London.
Aust C. F. (2003) Factors in the appeal of news. In: Bryant J., Roskos-Ewoldsen D. 
and Cantor J. (eds) Communication and Emotion: Essays in Honour ofDolfZillmann. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: London. 511-530.
310
Bailey B., Aranda S., Quinn K, and Kean H. (2000) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: 
extending palliative care nursing knowledge. International Journal o f Palliative 
Nursing. 6(3) 131-139.
Barnett F. (2002) Nursing patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease at home, 
British Journal o f Community Nursing. 7(9) 445-450.
Bateman D., Hilton D., Love S., Zeidler M., Beck J. and Collinge J. (1995) Sporadic 
Creutzeldfelt-Jakob disease in an 18-year-old in the UK. Lancet, 346:1155-6.
Bauby J. (1997) The Diving-Bell and the Butterfly. Fourth Estate: London. Translated 
by Jeremy Leggatt.
BBC (2002a) Medicines could carry vCJD. Health, 18*^* March 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/1225284.stm (Accessed 30/09/02).
BBC (2002b) Baby food meat risk probed. Health, 10**' October. 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/liealth/2316791.stm (Accessed 12/10/02)
Beauchamp T. L. and Childress J. F. (2001) Principle o f Medical Ethics. (5^  ^edition) 
Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Beaver K., Luker K. and Woods S. (1999) Conducting research with the terminally ill: 
challenges and considerations. International Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 5(1) 13-
17.
Beck U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage: London. Translated by 
Mark Ritter.
Beck U. (1995) Ecological Politics in an Age o f Risk. Polity Press: Cambridge.
Beck U. (2000) Risk society revisited: theory, politics and research programmes. In: 
Adams B., Beck U. and van Loon J. (eds) The Risk Society and Beyond. Sage:
London. 211-229. Translated by Amos Weitz.
Belkin N. L. (2003) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: identifying prions and carriers. AORN 
Journal. 78(2) 204-210.
Benoliel J. Q. (1996) Grounded theory and nursing knowledge. Qualitative Health 
Research. 6(3) 406-428.
Berrios G. E. and Freeman H. L. (1991) Introduction. In: Berrios G. E. and Freeman 
H. L. (eds) Alzheimer and Dementias. Royal Society of Medicine Services: London. 
1- 8.
Beyless A. (2001). An overwhelming irrational fear. Lancet Supplement 358. s54.
Bingham B. (2002) New variant CJD -  BSE (mad cow disease). The need for 
disposable ENT instruments. International Journal o f Paediatric 
Otorhinolaryngology. 62(3) 203-206.
311
Bird S. M. (2004) Recipients of blood or blood products “at vCJD risk”. (Editorial) 
British Medical Journal. 328:118-119.
Biswas B. (1993) The medicalization of dying: a nurse’s view. In: Clark D. (ed) The 
Future for Palliative Care. Open University Press: Buckingham. 132-139.
Black C., Hanson E., Cutcliffe J. and Goward P. (2001) Palliative care nurses and 
mental health nurses: sharing common ground? International Journal o f Palliative 
Nursing. 7(1) 17-23.
Black D. and Jolley D. (1990) Slow euthanasia? The deaths of psychogeriatric 
patients. British Medical Journal. 300:1321-1323.
Blank R. H. (2001) Technology and death policy: redefining death. Mortality. 6(2) 
191-202.
Bleathman C. and Morton I. (1992) Validation therapy: extracts from 20 groups with 
dementia sufferers. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 17(6) 658-666.
Blumer H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism. University of California Press: London.
Bosek M. S. D., Lowry E., Lindeman D. A., Burck J. R. and Geyther L. (2003) 
Promoting a good death for persons with dementia in nursing facilities: family 
caregivers’ JONA’S Healthcare, Law. Ethics, and Regulation. 5(2) 34-
41.
Bow J. (2002) When it’s all over. Alzheimer's Care Quarterly. 3(3) 191-193.
Bradshaw A. (1996) The spiritual dimension of hospice: the secularization of an ideal. 
Social Science and Medicine. 43:3 409-419.
Brajtman S. (2005) Teiminal restlessness: perspectives of an interdisciplinary 
palliative care team. International Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 11(4) 170-178.
Brechling B. G. and Kuhn D. (1989) A specialized hospice for dementia patients and 
their families. The American Journal o f Hospice Care  ^May/June: 27-30.
Brehony K. A. (1999) Ordinary Grace: An Examination o f the Roots o f Compassion, 
Altruism, and Empathy, and the Ordinary Individuals Who Help Others in 
Extraordinary Ways. Riverhead Books: New York.
Bright R. (1992) Music therapy in the management of dementia. In: Jones G. M. M. 
and Miesen B. M. L. (eds) Care-giving in Dementia. Research and Applications. 
(Volume 1). Routledge: London. 162-180.
British Medical Journal Rapid Response Website (2004) 
www.bmi.com%macklin%20327%20r7429J%201419.htm (Accessed 19/01/04)
312
Britton T. C., Al-SaiTaj S., Shaw C., Campbell T. and Collinge J. (1995) Sporadic 
Creutfeldt-Jakob disease in a 16-year-old in the UK. Lancet 346:1155.
Broeckaert B. and Nunez Olarte J. M. N. (2002) Sedation in palliative care: facts and 
concepts. In: ten Have H. and Clark D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open 
University Press: Buckingham. 166-180.
Brookes R. (1999) Newspaper and national identity: the BSE/CJD crisis and the 
British press. Media Culture and Society. 21:247-263.
Brown P. (2000) The risk of blood-bome Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Developments in 
Biological Standardization. 102:53-59.
Brown P. (2001a) Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease. BritishMedicalJournal. 322(7290) 841-844.
Brown P. (2001b) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: blood infectivity and screening tests. 
Seminars in Haematology 38 (Oct. 4 Supplement 9) 2-6.
Brown P., Will R. G., Bradley R., Asher D. M. and Detwiler L. (2001) Bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: background, 
evolution, and current concerns. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 7(1) 6-16.
Broxmeyer L. (2004) Is mad cow disease caused by a bacteria? Medical Hypotheses. 
63:731-739.
Bruce M. E., Will R. G., Ironside J. W., McConnell L, Diummond D., Suttle A., 
McCardle L., Chree A., Hope J., Birkett C., Consens S., Fraser H. and Bostok C. J. 
(1997) Transmission to mice indicate that ‘new variant’ CJD is caused by the BSE 
agent. Nature. 389:498-501.
Bryden C. (2005) Dancing with Dementia. Jessica Kingsley Publishers: London.
Bums N. and Grove S. K. (2001) (4**^ ed) The Practice o f Nursing Research. W.B. 
Saunders Company: London.
Burrell G. and Morgan G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. Heinemann: London.
Buzan T. and Buzan B. (2003) The Mind Map Book: Radiant Thinking. BBC Books: 
London.
Buzan T. (2004) Mind Maps at Work. Harper Collins: London.
Campbell A. V. (1984) Moderated Love: a Theology o f Professional Care. SPCK: 
London.
Caraceni A. and Grassi L. (2003) Delirium: Acute Confusional States in Palliative 
Medicine. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
313
Caraceni A., Martini C. and Simonetti F. (2004) Neurological problems in advanced 
cancer. In: Doyle D., Hanks G., Cherny N. and Caiman K. (eds) Oxford Textbook o f 
Palliative Medicine. (3^  ^edition) Oxford University Press: Oxford. 702-726.
Centeno C., Sanz A. and Bruera E. (2004) Delirium in advanced cancer patients. 
Palliative Medicine. 18:184-194.
Central Office for Research Ethics Committees (COREC) (2004) Working Group on 
Ethical Review o f Student research in the NHS. www.corec.org.uk/specs.htm. 
(Accessed 11/03/04)
Charmaz K, (1991) Good Days, Bad Days: The Self in Chronic Illness and Time. 
Rutgers University Press: Brunswick, NJ.
Charmaz K. (2000) Grounded theory: objectivist and constructivist methods. In 
Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S. (eds) Handbook o f Qualitative Research. (2"  ^edition) 
Sage: London. 509-536.
Charmaz K. (2003a) Grounded theory: objectivist and constructivist methods. In 
Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S. (eds) Strategies o f Qualitative Inquiry. (2*^  ^edition) 
Sage: London. 249-290.
Charmaz K. (2003b) Qualitative interviewing and grounded theory analysis. In: 
Holstein J. A. and Gubrium J. F. (eds) Inside Interviewing. Sage: London. 311-330.
Charmaz K (2004) Premises, principles, and practices in qualitative research: 
revisiting the foundations. Qualitative Health Research. 14(7) 976-993.
Charon J. M. (2001) (7^ *^  ed) Symbolic Interactionism: An Introduction, An 
Interpretation, An Integration. Prentice Hall: New Jersey.
Chater S., Viola R., Paterson J. and Jarvis V. (1998) Sedation for intractable distress 
in the dying - a survey of experts. Palliative Medicine. 12:255-269.
Chenitz W. C. and Swanson J. M. (1986) From Practice to Grounded Theory: 
Qualitative Research in Nursing. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company: Wokingham, 
UK.
Chesebro B. (2003) Introduction to the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies or 
prion disease. British Medical Journal. 66:1-20.
Cheston R. and Bender M. (1999) Understanding Dementia. Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers: London.
Chiovitti R. F. and Piran N. (2003) Rigour and grounded theory research. Journal o f 
Advanced Nursing. 44(4) 427-435.
Chochinov H. M., Hack T., Hassard T., Kristjanson J., McClement S. and Harlos M. 
(2002) Dignity in the tenninally ill: a cross-sectional, cohort study. Lancet. 360(9350) 
2026-2030.
314
Chochinov H. M. (2002) Dignity-conserving care -  a new model for palliative care: 
helping the patient feel valued. Journal o f the American Medical Association. 287(17) 
2253-2260.
CJD Support Network (2004) Carers’ view. www.cidsunport.net/caiersviews.html 
(Accessed 19/03/05)
CJD Support Network Newsletter (2003) Sporadic CJD linked to BSE. Issue 12: May.
Clark D. (1993) Whither the hospices? hi: Clark D. (ed) The Future for Palliative 
Care. Open University Press: Buckingham. 166-177
Clark D. (1999) ‘Total pain’, disciplinary power and the body in work of Cicely 
Saunders, 1958-1967. Social Science and Medicine. 49:727-736.
Clark D. (2002) Between hope and acceptance: the médicalisation of dying. British 
Medical Journal. 324:905-907.
Clark D., ten Have H. and Janssens R. (2002) Conceptual tensions in European 
palliative care. In: ten Have H. and Clark D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open 
University Press: Buckingliam. 52-65.
Clark D. and Seymour J. (1999) Reflections on Palliative Care. Open University 
Press: Buckingham.
Clark D., Small N., Wright M., Winslow M. and Hughes N. (2005) A Bit o f Heaven 
for the Few: An Oral History o f the Modern Hospice Movement in the United 
Kingdom. Observatory Publications: Lancaster.
Clarke C. L. (1999) Family care-giving for people with dementia: some implications 
for policy and professional practice. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 29(3) 712-720.
Clarke R. (2004) Precious experience beyond mere words.. Journal o f Dementia 
Care. 12(3) 22,23.
Clarkson D. (2000) Cross infection of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Nursing Times 96(6) 
43.
Clulow C. (1994) Balancing care and control: The supei*visory relationship as a focus 
for promoting organizational health. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The 
Unconscious at Work: Individual and Organizational Stress in the Human Services. 
Routledge: London. 179-186.
Collinge J. (2001) vCJD may take 30 years to show. BBC News Online. Thursday 
22"*' March.
Collins S., Law M. G., Fletcher A., Boyd A., Kaldor J. and Masters C. L. (1999) 
Surgical treatment and risk of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a case-control 
study. Lancet 353(9154) 693-697.
315
Copp G. (1996) Facing Impending Death: the Experiences o f Patients and Their 
Nurses in a Hospice Setting. PhD Thesis, Oxford Brooks University: Oxford.
Copp G. (1999) Facing Impending Death: Experiences o f Patients and Their Nurses. 
Nursing Times Books: London.
Consens S. N., Vynnycky E., Zeidler M., Will R. G. and Smith P. G. (1997)
Predicting the CJD epidemic in humans. Nature. 385:197-198.
Cowie H. (2004) Emotional Health and Well-Being. Paul Chapman Publishing: 
London.
Crawford C. (1998) The theory of evolution in the study of human behaviour: An 
introduction and overview. In: Crawford C. and Krebs D. L. (eds) Handbook o f 
Evolutionary Psychology. Mahwah: New Jersey. 3-41.
Creswell J. W. (1998) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Sage: London.
Croes E. A., Roks G., Jansen G. H., Nijssen P. C. G and van Duijn C. M. (2002) 
Creutzefeldt-Jakob disease 38 years after diagnostic use of human growth hormone. 
Journal o f Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry. 72:792-793.
Crozier W. R. and Dimmock P. S. (1999) Name-calling and nicknames in a sample of 
primary school children. British Journal o f Educational Psychology. 69: 505-516.
Cutcliffe J. R., Black C., Hanson E. and Goward P. (2001a) The commonality and 
synchronicity of mental health nurses and palliative care nurse: closer than you think? 
Part one Journal o f Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing. 8:53-59.
Cutcliffe J. R., Black C,, Hanson E. and Goward P. (2001b) The commonality and 
synchronicity of mental health nurses and palliative care nurse: closer than you think? 
Part two Journal o f Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing. 8:61-66.
Czechmeister C. A. (1994) Metaphor in illness and nursing: a two-edged sword. A 
discussion of the use of metaphor in everyday language, and the implications of 
nursing and nursing education. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 19:1226-1233.
Daker-White G., Beattie A., Means R. and Gilliaid J. (2002) Serving the needs of 
marginalised groups in dementia care: younger people and minority ethnic groups. 
University of the West of England, Bristol and Dementia Voice, the dementia services 
development centre for South West England.
DartingtonT., Miller E. and Gwynne G. (1981)/! Life Together: The Distribution o f 
Attitudes Around the Disabled. Tavistock Publications: London.
Davis H. and McLeod S. L. (2003) Why humans value sensational news: an 
evolutionary perspective. Evolution and Human Behaviour. 24:208-216.
de Beauvoir S. (1970) Old Age. Penguin Books: London.
316
Dekkers W., Sandman L. and Webb P. (2002) Good death or good life as a goal of 
palliative care. In: ten Have H. and Clark D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open 
University Press: Buckingham. 106-125.
DelVecchio Good M.-J., Gadmer N. M., Ruopp P., Lakoma M., Sullivan A. M., 
Redinbaugh E., Arnold R. M. and Block S. D. (2004) Narrative nuances on good and 
bad deaths: internists’ tales from high-technology work places. Social Science and 
Medicine. 58(5) 939-953.
Denscombe M. (1998) The Good Research Guide. Open University Press: 
Buckingham.
Denzin N. K. (1983) Interpretive Interactionism In: Morgan G. (ed) Beyond Method. 
Sage: London. 129-159.
Denzin N. K. (1989) Interpretive Interactionism. In: Fontana A. and Frey J. H. (1994) 
Interviewing: the art and science. In: Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S. (eds) Handbook 
o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 361-376.
Denzin N. K. (1998) The art and politics of interpretation. In: Denzin N. K. and 
Lincoln Y. S. (eds) Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials. Sage: London. 
313-371.
Denzin N. K. and Lincoln Y. S. (1994) Entering the field of research. In: Denzin N.
K. and Lincoln Y. S. Handbook o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 1-17.
Department of Health (2001) Trial o f treatment for Creutzfeld-Jakob disease 
announced. Press release, Department of health: London.
Department of Health (2003) Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents: Safe 
Working and the Prevention o f Infection. Department of Health: London.
Department of Health (2005) End O f Life Initiative.
www.dh.gov.uk/PolicvAndGuidance/QrganisationPolicv/EndOfLifeCare7fs/en
de Raeve L. (1994) Ethical issues in palliative care research. Palliative Medicine. 
8:298-305.
de Vries K. (2000a) Case Study On How Role-Models Influence Palliative Care 
Nurses in Their Choice o f Career. MSc Dissertation, Education Studies, University of 
Surrey, Guildford.
de Vries K. (2000b) Choosing to nurse the dying. European Journal o f Palliative 
Care. 8(1) 17,18.
de Vries K. (2003a) Nursing patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 
European Journal o f Palliative Care. 10(1) 9-12.
317
de Vries K. (2003b) The experience o f caring for patients with variant Creutzfeldt- 
Jakob disease (vCJD) in the hospice environment: report on pilot study. Paper 
Presentation, Prion Centre, St Mary’s Hospital, Paddington: London.
de Vries K. (2004) Dealing with the unknown ’: A sociological perspective on variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Paper presentation, The British Sociological Association 
Annual Conference. York.
de Vries K., Sque M. R., Bryan K. and Abu-Saad H. (2003) Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease: need for mental health and palliative care team collaboration. International 
Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 9(12) 512-520.
Dey I. (1999) Grounding Grounded Theory: Guidelines for Qualitative Inquiry. 
Academic Press: London.
Doka K. (1997) Aids, Fear, and Society Taylor & Francis: Washington DC.
Douglas C. (1992) For all the Saints. British Medical Journal. 304:579.
Douglas M. J., Campbell H. and Will R. G. (1999) Patients with New Variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Their Families: Care and Information Needs. National 
Surveillance Unit for CJD: Edinburgh.
Douglas M. (1987) How Institutions Think. Routledge & Regan Paul: London.
Downie J. (2004) Unilateral withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining 
treatment: a violation of dignity under the law in Canada. Journal o f  Palliative Care. 
20(3) 143-149.
Doyle D (1993) Specialist palliative care services defined. In: National Council for 
Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services (NCHSPCS). Needs Assessment for 
Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services: From Philosophy to Contracts. 
NCHSPCS. Papers presented at a Conference sponsored by Janssen Phaimaceutical 
Ltd, 19^  ^April: London. 11-15.
Doyle D. (1997) Dilemmas and Directions: The Future o f Specialist Palliative Care.
A Discussion Paper. National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care 
Services NCHSPCS: London.
du Boulay S. (1984) Cicley Saunders. Hodder and Stoughton: London.
Dyer C. (2003) Second vCJD patient to receive experimental tieatment. British 
MedicalJournal. News Item. 327:886.
Dyke M. (1997) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease -  An emerging risk. British Journal o f 
Theatre Nursing. 7(8) 33-38.
Eagle L. (2002) What Factors Influence the Decision Making Process When 
Prioritising Patient Need for Hospice In-Patient Admission? MSc Dissertation, 
University of Suney: Guildford.
318
Eagle L. and de Vries K. (2005) Exploration of the decision-making process for in­
patient hospice admission. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 52(6) 584-591.
Enes T. (2000) An Exploration o f Dignity in Palliative Care. MSc Dissertation: 
King’s College, University of London: London.
Enes S. P. D. (2003) An exploration of dignity in palliative care. Palliative Medicine. 
17:263-269.
Engelhardt H. T. (1986) The Foundation o f Bioethics. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford.
Entwistle V. and Sheldon T. (1999) The picture of health? Media coverage of the 
health service. In Franklin B. (ed) Social Policy, the Media and Misrepresentation. 
Routledge: London. 118-134.
Eve A. and Smith A. E. (1996) Survey of hospice and palliative care inpatient units in 
the UK and Ireland. Palliative Medicine 10:13-21.
Ewing G., Rogers M., Barclay S., McCabe J., Martin A. and Todd C. (2004) 
Recruiting patients into a primary care based study of palliative care: why is it so 
difficult? Palliative Medicine. 18:452-459.
Exline J. J. and Geyer A. L (2004) Perceptions of humility: a preliminary study. Self 
and Identity. 3(2) 95-114.
Fainsinger R. L., de Moissac D., Mancini I. and Oneschuk D. (2000a) Sedation for 
delirium and other symptoms in terminally ill patients in Edmonton. Journal o f 
Palliative Care. 16(2) 5-10.
Fainsinger R. L., Waller A., Bercovici M., Bengtson K., Landman W., Hosking M., 
Nunez-Olarte J. M. and de Moissac D. (2000b) A multicentre international study of 
sedation for uncontrolled symptoms of terminally ill patients. Palliative Medicine. 
14:257-265.
Fakhoury W. K. H., McCarthy M. and Addington-Hall J. M. (1997) The effects of 
clinical char acteristics of dying patients on informal caregivers’ satisfaction with 
palliative care. Palliative Medicine. 11:107-115.
Ferguson N. M., Ghani A .C., Donnelly C. A., Hagenaars T. J. and Anderson R. M. 
(2002) Estimating the human health risk from possible BSE infection of the British 
sheep flock. Nature. 415(6870) 420-424.
Field D. (1994) Palliative medicine and the medicalization of death. European 
Journal o f Cancer 3:58-62.
Field D. (1996) Awareness and modern dying. Mortality. 1(3) 255-265.
319
Field D. and Copp G. (1999) Communication and awareness about dying in the 
1990s. Palliative Medicine. 13:459-468.
Field D. and Addington-Hall J. (1999) Extending specialist palliative care to all? 
Social Science and Medicine. 48:1271-1280.
Fielding N. G. and Lee R. M, (1991) Computing for qualitative research: Options, 
problems and potential. In: Fielding N. G. and Lee R. M. (eds) Computer analysis and 
qualitative research. Sage: London. 1-15.
Fielding N. G. and Lee R. M. (1998) Computer analysis and qualitative research. 
Sage: London
Finkelstein L. E., Mendelson M. H., Tejero C. and Troccoli J. (1998) Creutzfeldt- 
Jakob disease (Infection Control) American Journal o f Nursing. 98(9) 66-67.
Fitzgerald L. and van Hooft S. (2000) A Socratic dialogue on the question ‘What is 
love in nursing?’ Nursing Ethics. 7(6) 481-491.
Forbes S, Bem-Klug M and Gessert C (2000) End-of-life decision making for nursing 
home residents with dementia. Journal o f Nursing Scholarship. 32(3) 251-258.
Fontana A. and Frey J. H. (1994) hiterviewing: the art of science. In: Denzin N. K. 
and Lincoln Y. S. (eds) Handbook o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 361-276.
Frank A. W. (2004a) Dignity, dialogue, and care. Journal o f Palliative Care. 20(3) 
207-211.
Frank A. W. (2004b) Can we research suffering? In: Seale C (ed) Social Research 
Methods: A Reader. Routledge: London. 420-424.
Fried T. R., van Doom C., O’Leary J. R., Tinetti M. E. and Drickamer M. A. (1999) 
Older persons’ preferences for site of terminal care. Annals o f Internal Medicine. 
131:109-112,
Froggatt K (1995) Keeping the Balance: Hospice Work, Death and Emotions. PhD 
Dissertation, South Bank University: London.
Froggatt K (1997) Rites of passage and the hospice culture. Mortality. 2(2) 123-136.
Froggatt K. (1998) The place of metaphor and language in exploring nurses’ 
emotional work. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 28(2) 332-338.
Fu-Chang Tsai D. (2001) How should doctors approach patients? A Confucian 
reflection on personhood. Journal o f Medical Ethics. 27:44-50.
Gabriel Y. (1999) Organisations in Depth. Sage: London.
Gaffin J. (1996) Achievements and intentions: the work of the NCHSPCS. European 
Journal o f Palliative Care. 3(3) 100-104.
320
Gallant M. H., Beaulieu M. C. and Camevale F. A. (2002) Partnership: an analysis of 
the concept wiÜiin the nurse-client relationship. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 40(2) 
149-157.
Gannon C. (2002) A Comparison o f Urgent and Non-urgent Hospice Admissions. 
Unpublished MSc Dissertation. University College of Wales: Cardiff.
Garnett M. J. (2000) Out o f This World: An Exploration in the Use o f Complementary 
Therapies by Those Who Nurse the Dying. PhD Thesis, Goldsmith’s University: 
University of London: London.
Garofalo O., McFarlane E. H., lyegbe C., Wliatley S. A., Campbell 1. C., Kopp N. and 
Will R.G. (2001) Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is not associated with individual 
abilities to metabolise organophosphates. Journal o f Neurology, Neurosurgery and 
Psychiatry. 71(4) 558-559.
Gessert C. E., Forbes S. and Bem-Klug M. (2001) Planning end-of-life care for 
families with dementia: roles of families and health professionals. Omega; Journal o f 
Death and Dying. 42(4) 273-291.
Giddens A. (1999) Runaway World. Profile Books Ltd: London.
Glaser B. G. (1978) Theoretical Sensitivity, Sociological Press: Mill Valley, CA.
Glaser B. G. (1992) Basics o f Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence vs Forcing. 
Sociology Press: Mill Valley, CA.
Glaser B. G. (2005) The Grounded Theory Perspective III: Theoretical Coding. 
Sociology Press: Mill Valley, CA.
Glaser B. G. and Strauss A. L. (1965) Awareness o f Dying. Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 
London.
Glaser B. G. and Strauss A. L. (1967) The Discovery o f Grounded Theory.
Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London.
Glaser B. G. and Strauss A. L. (1968) Time for Dying. Aldine: Chicago.
Goddard M. (1993) The importance of assessing the effectiveness of care: the case of 
hospices. Journal o f Social Policy. 22:1-17.
Goffman E. (\96\) Asylums. Penguin Books: London.
Goffman E. (1959) The Presentation o f Self in Everyday Life. Penguin Books:
London.
Grande G. E., Todd C. J., Barclay S. I. G. and Doyle J. H. (1996) What terminally ill 
patients value in the support provided by GPs, district and Macmillan nurses. 
International Journal o f Palliative Care Nursing. 2:138-143.
321
Grande G. E., Todd C. J. and Barclay S. I. G. (1997) Support needs in the last year of 
life: patient and carer dilemmas. Palliative Medicine. 11:202-208.
Grande G. E., Addington-Hall J. M. and Todd C. J. (1998) Place of death and access 
to home care services: are certain patient groups at a disadvantage. Social Science and 
Medicine. 47(5) 565-579.
Grande G, E., McKerral A., Addington-Hall J. M. and Todd C. J. (2003) Place of 
death and use of health services in the last year of life. Journal o f Palliative Care. 
19(4) 263-270.
Guardian Unlimited (2004) Killer in the shadows.
www.societv.guardian.co.uk/health/storv/0.7890.1269844.00.html (Accessed 
22/09/04)
Guba E. G. and Lincoln Y. S. (1994) Competing paradigms in qualitative research hi: 
Denzin N K and Lincoln Y S (eds) Handbook o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 
105-117.
Gubrium J. F. (1986) The social preservation of mind: The Alzheimer’s disease 
experience. Symbolic Interactionism. 9(1) 37-51.
Halton W. (1994) Some unconscious aspects of organisational life: contributions from 
psychoanalysis. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work; 
Individual and Organisational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 11-
18.
Hammersley M. (1990) Reading Ethnographic Research: a Critical Guide.
Longmans: London.
Hammersley M. and Atkinson (1995) Ethnography: Principles and Practice. (2“*^ 
edition) Routledge: London.
Hanrahan P. and Luchins D. (1995a) Feasibility criteria for enrolling end-stage 
dementia patients in home hospice care. The Hospice Journal. 10(3) 47-54.
Hanrahan P. and Luchins D.J. (1995b) Access to hospice care for end-stage dementia 
patients: a national survey of hospice programmes. Journal o f the American Geriatric 
Society,_ 43(1) 56-59.
Hanrahan P., Raymond M., McGowan E. and Luchins D. J. (1999) Criteria for 
enrolling dementia patients in hospice: a replication. American Journal o f Hospice 
and Palliative Care. Jan-Feb, 16(1) 395-400.
Hansel P. A. (1999) Mad cow disease-the OR connection, AORN Journal. 70(2) 224- 
236.
322
Harding R., Easterbrook P., Higginson I. J., Raveis D. K. V. H. and Marconi K.
(2005) Access and equity in HIV/AIDS palliative care: a review of the evidence and 
responses. Palliative Medicine. 19:251-258.
Hart B., Sainsbury P. and Short S. (1998) Wliose dying? A sociological critique of the 
‘good death’. Mortality. 3(1) 65-77.
Harvey J. (1998) Younger onset dementia: epidemiology, clinical symptoms, family 
burden, support and outcome. NHS Executive North Thames: London.
Haslam S. R. (2004) Psychology in Organizations: The Social Identity Approach. (2”^  
ed.). Sage: London.
Hassard J. (1993) Sociology and Organisation Theory. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.
Hausman C. (1992) Dynamic psychotherapy with elderly demented patients. In: Jones 
G. M. M. and Miesen B. M. L. (eds) Care-giving in Dementia. Research and 
Applications .(Volume 1). Routledge: London. 181-198.
Heath H. and Cowley S. (2004) Developing a grounded theory approach: a 
comparison of Glaser and Strauss. InternationalJournal o f Nursing Studies. 41:141- 
150.
Hellstrom I., Nolan M. and Lundh U. (2005) Awareness context theory and the 
dynamics of dementia: Improving understanding using emergent fit. Dementia. 4(2) 
269-295.
Help the Hospices (2005) Hospice and Palliative Care Directory; United Kingdom 
and Ireland 2005. Help the Hospices: London.
Henry C., Lowman A. and Will R. G. (2002) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in elderly 
people. Age and Ageing. 31:7-10.
Heimans D., Lisaerde J. and Triau E. (1989) Sense and non-sense of a technological 
health care model in terminally ill demented patients. In: Ryan D. P. and Zorzitto M. 
L. The First International Conference on the Palliative Care of the Elderly: An 
Overview. Journal o f Palliative Care. 5(4) 39-42.
Herskovits E. (1995) Stmggling over subjectivity: debates about the “Self’ and 
Alzheimer’s disease. Medical Anthropology Quarterly. 9(2) 146-164.
Hewitt P. E. and Llewelyn C. A. (2001) Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance in the 
UK. Tenth Annual Report. CJD Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh.
Higginson I. J. (1993) Palliative care: A review of past changes and future trends. 
Journal o f Public Health Medicine. 15:3-8,
323
Higginson I. J., Astin P. and Dolan S. (1998) Wliere do cancer patients die? Ten-year 
trends in the place of death of cancer patients in England. Palliative Medicine. 
12:353-363.
Higginson I. J. and Sen-Gupta G, J. A. (2000) Place of caie in advanced cancer; a 
qualitative systematic literatuie review of patient preferences. Journal o f Palliative 
Medicine. 3(3) 287-300.
Higginson I. J., Hearn J., Myers K. and Naysmith A. (2000) Palliative day care: what 
do semces do? Palliative Medicine. 14:277-286.
Higginson I. J.. (2003) Priorities and Preferences for End o f Life Care in England 
Wales and Scotland. National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care 
Services (NCHSPCS): London.
Hill A. F., Butterworth R. J., Joiner S., Jackson G., Rossor M. N., Thomas D. J., Frosh 
A., Tolley N., Bell J. E., Spencer M., King A., Al-Sarraj S., Iionside J. W., Lantos P. 
L. and Collinge J. (1999) Investigation of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and other 
human prion diseases with tonsil biopsy sample. Lancet. 353(9148) 183-189.
Hillier C. E. M., Salmon R. L., Neal J. W. and Hilton D. A. (2002) Possible 
underascertainment of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: a systematic study. Journal 
o f Neurosurgery and Psychiatry. 72:304-309.
Hilton J. (1933) Lost Horizon.Vexi Books Ltd: London.
Hinshelwood R. D. and Skogstad W. (2000) The dynamics of health care institutions. 
In; Hinshelwood R. D. and Skogstad W. (eds) Observing Organisations: Anxiety, 
Defence and Culture in Health Care. Routledge: London. 3-16
Hinton J. (1994) Can home care maintain an acceptable quality of life for patients 
with terminal cancer and their relatives? Palliative Medicine. 8:183-196.
Hjeimstad M. J., Loge J. H. and Kaasa S. (2004) Methods of assessment of cognitive 
failure and delirium in palliative care patients: implications for practice and research. 
Palliative Medicine. 18:494-506.
Hochschild A. R, (2003) The Managed Heart. (Twentieth Anniversary Edition) 
University of California Press Ltd: London
Hockley J. (1997) The evolution of the hospice approach. In: Clark D., Hockley J. and 
Ahmedzai S. (eds) New Themes in Palliative Care. Open University Press: 
Buckingham. 84-100.
Hoffart N. (1991) A member check procedure to enhance rigor in naturalistic 
research. Western Journal o f Nursing Research. 13:522-534.
Hofstede G. (1991) Culture and Organisations: Software o f the Mind. McGraw-Hill: 
London.
324
Houston F., Foster J. D., Chong A., Hunter N. and Bostock C. J. (2000) Transmission 
of BSE by blood transfusion in sheep. Lancet 356:999-1000.
Hutchinson S. A., Leger-Krall S. and Wilson H. S. (1997) Early probable Alzheimer’s 
disease and awareness context theory. Social Science and Medicine. 45(9) 1399-1409.
Humphreys C. (1998) Caring for Keith. Mental Health Care 1(9) 292-293.
Hunt R (1997) Place of death of cancer patients: choice versus constraints. Progress 
in Palliative Care. 5(6) 238-241.
Hurley L., Volicer L. and Blasi Z. V. (2000) End-of-life care for patients with 
advanced dementia. JAMA. 284: 2449-2450
Illhardt F. and ten Have H. (2002) Research ethics in palliative care. In: ten Have H. 
and Clark D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open University Press:
Buckingham. 198-211.
Ingleton C., Payne S., Nolan M. and Carey I. (2003) Respite in palliative caie: a 
review and discussion of the literature. Palliative Medicine. 17:567-575.
Inouye S. K. (1994) The dilemma of delirium: clinical and research controversies 
regarding diagnosis and evaluation of delirium in hospitalised elderly medical 
patients. American Journal o f Medicine. 97:278-288.
Inouye S. K., Foreman M. D., Mion L. C. and Cooney L-M. J. (2001) Nurses’ 
recognition of delirium and its symptoms: comparison of nurse and research ratings. 
Archives o f Internal Medicine. 161:2467-2473.
Ironside J. W. and Head M. W. (2003) Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and its 
transmission by blood. Journal o f Thrombosis and Haemostasis. 1:1479-1486.
James N. and Field D. (1992) The routinization of hospice: charisma and 
bureaucratization. Social Science and Medicine. 34(12) 1363-1375.
James V and Field D. (1996) Who has the power? Some problems and issues affecting 
care of dying patients. European Journal o f Cancer Care. 5:73-80.
Jansson L., Norberg A., Sandman P. O., Athlin E. and Asplund K. (1993) Inteipreting 
facial expressions in patients in the terminal stage of Alzheimer’s disease. Omega. 
26:319-334.
Jarrett N. J., Payne S. A. and Wiles R. A. (1999) Terminally ill patients’ and lay- 
carers’ perceptions and experiences of community-based services. Journal o f  
Advanced Nursing. 29(2) 476-483.
Jha A. (2005) Call to halt decline in autopsies. The Guardian. Wednesday March 2. 
WWW.guardian.co.uk/life/news/storv (Accessed 11/03/05)
325
Johnson L, Rogers C., Biswas B and Ahmedzai S (1990) What do hospices do?
British Medical Journal. 300:791-793.
Johnson M. W. (1999) Governing hospice projects: a review of governance, 
leadership, and management as seen in the foundation of the modem hospice 
movement. Professional Papers 7(1) 21-30.
Johnston G. and Abraham C. (1995) The WHO objectives for palliative care: to what 
extent are we achieving them? Palliative Medicine. 9:123-137.
Kabel A. and Roberts D. (2003) Professionals’ perceptions of maintaining personliood 
in hospice care. International Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 9(7) 283-289.
Kaplan C, Turner G S and Warrell D A (1986) Rabies: The facts. (2"  ^edition) Oxford 
University Press: Oxford
Karlsen S. and Addington-Hall J (1998) How do cancer patients who die at home 
differ from those who die elsewhere. Palliative Medicine. 12:279-286.
Kastenbaum R. and Wilson M. (1997) Hospice care on the international scene: today 
and tomorrow. In: Saunders C. and Kastenbaum R. eds. Hospice Care on the 
International Scene. Springer Publishing Company: New York. 267-271.
Katz D. and Khan R. L. (1966) The Social Psychology o f Organisations (2"  ^edition) 
John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.
Kellehear A. (1990) Dying o f Cancer: The Final Year o f Life. Harwood Press:
London.
Kihlgren M., Hallgren A., Norberg A. and Karlsson I. (1996) Disclosure of basic 
strengths and basic weaknesses in demented patients during morning care, before and 
after staff training, analysis of video-recordings by means of the Erikson theory of 
‘eight stages of man’. International Journal o f Aging and Human Development. 
43:219-233.
Kincheloe J. L. and McLaren P. L. (1994) Rethinking critical theory and qualitative 
research. In: Denzin N K and Lincoln Y S (eds) Handbook o f Qualitative Research. 
Sage: London. 138-157.
King S. (1981) Cujo. Signet Books: New York.
Kitwood T. (1988) The technical, the personal and the framing of dementia. Social 
Behaviour. 3:161-180.
Kitwood T. (1989) Brain, mind and dementia: with particular reference to 
Alzheimer’s disease. Ageing and Society. 9:1-15.
Kitwood T. (1990) The dialectics of dementia: with particular reference to 
Alzheimer’s disease. Ageing and Society. 10:177-196.
326
Kitwood T. (1993) Towards a theory of dementia care: the interpersonal process. 
Ageing and Society. 13:51 -67.
Kitwood T. (1997) Dementia Reconsidered: The Person comes First. Open University 
Press: Buckingham.
Kitwood T. and Bredin K. (1992) Towards a theory of dementia care: personhood and 
well-being. Ageing and Society. 12:269-287.
Kitzinger J. (1994) The importance of interaction between research participants. 
Sociology o f Health and Illness, 16(1) 104-121.
Kitzinger J. (1996) Introducing focus groups. In: Mays N. and Pope C. (eds) 
Qualitative Research in Health Care. BMJ Publishing Group: London. 36-45.
Knight R. S. G. (2005) Potential Treatment for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 
www.cid.ed.ac.uk/TREAT.htm (Accessed 18/03/05)
Kolb D. A., Rubin I. M and McIntyre J. M. (1984) Organisational Psychology: 
Readings on Human Behaviour in Organisations. (4^** edition) Prentice-Hall Inc: New 
Jersey.
Kristjanson L., McPhee I., Pickstock S., Wilson D., Oldhan L. and Martin K. (2001) 
Palliative care nurses’ perceptions of good and bad deaths and care expectations: a 
qualitative analysis. International Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 7(3) 129-139.
Krueger R. A. (1994) Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research. (2*^*^ 
edition) Sage: London.
Kübler-Ross E. (1969) On Death and Dying. Macmillan: New York.
Kunz G., Cligaman D., Kortsep R., Kugler B. and Park M. (1987) A dialogal 
phenomenological study o f humility. Paper read at the Sixth International Human 
Science Research Conference, University of Ottawa, Canada, May 28.
Kunz G. (1998) The Paradox o f Power and Wealmess. State University of New York 
Press: Albany NY.
Lacey R. W. (1994) Mad Cow Disease: The history o f BSE in Britain. Cypsela 
Publications Limited: Jersey, Channel Islands.
Lakoff G. and Johnson M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By. The University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago.
Lanara V. A. (1991) Heroism as a Nursing Value: A Philosophical Perspective. 
Vassiliki A. Lanara: Athens, Greece.
Langley-Evans A. and Payne S. (1997) Liglit-hearted death talk in a palliative day 
care centre. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 26(6)1091-1097.
327
Lattanzi-Licht M. and Connor S. (1995) Care of the dying; the hospice approach. In: 
Wass H. and Neimeyer R. A. (eds) Dying: Facing the Facts. (3*^  ^ edition). Taylor & 
Francis: Washington. 143-162.
Laurance J. (2005) Cosmetic injections are linked to spread of variant CJD and 
hepatitis. The Independent, www.news.independent.co.uk/uk/health (Accessed 
02/02/05)
Lawler J (1991) Behind the Screens: Nursing, Somonology, and the Problem o f the 
Body. Churchill Livingstone: Melbourne.
Lawlor P., Gagon B., Mancici I., Pereira J., Suai’ez-Almazor M., and Bruera E. (2000) 
Occurrence, causes, and outcomes of delirium in patients with advanced cancer. 
Archives o f Internal Medicine. 160:786-794.
Lawton J. (1998a) The Disintegration o f Self: A Study o f Patients in a Day Care 
Service and a Hospice in England. PhD Thesis: University of Cambridge: Cambridge.
Lawton J. (1998b) Contemporary hospice care: the sequestration of the unbounded 
body and ‘dirty dying’. Sociology o f Health and Illness. 20(2)121-143.
Lawton J. (2000) The Dying Process: Patients ’ Experience o f Palliative Care. 
Routledge: London.
Leary D. E (1990) Psyche’s muse: the role of metaphor in the history of psychology. 
In: Leary D. E. (ed) Metaphors in the History o f Psychology. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge. 1-78.
Lee R. M. (1993) Doing Research on Sensitive Topics. Sage: London.
Lee S. and Kristjanson L. (2003) Human research ethics committees: issues in 
palliative care research. InternationalJournal o f Palliative Nursing. 9(1) 13-18.
Leichtentritt R. D. and Rettig K. D. (2000) The good death: reaching an inductive 
understanding. Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying. 41(3)221-248.
Leiper R. (1994) Evaluation: Organizations learning from experience. In: Obholzer A. 
and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work; Individual and Organisational 
Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 197-205.
Levinas E. (1985) Ethics and Infinity. (English Translation) Duquesne University 
Press: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Translated by Richard A. Cohen.
Li S. (2002) Symbiotic Niceness: A Study o f Psychosocial Care in Palliative Care 
Settings. PhD Thesis, Goldsmith’s College, University of London: London.
Lidzey A. (2004) Coma work: a new approach to withdrawn states. Journal o f 
Dementia Care. 12(3)20-22.
328
Llewelyn C. A., Hewitt P. E., Knight R, S. G., Amar K., Consens S., MacKenzie J. 
and Will R. G. (2004) Possible transfusion of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease by 
blood transfusion. Lancet. 363:422-428.
Lloyd-Williams M. (1996) An audit of palliative care in dementia. European Journal 
o f Cancer Care. 5:53-55.
Lloyd-Williams M. and Payne S. (2002) Can multidisciplinary guidelines improve the 
palliation of symptoms in the terminal phase of dementia? International Journal o f 
Palliative Nursing. 8(8) 370-375.
Lorains J. W., Henry C., Agbamu D. A. (2001) Variant CJD in an elderly patient. 
Lancet. 457:1339.
Low J. T. S. and Payne S. (1996) The good and bad death perceptions of health 
professionals working in palliative care. European Journal o f Cancer Care. 5:237- 
241.
Luchins D. J., Hanrahan P. and Murphy K. (1997) Criteria for enrolling dementia 
patients in hospice. Journal o f the American Geriatrics Society. 45(9) 1054-1059.
Luchins D. J, and Hanrahan P. (1993) What is appropriate health care for end-stage 
dementia? Journal o f the American Geriatric Society. 41:25-30.
Lundh U., Sandberg J. and Nolan M. (2000) ‘I don’t have any other choice’ : spouses’ 
experiences of placing a partner in a care home for older people in Sweden. Journal o f 
Advanced Nursing. 32(5) 1178-1186.
Lupton D. (1994) Medicine as Culture: Illness, Disease and the Body in Western 
Societies. Sage: London.
Lupton D. (1997) Food, the Body and Self. Sage: London.
Lupton D. (1999) Risk. Routledge: London.
Lyketsos C., Sheppard J. and Rabins P. V. (2000) Dementia in Elderly Persons in a 
General Hospital. The American Journal o f Psychiatry. 157(5) 704-707.
Macalister G. O. and Buckley R. J. (2002) The risk of transmission of variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease via contact lenses and ophthalmic devices. Contact Lens 
and Anterior Eye. 25(3) 104-136.
Macklin R. (2003) Dignity is a useless concept. (Editorial). British Medical Journal. 
327:1419-1420.
Maguire C. P., Kirby M., Coen R., Coakley D., Lawlor B. A. and O’Neill D. (1996) 
Family members’ attitudes toward telling the patient with Alzheimer’s disease their 
diagnosis. British Medical Journal. 313:529-530.
329
Mantzoukas S. (2004) Issues of representation within qualitative inquiiy. Qualitative 
Health Research. 14(7) 994-1007.
Marks N. (2003) Journalists debate the limits of hoixor. British MedicalJournal. 
326(7393) 828.
Marshelle H. (2002) Descending into delirium: confusion, isolation, forgetfulness, 
lethargy: as one case study shows, older people with dementia and depression are 
especially vulnerable to the vagaries of delirium. American Journal o f Nursing, 
102(3) 49-56.
Martin G. (1998) Empoweiment of dying patients: the strategies and barriers to 
patient autonomy. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 28(4) 737-744.
Mason J. (2002) Qualitative Researching. (2"  ^edition). Sage: London.
Masson J. D. (2002) Non-professional perceptions of ‘good death’: a study of the 
views of hospice care patients and relatives of deceased hospice care patients. 
Mortality. 7(2) 191-209.
Mayeroff M. (1972) On Caring. Harper Row: London.
Mayor S. (2003) Small improvement seen in teenager with vCJD. British Medical 
Journal. News Item. 327:765.
Mazairac G. (2004) Road Trauma, a socially accepted horror movie. British Medical 
Journal. 328(7444) 903.
McAndrew F. T. and Milenkovic M. A. (2002) Of Tabloids and Family Secrets: The 
Evolutionary Psychology of Gossip. Journal o f Applied Social Psychology. 32(5) 
1064-1082.
McCarthy M., Addington-Hall J. M. and Altman D. (1997) The experience of dying 
with dementia: a retrospective study. International Journal o f Geriatric Psychiatry. 
12:404-409.
McClement S. E., Chochinov H. M,, Hack H. F., Kristjanson L. J. and Harlos M. 
(2004) Dignity-conserving care: application of research findings in practice. 
International Journal o f Palliative Nursing, 10(4) 173-179.
McConville B. (2000) An expert in his field. The Times Magazine. Saturday, 5(19) 
72-75.
McCormack B. (2004) Person-centredness in gerontological nursing: an overview of 
the literature. International Journal o f Older People Nursing. 13(3) 31-38.
McNamara B., Waddel D. and Colvin M. (1994) The institutionalisation of the good 
death. Social Science Medicine. 39(11)1501-1508.
330 I
I
McNamara B., Waddel D. and Colvin M. (1995) Tlneats to the good death; the 
cultural context of stress and coping among hospice nurses. Sociology o f Health and 
Illness. 17:222-244.
McVey A. (2002) No cure in sight. Nursing Times. 98(40) 10.
Mead H. G. (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago University Press: Chicago.
Medley G. F. (2001) Epidemiology. Predicting the unpredictable. Science. 294(5547) 
1663-1664.
Meek J. (1998) A case study: team support for a patient with CJD. Community Nurse. 
November, 27-28.
Meikle J. (2005) BSE ‘may have entered baby food in 70s’. The Guardian. Friday 
March 4. www. guardian, co.uk/life/science/storv (Accessed 11/03/05)
Mellor P. (1993) Death in high modernity: the contemporary presence and absence of 
death. In: Clark D. (ed) The Sociology o f Death. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford. 11-30.
Menzies Lyth I. (1988) Containing Anxiety in Institutions: Selected Essays. Volume 1. 
Free association Books: London.
Menzies Lyth I. (1990) Social systems as a defence against anxiety: an empirical 
study of the nursing seiwice of a general hospital. In: Trist E. and Murray H (eds) The 
Social Engagement o f Social Science. VolurHe 1: The Socio-Psychological 
Perspective. Free Association Books: London. 439-462.
Miesen M. L. (1993) Alzheimer’s disease, the phenomenon of parent fixation and 
Bowlby’s attachment theory. International Journal o f Geriatric Psychiatry. 8:147- 
153.
Miesen B. M. L. (1997) Awareness in dementia patients and family grieving: A 
practical perspective. In: Miesen B. M. L. and Jones G. M. M. (eds) Care-Giving in 
Dementia: Research and Applications Volume 2. Routledge: London.67-79.
Miesen M. L. (1999) Dementia in Close-up: Understanding and Caring for People 
with Dementia. Translated by Gemma M. M. Jones. Routledge: London.
Miles M. B. and Hubeiman A. M. (1994) (2"  ^edition) Qualitative Data Analysis: A 
Sourcebook o f New Methods. Sage: London.
Miller E.J. and Rice A. K. (1967) Systems o f Organization: The Control o f Task and 
Sentient Boundaries. Tavistock: London.
Miller E. J. and Rice A. K. (1990) Task and sentient systems and their boundary 
controls, In:Trist E. and Murray H. (eds) The Social Engagement o f Social Science: 
Volume 1: The Socio-Psychological Perspective. Free Association Books: London. 
259-271.
331
Miller E. J. and Gwynne G. (1972) A Life Apart. Tavistock Publications: London.
Mitteness L. and Barker C. (1995) Stigmatizing a ‘nonnaP condition: urinary 
incontinence in later life. Medical Anthropology Quarterly. 9(2) 188-210.
Morgan G. (1997) Images o f Organisation. (2"  ^edition) Sage: London.
Morgan D. L. (1998) Why things (sometimes) go wrong in focus groups. Qualitative 
Health Research. 5(4) 516-523.
Monta T., Tsunoda J., Inque S. and Chihara S. (1999) Do hospice clinicians sedate 
patients intending to hasten death? Journal o f Palliative Care. 15(3) 20-23.
Morita T., Miyashita M., Kimura R., Adachi I. and Shima Y. (2004) Emotional 
burden of nurses in palliative sedation therapy. Palliative Medicine. 18:550-557.
Morris F. (2003) Dementia Survival: A New Vision. Alzheimer’s Care Quarterly.
4(2) 79-84.
Morrow S. L. and Smith M. L. (1995) Constiuctions of survival and coping by 
women who have survived childhood sexual abuse. Journal o f Counselling 
Psychology. 42: 24-33.
Morse J. (1994) Designing funded qualitative research. In: Denzin N K and Lincoln Y 
S Handbook o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 220-235.
Moss M., Braunschweig H. and Rubinstein R. L. (2002) Terminal care for nursing 
home residents with dementia. Alzheimer’s Care Quarterly. 3(3) 233-246.
Mosse J. (1994) Introduction: The institutional roots of consulting to institutions. In: 
Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work; Individual and 
Organisational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 1-8.
Mui Hing Mak J. and Clinton M. (1999) Promoting a good death: an agenda for 
outcomes research -  a review of the literature. Nursing Ethics. 6(2) 97-106.
National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services (NCHSPCS)
(1995) Specialist Palliative Care: A Statement o f definitions. Working Party of the 
NCHSPCS: London.
National Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services (NCHSPCS) 
(2004) The House o f Commons Committee Inquiry into Palliative Care. NCHSPCS: 
London.
National Council for Palliative Care (NCPC) (2005a) Our Mission & Direction. 
www.ncpc.org.uk/mission/index.html
National Council for Palliative Care (NCPC) (2005b) The National Council for 
Palliative Care. November E-NEWS.
332
National CJD Sui'veillance Unit (2002) National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
Surveillance Protocol, www.cid.ed.ac.uk/protocol (Accessed 15/04/02)
National CJD Surveillance Unit (2005) Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance in the 
UK. The National CJD Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh and Department of Infectious 
and Tropical Diseases, London, www.cid.ed.uk (Accessed 02/06/05)
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2004) Improving Supportive 
and Palliative Care for Adults with Cancer. National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence: London.
Neary D. (1999) Classification of the dementias. Reviews in Clinical Gerontology, 
9:55-64.
Nebauer M., Prior D., Berggren L., Haberecht J., Ku M., Mitchell A. and Davies E.
(1996) Nurses’ perceptions of palliative care nursing. International Journal o f 
Palliative Nursing, 2(1) 26-34,
Nolan M. and Dellasega C. (2000) T really feel I’ve let him down’: supporting family 
carers during long-teim care placement for elders. Journal o f Advanced Nursing.
31(4) 759-767.
Nolan M., Ryan T., Enderby P. and Reid D. (2002) Towards a more inclusive vision 
of dementia care practice and research. Dementia. 1(2) 193-211.
Nolan M., Grant G., Ready J. and Lundh U. (2003) New directions for partnerships: 
relationship-centred care. In: Nolan M., Lundh U., Grant G. and Ready J. (eds) 
Partnerships in Family Care. Open University Press: Maidenhead. 257-291.
Nolan M. R., Davies S., Brown J., Ready J. and Nolan J. (2004) Beyond ‘person- 
centred’ care: a new vision for gerontological nursing. International Journal o f Older 
People Nursing. 13(3a) 45-53.
Norberg A., Melin E. and Asplund K. (1986) Reactions to music, touch and object 
presentation in the final stage of dementia. An exploratory study. International 
Journal o f Nursing Studies. 23:315-323.
Norberg A. and Asplund K. (1990) Caregivers’ experience of caring for severely 
demented patients. Western Journal o f Nursing Research. 12(1) 75-84.
Normann H. K., Asplund K. and Norberg A. (1998) Episodes of lucidity in people 
with severe dementia as nanuted by formal carers. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 
28(6) 1295-1300.
Normann H. K., Norberg A. and Asplund K. (2002) Confirmation and lucidity during 
conversations with a woman with severe dementia. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 
39(4) 370-376.
333
Obholzer A. (1994) Managing social anxieties in public sector organisations. In: 
Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work: Individual and 
Organizational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 169-178.
Oldstone M. B. A. (1998) Viruses, Plagues, and History. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford.
Oliver C. (1999) Ordering the disorderly. Education and Ageing. 14(2) 171-185.
Orona C. J. (1990) Temporality and identity loss due to Alzheimer’s disease. Social 
Science and Medicine. 30(11) 1247-1256.
Osborn D. P. J. (1999) Research and ethics: leaving exclusion behind. Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry. 12(5) 601-604.
Oxford Dictionary [Concise] (1999) 10^  ^edition: Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Parsons T. (1951) The Social System. Routledge & Regan Paul: London.
Parsons M. (2003) Younger people with dementia: coming out of the shadows. In: 
Adams T. and Manthrope J. (eds) Dementia Care. Arnold: London. 164-183.
Patton M. Q. (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. (3"^  ^edition) Sage: 
London.
Payne N. (2001) Occupational stressors and coping as determinants of burnout in 
female hospice nurses. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 33(3) 396-405.
Payne S., Hillier R., Langley-Evans A. and Roberts T. (1996a) Impact of witnessing 
death on hospice patients. Social Science and Medicine. 43(12) 1785-1794.
Payne S. A., Langley-Evans A. and Hillier R. (1996b) Perceptions of a ‘good’ death: a 
comparative study of the views of hospice staff and patients. Palliative Medicine. 
10:307-312.
Payne S. A., Dean S. J. and Kalus C. (1998) A comparative study of death anxiety in 
hospice and emergency nurses. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 28(4) 700-706.
Payne S., Ingleton C., Scott G., Steele R., Nolan M. and Carey I. (2004) A survey of 
the perspectives of specialist palliative care providers in the UR of inpatient respite. 
Palliative Medicine. 18:692-697.
Pearson A. (2000) An unthinlmble death, www.health.telegraph.co.uk (Accessed 
23/11/03)
Peden A. H., Heah M, W., Ritchie D. L., Bell J. E. and Ironside J. W. (2004) 
Preclinical vCJD after blood transfusion in a PRNP codon 129 heterozygous patient. 
Lancet. 364 (9433) 527-529.
334
Pemberton C., Storey L. and Howard A. (2003) The Preferred Place of Care 
document: an opportunity for communication. International Journal o f Palliative 
Nursing. 9(10) 439-441.
Perakyla A. (1997) Reliability and validity in research based on tapes and transcripts. 
In: SilvennanD. (ed) Qualitative Research. Sage: London. 201-220.
Pickard S. and Glendinning C. (2001) Caring for a relative with dementia: the 
perceptions of carers and CPNs. Quality in Ageing -  Policy, practice and research. 
2(4)3-11.
Pini P. (1995) Media wars. Lancet. 346:1681-1683.
Pitt B. (1997) ‘You’ve got Alzheimer's Disease’: telling the patient. Current Opinion 
in Psychiatry. 10:307-308.
Poser S., Mollenhauer B., KrauB A., Zerr I., Steinhoff B. J., Schroeter A., 
Finkenstaedt M., Schulz-Schaeffer W. J., Kretzschmar H. A and Felgenhauer K. 
(1999) How to improve the clinical diagnosis of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Brain. 
122:2345-2351.
Post S. G. (1990) Infanticide and geronticide. Ageing and Society. 10:317-328.
Post S. G. (1993) Alzheimer’s disease and physician-assisted suicide. Alzheimer 
Disease and Associated Disorders. 7(2) 65-68.
Post S. G. (2000) The concept of Alzheimer disease in a hypercognitive society. In: 
Whitehouse P.J., Maurer K. and Ballenger J. F (eds) Concepts o f Alzheimer Disease: 
Biological, Clinical and Cultural Perspectives. The John Hopkins University Press: 
Baltimore. 245-256.
Prior L. (1997) Following in Foucault’s footsteps: text and context in qualitative 
research In: Silverman D. (1997) (ed) Qualitative Research. Sage: London 63-79
Proot I. M., Abu-Saad H. H., ter Meulen R. H. J., Goldsteen M., Spreeuwenberg C. 
and Widdershoven G. A. M. (2004) The needs of terminally ill patients at home: 
directing one’s life, health and things related to beloved others. Palliative Medicine. 
18:53-61.
Prout K. (2000) Help at hand for people dealing with prion disease. Nursing Times. 
96(6) 39-40.
Pullman D. (2004) Death, dignity, and moral nonsense. Journal o f Palliative Care. 
20(3) 171-178.
Radley A. (2004) Pity, modernity and the spectacle of suffering. Journal o f Palliative 
Care. 20(3) 179-184.
335
Ragiieskog H., Gerdner L.A. and Hellstrom L. (2001) Integration of lucid individuals 
and agitated individuals with dementia in different care units. Journal o f Advanced 
Nursing. 10:730-736.
Ramsay N. (2000) Sitting close to death: A palliative care unit. In: Hinshelwood R. D. 
and Skogstad W. (eds) Observing Organisations: Anxiety, Defence and Culture in 
Health Care. Routledge: London. 142-151.
Rasmussen B. H., Norberg A. and Sandman P. O. (1995) Stories about becoming a 
hospice nurse: reasons, expectations, hopes and concerns. Cancer Nursing. 18(5) 344- 
354.
Rasmussen B. H., Sandman P. O. and Norberg A. (1997) Stories of being a hospice 
nurse: a journey towards finding one’s footing. Cancer Nursing. 20(5) 330-341.
Regnard C., Mathews D., Gibson L. and Clarke C. (2003) Difficulties in identifying 
distress and its causes in people with severe communication problems. International 
Journal o f Palliative Nursing. 9(4) 173-176.
Rice K. and Warner N. (1994) Breaking the bad news: what do psychiatrists tell 
patients with dementia about their illness? International Journal o f Geriatric 
Psychiatry. 9:467-471.
Richardson R. (1988) Death, Dissection and the Destitute, (2"  ^edition) Phoenix 
Press: London.
Ritzer G. and Goodman D. J. (2003) Sociological Theory. (6^  ^edition) McGraw Hill: 
New York.
Roberts V. Z (1994a) Till death us do part: caring and uncaring in work with the 
elderly. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work: Individual 
and Organizational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 75-83.
Roberts V. Z (1994b) The organization of work: contributions from open systems 
theoiy. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work: Individual 
and Organizational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 28-38.
Roberts D. J. (2003) The pathophysiology of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: The 
hypothesis behind the concerns for blood components and products. British Journal o f 
Haematology. 122:3-9.
Robbins M. (1997) Assessing needs and effectiveness: is palliative care a special 
case? In Clark D., Hockley J. and Ahmedzai S. (eds) New Themes in Palliative Care. 
Open University Press: Buckingham. 13-33.
Robbins M. (1996) Evaluating Palliative Care. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Rock P. (1979) The Making o f Symbolic Interactionism. Macmillan: London.
336
Rose H, (2000) Risk, tmst and scepticism in the age of the new genetics. In: Adams 
B., Beck U. and van Loon J. (eds) The Risk Society and Beyond. Sage: London. 63-77.
Translated by Amos Weitz.
Sabat S. R. and Harré R. (1992) The construction and deconstruction of self in 
Alzheimer’s disease. Ageing and Society. 12:443-461.
Salander P. and Spetz A. (2002) How do patients and spouses deal with the serious 
facts of malignant glioma? Palliative Medicine. 16:305-313.
Sales J. P. (2001) Sedation in terminal care. European Journal o f Palliative Care. 8(3)
97-100.
Salisbury C., Bosanquet N., Wilkinson E. K., Franks P. J., Kite S., Lorentzon M. and 
Naysmith A. (1999) The impact of different models of palliative care on patients’ 
quality of life: a systematic review. Palliative Medicine. 13:3-17.
Sandage S. J., Wiens T. W. and Dahl C. M. (2001) Humility and attention: the 
contemplative psychology of Simone Weil. Journal o f Psychology and Christianity.
20(4) 360-369.
Sandage S. J. and Wiens T. W. (2001) Contextualizing models of humility and 
forgiveness: a reply to Gassin. Journal o f Psychology and Theology. 29(3) 201-211.
Sandelowski M. (1993) Rigor or rigor mortis: the problem of rigor in qualitative 
research revisited. Advances in Nursing Science. 16(2) 1-8.
Sandelowski M. (1995) On aesthetics of qualitative research. Image: The Journal o f j
Nursing Scholarship. 27(3) 205-209. |
Saunders C. (1990) Hospice and Palliative Care: An Interdisciplinary Approach. '
Edward Arnold: London.
Saunders C. M. (1993) Risk factors in bereavement outcomes. In: Stroebe M., Stroebe 
W. and Hansson R (eds) Handbook o f Bereavement. Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge. 255-270.
Saunders C. (2000) The evolution of palliative care. Patient Education and 
Counseling. 41:7-13.
Saunders C., Summers D. and Teller N. (1981) Hospice -  The Living Idea. Edward 
Arnold: Leeds.
Schonwetter R. S, Han B., Small B. J., Martin B., Tope K. and Haley W. E. (2003)
Predictors of six-month survival among patients with dementia: an evaluation of i
hospice Medicare guidelines. American Journal o f Hospice and Palliative Care. \
20(2)105-113. j
Schotsmans P. (2002) Palliative care: a relational approach. In: ten Have H. and Clark 
D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open University Press: Buckingham. 126-140.
337
Scott A. (2000) Risk society or angst society? two views of risk, consciousness and 
community. In: Adams B., Beck U. and van Loon J. (eds) The Risk Society and 
Beyond. Sage: London. 33-46. Translated by Amos Weitz.
Scott M. R., Will R ., Ironside J., Hoang-Oanh B. N., Tremblay P., DeArmond S. J. 
and Prusiner S. B. (1999) Compelling transgenetic evidence for transmission of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions to humans. Proceedings o f the National 
Academy o f Science (PNAS). 96(26) 15137-15142.
Seale C. (1990) Caring for people who die: the experience of family and friends. 
Ageing and Society. 10:413-428.
Seale C. (1991) A comparison of hospice and conventional care. Social Science and 
Medicine. 32(2) 147-152.
Seale C. (1998) Constructing Death: The Sociology o f Dying and Bereavement. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Seale C. (1999a) Awareness of methods: re-reading Glaser & Strauss. Mortality. 4(2) 
195-202.
Seale C. (1999b) The Quality o f Qualitative Research. Sage: London.
Seale C. (2000) Using computers to analyse qualitative data. In: Silverman D. Doing 
Qualitative Research. 154-174.
Seale C. (2002) Media and Health. Sage: London.
Seale C. and Cartwright A. (1994) The Year Before Death. Avebury: Aldershot.
Seale C. and Basiro D. (1997) Experiencing and explaining disease: some 
conclusions. In: Basiro D and Seale C. (eds) Experiencing and Explaining Disease. 
(revised edition) Open University Press: Buckingham. 158-168.
Seymour J. E. and Ingleton C. (1999) Ethical issues in qualitative research at the end 
of life. InternationalJournal o f Palliative Nursing. 5(2)65-73
Seymour J. E., Bellamy G., Gott M., Ahmedzai S. H. and Clark D. (2002) Good 
deaths, bad deaths: older people’s assessment of the risks and benefits of morphine 
and terminal sedation in end-of-life care. Health Risk and Society. 4(3)287-303.
Seymour J., Ingleton C., Payne S. and Beddow V. (2003) Specialist palliative care: 
patients’ experiences. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 44(1) 24-33.
Shaw A. (1999) “What are ‘they’ Doing to our Food?”: Public Concerns about Food 
in the UK. Sociological Research Online 4(3).
http://www.socresonline.org.Uk/socresonline/3/3/shaw.html (Accessed 05/03/01)
338
Slienk D. (2001) The Forgetting. Alzheimer’s: Portrait o f an Epidemic. Anchor 
Books: New York.
Shilling C. (2003) The Body and Social Theory. (2“^  edition) Sage: London.
Shipton M. (2005) CJD deaths linked to school meat. Western Mail. 
www.icwales.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0200wales/tm (Accessed 11/03/05)
Silverman D. (1970) The Theory o f Organisations. Heinemann: London.
Silverman D. (2000) Doing Qualitative Research. Sage: London.
Skilbeck and Payne (2005) End of life care: a discursive analysis of specialist 
palliative care nursing. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 51(4) 325-334.
Small N. (1993) Dying in a public space: AIDS deaths. In: Clark D. (ed) The 
Sociology o f Death. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford. 87-111.
Smith A., Dickson M., Aitken J. and Bagg J. (2002) Contaminated dental instruments. 
Journal o f Hospital Infection. 51(3) 233-235.
Sontag S. (1978) Illness as Metaphor. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Sontag S. (1988) Aids and Its Metaphors Penguin Books: London
Speck P. (1994) Working with dying people: on being good enough. In: Obholzer A. 
and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work: Individual and Organizational 
Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: London. 94-100.
Spencer M. D., Knight R. S. G. and Will R. G. (2002) First hundred cases of variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: retrospective case note review of early psychiatric and 
neurological features. British Medical Journal. 324 (7352)1479-1482.
Stanworth R. (2004) Recognising Spiritual Needs in People Who are Dying. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford.
Stake R. E. (1995) The Art o f Case Study Research. Sage: London.
Steinhauser K. E., Clipp E. C., McNeilly M., Christakis N. A., McIntyre L. M. and 
Tulsky J. A. (2000) In search of a good death: observations of patients, families and 
providers, o f Internal Medicine. 132(10) 825-832.
Stevens T., Wilde D., Paz S., Ahmedzai S. H., Rawson A. and Wragg D. (2003) 
Palliative care research protocols: a special case for ethical review? Palliative 
Medicine. 17:482-490.
Stoddard S. (1978) The Hospice Movement. Jonathan Cape Ltd: London.
Stokes J. (1994a) The unconscious at work in gioups and teams: contributions from 
the work of Wilfred Bion. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious
339
at Work: Individual and Organizational Stress in the Human Services. Routledge: 
London. 19-27.
Stokes J. (1994b) Institutional chaos and personal stress. In: Obholzer A. and Roberts 
V. Z. (eds) The Unconscious at Work: Individual and Organizational Stress in the 
Human Services. Routledge: London. 121-128.
Storey L., Pemberton C., Howard A. and O’Donnell L. (2003) Place of death: 
Hobson’s Choice or patient choice? Cancer Nursing Practice. 2(4) 33-37.
Storr A. (1988) Solitude. Ballantine Books: New York.
Strauss A. and Corbin J (1997) (eds) Grounded Theory in Practice. Sage: London
Strauss A. and Corbin J. (1990) Basics o f Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques. Sage: London.
Strauss A. and Corbin J. (1998) Basics o f Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for developing Grounded Theory. (2“^  edition) Sage: London.
Strauss A. L. and Corbin J. (2004) Open coding. In: Seale C. (ed) Social Research 
Methods: A Reader. Routledge: London. 303-306.
Street A. F. and Kissane D. W. (2001) Constructions of dignity in end-of-life care. 
Journal o f Palliative Care. 17(2)93-101.
Streubert H. J. and Carpenter D. R (1999) Qualitative Research In Nursing: 
Advancing the Humanistic Imperative. (2"  ^edition) Lippincott: New York.
Sullivan T. J. (2001) Methods o f Social Research. Harcourt, Inc: Orlando.
Sundararajan L. (1995) Patient as the Other. The Humanistic Psychologist. 23:53-70.
Symiott A. (1993) The Body Social. Routledge: London.
Szasz T. (1975) The Age o f Madness: The History o f Involuntary Mental 
Hospitalisation Presented in Selected Texts. Routledge, Kegan and Paul: London.
Tamborini R. (2003) Enjoyment and social functions of horror. In: Bryant J., Roskos- 
Ewoldsen D. and Cantor J. (eds) Communication and Emotion: Essays in Honour o f 
DolfZillmann. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: London. 417-443.
Tang S. T. (2003) When death is imminent: Where terminally ill patients with cancer 
prefer to die and why. Cancer Nursing. 26(3) 245-251.
Tangney J. P. (2000) Humility: theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and 
directions for future research. Journal o f Social and Clinical Psychology. 19(1) 70-82.
Tebbit P (2004) Population-Based Needs Assessment for Palliative Care. National 
Council for Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Semces: London.
340
Teno J. M., Clarridge B. R., Casey V., Welch L. C., Wetle T., Shield R. and Mor V. 
(2004) Family perspectives on end-of-life care at the last place of care. Journal o f the 
American Medical Association. 291(10) 88-93.
Thorpe G. (1993) Enabling more dying people to remain at home. British Medical 
Journal. 307:915-918.
Timmermans S. (1994) Dying of awareness: the theory of awareness contexts 
revisited. Sociology o f Health and Illness. 16(3)332-339.
Tong E., McGraw S. A., Dobihal E., Baggish R., Cherlin E. and Bradley E, H. (2003) 
What is a good death? minority and non-minority perspectives. Journal o f Palliative 
Care. 19(3) 168-175.
Townsend J., Frank A. O., Fermont D., Dyer S., Karran O., Walgrove A. and Piper M. 
(1990) Terminal cancer care and patient’s preference for place of death: a prospective 
study. British Medical Journal. 301:415-417.
Trist E. (1990) Preface. In: Trist E. and Murray H (eds) The Social Engagement o f 
Social Science. Volume 1: The Socio-Psychological Perspective. Free Association 
Books: London, xi-xii
Trist E. and Murray H (1990) Historical overview: the foundation and development of 
the Tavistock Institute. In: Trist E. and Murray H (eds) The Social Engagement o f 
Social Science. Volume 1: The Socio-Psychological Perspective. Free Association 
Books: London. 1-34.
Turner K., Chye R., Aggarwal G., Philip J., Skeels A. and Lickiss J. N. (1996)
Dignity in dying: a preliminary study of patients in the last thr ee days of life. Journal 
o f Palliative Care. 12(2) 7-13.
Turner G. (2004) Emerging concerns related to CJD. Nursing Times 100 (34)28-30.
Vachon M. (1995) Staff stress in hospice/palliative care: a review. Palliative 
Medicine. 9:91-122.
Vachon M. (1997) Recent research into staff stress in palliative care. European 
Journal o f Palliative Care. 4(3) 99-103.
Valleron A. J., Boelle P. Y., Will R. and Cesbron J. Y. (2001) Estimation of epidemic 
size and incubation time based on age characteristics of vCJD in the United Kingdom. 
Science. 294(5547) 1726-1728.
van Everbroeck B., Quoilin S., Boons J., Martin J. J. and Cras P. (2003) A prospective 
study of CSF markers in 250 patients with possible Creutzdeldt-Jakob disease.
Journal o f Neurology and Neurosurgical Psychiatry. 74:1210-1214.
van Gennep A. (1960) The Rites o f Passage. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London. 
Translated by Monika B, Vizedome and Gabrielle L. Caffee.
341
van Loon J. (2000) Virtual risks in an age of cybernetic reproduction. In: Adams B., 
Beck U. and van Loon J. (eds) The Risk Society and Beyond. Sage: London. 165-182. 
Translated by Amos Weitz.
Venters G. (2001) New variant Creutzfedt-Jakob disease: the epidemic that never was. 
British Medical Journal. 323(7317)858-861
Verdrager J. (1997) Kuru and “new variant” CJD. South East Asian Journal o f 
Tropical Medicine and Public Health. 28(3)535-540.
Vig E. K., Davenport N. A. and Pearlman R. A. (2002) Good deaths, bad deaths, and 
preferences for the end of life: a qualitative study of geriatric outpatients. Journal o f 
the American Geriatrics Society. 50(9)1541-1548.
Volicer L. (1986) Need for hospice approach to treatment of patients with advanced 
progressive dementia. Journal o f the American Geriatrics Society. 34(9) 655-658.
Volicer L. (1997) Hospice care for dementia patients. Journal o f the American 
Geriatrics Society. 45(9) 1147-1149.
Volicer L, Hurley A. C. and Blasi Z. V. (2001) Scales for evaluation of end-of-life 
in ÛQmeaûsi. Alzheimer Disease Association. 15: 194-200.
Volicer L, Hurley A. C. and Blasi Z. V. (2003) Characteristics of dementia end-of-life 
care across care settings. American Journal o f Hospice and Palliative Care. 20(3)191- 
200.
von Gunten C. and Twaddle M. (1996) Terminal care for non-cancer patients. Clinics 
in Geriatric Medicine. 12:349-358.
von Hagens G. (2002) Body Worlds: The Anatomical Exhibition o f Real Human 
Bodies. Exhibition: London.
Wallace M. (1999) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: assessment and management update 
Journal o f Gerontological Nursing. October, 17-25
Walsh K. and Kowanko I. (2002) Nurses’ and patients’ perceptions of dignity. 
International Journal o f Nursing Practice. 8:143-151.
Walter T. (1993) Sociologists never die: British sociology and death, hi: Clark D. (ed) 
The Sociology o f Death. Blackwell Publishers: Oxford. 264-295.
Walter T. (1994) The Revival O f Death. Routledge: London.
Walter T. (2003) Historical and cultural variants on the good death. British Medical 
Journal. 327(7408)218-220.
Walters G. (2004) Is there such a thing as a good death? Palliative Medicine. 18:404- 
408.
342
Waskul D. D and van der Riet P. (2002) The abject embodiment of cancer patients: 
dignity, selfhood, and the gi'otesque body. Symbolic Interactionism. 25(4) 487-513.
Webb C. and Kevem J. (2001) Focus gioup as a research method: a critique of some 
aspects of their use in nursing research. Journal o f Advanced Nursing. 33(6) 798-805.
Weihl C. C. and Roos R. P. (1999) Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, new variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy. Neurological 
Clinics. 17(4)835-859.
Whalley L (1997) Early onset dementia: In: Hunter S (ed) Dementia Challenges and 
New Directions. Jessica Kingsley: London. 71-77.
WHO (2003) ICD-10 for Dementia, Mental and behavioural disorders. 
www3.who.int/icd/vol 1 htm2003 (Accessed 10/03/05)
Wilcock G. K., Bucks R. S. and Rockwood K. (1999) (eds) Diagnosis and 
Management o f Dementia. A Manual for Memory Disorder Teams. Oxford University 
Press: Oxford.
Wilkinson E. K., Salisbury C., Bosanquet N., Franks P. J., Kite S., Lorentzon M. and 
Naysmith A. (1999) Patient and carer preferences for, and satisfaction with, specialist 
models of palliative care: a systematic review. Palliative Medicine. 13:197-216.
Will R. G. (2001) The facts about vCJD. Practitioner. 245:469.
Will R. G. (2002) The Role o f the CJD Surveillance Unit Edinburgh. Human BSE 
Foundation, www.hbsef.org (Accessed 05/07/02)
Will R. G. (2003) Acquired prion disease: iatrogenic CJD, variant CJD, kuru. British 
Medical Bulletin. 66:255-265.
Will R. G., Ironside J. W., Zeidler M., Consens S. N., Estibeiro K., Alperovitch A., 
Poser S., Pocchiari M., Hofman A. and Smith P. G. (1996) A new variant of 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet. 347:921-925.
Will R. G., Zeidler M., Stewart G. E., Macleod M. A., Ironside J. W., Consens S. N., 
Mackenzie J., Estibeiro K., Green A . J. and Knight R. S. (2000) Diagnosis of new 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Annals o f Neurology. 47(5)575-582.
Williams M. (1999) CJD under the microscope. British Journal o f Theatre Nursing. 
9(6)250-256.
Williams S. J. and Bendelow G. (1998) The Lived Body. Routledge: London.
Wilson K. and Ricketts M. N. (2004) The success of precaution? Managing the risk of 
transfusion transmission of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Transfusion. 44:1475- 
1478.
343
Wolfson A. (1998) Killing off the dying? The Public Interest. Spring. 50-70.
Wood S. (2002) Respect for autonomy and palliative care. In; ten Have H. and Clark 
D. (eds) The Ethics o f Palliative Care. Open University Press: Buckingham. 143-165.
Woods B. (1999) Younger people with dementia: psychosocial interventions. In: Cox 
S. and Keady J. (eds) Younger People with Dementia. Jessica Kingsley Publishers: 
London. 245-260
Wuest J. (2000) Negotiating with helping systems: an example of grounded theory 
evolving through emergent fit. Qualitative Health Research. 10(1) 51-70.
Wyschogrod E. (1992) Who is Emmanuel Levinas? Sh 'ma: A Journal o f Jewish 
Responsibility. 22(429) March 6. 65-67.
Yahoo News (2005a) Dutch woman diagnosed with mad cow.
WWW.vahoo.com/news/netherlands (Accessed 25/04/05)
Yahoo News (2005b) ‘School dinners link’ to CJD deaths. 
www.uk.news.vahoo.eom/050304/344/fdpbm.htm (Accessed 11/03/05)
Yorkshire Post (2005) Just 18 -  Then came news that devastated a family.
WWW, vorkshiretodav. co.uk (Accessed 11/03/05)
Zeidler M., Johnstone E. C., Bamber R. W., Dickens C. M., Fisher C. J., Francis A. 
F., Goldbeck R., Hoggo R., Johnson-Sabine E. C., Lodge G. J., McGarry P., Mitchell
S., Tarlo L., Turner M., Ryley P., and Will R. G. (1997) New variant Creutzfeldt- 
Jakob disease: psychiatric features. Lancet, 350(9082)908-910.
Zerr I., Brandel J. P., Masullo C., Wientjens D., de Silva R., Zeidler M., Granieri E., 
Sampaolo S., van Duijn C., Delasnerie-Laupretre N., Will R. and Poser S. (2000) 
European surveillance on Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; a case-control study for medical 
risk factors. Journal o f Clinical Epidemiology. 53(7)747-754.
Zerwekh J. (1993) Transcending life: the practice of wisdom of nursing hospice 
experts. The American Journal o f Hospice and Palliative Care. 10(5) 26-31.
Appendix 1 
Approval from LREC for first data set (pilot)
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LOCAL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
SH/AJR
Date: 19th June 2001.
To: Kay de Vries,
Dear Ms De Vries,
RE: MANAGEMENT OF END-STAGE NEW VARIANT CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB 
DISEASE IN A HOSPICE ENVIRONMENT 
REF: 14KDCJ(312) - to  be quoted on an future correspondence please
Thank you for your letter dated 31st May 2001 in response to our letter of concerns 
dated 21st May 2001 with regard to the above research project This has now been 
reviewed and I confirm that Chairman's Approval has been granted to go ahead with 
this trial.
In future, the Committee would like to follow up all new trials. Therefore, we would 
be grateful if you could send us an update after a period of a year from the 
commencement of the study with the following details:-
1. Is the research still continuing?
2. If it is, which stage has it reached:-
2.1. Data being collected
2.2. Data being analysed
2.3. Research being written up
2.4. Research published.
N.B. If you are sending any Protocol Amendments to us, please ensure that 
you highlight the areas o f change.
Thank you for your trouble.
Yours sincerely.
Selina Harris, 
Manager - ESLREC
c.c. JC 
c.c. ShH
345
Appendix 2 
Information sheet
U n is
Information sheet
TITLE OF STUDY
An investigation into the experience 
of caring for people with acquired new 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
[nvCJD] by specialist palliative care teams.
RESEARCHER 
Kay de Vries
Senior Lecturer/Research Fellow
University 
of Surrey
G uild fo rd
S urrey G U 2 7XH, U K  
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 0 0 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .surrey .ac .uk
European 
institute of 
Health and 
Medicai 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke  o f K en t B u ild ing  
S ta g  Hiii 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G U 2  7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
F a cs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 86 7 0 1
As part of my doctoral study, which I am canying out at the European Institute of 
Health and Medical Sciences, University of SuiTcy. I would like to invite you to 
participate in a study on the experience of providing caie for people who have died as 
a result of nvCJD. CJD is a rare and fatal disease classified within the spongiform 
encepahalopathies. It is also refeixed to as prion disease and is closely related to a 
gi'oup of neurodegenerative diseases known to occur in humans and animals. The 
transmittable agent is either genetic or an abnoimal form of prion protein. The 
emergence of nvCJD is believed to be linked to the bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy [BSE] outbreak duiing the 1980s [Will etal 1996 ].
The broad aim of this research is to explore palliative care staff experience of 
providing care for people who are dying as a result of nvCJD. To increase knowledge 
and understanding of providing care for people who are dying as a result of nvCJD, 
and to identify developments required by specialist palliative care teams in order to 
provide quality palliative care to this group of people.
Participation in the study will involve taking part in a tape-recorded inteiwiew or focus 
group interview. You are under no obligation to participate in this study. If you do 
agree to participate you are fiee to refuse to answer any specific questions and you 
may withdraw fi’om the study at anytime without giving a reason. If you do decide to 
participate you will be asked to sign a consent fonn. Any infoimation you provide in 
relation to this research will be confidential and will be accessed only by myself and 
my supervisors. No names will be attached to any information that you give, and the 
hospice site will be made anonymous.
If you have any questions you would like to ask before you make a decision regarding 
participation in this study I would be happy to talk to you further.
My contact numbers are:
01483 684635 k.de-vries(%surrev.ac.uk
MB Q u e e n ’ s 
1ensA % Y  P r i z e s  
2002
r
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Appendix 3 
Consent form
T h e  Q u e e n ’s 
(IVERSARY P r i z e s
UniS
Consent Form
Title of Project: An investigation into the experience 
of caring for people with acquired new variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease [nvCJD] by specialist 
palliative care teams.
Name of Researcher: Kay de Vries
University 
of Surrey
G uild fo rd
S urrey G U 2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .su rrey .ac .uk
European 
institute of 
Health and 
Medical 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke  o f K en t B u ild ing  
S tag  Hill 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G Ü 2 7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
F a cs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 1
Position of Researcher: PhD Student, European Institute of Health and Medical 
Sciences, University of SuiTey, Guildford
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet, dated 10“^ 
August 2002, for the above study, and have had the opportunity to ask
questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving any reason.
3. I agree to take part in the above study.
Name of Participant:
Name of Researcher:
Date: Signature:
Date: Signature:
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Appendix 4
Interview guide for hospice staff - for both single and focus group
interviews
0
__L
Interview guide for hospice staff - for both single and focus group interviews
Introductory question:
Wliat were the issues that were encountered when providing care for the person with 
nvCJD patients and their family [for the patient, for the staff, for the family and for 
the organisation]?
Focus on issues:
How was the admission managed?
What information was given on admission from other services?
What types of symptoms did they have to deal with?
Wliat medications were used?
Wlio gave infonnation to the family members/relatives?
What sort of questions did family members/relatives ask?
Were there any issues related to body disposal?
Focus on management:
How were any issues managed?
How was the team allocated?
Who took the lead?
Was there any conflict in decisions made within the team?
Were there any organisational problems?
Where could care have been improved?
Focus on feelings:
How did you feel about caring for patients with nvCJD and their families?
How were you supported in providing care for the patient/family?
What previous experience did you have of cai’ing for people with a dementia 
syndrome?
What were the responses of other team members?
What were the family responses?
What were the responses from other people in the hospice?
Focus on learning:
What have you learned as a result of tlie experience?
Wliat were the sources of information on CJD?
How accurate was the infonnation?
How useful was the information?
Wliat were the gaps in knowledge previous to the admission?
Where are the knowledge gaps now?
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Interview guide for family member interviews
Interview guide for family member interviews
Introductory question:
What was your experience of having your family member nursed in the hospice? 
Focus on issues:
Where did you learn about the hospice?
Who arranged the admission?
How was the admission managed?
Was the hospice near to your home?
How long did you have to wait for a placement?
How was the team allocated?
Who gave you information at the hospice?
What sort of questions did you ask the staff?
Were they able to answer your questions?
Were there any issues related to autopsy?
Were there any issues related to funeral arrangements?
Focus on management:
How were issues managed?
Were you consulted regarding any treatments?
Did you have a specific contact person?
Was there any conflict in decisions made by the staff and how you wanted your 
family member to be treated?
Focus on feelings:
How did you feel about using the hospice?
How do you feel about the hospice now?
I*
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Appendix 6 
Manual coding of interactions for pilot study
INTERACTIONS
Conflict Inarticulate
Agreement
Hierarchy]
• Decision making re 
interventions - who 
should make the 
decisions?
• Was this an 
appropriate 
admission?
• Level of
personhood [did she 
still have a 
personality?]
• How people with 
dementia should be 
treated [generally]?
• Should have come 
to hospice 
earlier/should not 
have come earlier?
• Professional I 
personal
[Beyond
helplessness]
• Silences
• Uncertainty
• Cohesion
• Comradeship
• Bonded [emotionally]
• Compassion
• Reminiscing
• Team spirit
• Collaboration
• Indignation [re doctors]
• Honor [at disease]
• Helplessness
• Pride [re good care]
Language
Power
Professional / personal
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Appendix 7
‘Mind map’ of categories for preliminary framework from pilot
!
I
Between nurses 
Between Dr & nurses 
Family [Internal] 
Family [external]
Appropriate 
admission 
RIsk/no risk 
Sedate/not sedate 
Person/non person 
Aware/not aware 
Body disposal 
Decision making 
Profess tonal/pers 
nal
Fascination with unknown 
Wanting to know 
Experts didn’t know
Because of not knowing 
Didn’t know 
Fear of unknown
Not knowingContagion Risk
Conflict
)^l^velty TABULATIONINTERACTONS
Agreement
Good care 
Pride 
Hospice ridbt pf^ SedationHelplessness
Inarticulate
Awareness
Not knowing 
Sllences[s]
HumilityHierarchy
Language - 
professions I/personal 
- power
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Appendix 8
Manual tabulation for ‘not knowing’ from pilot
TABULATION
‘Not Knowing' - some of these were repeated several times in various ways 
Terms used -  don't know*, ‘didn’t know/, ‘couldn’t tell’ , ‘unknown’
• 1:2 whether she was in pain - communication /distress/ helplessness 
•1:1 what she was actually experiencing - communication/helplessness
• 2:6 that it would be that bad - distress / helplessness
• 2:7 how you were going to help - helplessness
• 33:6 If she was aware of her surroundings - communication
• 36:7 If she understood yau - communication
• 1:3 wh ether sh e got an y pleasure out of an ything that was going on - 
communication
• 33:17if she was happy [with care provided] - communication
• 33:4 if sh e liked what was done to her - communication
• 33:21 who were theydoing it for - conflict / distress
• 1:17 what sort of prognosis to look for - professional
• 3:19 so little known about it - professional I  helplessness
• 2:1 that this was going to be the course of events - ? / distress I  helplessness
• 2:18 how you were going to help the husband and sister - helplessness/ 
professional I  personal
• 3:18 whether the children had Inherited it - professional / helplessness
• 3:12 anything about the disease - professional / helplessness
• 2:17 what to say to the fa mil y [about various aspects of the disease] - 
helplessness I  professional
• 4:4 wh ether they were at risk from contamln ation - conflict I  distress I  professior 
•4:5 that in years to come they will find that they were at risk-personal/ 
professional
• 4:12 prion centre didn’t know- professional
• 5:10 whether she could see - communication
• 5:22 if she was comfortable - communication
• ++ whether they had done a good job - conflict / professional
• ++ what werethe major symptoms to look for - professional
• 11:1 what they were dealing wnth - hdplessness/ professional
• 27:5 doctors didn’t knowelther- professional I  conflict
• 6:5 wh at effect it was having on the ch lidren - h elplessn ess / profession al I  
distress
• 31:22 whether [dianges in condition] werethe progression of the disease or 
something they had done or not done - conflict/helplessness / professional
352
Appendix 9 
Manual tabulation of sedation for pilot
TABULATION
Sedation
• 1:6 sedation was the most important issue for me - personal / 
professional / conflict
• 1:7 should have sedated earlier - conflict / professional
• 7:10 sedation best option if risk of falling - professional
• 7:14 sedate because she was screaming - awareness / professional / 
personal
• 7:18 hoo and cry about sedating -conflict/ personal / professional
• 7:20 sedate because she was dislressed - professional / distress
• 10:14 not sedated until final week - ?
• 11:12 if it was my daughter I would want sedation - personal
• 13:1 nursed her better when she was sedated - distress / avoidance / 
professional
• 13:9 did not sedate until had lost ability to swallow - professional
• 14:2 we were giving her her dignity back [with sedation] II - 
professional / culture
• 18:20 we all wanted sedation - but doctors wouldn’tagree - conflict / 
professional
• 25:23 might consider sedating a patient with dementia if they were 
noisy and distressed - professional
• 25:13 you'd think there would be less of an issue about sedation 
because the ‘person’ was already gone - awareness
• 26:4 would sedate a patient with the super-sensitivity thing - 
professional?
• 27:5 we sedate patients who are noisy and screaming -awareness I 
cultural [professional!]
• 27:7 the doctors do not like to sedate if it is for noisiness only -  
professional / conflict
• 28:10 sister was not keen to have her sedated - decision making I 
conflict
• 29:17 if you sedate you are taking away their personality - conflict/ 
professional
• 30:1sedation can be withdrawn if it has a detrimental effect - 
professional
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Appendix 10
Invitation to hospice Medical Director to participate in study
U n is
Medical Director
Name and address of hospice site
Date...................
Dear Dr
University 
of Surrey
G uild ford
Surrey G U 2 7XH, U K  
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 0 0 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+44  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .surrey .ac .uk
European 
institute of 
Health and 
Medical 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke o f K en t Bu ild ing  
S tag  Hill 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G U 2  7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
F a cs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 86 7 0 1
As part of my doctoral study, which I am carrying out at the Eiu'opean Institute of 
Health and Medical Sciences, University of SuiTey, I am conducting an investigation 
into the experience of caring for people with acquired new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease [nvCJD] by specialist palliative care teams. I am writing to a number of 
hospices to ask if they have had experience in caring for people who have died as a 
result of nvCJD. If you have had any patients either as inpatients, or cared for by the 
specialist palliative care community team, who have had nvCJD, within the last 12 
months, I would like to invite you to participate in this study.
Participation in the study would involve giving me access to staff who were active in 
carrying out care for a person with nvCJD, to cany out focus group and/or single 
interviews. It would also involve having access to the notes of the person who has 
died as a result of nvCJD. I would also be interested in inteiwiewing any family 
members of the patient, however, I would only approach them tluough your staff if 
you agree to the study. At previous sites I have found that the family members were 
very enthusiastic to participate in research that would benefit future iivCJD sufferers.
I am experienced in palliative care and in research processes and I would be grateful if 
you would consider taking part in this study. The broad aim of this research is to 
explore palliative care staff experience of providing care for people with nvCJD, To 
increase knowledge and understanding of providing care for people who are dying as 
a result of nvCJD, and to identify developments required by hospices and palliative 
care teams in order to provide quality palliative care to this patient group.
Attached is the information letter that would be provided to participants in the study.
Yours truly
Kay de Vries
Telephone:
Fax:
Email:
01483 684635
k.de-vries(S)surrev. ac.uk
T h e  Q u e e n ’s
NivERSARY P r i z e s
2 0 0 2
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Appendix 11 
Agreements from hospice sites
U n is
TITLE OF STUDY
An investigation into the experience 
of caring for people with acquired new 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
[nvCJD] by specialist palliative care teams.
RESEARCHER 
Kay de Vries
Senior Lecturer/Research Fellow
University 
of Surrey
G uild fo rd
Surrey G U 2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 0 0 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .surrey .ac .uk
European 
institute of 
Health and 
Medical 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke o f K en t B u ild ing  
S tag  Hill 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G U 2 7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )14 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
F a cs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )14 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 1
I ......................................................     *agree/do not agree
to allow the hospice to be involved in a research study on the experience of caring for 
a person who has died as a result of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. I agree to 
allow staff to be approached to participate in single/focus group interviews and I 
consent to the researcher having access to the medical records of the relevant patient 
['^Delete as appropriate]
Organisation [Hospice]:.................................................................................................
Name:..............................................................................................................................
Designation:....................................................................................................................
Telephone Number:........................................................................................................
Email Address:..............................................................................................................
Date:................................................................................................................................
T h e  Q u e e n ' s
-h v e r s a r y  P r i z e s
2002
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Appendix 12
Acknowledgement of agreement to participate in study
U n is
[Letter to Medical Directors of hospices who 
have agreed to participate in study]
Contact address
Date.................
University 
of Surrey
G uild fo rd
Surrey G U 2 7XH, U K  
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 0 0 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .surrey .ac .uk
European 
Institute of 
Health and 
Medical 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke  o f K en t B u ild ing  
S tag  Hill 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G U 2  7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
F a cs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )1 4 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 1
Dear.
Title of study: An investigation into the experience of caring for people with 
acquired new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease [nvCJD] by specialist palliative 
care teams.
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the above study. Following completion of 
gaining ethical approval horn the Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee [MREC] I 
will contact you to aiTange dates and venues for the interviews.
Yours truly 
Kay de Vries
01483 684635Telephone:
Email: k. d e -v r ie s @ s m T e y . a c . u k
A
[Letter to participants who have agreed
2002
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Appendix 13 
Letter of confirmation to participants
yiit/
T h e  Q u e e n ’s
•iiVERSARY P r i z e s
2 0 0 2
UniS
to participate in the study] 
Contact address
Date.........................
Title of study: An investigation into the experience 
of caring for people with acquired new variant 
Creutzfeidt-Jakob disease [nvCJD] by specialist 
pailiative care teams.
Dear.
University 
of Surrey
G uild fo rd
S urrey G U 2 7XH, U K  
Telephone
+ 44  (0)1483 3 0 0 8 0 0  
Facsim ile
+ 4 4  (0)1483 3 00 8 0 3  
w w w .surrey .ac .uk
European 
institute of 
Health and 
Medical 
Sciences
University Campus
D uke o f K en t B u ild ing  
S tag  Hill 
G u ild fo rd  
S urrey G U 2 7TE
Telephone
+ 4 4  (0 )14 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 0  
Facs im ile
+ 4 4  (0 )14 8 3  6 8 6 7 0 1
I am writing to thank you for agreeing to participate in the above study and to confiiin 
that your interview/focus group will take place:
O n .....................................................................................................................................
Time.................................................................................................................................
Venue................................................................................................................................
I look forward to meeting you. If there are any difficulties please do not hesitate to 
contact me.
01483 684635Telephone
Email: k.de-vries(%sunev. ac.uk
Yours sincerely 
Kay de Vries
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Flow chart of stages of data collection and analysis
Flow chart of stages of data collection and analysis
Pilot -  first data set -  (In-house admission)
Using interview guide
Manual data analysis 
Open coding of data 
Categorising data
Preliminary framework drafted and coding scheme developed 
Potential core category o f ‘not knowing’ identified
First data set re-coded in NUD*IST
Main study
Second data set (Community admission)
Analysed in NUD*IST using coding scheme 
Beginnings of conceptualising ‘Change over time’
Changes made to categories 
Core category strengthened
Third data set (Community and day hospice admission) 
Analysed in NUD*IST combined with a return to manual coding
Changes made to categories 
Core category strengthened 
Firm decision to use time context 
Importance of metaphors becoming apparent 
(Symbolic Interactionist literatur e refocus)
Fourth data set (Community and day hospice admission) 
Analysed in NUD*IST plus manual coding
Changes made to categories 
Core category strengthened
Fifth data set (In-House admission)
Analysed in NUD*IST plus manual coding
Changes made to categories 
Core category weakened 
Time context introduced to conceptual framework 
Systems theory interpretation applied to data
Synthesis and interpretations of findings 
Theory construction
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Appendix 15 
Example of line-by-line coding of raw data
CNS I The main issues seemed to be for me was that we didn't
actually know what^he^^s experiencing. We didn't know whether she was 
in pain, whether she was acftuaily awai e of her surroundm^s, or her
family, whether she actually got any pWsure out
going on whilst she was here. Ajid the issue of^ed^atioj^^rsonally  for 
me)is the biggest thing I felt. I thought we. should have gone in with
ig that was
sedation earlier,gthan we did.
CNS 2 Also there was c q ^ c t  in the communication we got f ro n ^ ' 
they said that she said that she liked to be hugged and touched. From the
hand-over. And then when she got here she did not, not bear it
at all, even to wash or move her %  anything- And it was thefstream iii^sV
5
y
10
11
\
HCA 1 Sjie screamed and howled like an animal in a corne/^ Because she 13 V_ ^
^ —    -Couldn't be in a bed at first. And that was n o ta ry  nice for her family 14 
to see. 15
JK at^  CNS I We alsd didgT know what sort of prognosis we were looking at
J<yV0(A/v^
.jtc  aJt There had not been that many similar cases that we knew of when she
7 7 fast came in. We^ u n d  out more about it àôerward^r^utfâéjcording to
   ----------------
, ^^zT l^Re l^iterature that we had we could have been lo o k ^ g ^ a  couple ofJ W  ^   "
/  years^j^ it was as she deteriorated really rapidlÿ but we didn't know
17
iï^^^^this was going to be the course of events or whether it(was something
/ t f i^ e h a d o rh a d n ^ done. 7 >  ^
CNS 2 I think there was a lot ^emotiomas-well r ^ e  was 25 
[JW d ' old v d u T t^^ id s^n ^h e  youngest being ISjnontl^  Aria with all the
media^oVBT^e on CJD we didn't really expeptit to be that bad, someboc
19
21
22
23
24
25
£Ii^*vUÇit£>
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Appendix 16 
Approval from MREC for main study
m a
South East Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee
Chairman of the South East MREC -  Dr J Lamberty FRCA 
M s Kay d e  V ries
Room 76, B Block 
40 Eastbourne Terrace 
London W2 3QR
Tel: 01227 831 562 
Fax: 01227 831 662 
Email: jane-martin@stmrec.fsnet.co.uk
12*^  November 2002
Dear Ms da Vries
MREC 02/01/98 An investigàtiott into the expedience of caring for people with acquired new 
variant Creützfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD) by specialist palliative câre 
teams.
Revised application form dated 28 10 02 
Protocol — version I
Interview guide for both single interviews andfocus group interviews - version 1 
Interview guide forfamily member interviews — version!
Letter to Medical Director at Hospice — version 1 
Cotisent forth for hospice — versiôtr I '
Information sheet — version I
Letter to Medical Directors of Hospices,who have agreed to take part — version I 
Consent form ~ version 2 . . , ; . , .
Letter to participants who have 'a^eed to participate — version ! * • '
Participant consent form -  version 1 
Ms Kay de Vries Curriculum Vitae
The Chàirmati of the South East MREÇ has considered, the amendments submitted in response to the 
Committee’s eatiier review of your apjilication on October 2002 as set out in our letter dated 16**' 
October 2002,
The Chairman, acting under delegated authority, is satisfied that these accord with the decision of the 
Committee and has agreed that there is no objection on ethical grounds to the proposed study. I am, 
therefore, happy to give you our approval on the understanding that you will follow the conditions of 
approval set doSvn below. A record of the review undertaken by the MREC is contained in the attached 
MREC Response Form. The project must be started within three years of the date on which MREC 
approval Is given.
While undertaking the review of your application the MREC noted the research involves the use of an 
existing database collected for previous research or other purposes with subsequent patient contact 
patient. For this reason you are asked to read carefully the sections concerning LREC 
involvement and local NHS management set out below as there are specific requirement involved 
when undertaking such research.
MREC Conditions of Approval
The Central Office for-Research Ethics Committees is responsible for. the 
operational management o f  Multi-centre Research Ethics C o m m itte e s
• No research procedures are undertaken imtiJ the appropriate JocaJ reseaich ethics committees is
informed of the research including the name of the local clinician involved.
• The local clinician must inform his/her NHS organisation of their co-operation in the research 
project.
• The protocol approved by the MREC is followed and any changes to the protocol are undertaken 
only after MREC approval.
• If projects are approved before funding is received, the MREC must see, and approve, any major 
changes made by the funding body. The MREC would expect to see a copy of the final 
questionnaire before it is used.
• You must promptly inform the MREC of:
(i) any changes that increase the risk to subjects and/or affect significantly the conduct of the 
research;
(ii) any new information that may affect adversely the safety or welfare of the subjects or the 
conduct of the trial.
• You must complete and return to the MREC the annual review form that will be sent to you once a 
year, and the final report form when your research is completed,
LREC involvement
When undeitaking the review of your project the MREC observed that there is initial contact 
by a local clinician for puiposes of recruitment. It is felt that these tasks appear well within 
his/her routine professional competence and adequate facilities for such procedure are 
available as part of his/her normal professional practice.
For this reason you are asked to only inform the appropriate LREC of the project by sending a 
copy of this letter and also giving the name and contact details of the local clinician involved 
and what procedures will be undertaken by this person. If (unusually) the LREC has any 
reason to doubt that the local clinician is competent to carry out the tasks required, it will 
inform the clinician and the MREC that gave ethical approval giving full reasons.
When such tasks are performed by centrally based researchers it should be assumed 
that the MREC has reviewed their competence to undertake the tasks and it is not 
necessary to inform the LREC of the contact details but only that the research will take 
place.
You are not required to wait for confiimation from the LREC before starting your research.
Lbcal NHS Management
The local clinician must inform his/her NHS organisation of their co-operation in the research project 
and the nature of their involvement. Care should be taken to ensure with the NHS organisation that 
local indemnity arrangements are adequate.
Legal and Regulatory Requirements
It remains your responsibility to ensure in the subsequent collection, storage or use of data or research 
sample you are not contravening the legal or regulatory requirements of any part of the UK in which the 
research material is collected, stored or used. If data is transferred outside the'UK you should be aware 
of the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998.
ICHGCP Compliance
The MRECs are fully compliant with the International Conference on Harmonisation/Good Clinical 
Practice (ICH GCP) Guidelines for the Conduct of Trials Involving the Participation of Human 
Subjects as they relate to the responsibilities, composition, function, operations and records of an 
Independent Ethics Committee/Independent Review Board. To this end it undertakes to adhere as far as 
is consistent with its Constitution, to the relevant clauses of the ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline 
for Good Clinical Practice, adopted by the Commission of the European Union on 17 January 1997. 
The Standing Orders and a Statement of Compliance were included on the computer disk containing 
the guidelines and application form and are available on request or on the Internet at 
www.corec.org.uk
Yours sincerely
' DR JM  LAMBERTY 
CHAIRMAN, SOUTH EAST MREC
Enclosures MREC Response Form dated 12 11 02
